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To D arren  —
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and being m y singular w itness.
A bstract:
This thesis addresses the question of bearing witness. It hypothesizes that 
witnessing is singular in nature and as such, demands certain kinds of idioms. It 
problematizes modern politico-scientific conceptions of knowledge for their 
insistence on functionality, universalization and calculability. More specifically, it 
offers a systematic examination of witnessing in relation to the ‘juridical,’ the 
‘literary’ as poetry, memory and the refugee. An underlying performative 
relationship between bearing witness, power and displacement will re-theorize the 
international order, defined by crises and liminality, as the condition of out-living 
sovereign, institutionalized security through negotiations borne out of the demands 
of lived experiences. An engagement with poetry and storytelling will engage the 
productive potential of language thereby challenging the scientific reduction of 
history, politics and memory to fact. Human beings, refugees more specifically, will 
be discussed as sentient in addition to being calculable and thus, as the very political 
agents, constituted and addressed through a rhetoric of responsibility, that inform  
the ways in which we as researchers comport ourselves in the world of humanity. 
Each chapter will address a specific component of witnessing in an effort to explain 
and understand better the nature of the productive, linguistic relationships that 
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INTRODUCTION
The scientific obsession with the production and dissemination of knowledge 
as truth has recruited, for the academic discipline of political science, a multiplicity of 
modalities and idioms in service of certitude, security, legitimacy, and order. Bearing 
witness, in turn, has been welcomed for its suggested access to privileged personal 
information and experience, thus making ‘truth’ itself the product of a sem i­
sensationalist, semi-narrative, yet scientific reconstruction o f ‘event.’ The underlying 
belief in the sanctity of truth-claims and their inherent role in realizing a Kantian idea 
of progress has led social science to an institutionalized and highly regimented notion 
of what the acceptable and reliable ways for accessing ‘truth’ are. The discipline of 
political science has been no stranger to these commitments.
The methodological conscription of textual and numerical interpretations in 
service of truth-claims has been supplemented by the idioms of language making up 
just one such appropriable network of forces, operations and data. In an effort to 
challenge this understanding of the linear relationship between language, 
representation, and knowledge, this thesis will be guided by the belief that how we 
evoke, use, and interpret language has important implications for the ways in which 
we engage, address and think of the human as the subject of politics. More 
specifically, this thesis argues that the assumptions and ends guiding our 
interpretations and operationalization of both theory and reality are made up of 
elements and idioms that defy simple summary or generalization. This invites us to 
think seriously about the potential of language to inform, represent and address the 
fact of being in the world beyond reducing the latter to structural imperatives.
This thesis addresses the productive, performative, and singular nature of 
bearing witness through the idioms of the juridical, the literary, poetry, memory and
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the refugee. All claims made hereafter will be informed by a close textual 
engagement with the implications, demands and propositions following from a 
reading of bearing witness as a politically complex network of singular events. While 
informed by a mainstream international relations narratives, this thesis takes as its 
starting point an understanding of war, democracy, security, the state and the human 
based on a discursive-interpretative commitment to the messy, chaotic, disorganized 
and unpredictable nature of being.
The ultimate aspiration of this thesis amounts to nothing more than an initial 
attempt to work through, take seriously and address the political stakes of the 
question of being in the world when (re)read and (re)constructed through language. 
This thesis simply asks us to consider and think through the implications that a 
singular, performative operationalization of ‘event’ has for practising politics. In 
other words -  to follow through with the demands that the specificity and materiality 
of being in the world places on the ways in which we comport ourselves regarding the 
production, packaging and distribution of knowledge.
This thesis asks a number of important questions regarding the production 
and disseminations of information. Namely: How do individuals access the kinds of 
information that define and delimit what are known as ‘private memories?’ How are 
these memories, in turn, recruited in service of theoretical commitments to be 
recorded, translated, typed, edited, published and analyzed in service of a particular 
understanding of the components of scientific knowledge? How are memories of 
trauma, suffering, and violence recovered without disrupting the make-up of 
everyday life or committing the latter to institutionalized appraisal and keeping? 
What is the responsibility of the researcher for the recording and representation of 
past events as singular occurrences, not universal deductions? What is the 
relationship between witnessing and the restoration of justice? How is human
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agency understood, addressed and re-covered in instances of trauma, suffering, 
violence and death? Whose responsibility is it to mediate the transition between 
memory and witness, between trauma and reconciliation? In what ways does poetry 
disclose the singularity inherent in language, the academic variety included?
These are just a few of the questions this thesis hopes to address and by 
addressing, problematize further. The underlying hypothesis guiding these questions 
derives from an understanding of politics as a sphere made up of stories - allegorical, 
fablistic and unfinished in nature. These stories, however, and their interpretations 
have the potential to produce, justify, perpetuate and enact violence. A positivist, 
rational-scientific reading of these narratives not only overlooks their performative 
nature, but ends up reducing the multiplicity of life-truths to a reproducible world 
order. Through a careful and close reading of five different idioms of witnessing, this 
study will posit the political re-production of knowledge as an outcome of an 
institutionalized over-commitment to the security and stability of pre-determined 
ends. In this universe the human, too, has been recruited in service of formulaic 
realities.
This thesis will unfold in the form of a narrative. It will comment on the 
political and ethical implications inherent in an understanding of witnessing as an 
exegesis on the nature of ‘event’ beyond and after memory. That is, my engagement 
with bearing witness will be informed by a reading of experience alongside language.1 
A literary engagement with the political will alert to the changing dimensions of our 
understandings of history and politics beyond uni-dimensional and pre-determined.
1 J o a n  S co tt, “T h e  E v id en ce  o f  E x p e r ie n c e ” In  P r a c tic in g  H is to r y ,  1 9 9 -2 1 6 . E d ited  b y  G ab rie lle  S p ieg e l. 
(N e w  York: R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  2 0 0 .
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Joan Scott discusses the evidential nature of experience as conditioned by the
complexities and histories underwriting both our ontological and actual historical
being in the world.
Experience is at once always already an interpretation and  something that 
needs to be interpreted. What counts as experience is neither self-evident nor 
straightforward; it is always contested, and always therefore political. The 
study of experience, therefore, must call into question its originary status in 
historical explanation.2
Bearing witness will be theorized as one such field of forces and practices, alerting to
the unavoidable relationship between determination, decision and experience.
Because of the inherent complexities and multi-disciplinary commitments associated
with a study on witnessing, the key terms of this study will be defined with explicit
attention to their bearings in a discussion of the political implications of witnessing.
Three particular bearings will situate this study within international relations 
orthodoxy. First, a discussion of witnessing as a performative and singular 
engagement with ‘event’ will challenge the scientific insistence on producing rational 
subjects on the one hand while producing historically accurate accounts on the other. 
Second and following from this, history and (scientific) knowledge will be defined as 
an emerging field of forces underwritten by a similarly porous understanding of the 
processes we use to make knowledge commitments stick. As far as our 
understanding of the human is concerned, the latter’s situational, experiential, and 
interpretative experience of reality will inform a shifting positioning of knowledge as 
fiction. Last but not least, this thesis will comment on the relationship between 
displacement and security, the latter understood as a grand narrative aimed at 
increasing control, order and predictability by reducing risk, insecurity and chance.
A discussion of particular refugee experiences will challenge the sovereign positing of 
security as the bearer of stability, order and (human) rights, as if security itself was 
somehow possible independently of the very things that challenge and threaten the
2 S co tt, “T h e E v id en ce  o f  E x p e r ie n c e ,” 213.
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security of security. The security of the sovereign state will be shown as derived from 
the insecurity of the foreign, the nomadic and “the other” in a move aimed at 
examining everyday individual practices based on adaptability, fluidity, flexibility and 
violence and aimed at ‘out-living’ the myth of security itself.
The rest of this introductory chapter will offer an overview of the basic 
reference points underwriting my discussion of bearing witness. Because of the 
latter’s interdisciplinary character and because of the definite political leanings of my 
study, this short overview should not be read as an exhaustive, authoritative 
commentary on all possible aspects and theories of witnessing. Rather, it should be 
seen as exemplifying one kind of reading of the particular implications witnessing 
potentially has for a politically-situated engagement with ‘event’ and knowledge.
situating  b earing  w itness
While this thesis is informed by a range of readings across several academic 
disciplines, its end goal is to problematize witnessing from the point of view of 
international relations. The latter, theorized in the mainstream as an anarchical 
realm populated by legitimate, sovereign nation-states - controlling the means and 
the dissemination of power/knowledge and informed by an underlining desire for 
security, order and control -  has remained the focus of the majority of theoretical, 
methodological and ontological exploits of international relations the discipline. In 
that regard, individual agency has been predicated and granted on account of the 
possession of a legitimate citizenship label with intergovernmental relationships 
demarcating and perpetuating the very rhetoric underwriting sovereign stability and 
power, and with the configurations of the politico-moral universe themselves 




My reading of international relations through the prism of bearing witness 
will not be informed simply by a critique of the mainstream. Rather than position it 
as another methodological tool in a hierarchical universe populated by 
parsimoniousness, external/internal validity, theoretical replicability, necessary and 
sufficient conditions and causality, bearing witness will produce a reading of the 
discipline of international relations informed by the singularity of ‘event.’ This study 
will not critique only to re-introduce methodological constants, but will address the 
specific idioms of international relations through idioms of witnessing in an effort to 
recall and re-introduce a singular, performatively-informed reading of politics.
The idea of the unproblematic retrieval, interpretation and use of information 
and the latter’s general application over different cultures, populations, geographic 
locations and political systems will be challenged for failing to problematize the 
institutional, theoretical, and practical violence responsible for the production, 
dissemination and abuse of knowledge-power-control systems. This should not 
suggest in any way that this study provides a definite answer, a solution to the 
potentially negative outcomes of these dynamics. It is this thesis’ intention, however, 
to expose as fablistic the truth-claims underwriting international relations’ obsession 
with security, order and progress.
Bearing witness, in this sense, will be discussed as a particular mode of
address that accommodates singularity and evokes the performative nature of
constant repetition. Derek Attridge offers an interesting understanding of repetition:
the singular work is therefore not merely available  for translation but is 
constituted  by what may be thought of as an unending set of translations -  
for each new context in which it appears produces a further transformation. 
Words irrecoverably change their meanings, historical hindsight shifts 
emphasis, generic expectations alter over centuries, and in multiple other 
ways the work continually becomes another work for its reader.3
3 D e r e k  A ttr id g e , T h e S in g u la r i ty  o f  L i te r a tu r e  (L on d on : R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 4 ) ,  73 .
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Bearing witness carries important transformative implications for any automatic
invocation of narrative unity by disclosing language’s potential to produce as well as
record an event A This particular proposition is discussed in Jacques Derrida’s
engagement with the archive.
There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory. 
Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion 
the participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution, and its 
interpretation.5
It is important at this point to disclose the guiding principles behind this 
project. An interest in the relationship between knowledge, language and power, first 
originating outside political science, has not left the discipline of international 
relations untouched. Michael Dillon, Richard Ashley, R.B.J. Walker, Michael 
Shapiro, David Campbell6 and more recently, a number of topic-specific politico- 
anthropological studies have alerted to a number of serious problems inherent in 
purely quantitative renditions of the political realm. In addition, the mid-to-late- 
1990s constructivist turn in politics, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
attention to processes of technological, cultural and political globalization have left 
the realist, rational-choice strand of international relations with much to be desired.
4 J a c q u e s  D err id a  in tr o d u c e s  a n d  e x p lo res  fu r th er  th is  id ea  w ith  regard  to  re lig io n  a n d  p sy c h o a n a ly s is  in  
h is  T h e  G if t  o f  D e a th .  (C h icago: T h e  U n iv e r s ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 1 9 9 5 b ). T h is  p a rticu la r  id e a  c o m e s  
fro m  a d isc u s s io n  o f  th e  r e la t io n sh ip  b e tw e e n  p o litic s , m e d ia  a n d  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  th a t  can  
b e  fo u n d  o n  p. 17.
5 J a c q u e s  D err id a . A r c h iv e  F e v e r .  (C h icago: T h e  U n iv e r s ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 1 9 9 5 a ), 4 .
6 F or an  in  d e p th  e n g a g e m e n t w ith  th e  o r ig in a l cr it iq u e s  o f  so v e r e ig n ty , s e e  M ich a e l D illo n , P o lit ic s  o f  
S e c u r i ty  (L o n d o n : R o u tle d g e , 199 6 ); R ich ard  A sh ley , “U n ty in g  th e  S o v ere ig n  S ta te ” M ille n n iu m :  
J o u r n a l  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  S tu d ie s  17, n o  2  (1 9 8 8 ):  2 2 7 -2 6 2 , “L iv in g  on  B o rd er lin es: M an , 
P o ststr u c tu r a lism , a n d  W a r” In  I n te r n a t io n a l /I n te r te x tu a l  R e la tio n s ,  ed ite d  b y  J a m e s  D er  D er ia n  an d  
M ich a e l S h a p ir o , (M a ssa c h u se tts , L ex in gton : 1 9 8 9 );  D av id  C am p b e ll, P o lit ic s  W ith o u t  P r in c ip le .  
(B o u ld er , Co: L y n n e  R e in n er , 1 9 9 3 ); J e n n y  E d k in s, P o s ts t r u c tu r a l i s m  a n d  I n te r n a t io n a l  R e la tio n s .  
(B o u ld er , CO: L yn n e R e in n er , 199 9 ); J im  G eorge, “R ea lis t  E th ic s ,’ In te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s  a n d  P o st-  
M o d e r n ism ” M ille n n iu m :  J o u r n a l  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  S tu d ie s  2 4 ,1 1 0 .2  (1 9 9 5 ): 1 9 5 -2 2 3 ; L in d a  H u tc h e o n , 
T he P o li t ic s  o f  P o s tm o d e r n is m  (L on d on : R o u tle d g e , 1 9 8 9 );  Carl S ch m itt , P o li t ic a l  T h e o lo g y . F o u r  
C h a p te r s  o n  th e  C o n c e p t o f  S o v e r e ig n ty  (C am b rid ge: M IT  P ress , 1 9 8 8 );  C h arles T aylor, S o u rc e s  o f  th e  
S elf. (C am b rid ge: H arvard  U n iv e r s ity  P ress, 1 9 8 9 ); C yn th ia  W eb er, S ta te  S o v e r e ig n ty  a s  S o c ia l  
C o n s tr u c t  (C am b rid ge: C am b rid ge U n iv ers ity  P ress , 1 9 9 6 ).
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It is important to note here that a study on the politics of bearing witness, the 
sheer fact of its taking place, testifies to the current temporal, theoretical and 
ontological climate testifying not only the very history making possible such a study, 
but also to the dynamics of the current theoretical debates enabling, but also 
challenging in repeated fashion the unproblematic positing of this development as 
norm. Though the times may be a-changing, the specific nature and direction of this 
change is yet to be revealed and understood fully.
One thing is for certain: the discipline of international relations has re-written 
itself and continues to re-write itself following the directives of the theoretico- 
methodological imperative of Kantian enlightenment. It is not at all clear whether an 
engagement with this orientation can actually deliver a new understanding of the 
human in post-modernity . 7 However, it is beyond doubt that this same human can 
no longer be understood as the product of a determinist sovereign politics only.
What I mean by a politics of bearing witness is, more specifically, a different 
cosmology of relations uncovered through a critical re-reading of the human being as 
informed by a performative, situational relationship to language and ‘event.’ That is, 
examining the nature and implications of the specific idioms informing the process of 
bearing witness uncovers an emerging attitude toward international relations itself 
where theorizing the international is no longer possible without taking into account 
the effects and imperatives of the ‘linguistic turn.’ Commentators are thus obliged to 
conceive of politics
7 S e e  N ic k  V a u g h a n -W illia m s. “B e y o n d  a C o sm o p o lita n  Id ea l: T h e  P o lit ic s  o f  S in g u la r ity .” In  
I n te r n a t io n a l  P o li t ic s  4 4  (2 0 0 7 ):  107-124; J a m e s  B r a sse tta  an d  D an  B u lley , ’’E th ics in  W orld  P o lit ic s .” 
I n te r n a t io n a l  P o li t ic s  4 4  (2 0 0 7 );  J e n n y  E d k in s, V ero n iq u e  P in -F a t a n d  M ich a e l S h a p ir o  (e d s) .
S o v e r e ig n  L iv e s . P o w e r  in  G lo b a l P o litic s .  (N e w  Y ork, R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 4 ) ;  R o x a n n e  L ynn  D oty . A n ti -  
I m m ig r a n ti s m  in  W e s te r n  D e m o c r a c ie s . S ta te c r a f t ,  D e s ir e  a n d  th e  P o li t ic s  o f  E x c lu s io n . (L on d on :  
R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 3 ) ;  M ich a e l H ard t an d  A n to n io  N eg r i. E m p ir e .  (C am b rid ge, M A: H arvard  U n iv ers ity  
P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ;  J . M arsh a ll B e ier. In te r n a t io n a l  R e la t io n s  in  U n c o m m o n  P la c e s .  (N e w  York: P algrave  
M a cm illa n , 2 0 0 5 ) ;  an d  E liza b eth  D a u p h in e e . T he E th ic s  o f  R e se a r c h in g  W a r :  L o o k in g  f o r  B o sn ia .  
(M a n ch ester: M a n c h e s te r  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 7 ) .
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as something which arises from human being as a possibility. To understand 
human being as a possibility, however, means understanding that it consists 
in the improbable feast of always containing more than it is possible to 
contain; understanding that there is always already in human being an excess 
of being over appearance and identity.8
What this demands, furthermore, with relation to bearing witness is an imperative to 
address the human with regard for the nature of this excess as the precise, singular 
manifestation of the performative nature of the political itself.
Bearing witness, thus, can now be defended not as the next frivolous, un­
scientific engagement (with)in international relations, but as a potential opening of 
the latter toward understanding itself in light of the underlying implications of its 
own rhetoric. Bearing witness has, for the most part, been engaged by disciplines 
interested in the human, culture, psychology and history, as if somehow the question 
of witnessing were, if I may be so bold, privy only to emotive, fictional, or literary 
disclosures. Because of international relations’ scientific commitments, bearing 
witness has been reduced to the excavation and recovery of facts for the production of 
truth.
In this sense, if we were to theorize politics as the examination of events 
leading to the evocation of powerful feelings regarding our individual, singular 
engagement with the world, would it be totally scandalous to propose to read 
international relations as poetry? I have been told that such a proposition within 
academic politics is much like selling rock climbing to someone afraid of heights and 
that the latter, quite unnerving for a number of people, is altogether out of the 
question regardless of how hyped it may be. I would like to state from the very 
beginning: there will be no rock-climbing involved in this study. My invitation is of a 
different kind, namely -  to provoke international relations to take seriously the
8 D illo n , P o lit ic s  o f  S e c u r i ty ,  1.
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political implications derived from recognizing the singular nature contained within 
language, that of bearing witness especially. In an effort to move away from a purely 
speculative exegesis, allow me to summarize the specific coordinates of this study.
co o rd in a tes : outline of study
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Each chapter builds up on the one(s) 
before it. The first two chapters offer a theoretical engagement with the juridical and 
literary modalities of bearing witness. Chapters Three and Five offer two specific, 
though very different, examples that will help guide my discussion back to 
international relations. Chapter Four returns to the most interdisciplinary and risky 
idiom of bearing witness of interest here -  that of memory.
Chapter One engages three of the most important juridico-political writings of 
Giorgio Agamben. It does not engage all of Agamben’s writings, but limits itself to 
the few whose contribution to the discussion on witnessing, power and human agency 
seem s to me to be the most significant. I realize that leaving out a number of 
Agamben’s other writings might weaken my argument and prevent me from issuing a 
conclusive statement with regard to his work, but I do hope that my close reading of 
the texts I do engage will help guide the reader and myself despite bibliographical 
weaknesses. This chapter examines how, originated by the law’s suspension, the 
“state of exception” and homo sacer as categories of identity turn into statically 
assigned states of being. Suspicious of Agamben’s circular theoretical framework, 
this chapter re-reads his arguments through the lens of Veena Das’ “descent into the 
ordinary.” With reference to the discipline of international relations, this chapter 
makes clear the potential dangers of recruiting limit categories in service of 
affirmative pronouncements on the nature and unfolding of modern (human) life.
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The chapter has two underlying hypothesis. The first one has to do with the 
relationship between homo sacer, the norm (as the normalized exception) and 
Agamben’s conjugation of po testas  and goes something like this: If being in the 
condition of the exception means not to remain in that condition, then homo sacer as 
a limit figure deconstructs the unproblematic positing of the “state of exception” as 
norm. The second hypothesis addresses directly Agamben’s chosen witness: the 
Muselmann. It is here that Veena Das’ engagement with ‘the ordinary’ as a 
performative re-enactment of being in the world challenges Agamben’s theory of the 
limit as norm, where the figure of homo sacer is introduced through a generalization 
that effaces it. What is more, Agamben’s over-commitment to binary oppositions 
does not allow him to explore the physical, material, and situational implications of 
living the exception.
In the end, Agamben does have a tendency to rely too much on a juridico- 
political understanding of being in the world which leads to a denial and a failure to 
acknowledge the reality of actual Holocaust testimonials as well as a thrust to 
supplement his discussion of the exception with a problematization of the latter. In 
that sense, Agamben is not always Agambenian enough, for he leaves to guess work 
or, at times, abstraction the fate of wo(man) when not defined as homo sacer. As will 
be discussed in Chapter Five, there are indeed very real and non-reducible material, 
physical and historical differences that separate a refugee from someone on welfare, 
from a disgruntled citizen of 21st century Europe, from the rest of mankind -  itself 
heterogeneous, disparate and hardly made of the same stuff.
Agamben’s writings are useful for an engagement with bearing witness if only 
because he comments extensively on the nature of the relationship between the 
human, power and the juridical. Furthermore, his writings alert to the 
heterogeneous, complex and often juridically-normalized and ignored fact of liminal
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states as such: hom elessness, statelessness, poverty, namelessness being only a few 
prominent examples. In addition Agamben, precisely because he fails to engage the 
corporeal and psychological complexity of being homo sacer, alerts to the fact that 
being in the world is actually defined beyond the juridico-political prescriptions of 
nation-state discourse. It is for this very reason that Agamben opens the discussion 
of bearing witness and serves as a guiding post for the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter Two continues the engagement with the idioms of bearing witness by 
addressing “the literary” as exemplified through the writings of Jacques Derrida. 
Because of the breadth of his philosophical work, this chapter focuses specifically on 
Derrida’s understanding of the role of language (more specifically poetry) for the 
communication of information. This chapter, though structurally parallel to the 
previous one, does limit the scope of its engagement to a few specific idioms, namely 
“singularity,” “the poetic,” and “aporia,” if only because these figure as central axis of 
Derrida’s engagement with the economy of communication and language in general.
The chapter begins with a casting of the Agambenian witness in light of 
Geoffrey Hartman’s idea of “authenticity.” Then, the discussion moves from the 
juridico-political to an engagement with the nature of the relationship between 
‘event’ and the literary. This is especially important since Jacques Derrida’s work has 
been instrumental in thinking through ‘event’ as a dual ontico-ontological category 
(of being in the world). What is more, once the mutually constitutive relationship 
between history and ontology is established, a turn away from theoretical abstraction 
is accomplished, that is -  a turn toward the exemplarity of Derrida’s oeuvre.
The idiom of singularity, in turn, sets up the process of bearing witness by 
helping define the latter as a unique, non-generalizable engagement with language on 
the one hand and by evoking the always performative, occurring, dynamic nature of
21
witnessing on the other. In a way, singularity’s implications are extended to include 
not only literature, but also the discipline of international relations. This is 
important and relates to the opening chapter because of the linguistic provisions it 
makes regarding the nature of juridico-political discourse as well.
A reading of “aporia” accentuates Derrida’s methodological toolbox by 
supplementing his discussion of ‘singularity’ with an insistence on the importance of 
repeated readings, writings, and translations of both text and ‘event.’ The latter, in 
turn, addresses the question of deciding as an inseparable part of the ethical 
imperative to engage undecidability. In light of this productive setting up of 
language, bearing witness cannot be understood either as unproblematic healing or 
as some sort of a mystic revelation. It is, rather, the result of a constant insistence on 
the non-replicability of experience and on the potential for violence definitive of every 
instance of both (re)presentation and repetition.
The third Derridean idiom addressed in this chapter is that of Paul Celan’s 
poetry. What becomes apparent from his exegesis is a tendency to romanticize poetry 
as a special, untainted, purer and more authentic mode of linguistic expression.
What is more, Derrida attributes a certain resuscitative power to poetry that is 
manifested in an effort to save language from mechanical repetition, from falling into 
apathy. The implications this has for our understanding of bearing witness will be 
explained in depth in the chapter itself, but allow me to say for the moment that a 
certain contra-Derridean tendency is apparent with respect to Derrida’s reading of 
poetry.
Nonetheless, poetry does evoke and address the question of hospitality. In 
this way, it bears witness to the political implications of its art beyond metaphor, 
simile and allegory and by focusing the researcher’s gaze on the actual, real-life
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policies and actions taken up by governments and institutions. It is in this way that 
poetry makes clear the parallel between the decision language makes at the moment 
of bearing witness and the decision politics must make in the face of the call to 
justice. The danger remains, however, one of wanting to make the poetic mean too 
much. It is here than an engagement with Thomas Keenan’s theory of responsibility 
showcases the mutually constitutive relationship between insecurity and 
responsibility, to be engaged in greater detail in the final chapter of this thesis. 
Keenan’s ‘fables’ pronounce themselves not only on the groundlessness of language, 
but also on the very insecurity of language that allows for a decision to arrive, for 
responsibility to be had as the practice of addressing.
It becomes apparent that bearing witness realizes the fact that every 
singularity is contained within a universality, that the performative potential 
contained within the testimony of a Holocaust survivor, a refugee, a rape victim, a 
single mother, a prisoner of war, an academic is the creative aspect of memory that 
blurs the line between fact and fiction, making any appeal to Truth not only violent, 
but also impossible. Chapter Four of this thesis will offer another look at Derrida’s 
writings on the function, political purpose and use of the archive.
Chapter Three offers a journey through the poetry of Paul Celan. I engage 
Celan and not any other poet or, for that matter, another case study, for two 
important reasons. First, I had already introduced him in my discussion of Derrida 
and what is more, it was precisely the example of his poetry that informed my 
critique of Derrida’s tendency to romanticization. By engaging Celan’s work myself, I 
have the opportunity to refine and test my own quarrel with Derrida against the 
poetic testimony of Celan. Second, the case of Paul Celan, at once a poet, a Holocaust 
survivor, a Jew and a philosophical writer, offers the chance to bring together the 
works of both Derrida and Agamben, fusing the central points of my theoretical
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discussion so far while, at the same time, taking advantage of an opportunity to re­
read this discussion more slowly and with greater attention to the nuances, force and 
body of language at work.
Paul Celan’s poetry situates my earlier engagement with Jacques Derrida by 
commenting on the failure of any exclusively literary idiom to address the nature of 
writing about being in the world. This chapter moves to a specific operationalization 
of witnessing by offering a close reading of Celan’s poetry and by making the case for 
the importance of practices of reading and interpretation not only with regard to 
literature, but also in a discussion of the workings of international relations.
The guiding propositions of chapters one and two are hereby tested by the 
poem. Undecidability, addressed by Agamben in the figure of homo sacer and then 
in Derrida, as the aporetic imperative for a decision, will here manifest itself by 
alerting once again to the singularity characterizing all language: international 
relations discourse included. The remainder of chapter three traces Celan’s 
testim ony to his own Holocaust experiences by taking the reader on a journey of the 
author’s pained, minimalistic, almost incomprehensible language.
In particular, this chapter supplements the earlier discussion of 
performativity by commenting on the cyclical, repetitive, and experimental nature of 
Celan’s language. As disclosed by Ulrich Baer, Celan’s style - ‘stuttering,’ 
‘fragmentary,’ ‘self-evolving,’ ‘philosophical,’ and ‘abstract’ -  “m aybe understood as 
the wish to restore order by reducing to the most simple lines and shapes a world that 
seems to lack an inner principle and coherence . ” 9 Each of Celan’s poems casts 
witnessing as the relationship between experience, language and singularity.
9 U lr ich  B aer, R e m n a n ts  o f  S o n g . T r a u m a  a n d  th e  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  M o d e r n i ty  in  C h a r le s  B a u d e la ir e  a n d  
P a u l C e la n  (S ta n fo rd , CA: S ta n fo rd  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  2 3 4 .
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Furthermore, Celan’s language comments on the very concept of truth by 
exposing and accessing it at the limits of language. In fact, Celan’s vivid, graphic 
descriptions of the universe of extermination emphasize the over-insistence on truth 
by engaging in an active way the otherwise empty spaces of painful experience. This 
is the performative aspect of poetry that Derrida likens to resuscitation. Perhaps the 
resuscitative power of poetry is contained in the fact that it frees itself from the 
functional demands of language and approaches, to the greatest degree, an address.
The single most telling quality of Celan’s work is the way in which it 
comments on the experience of living in a post-Holocaust world. Among accusations 
of plagiarism, painful memories and the difficulties of re-inventing the German of the 
Nazis, Celan’s poetry offers hope of a dual kind. On the one hand, he comments on 
language’s power to resist appropriation while at the same time, sharing an obligation 
to keep the seeds of change alive for mankind. What is so politically potent in Celan’s 
work is the force of the word that at once knows that is cannot stand for the history it 
has lived through and, at the same time, makes itself heard even at the limits of 
language as the text makes itself known, heard through its readers.
That word is memory’s work. Chapter Four of this thesis engages the 
question of memory and the ways in which remembrance is summoned, recovered 
and translated as fact. After tracing Celan’s own journey through this treacherous 
terrain, this chapter returns to a number of theoretical conceptions of what memory 
is and how it works. In a way, this chapter is perhaps the most speculative one of the 
whole thesis, for it is informed by a variety of anthropological, ethnographic, 
historiographic, sociological, literary and political commentaries. However, the one 
thing that unites them all is a commitment to a critical examination of the modalities 
and agendas underwriting the turning of memory into truth-claims, both within and 
outside of international relations. In an important way, this is also the most
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provocative chapter of the thesis, for it attempts to bridge a ban on interdisciplinarity 
in an effort to arrive at a particularly singular notion of truth.
More specifically, the chapter examines the relationship between the recovery 
of traumatic memory and the implications this has for bearing witness. The former, 
because of its personal, emotionally-informed character does not necessarily serve as 
the best conductor of truth. Nonetheless, an engagement with the concept of memory 
as an idiom of bearing witness alerts once again to the performative character of 
‘event’ as such. The processual nature of recovering memory is, in turn, discussed in 
light of the need to problematize the otherwise taken for granted, common-sensical 
and “natural” historical, literary and political conjugations of truth.
The chapter is also an exercise in repetition for it engages, again, Giorgio 
Agamben and Jacques Derrida in light of their specific treatment of ‘memory.’ A look 
back at chapters one and two will not simply serve as a regurgitation of information 
already covered, but will in fact fine tune my discussion of the idioms of bearing 
witness with specific attention to the question of memory. In addition, this 
engagement is triangulated with a more pointed discussion of memory’s implications 
for the practice of international relations. Memory, occupying the precarious space 
between fact and fiction, language and silence, past and present, offers a unique 
opportunity to engage these dichotomies not as rivalries but as equally important 
pieces of the puzzle of bearing witness. The dynamic, unstable, even self­
contradictory character of memory points to the potential ways in which political 
science can recover the singular nature of experience without reducing or committing 
the latter to functional, rational, or progressive solutions.
That is not to say that every single engagement with the world is guided by a 
consideration for a narrative voice informed by universalizing truths, but by a poetic
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engagement. The argument put forth in the previous chapters, revealing the inherent 
singularity of all language, is hereby substantiated by an engagement with the ways in 
which everyday experience figures in academic writings. Memories are discussed as 
points of reference, as instances of evental unfolding, as an example of the difficulty 
of speaking of the dual nature of ‘event’ as theory and evidence.
The final, Fifth Chapter of this thesis offers an engagement with the refugee 
and more specifically, with the refugee exemplifying a desire to “out-live” 
international relations security.10 In addition to my longtime, personal interest in 
refugee studies, understanding the specific figure of the displaced person is 
absolutely pivotal to an understanding of the ways in which modern international 
relations works and (re) invents itself. The refugee both challenges and underwrites 
the nation-state desire for security and looking at specific examples of displacement 
helps us understand just how this is accomplished. In addition, the liminal essence of 
being displaced, together with the refugee’s central role in legitimizing sovereign 
power, alerts to the highly insecure, always emerging character of politics itself.
This chapter argues, engaging a few real-life examples, that while specific, 
practical and policy-informed singular solutions to refugee crisis are of immense
10 W ith  p a rticu la r  a tte n t io n  to  th e  q u e st io n  o f  r e fu g ees , s e e  In g e  A gger, T h e B lu e  R o o m :  t r a u m a  a n d  
T e s t im o n y  A m o n g  R e fu g e e  W o m e n . (L o n d o n : Z ed , 199 4 ); C ath y  C aruth , U n c la im e d  E x p e r ie n c e :  
T r a u m a , N a r r a t iv e ,  a n d  H is to r y .  (B a ltim o re , M D : J o h n s  H o p k in s  U n iv e r s ity  P ress); M ich a e l D illo n , 
“T h e  S ca n d a l o f  th e  refu ge: S o m e  R e fle c tio n s  on  th e  ‘In ter ’ o f  In te r n a tio n a l R e la tio n s  a n d  C o n tin en ta l 
T h o u g h t.” In  M o r a l  S p a c e s ,  e d ite d  b y  D av id  C am p b e ll a n d  M ich a e l S h a p iro . (M in n e a p o lis :  U n iv e r s ity  o f  
M in n e so ta  P ress , 1 9 9 9 a ); E m m a  H a d d a d , ‘W h o  is (n o t)  a R efu g ee? ” E u ro p ea n  U n iv e r s ity  In s titu te  
W o rk in g  P aper, n o .6  (2 0 0 4 ) ;  E llen  L a em m ers, R e fu g e e s , G e n d e r  a n d  H u m a n  S e c u r i ty :  A  T h e o re tic a l  
I n tr o d u c t io n  a n d  A n n o ta te d  B ib l io g r a p h y .  (U trech t: In tern a tio n a l B o o k s, 1 9 9 9 ); L iika M alkk i, P u r i ty  
a n d  E x ile  (C h icago: U n iv e r s ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 1995); P e ter  N y ers , R e th in k in g  R e fu g e e s .  (N e w  York: 
R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 6 ) ;  P rem  K u m ar R ajaram  an d  Carl G rundy-W arr, “T h e Irregu lar  M igran t as H o m o  
S a cer ,” I n te r n a t io n a l  M ig r a t io n  4 2 , n o . i  ( 2 0 0 4 ) :  3 3 -6 3 ;  F io n a  R o ss, B e a r in g  W itn e s s :  W o m e n  a n d  th e  
T ru th  a n d  R e c o n c ilia t io n  C o m m it te e  in  S o u th  A fr ic a .  (L on d on : P lu to , 2 0 0 3 ) ;  A n d rew  S h a ck n o v e , “W h o  
is  a re fu g e e ? ” E th ic s  9 5 , n o .2  (1 9 8 5 ):  2 7 4 -2 8 4 ;  P e ter  an d  R en a ta  S in g er , “T h e E th ics o f  R efu g ee  P o lic y ,” 
In  O p e n  B o r d e r s ?  C lo s e d  S o c ie tie s?  T he E th ic a l  a n d  P o li t ic a l  I s su e s ,  1 1 3 -130). E d ited  b y  M ark G ibney. 
(N e w  York: G reen w o o d  P ress , 1 9 8 8 );  N e v z a t S ogu k , S ta te s  a n d  S tr a n g e r s .  (M in n e a p o lis :  U n iv e r s ity  o f  
M in n e so ta  P ress , 1 9 9 9 ); J a c q u e s  V ern a n t, T he R e fu g e e  in  th e  P o s t - w a r  W o r ld .” ( N e w  H aven : Y ale  
U n iv e r s ity  p ress , 1953); R o g er  Z etter, “R efu g ees  an d  R efu g ee  S tu d ie s  -  A  L abel a n d  an  A g e n d a ,” J o u r n a l  
o f  R e fu g e e  S tu d ie s  1,110.1 (1 9 8 8 ) , an d  A r istid e  Z olb erg , A stri S u h rk e an d  S erg io  A g u a y o  (e d s .)  E s c a p e  
f r o m  V io len ce: C o n flic t a n d  th e  r e fu g e e  c r is is  in  th e  d e v e lo p in g  w o r ld .  (O xford: O xford  U n iv ers ity  
P ress , 1 9 8 9 ) .
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importance in alleviating suffering, hom elessness and death, instances of 
spontaneous, invented, unexpected and imaginative negotiating with displacement 
are just as valuable in affirming human life in the face of life-negating circumstances. 
It is important to stress that my choice of a particular case study was largely the 
result of access and resources in an otherwise open pool of case candidates. The 
example of the Bhutanese refugees is not an exemplary one and it does not speak for 
other refugees, nor does it aim at generalizing beyond its specific example. It is, 
however, an understudied case, a largely unknown and unspoken of refugee 
population that is thus doubly liminal and more compelling. Beyond this 
explanation, I offer no other defensive arguments against possible accusation of case 
selection bias.
An engagement with displaced people witnesses liminality and its bearings on 
an engagement with justice, power and life itself. Importantly, this chapter’s re­
reading of the question of “the refugee” is informed by a singular understanding of 
‘event.’ Thus the chapter’s hypothesis: The historicity of refugees is what makes them  
credible; that historicity is always singular. With regard for a discussion of 
international relations, the refugee is theorized as a political actor that understands 
security as the task of out-living the desire to be secure. That is, while questions of 
fear, insecurity, weakness and poverty are considered problematic, a careful 
engagement with the ways in which they teach about being in the world comments on 
what it means to be human and on how to address, engage and write about what it 
means to be human. In other words, refugees’ everyday living in insecurity prompts 
us to think about the always changing nature of security itself.
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conclusion
This thesis concludes by iterating a few of the numerous unposited and 
unanswered questions encountered on the path of its journey. These questions open 
avenues for future research, for similarly performative engagements with stories, 
lives, memories, locales and poems. The thesis returns to the question of bearing 
witness by summarizing this introduction, though it introduces a tentative note to its 
otherwise declarative tone. It is a tentative note that acknowledges the potential 
weaknesses of its position, indeed the potential weaknesses of any one position, 
without stepping down or giving up its insistence on the enlightening quality of all 
things and all beings unstable, insecure, liminal, and ‘hom eless.’
This thesis is not just the product of countless hours spent over books, journal 
articles and other people’s conference papers. It has been difficult but only to an 
extent. It is not solely the product of an academic demand that, when met, rewards 
the candidate with the honors and joys of a doctoral degree. I will always remain an 
apprentice in the business of inquiring and addressing the world. This thesis is, 
above all else, the result of many years of reading, writing, and thinking about what it 
means to act politically in the world and about how we bear witness to this being. 
While I still have no single answer to these questions, I hope the reader will find my 
engagement with a number of possible answers at least as interesting, provocative 
and intellectually stimulating as my thinking through these answers has been for me. 
I invite you on this journey and urge you to challenge me and yourself while on it.
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C hap ter Dne
The e x tra -o rd in a ry ' a s  homo sacer:
Giorgio Agamben and the  limit of testim ony
“So it is with nations. There is a moment for them 
too, between the battle and the safety of the 
stockade, when men create the law to suit the 
circumstances.”
More than meets the eye,_Carl Mydans
th e  Agambenian s ta te
The theoretical writings of Giorgio Agamben have originated the re-birth of 
the modern edition of the discussion on the ‘exception.’ Carl Schmitt’s sovereign as 
“he who decides on the exception”11 has produced, in Agamben’s writings on 
sovereignty and law, a parsimonious explanation that “seemingly captures our 
current political situation.”12 Refugee, detention and concentration camps, zones 
d ’attentes  at airports, secret prisons, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib have all been 
explained with reference to Agamben’s theory of the exception-become-rule 
cognizant of the ways in which the latter informs current political configurations and 
the ability of sovereign power to explain, perpetuate and impose its logic. Because of 
Agamben’s interest in the nature of juridical sovereignty and in the ways the latter’s 
(ab)use of power constructs, determines and frames the subject, his thought posits 
important links not only between the law and the sovereign center but also, between 
law and life itself. More specifically, this chapter addresses, though is not limited to, 
four of Agamben’s works: M eans W ithout End, Rem nants o f  Auschwitz, Homo 
Sacer, and The S tate o f  Exception.
Because for Agamben life in a “state of exception” is posited as bare life and 
because his understanding of the relationship between the two is rather a self-
11 Carl S ch m itt . P o li t ic a l  T h e o lo g y . F o u r  C h a p te r s  o n  th e  C o n c e p t o f  S o v e r e ig n ty . T r a n s la te d  b y  
G eorge S ch w ab . (C am b rid ge: M IT  P ress , 2 0 0 6 ) .
12 P au l A. P a ssa v a n t. “T h e  C on tra d ic to ry  S ta te  o f  G iorg io  A g a m b e n ” P o li t ic a l  T h e o r y  3 5  (2 0 0 7 ):  148.
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deterministic one, his theory bears important implications for the ways in which, on 
the one hand, representing the subject and reconstructing memory are accomplished 
within a “state of exception” and, on the other, for the ways in which the subject is 
derived from and isolated within a theory of the limit as the (extra) ordinary. In an 
attempt to challenge Agamben’s theory, I would like to suggest that bare life is at 
stake each time one apprehends it and that the latter carries within itself the potential 
both to challenge and underwrite the exception.
Since this thesis is informed by the problematic of bearing witness, my 
engagement with Giorgio Agamben, too, will take its bearings from a continuous 
reference to questions of memory, testimony, witness and language. Agamben’s close 
reading of the Holocaust in Rem nants o f  Auschwitz, as well as his exegesis on the 
nature of the human in a “state of exception” in Homo Sacer will guide my discussion 
to a considerable, though not exclusive, degree. I will supplement my engagement 
with Agamben by bringing to my discussion secondary writings informed by a similar 
interest in the relationship between the juridical, the biological, the political and the 
exception. A central question guiding my discussion traces the relationship between 
the ‘exceptional’ and the ‘ordinary’ as figured both in theorizing the subject and in 
engaging the juridico-political. In an effort to avoid a reading of the human solely 
from the point of view of homo sacer, a witness capable of testimony will be foreseen 
and addressed. Thus, I will engage the Muselmann both as a limit figure and as 
someone who challenges the positing of the exception as limit precisely because the 
former is set apart and is not an explanation of the law of exception, that is, the 
Muselmann is witness and not simply bare life “constituted by what it itself 
produces.”13 For someone who, as claimed by Agamben, cannot testify or speak, the 
Muselmann has been surprisingly vocal as a resurrected figure in service of theory.
P eter  F itzp atrick . “B are S o v e r e ig n ty .” In  P o litic s , M e ta p h y s ic s  a n d  D e a th , 4 9 -7 3 . (D u rh am : D u k e  
U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 5 ) :  4 9 .
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A discussion of bearing witness, defined as a singular activity, will 
problematize the ability of a theory of the limit (exception) to address and engage the 
historically irreproducible nature of the event as well as an understanding of life as a 
derivative of an exclusively juridico-political, yet outside the law, view of the human. 
As Peter Fitzpatrick’s insightful observation has alerted: “Being thus outside any 
mediating or endowing law, homo sacer  is for Agamben the originating figure of ‘bare 
life’ or bare life as such.’ Yet Agamben still sees homo sacer  as a ‘figure o f  the law.”1^  
An engagement with the process of bearing witness will pose as problematic not only 
the relationship between the human being and language, but also the definition of the 
human being as homo sacer in exceptio. I hope to be able to show, referring to the 
work of Veena Das, that theorizing the human as victim of violence, suffering, and 
torture is neither determined by nor contingent upon an understanding of life either 
as sacred or as profane. Her metaphor of a “descent into the ordinary” will help 
counter Agamben’s insistence on being able, at one and the same time, to affirm life 
by going beyond it.
Agamben’s thought has, in recent years, become symptomatic of a number of 
engagements with the nature of ontology (Being) and with the (im)possibility of 
bearing witness to that Being. I hope that a critical examination of the universalizing 
potential of the exception will help clarify and alert to a possible incongruity between 
homo sacer, lived life and the monopolizing presence of the juridico-political 
regarding the practical implications for bearing witness that a theory of the exception 
has. This chapter will address the problem of generalizing the exception in ways that, 
rather than explain, make theoretically excusable and justified homo sacer  as a 
monolithic category of identification. I will suggest that Agamben’s juridico-political 
idiom is not only unable to think through and accommodate the real-life implications 
of bearing witness, but that it also represents a totalizing claim on truth and truth-
14 F itzp atr ick , “B are S o v e r e ig n ty ,” 51.
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telling derived from an operationalization of dichotomies. Thus sacred life as 
“presupposed and abandoned by the law in a state of exception”^ can be 
distinguished from naked life “abandoned to a kind of violence that is all the more 
effective for being anonymous and quotidian.”16 A definition of the human being as 
homo sacer, while informative of the experience of being a depoliticized subject 
during the Holocaust, fails to address two important aspects of living in the political 
everyday.
First, it does not challenge the assumed calculability of the human as a 
product of a decision made by law, nor does it unearth modalities of engagement with 
individual experiences that are predicated and constructed on a belief in the totality 
of knowledge and sovereign power. The human as a “limit figure” predicated on a 
negatively constituted relationship to the juridical represents, on the one hand, “the 
radical crisis of every possibility of clearly distinguishing between membership and 
inclusion, between what is outside and what is inside, between exception and rule”17 
while, at the same time, the human is recruited to speak on behalf of the sacred 
“insofar as it is taken into the sovereign exception.”18 If “only bare life is authentically 
political”1^  then hare life either includes all of humanity or is specifically reserved as 
an identifying category for some and not other individuals. Refugees, prisoners, 
detainees, the homeless are, as carriers of bare life, reduced to the violence that 
produces them while citizenship is still seen as something “one had to prove oneself 
worthy and which could therefore always be called into question.”20 I will address the 
problematic nature of refugees’ rendition as ‘limit figures’ in the final chapter of this 
thesis. Allow me at this point to say that the political relevance of being a refugee will
*5 G iorg io  A g a m b en . M e a n s  W ith o u t  E n d . N o te s  o n  P o litic s .  (M in n e a p o lis :  U n iv e r s ity  o f  M in n e so ta  
P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  113.
16 A g a m b en , M e a n s  W ith o u t E n d ,  113.
17 G iorg io  A g a m b en . H o m o  S a c e r . S o v e r e ig n  P o w e r  a n d  B a r e  L ife . (S ta n fo rd , CA: S ta n fo rd  U n iv ers ity  
P ress , 1 9 9 8 ) , 2 5 .
18 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  8 5 .
19 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  106 .
20 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  132.
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be theorized as irreducible to the latter’s inclusive or exclusive relationship to a 
sovereign center. The question of securing the body of the refugee will be addressed 
not so much through the workings of a legitimately appointed sovereign apparatus 
but in terms of examples of out-living that security.
Reducing the Muselmann to a non-human because of the former’s 
malnutrition and basic physical degeneration while, at the same time, using that as a 
basis for establishing the constitutive relationship of bare life to the bio-political 
make-up of subjects leaves the human at once “marking the limit of, and being 
beyond the human.”21 An engagement with the process of bearing witness, I hope, 
will allow me to dispel the obsolescence of the human being by addressing specific 
instances of making life liveable independently of universalizing formulas. As Peter 
Fitzpatrick has observed, “Whether one could by way of induction plausibly arrive at 
a general condition of sovereignty or bare life derived from alleged instances could 
depend on the quantity and quality of these instances. The camp, rather obviously, is 
a monumental one, but its paradigmatic quality is not made out.”22 Insisting on the 
inhumanity of the Nazi camp commanders on the one hand and on the non-humanity 
of the Muselmanner, on the other, falls dangerously close to positing a similar 
relationship of the biological to the juridical. Agamben does not address the 
implications this has for a positing of the human as void of the possibility to 
experience, outside law, life through affective, imaginative, and individually-informed 
faculties. The reason we rebel against life turning into a mechanized response to 
orders is not because orders themselves are always bad or because we prefer to live in 
chaos, but because we take guidance for the ways in which we comport ourselves in 
the world from a relationship to the sensual, ethical, moral basis of life. The ‘non­
human,’ thus, cannot be a category of identification based solely on the latter’s (non) 
relationship to the law.
21 F itzp atr ick , “B are S o v e r e ig n ty ,” 6 6 .
22 F itzp atr ick , “B are S o v e r e ig n ty ,” 6 8 -9 .
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w itnessing  the  limit: b a re  tim es, barely  alive
In what follows, I will examine the mutually-constitutive and juridically- 
posited relationship between homo sacer  as a derivative of bios in a sta te  o f  exception 
(predicated on the suspension of law and the unlimited power(s) of the sovereign) 
against the activity of bearing witness. Agamben equates zoe with life common to all 
living things or, with natural life. On the other hand, bios is the kind of life that is 
included in the polis  or, in other words, zoe made political. In other words, “The life 
of the polis, for the Greeks, was bios, a form of living particular to an individual or 
group. The simple natural life of zoe was separated from the politically qualified life 
that was part of the po lis .”23 What is more, Agamben argues that natural life or zoe  is 
included in the political life, implicated in the workings of the latter, by virtue of 
being excluded. Jenny Edkins suggests that “At the threshold of the modern era then, 
the realm of bare life begins to coincide with the political, and inclusion and 
exclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right and left, enter into a zone of 
indistinction. In these zones of indistinction, bare life or homo sacer becomes both 
the subject and the object of the political order. ”24 The process of bearing witness will 
be discussed as a possibility of address predicated not on an understanding of 
(human) life as an exclusively juridico-political problem, but as an engagement with 
everyday practices and performances of bearing witness that recognize the dangers of 
theoretical abstraction. What I hope to offer is not a better theory of bearing witness, 
but a critically-informed engagement with the political nature of the human as an 
ethically and biologically posited being.
I open this journey with a question: “What becomes of bearing witness if we 
theorize the human being not only as a suffering, tortured, excluded presence (homo 
sacer), but also from within a discourse of address and responsibility predicated not
23 J e n n y  E d k in s. T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s . (C am b rid ge: C am b ridge U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 3 ) ,  
179.
24 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  182.
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on a totalizing singularity but on a contingent multiplicity?” I will trace the ways in 
which Agamben, in the works discussed here, moves through the highly precarious 
living terrains of “sacred” beings to derive specific, though monolithic in their nature, 
implications for the former’s place in language as a remnant, whose “intimacy” is 
perhaps tellingly so, “the name that we give to a proximity that also remains distant, 
to a promiscuity that never becomes identity. ”2s Though problematic, Agamben’s 
project remains central to any enunciation of witness precisely because the figure of 
the human does problematize the often taken for granted ability of language to 
account for an event beyond mere summary. Interspersed throughout Agamben’s 
discussion of sacred life is an insistent engagement with the relationship between 
politics, language, and life, the latter being that which, in the “state of exception,” is 
“included by means of an exclusion.”26 In Agamben’s discussion, singularity, defined 
as that which can never be generalized or decided upon in advance, the yet-to-come 
borne out of the repetition of the same that manifests itself for itself beyond 
representation, is made hostage to theory in which the human being (homo sacer) 
becomes a limit figure absorbed in the figure of law as a “potentiality that cannot pass 
over into actuality”2? at the same time that “at the limit, pure potentiality and pure 
actuality are indistinguishable, and the sovereign is precisely this zone of 
indistinction.”28 What happens to agency then?
I would like to suggest that a(ny) limit figure exceeds the materiality of the 
“state of exception” that is its conception. This thesis also intends to exceed these 
limits. As Michael Dillon has observed,
As a possibility, human being is obliged to bring the possibility of its way of 
being into new possibilities of being. Its freedom as possibility is not only a 
difficult, it is therefore also an obligatory, freedom. There is no escaping it; 
because the human way of being is a responsive way of being, shared with 
others in Otherness, challenged by its very responsiveness as a being to
2s G iorg io  A g a m b en . T h e S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n .  (C h icago: U n iv e r s ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  125.
26 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  7.
2? A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  45 .
28 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  47 .
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assume its possibility of being. The political is the plural ‘now’ dedicated to
keeping the taking place of that possibility open.29
What is more, I am not convinced that “sacred” adequately describes either the status 
of language within a system of knowledge, or any one example in a discussion of the 
relationship between law, the human being and the exception. Agamben’s “inclusive 
exclusion of zoe  in the polis”30 can be read as suggesting both that politics were the 
place in which life had to transform itself into good life and also, the place in which 
what had to be politicized was always already bare life.
Since mine is not a field-informed project, I am somewhat limited in my 
ability to analyze and/or present ‘original’ materials or case studies. Instead, I will 
make recourse to evidence already collected by others and relate the process of re­
reading as one modality of bearing witness. This will pose Agamben’s sta te o f  
exception against the process of bearing witness in an attempt to show that the latter, 
as a singular engagement with a past event, is informed by repetition, reiteration and 
authenticity figured neither as exception nor as norm only. In a sense, the status of 
language and one’s ability to testify to the past move into a realm of infinite 
repeatability where the authenticity of testimony is not dependent solely on 
eyewitness accounts but, also and more importantly, is always and continuously 
revised through the prism of singularity.
Giorgio Agamben’s engagement with the juridico-political nature of the 
human being as survivor, victim and “remnant” in a “state of exception” touches 
directly upon the question of bearing witness, its relationship to language (power) 
and to a sovereign (center). The production and dissemination of knowledge, in the 
absence of a witness, becomes the prerogative of the sovereign center. “It can even be 
said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign
29 D illo n , P o lit ic s  o f  S e c u r i ty ,  6.
30 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  7.
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pow er/’s1 If bearing witness announces an event, and if we take as working Jean-Luc 
Marion’s definition of the event as “the already of facticity”, “the right now of its 
occurrence”, and “the without end of its recollection,” its witnessing^2 then an event 
is never simply a stable referent regarding the question of temporality, nor is it just a 
(linguistic) commentary, a re-creation of a succession of facts by way of piecing 
together happenings recovered by memory. Bearing witness, framed and informed 
by an event, relates likewise to the already of facticity (past), the right now of its 
occurrence (remembering), and the without end of its recollection (witness).
That is, bearing witness defines the way in which truth is represented and 
decided upon both temporally and factually. An engagement with the remnant 
defined exclusively as homo sacer  and posited as constitutive of modern day politics 
ends up simplifying the complex nature of “event” and allows Agamben to argue for 
the irreducible indistinction between zoe (natural life) and bios (natural life included 
in the mechanisms and calculations of state power). It is from within this zone of 
indistinction that the concept of homo sacer  is derived and made synonymous with 
the condition of the human being in a normalized “state of exception.”
Agamben posits the exception in order to derive from it a prescriptive model 
applicable and generalizable to a larger group of examples. What is more, out of the 
exception he evokes the figure of homo sacer  and equates it to the Nazi concentration 
camp inmate, more specifically, to the inmate who died as M uselmann. The latter 
can then be posited as a limit figure “beyond which no further division is possible, the 
figure that makes it impossible to distinguish life from death.”33 Not only does this 
put in question the humanity of the survivor, but it also suggests a relationship 
between life, politics and language that is predicated on exclusion, silence and an 
understanding of humanity as predicated on an absolute and irresolvable necessity.
31 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  6.
32 J e a n -L u c  M arion . In E x c e ss . (N e w  York: F ord h a m  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 4 ) ,  3 6 .
33 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  185.
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Thus a theory conceived of to problematize the suspension of law subsequently 
assigns any and all discussion of the relationship between power and life to a strict 
juridico-political sphere, normalizing the exception into a Foucauldian ‘norm’ and 
making homo sacer  into an “indeterminate and im p e n e t r a b le ’^  category mediated 
by sovereign power. Interestingly enough, Agamben’s displacement of questions of 
power, knowledge and language into a realm of ontology, as suggested by Peter 
Passavant (2007), ends up offering the possibility to think politics itself once again as 
a relationship between ordinary (natural) life and an ethics of address.
Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer  as the being that can be killed but not 
sacrificed “and as such can be eliminated without punishment”35 validates the 
statement: “Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. 
It now ... dwells in the biopolitical body of every living being. ”36 The natural life of 
the species (zoe) turns into the initial vehicle for Agamben’s theory of the exception. 
The former is reconfigured as a stable, ethically stripped category signed over to the 
authority of state power over politicized life (bios), making it possible for Agamben to 
move somewhat unproblematically between dichotomies such as “exception” and 
“rule,” “victim” and “survivor,” “man” and “non-man.” “Exiled bare life, like the life 
of the camp inhabitant, the refugee, the band it... is without a voice in public affairs 
and may be killed or kept alive without ceremony and without criminality. ”37
While the creation of the juridico-political category of enemy combatants, for 
instance, is an example of the actual and uncensored appropriation of life by the 
political exception, I would like to suggest that there is a danger of oversimplifying 
the relationship between the exception, law, the human subject, and the ways in 
which these figure and are con-figured in practices of bearing witness. In other
34 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  182 .
35 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  139.
36 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  140 .
37 T h o m a s Carl W all. “A u  H a sa r d .” In  P o litic s , M e ta p h y s ic s ,  a n d  D e a th ,  3 1 -4 7 . (D u rh am : D u k e  
U n iv ers ity , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  3 9 - 4 0 .
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words, I will engage the actual implications the category of homo sacer  has for the 
process of bearing witness and juxtapose Agamben’s thought on the exception to a 
reading of the event “not as temporal punctuality or an instance of presence but, 
instead, a dynamic and open-ended field of forces, whose historicity prevents 
experience from closing into representational constructs, psychic spaces or lived 
instants.”38 H omo sacer, as the being that can be killed but not sacrificed, becomes 
the “originary activity of s o v e r e ig n t y ’^  predicated on an exceptional relationship to 
violence and the law. My initial question, “To what extent can we speak of bare life?” 
will be supplemented thus, “What becomes of bare life when measured against the 
activity of bearing witness?”
on the quietism  o f the exception as a state o f being
If the “state of exception” has become the normalized condition of politics, 
then homo sacer  turns into a juridico-political category of identification all its own: 
as immunized against opposition as it is abstracted and estranged from the practice 
of justice. Fixed in that way, homo sacer serves rather than challenges the sovereign 
by underwriting the latter’s claims to unlimited power. Once derived as the product 
of the relationship between law in a state of emergency and the sovereign’s will to the 
usurpation of power, homo sacer  easily turns into a limit figure founded on the 
juridical vacuum of the “beyond the law.” Alongside the rather monolithic picture of 
the concentration camp that Agamben presents in his Rem nants o f Auschwitz, the 
figure of homo sacer  as the M uselmann, rather than problematize the relationship 
between the sovereign and power, only undermines the latter’s role in accounting for 
and justifying violence. What is more, the human being as homo sacer becomes an 
exclusive political problem posited against few ethical demands and 
unproblematically committed to the care of a monolithic institution: the sovereign.
38 K rzy szto f Z iarek. T h e H is to r ic i ty  o f  E x p e r ie n c e :  M o d e r n i ty ,  th e  A v a n t- G a r d e ,  a n d  th e  E v e n t.  
(C h icago , II: N o r th w e ste r n  U n iv e r s ity  P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) , 13.
39 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  8 3 .
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Once life becomes the referent object of politics as homo sacer, modernity is crowned 
as the most politically charged of all preceding eras.40 By implicating the figure of zoe 
in the workings of the sovereign state, Agamben is able to reformulate Foucault’s 
biopolitics vis-a-vis the “state of exception” and claim that the “production of 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”41
If we understood politics as a theory of the limit, then the relationship 
between the human and politics becomes predicated not on a theory of committed 
relation but on a reality where, once the state of exception overflows its boundaries to 
coincide with the normal order, everything becomes possible.42 The witness, then, is 
one example that characterizes natural life beyond bios. The concentration camp 
survivor as zoe, separate from his essence as a speaking being, makes the passage 
between silence and witness an impasse within the limits of Agamben’s theory.
Central to Agamben’s logic is a retrospective turn theorizing bios as a 
derivative of the “state of exception,” the latter subsequently anchored in the being of 
homo sacer as the new norm. “The destitution of abandoned Being is measured by 
the lim itless severity of the law to which it finds itself exposed. Abandonm ent... is a 
compulsion to appear absolutely under the law, under the law as such and in its 
tota lity ... to be banished amounts not to coming under a provision of the law but 
rather to coming under the entirety of the law”43 The powers historically vested in 
the sovereign to define the biopolitical project transgress the sovereign’s obligation 
towards maintaining and upholding the singularity and security of zoe independent 
from bios. If politics is concerned with man and if human life exceeds the meaning 
that can be contained within a theory of exception or limit, then politics itself has to 
be thought differently: haman(e)ly. Far from oversimplifying Agamben, his
4° A n d rew  N o rr is . “In tro d u ctio n : G iorg io  A g a m b en  a n d  th e  P o lit ic s  o f  th e  L iv in g  D e a d .” In  P o litic s ,  
M e ta p h y s ic s  a n d  D e a th ,  1 -3 0 . (D u rh am : D u k e U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  2 .
41 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  6.
42 P a ssa v a n t, “T h e  C on tra d ic to ry  S ta te  o f  G iorg io  A g a m b e n ,” 156.
43 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  5 8 -9 .
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insistence on maintaining dichotomous categories of identification as reference 
points for criticizing the precursors to those very categories call for a careful reading 
of the politically-informed implications his writing has for a study of bearing witness.
In his Rem nants o f Auschwitz, Agamben addresses the nostalgic and tragic 
figure of the witness as victim, suffering and rejected, inscribed in language as the 
always absent, impossible trace of (the dead) witness. Left to the philosopher, the 
former’s testimony does not recover a voice as much as it mourns the subject’s 
severed relationship to the law and the former’s subsequent reduction to an object, a 
“no-man.” Reverse engineering this relationship, being protected by the law becomes 
symptomatic of security, of a justified claim to (human) rights and freedoms while 
being outside the law is presented as rejection, abandonment, and insecurity. “And 
law, in suspending the concrete custom and usage of individuals, has been able to 
isolate something like a norm,”44 so the representation of the human continues to be 
constructed with reference to a demand to be fragmentary. The relationship of the 
subject to law in a “state of exception” is explained as a reversal of the norm that 
would typically define the sovereign’s relationship to his subjects. Agamben seems to 
exploit the ambiguity inherent in the productive relationship that defines the 
interaction between the state, its subjects, and the law by cashing in on the idea that 
the concept of a human being contains the potential for a biopolitical fissure. “In 
every case, the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur 
with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation 
without any real reference. ”4s
What’s more, this fissure appears to be informed by a non-reversible 
relationship to an ethically-compromised norm. For Agamben to be able to claim 
that sovereign power is founded on the ability to decide on the state of exception, the
44 G iorg io  A g a m b en . R e m n a n ts  o f  A u s c h w itz :  T he W itn e s s  a n d  th e  A r c h iv e .  (N e w  York: Z o n e , 2 0 0 2 ) ,
37 -
45 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  4 0 .
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camp must be a structure in which the sta te  o f  exception  is permanently realized and 
where the human is defined from within a juridical void. In a state of exception 
everything is possible, making the camp a zone of infinite possibilities: both for 
violence and for security. The camp thus becomes “the inaugural side of modernity 
where public and private, political and biological life become indistinguishable,” “it is 
what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part as well as what cannot 
belong to the whole in which it is always already included”46 Similarly, the “state of 
exception” can never simply be “the norm” or “the rule” and remain such, for it is in 
its very nature as a carrier of infinite potentiality to make possible dissolution, 
erasure, forgetting, silence, and testimony. Agamben’s theory of the exception seems 
to posit the state as unitary, sovereign and rational when in fact the state is 
comprised of a variety of institutions whose complex nature actually perpetuates the 
modern state.47
securing rationality as ‘norm ’
At this point, it is important to posit states of exception such as Guantanamo 
Bay, Abu Ghraib, refugee and detention camps as examples participating and 
defining a security dialogue introduced by a sovereign state first, in order to ensure 
its continued and varied use of power and only then, because of threats and the fear 
of terrorist violence. Peter Passavant’s summary of Kim Lane Scheppele’s analysis of 
US executive laws/m easures post 9/11 suggests that “this emergence (and ruin) is 
hastened by those who seek to enhance surveillance and presidential powers, while 
diminishing the power of courts and legislative oversights as a response to September 
11, 2001.”48 What this makes evident is the purposeful funnelling of power in one 
branch of the government and/or in the hands of a single individual in an effort to 
legitimize, legalize and normalize the very same mechanisms otherwise antithetical to
46 A g a m b en , M e a n s  W ith o u t  E n d ,  122, 3 2
47 P a ssa v a n t, “T h e  C on tra d ic to ry  S ta te  o f  G iorg io  A g a m b e n ”, 169.
48 Q td  in  P a ssa v a n t 2 0 0 7 : 1 7 0 .
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the development and nature of democracy. Thus torture of enemy combatants, 
because they are not considered prisoners of war and thus, unprotected under the 
Geneva Convention, underwrites security and the law by a kind of violence that itself 
exists outside the law. It is no wonder then that US officials questioned by Congress 
with regard to this very torture would choose to enter self-imposed a m n e s ia .4 9
Once the “state of exception” becomes its own category of identification by 
claiming for itself a spatial, juridical (though defined through a lack) and human 
resource allotment, homo sacer comes to signify a way of life rather than a challenge 
to non-life. It is through such normalization that Agamben (usmg the examples of 
the prison, the refugee camp, and airport transit areas) posits the linear nature of the 
subject’s relationship to language (power). In the words of Peter Passavant, “In the 
state of exception law is in force even if specific legal prescriptions or prohibitions are 
suspended. When law is in force without significance, law is an empty potentiality 
that is so much in force without content that it becomes, as it did in the camps, 
indistinguishable from life.”50 Agamben defines pure potentiality as the potential to 
be and not to be at the same time. If this were true, then the “state of exception” read 
as a pure) potentiality cannot be defined either in positive or in negative terms, but 
must be seen rather as “double possibility.”51 What this comments on is the 
productive potential contained within every possible decision, the potential to decide 
against deciding as well as the potential to decide in favour of a decision. In other 
words, “Agamben’s work enables us to analyze what is at stake in the politics of the 
decision. He elaborates how sovereign power operates through the state of emergency 
and how the very positing of the question through the trope of emergency is always 
already on the side of sovereignty.”52
49 D a n ie l S ch orr. “O ffic ia ls C h an ge T u n e  o n  T o r tu e .” N P R  story: J u n e  19th, 2 0 0 8 .
h t tp : / /w w w .n p r .o r g /te m p la te s /s to r y /sto r y .p h p ? sto r y Id = 9 1 7 0 3 5 9 8 .
5° P a ssa v a n t, “T h e  C on tra d ic to ry  S ta te  o f  G iorg io  A g a m b e n ,” 156.
s1 P a ssa v a n t, “T h e  C on tra d ic to ry  S ta te  o f  G iorg io  A g a m b e n ,” 158. 
s2 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  212.
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Allow me to put forth a preliminary hypothesis for my discussion of the limit: 
If, following from Agamben’s discussion of potestas, we agree that being in the 
condition of exception means not to remain in that condition, then homo sacer as a 
limit figure deconstructs the unproblematic positing of the “state of exception” as 
norm. “What emerges in this limit figure is the radical crisis of every possibility of 
clearly distinguishing between membership and inclusion, between what is outside 
and what is inside, between exception and r u le .”53 The inability to distinguish clearly 
between these binary categories, even as they are instructive of the juridico-political 
nature of the sovereign exception, does threaten to universalize our thinking of the 
subject (as bare life) only from within the “exceptional” space of the political. Thus, 
in Agamben’s world “one mode of existence is, territorially predominant, in being 
elevated or affirmed and another denied. There is exclusion here, but also inclusion. 
And for law, inclusion is ir r e d u c ib le . ”54 If “inclusion always exceeds membership,” if 
“the exception expresses precisely this impossibility of a system’s making inclusion 
coincide with membership, its reducing all its parts to u n it y ,’’ss then does one only 
recognize the singularity of homo sacer through a movement of generalisation that 
effaces it? In the pages to follow, I offer an affirmative as well as a negative answer.
□n the  tru e  w itness  -  the Muselmann
Agamben’s engagement with Auschwitz interrogates a universe that exceeds 
the factual elements making it upA6 He insists on the gaps, lacunas and cavities 
reserving for this universe a space that is forever and always somehow closed in upon 
itself, re-creating its own fragmentariness in order that it can bear witness to the 
latter’s presence. Agamben must rely on the constitutive power of the law to 
represent the workings of power over zoe, so that “the Muselmanner document the
53 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  25 .
54 F itzp atr ick , “B are S o v e r e ig n ty ,” 7 0 .
55 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  7 0 .
56 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  12.
45
total triumph of power over the human being” where “the regime realizes its 
quintessential self.”57 I f  Levi is correct in maintaining that the Muselmanner had no 
story, then bearing witness to their fate would have to come from an appeal to 
something other than language. Agamben is able to derive the nonrelational nature 
of language as something that is not “possible either to enter into relation or to move 
out of relation with what belongs to the form or relation itse lf’58 only if he accepts 
that language, too, figures as a ban presupposed by an ambiguity of fact that is 
undecidable.
In order to make the relationship between the sovereign exception and life 
indistinguishable, Agamben needs the Muselmanner to occupy both the zone of 
“suspended” law in a “state of exception,” as well as oscillate between the inside and 
outside of the juridico-political constitution of biopolitical being. Only after the law 
has been suspended can Agamben name homo sacer as the real sovereign subject, the 
“true carrier of sovereignty.”59 If, “the sovereign remains the one able to decide on 
whether and when” violence and law “will be distinguished,”60 then if fact and law are 
indistinguishable yet have to be decided upon, they must also be distinguished and 
distinguishable.61 The subject that has lost her standing before the law, that has been 
reduced to a non-wo(man), whose life has entered the realm of unpunishable 
sacrifice, whose body represents the ability of the sovereign to materialize suspended 
law, turns into the being charged with bearing witness to the fact of her own erasure. 
It seems to me that the Muselmanner can only be defined as non-wo(men) by making 
their wo(m an)-ness dependent on and defined by its relationship to the juridico- 
political. In the sense in which the rights and freedoms of the concentration camp 
inmates were nonexistent, in the sense in which there was no obligation on the part
57 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts , 4 8 .
58 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r , 5 0 .
59 A g a m b en , M e a n s  W ith o u t  E n d , 113.
60 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  6 4 .
61 F itzp atrick , “B are S o v e r e ig n ty ,” 67.
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of the German state towards granting or upholding any law accountable to these 
subjects, the Muselmanner were, indeed, homines sacri.
However, being human is not only a question of one’s relationship to the law, 
though, ironically, the latter has been evoked exclusively and repeatedly to rectify and 
grant reparation to Holocaust victims (as in the Nuremberg and Jerusalem trials). 
Being human informs the choices one makes in meeting the exigent needs of the 
present -  choices that are informed both by determination and by contingency 
(excess). The latter, brought on a pedestal by theorists of the excess/lim it, can be 
read as overlooking the real-life implications that an over-reliance on potentiality can 
have for the actual practice of state-sponsored and state-authorized violence. 
Agamben’s juridically-informed theory as exemplified in the four books of interest 
here, offers too restricted, too impoverished a portfolio of idioms. What, then, are the 
kinds of idioms that accommodate singularity without reducing it to terminology?
deciding (on) the (extra)ordinary
In an attempt to answer this question, I will borrow Veena Das’ concept of a 
“descent into the ordinary.” I would like to suggest that, though being a citizen is 
directly implicated on one’s relationship to a sovereign center, being human, on the 
other hand, exceeds a person’s relationship to the state and is not the foster child of 
politico-juridical guardianship. Speaking of the academic representations of Indian 
women after the violence of the India/Pakistan Partition of 1947, Das offers the 
following understanding of the nature of the human: “It appears to me that we render 
such acts as shocking and unimaginable only when we have a given picture of how the 
human subject is to be constructed. Thus, these descriptions seem to reaffirm the 
boundaries between civilized and savage, while allowing our picture of the human 
subject to remain intact.”62 What this suggests for an inquiry into the relationship
62 V een a  D as. L ife  a n d  W o r d s . V io len ce  a n d  th e  D e s c e n t in to  th e  O r d in a r y .  (B erk eley: U n iv e r s ity  o f  
C aliforn ia  P ress , 2 0 0 7 ) ,  79 .
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between subject and violence is that the two are mutually constituted as opposites 
that not only help explain one another, but that also essentialize and universalize our 
understanding of the ontology (nature) of Being. Likewise, violence is not always 
narratable through stories, other performative gestures or through numerical 
representations that have, for a long time now, been evoked either as non-biased acts 
of expression or as scientifically-potent tools. The sta te  o f  exception  itself is a 
construction and, rather than as an exclusively juridical problematique, will be 
discussed in relation to the question of making life live in ways that address the 
relationship between norm  and exception practiced and negotiated daily beyond 
sovereignty.
To supplement Das’ challenge of the unproblematic equation of violence with 
silence, the example of Paul Celan’s poetry in Chapter Three of this thesis, will show  
that suffering neither compromises the possibility of witness nor reserves for itself a 
special status vis-a-vis the question of truth. In that sense, bearing witness partakes 
in a universe that exceeds the factual elements that inform it. As argued by Jenny 
Edkins, “There is a non-coincidence between the subject we are, or the subject we 
think we are, and the subject we would like to be. We are striving for an imaginary 
wholeness, when these things would be reconciled, but that is impossible. There is 
always something more, a surplus or an excess -  what Agamben calls the remnant, 
what remains, perhaps ...”63 In that sense, to posit bearing witness to violence as a 
limit experience and homo sacer as a limit figure responsible only to the law of the 
exception exemplifies violence. According to Das, the unsayable that is often paired 
with trauma and suffering finds its expression in acts of ordinary, everyday life.
A question arises: can shuffling back and forth between the ontological and 
the historical be described in any systematic way? In the case of Veena Das, an
63 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  187.
everyday engagement with the work and lives of women and men celebrates time 
doing its work of “reframing and rewriting the memories of violence. ”6« She 
recognizes that what is intolerable is not so much the violence against the body of 
woman but rather, the fact that the renewed interest in bearing witness as truth- 
telling has been reserved, within academic discourses, for trauma-stamped instances 
of torture, rape, suffering and war from within theoretically-constructed categories 
themselves intended to accommodate the former’s definitional boundaries. If 
Agamben’s sta te  o f  exception has indeed become the underlying characteristic of 
modern life, and if the juridico-political suspension of law(s) has assumed real life 
dimensions, then what becomes of bearing witness to the exception? What could 
possibly be the truth-affirming power of a witness that informs of what it means to be 
human through the lens of inhuman, intolerable suffering?
problem atizing th e  'ex cep tion '
Perhaps Agamben’s question, “What is the relation between politics and life, if 
life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion? ”6s ought to be read 
not so much as addressing the figure of homo sacer, but as an invitation to 
understand bare life itself as a state of being human that problematizes the project of 
the exception itself. In that sense, (human) life becomes predicated beyond a 
juridico-political relationship representing zoe and bios in the figure of homo sacer 
and instead, as a state of being informed by an irreducible, ethically constituted 
relationship to natural life as zoe. While the relationship between power, the law, 
and the subject (in a “state of exception” or not) is central to being able to establish 
and define a criteria for attributing blame and restoring justice, a discussion of 
bearing witness cannot limit itself to the juridico-political essence of testimony that, 
as long as it is recorded as part of a discourse informed by pairs such as “victim” and
64 D as, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  9 0 .
65 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  7.
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“perpetrator,” “guilty” and “innocent,” “man” and “non-man,” fails to account for 
experiences that are not as easily addressed by the language of “exception.”
Agamben’s homo sacer, though highly informative of the precarious and often 
ambivalent relationship between state-sponsored violence and the law, is a term of 
identification that cannot unproblematically be applied to any and all situations 
falling under the category of juridical emergency. A “state of exception” is what 
necessitates, nurtures and gives meaning to the term homo sacer  and that, 
subsequently, validates and fills in the legal void that is the subject/citizen in a theory 
of the “exception.” While the being that can be killed but not sacrificed might be 
adequately applicable to those who perished in the concentration and work camps of 
WWII (and in other genocide camps), the testimony borne out of the historically 
specific event of the Shoah cannot be referenced just as liberally to other instances 
where law, water, food, or shelter have been suspended or put under the control of a 
sovereign center.
With regard to bearing witness, speaking by proxy about the concentration 
camps, while perhaps acceptable regarding the Muselmann, fails to take into account 
the anonymous, though not wholly unidentifiable, ways in which refugee testimony, 
for example, does little to account for or approximate the Muselmann and vice versa.
I agree with Veena Das when she says: “I would submit that the model of trauma and 
witnessing that has been bequeathed to us from Holocaust studies cannot be simply 
transported to other contexts in which violence is embedded into different patterns of 
sociality.”66 Likewise, if Agamben’s exception bears weight mostly as a juridico- 
political one, it ought to be reviewed and perhaps re-defined when applied to other 
categories of relationality. “He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set 
outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned  by it, that is, exposed
66 D as, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  103.
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and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become 
indistinguishable.”67 For Agamben to be able to say that, he not only has to define 
“he who has been banned” as a limit figure, but he must also be able to isolate homo 
sacer  as a “way of life” from all discourses on “naked life” (zoe) and into a theory of 
“inclusive exclusion” which, in order that it traverse the field of specific historical 
references, must choose as its end point an aporetic condition partial to “the powers 
of law and myth.”68
What is more, Agamben has to be able to equate life and the law, the 
exception and the rule, “nature and right [as] the presupposition o f  the jurid ica l 
reference in the fo rm  o f  its suspension .”69 If bios is given over to the sta te  o f  
exception, then zoe as natural life approximates Veena Das’ “descent into the 
ordinary,” where “time can be allowed to do its work of reframing or rewriting the 
memories of violence”70 beyond the structures of representation, interrogation, and 
appropriation. “This aporia between speaking and not speaking, between the 
compulsion to bear witness and the impossibility of doing so, is for Giorgio Agamben 
the very structure of testimony. Survivors of the camps bore witness to something it 
was impossible to bear witness to.”71
The silence of Agamben’s Muselmanner and the spatial lacuna occupied by 
the Holocaust witness are both, when measured against the ability of language to 
make known, possible precisely because they are recovered, nurtured and engaged 
from within a space that exceeds the juridico-political universe of the exception. If 
testimony “founds the possibility of the poem”72 and if testimony is a singularly 
linguistic engagement with a past event, then the legal exception that founds homo
67 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  2 8 .
68 A g a m b en , T he S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n ,  8 8 .
69 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  21, e m p h a s is  in  th e  o rig in a l.
70 D as, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  9 0 .
71 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s , 177.
72 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  3 6 .
sacer  becomes predicated also on the possibility of language to signify and exist as a 
sphere with no recourse to ends. Language as the third, the other of “event,” exists 
beyond the “pure undecidabilty of letters” echoing in “the voice of something or 
someone that, for entirely other reasons, cannot bear w it n e s s ”^  without situating 
itself as an ethical subject implied in a rhetoric of limits. In order that one does not 
romanticize the Muselmann and his silence, one ought to beware of grounding or un­
grounding the metaphysical subject in a language that produces the former out of a 
negative relationship to life.
The point of contention here is not so much that the suspension of law by 
itself does not belong to and define the “state of exception” but rather, that homo 
sacer as a category of identification be read as “the bare life of the citizen” now  
become “the new biopolitical body o f  h u m a n ity . ”74 The figure of the concentration 
camp inmate, that is, bare life within a now norm-alized “state of exception,” does 
little to challenge a reading of politics as the occasional taking turns of normal and 
abnormal periods. If anything, it underwrites an understanding of the state as a 
monolithic, unified and rational actor whose relationship to the exception is 
constituted by a parsimonious theory of the exception. Agamben does not often 
problematize the monolithically-posited nature of the categories of “norm” and 
“exception,” formally engaged as each other’s opposites.
The “state of exception,” as the norm overthrown by a sovereign center 
holding the monopoly over the use of power, disguises practices of power abuse 
already inscribed in the normal workings of state(s) as instances of emergent security 
only. This, in turn, leads to a state where the “exception,” now tracked, protected and 
modified exclusively by the sovereign center, stands for the law in a relationship that
73 P rim o  Levi q u o ted  in  A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  3 9 .
74 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r , 8 .
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sooner or later grants legitimacy to the “exception” and inaugurates it as the new  
“norm.” This, it seem s to me, is no different than a situation of international 
hypocrisy where the United States of America, calling itself a beacon of justice, can 
still refuse to submit its torture practices for review or grant those of its citizens 
suspected of terrorist activities due process of law. The political, made subject to 
such objectives, is thought solely as security. Thinking the political as a desire to out­
live security75 demands the kind of language that speaks on behalf of this insecurity.
Out of this new “norm” another exception is born in due time and then 
another which, in a Foucauldian universe, would represent all those instances of 
control on the part of the sovereign that, in the latter’s attempt to normalize and 
discipline his/her subjects, underwrites the everyday workings and dissemination of 
power. Within Agamben’s argument, the figure of the human being ends up being 
theorized as a limit figure that validates both the “norm” and the “exception,” the two 
related to it through mechanisms of security. The actual needs that the human living 
the political everyday faces are hardly accounted for by Agamben who would rather 
call for the termination of the state (in favour of a reality of “pure potentiality”) than 
recognize the actual potential that state institutions have to ensure, protect and 
perpetuate justice, democracy and equality.
While Agamben’s movement between the “norm” and the “exception” is clear 
enough theoretically, an engagement with the terms of “norm” and “exception” as 
such creates its own lacuna within the everyday life of human beings. As Michel 
Foucault has clearly shown, it is not necessarily the case that what is called the 
“norm” is, as such, normal or that there has ever been a political order whose 
organization and rules were exempt from the workings of power or, for that matter,
75 I b o rro w  th e  term  ‘o u t- liv in g ’ from  M ich a e l D illo n ’s P o litic s  o f  S e c u r i ty  (1 9 9 6 ). A n en g a g e m e n t w ith  
th e  larger  im p lic a tio n  o f  ‘o u t- liv in g  se c u r ity ’ w ill b e  o ffered  in th e  la st  ch a p te r  o f  th is  th e s is .
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that such an order is ever achievable. Veena Das cautions, in a similar manner, 
against the unproblematic recalling of painful memories in language: “even the idea 
that we should recover the narratives of violence becomes problematic when we 
realize that such narratives cannot be told unless we see the relation between pain 
and language that a culture has evolved.”76 Das alerts to the fact that ideas become 
institutionalized by certain historical, societal, and political practices and come to be 
understood only from within these very same inflexible boundaries.
In the sense in which the state (as sovereign, law-deciding, policing, 
legitimating actor) can exercise power in constructing the land of truth that is made 
public, the practice of bearing witness becomes directly implicated in the process of 
power dissemination. What is important is that an officially recognized (theorized) 
sta te  o f  exception  fails to recognize the myriad of practices through which power 
becomes infiltrated and mutates, especially through and in language as present in 
everyday life. The sta te  o f  exception, in the moment it recognizes and proclaims itself 
as the norm, enters into a relationship with power and truth-telling that abandons 
itself to the presumed autonomy and unity of the sovereign. As Jenny Edkins has 
suggested, “the testimony of survivors can challenge structures of power and 
authority”77 that, when unchallenged, reproduce a certain social order. In a similar 
fashion, Edkins has suggested that, while helpful in certain instances, linear 
narratives end up depoliticizing and sterilizing trauma.78 Her call for narratives 
“encircling the trauma” alerts to an interesting phenomenon. Truth-telling as 
bearing witness, predicated on the ability to make the past known, exposes not only 
the workings of sovereign power vis-a-vis language, but also the ability of the witness 
to construct, reshape and manipulate truth as well. This very possibility empowers.
?6 D a s, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  57 .
77 E d k in s, T ra u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  5.
78 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s .
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traum a: testim on y: tru th
This is important especially when dealing with instances of violence, torture
and suffering that, in their attempted dissolution of the subject, alter and affect the
subject’s own testimony and perception of truth. The latter has been addressed by
Dori Laub in his engagement with Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah. To a survivor’s
(factually incorrect) testimony to the presence of three chimneys at Auschwitz, Laub
responds in the following way:
It was her very talk to me, the very process of her bearing witness to the 
trauma she had lived through, that helped her now to come to know the event. 
And it was through my listening to her that I in turn came to understand not 
merely her subjective truth, but the very historicity of the event, in an entirely 
new dim ension .... She was testifying not simply to empirical historical facts, 
but to the very secret of survival and of resistance to e x t e r m in a t io n .”79
A problematization of the process of truth-telling alerts us not only to the ways in 
which truth can be suppressed, rejected and/or constructed but also, to the ways in 
which truth-telling itself is a creative and not simply a reconstructive activity that 
anchors the witness in a similar relationship to power as that characterizing the 
sovereign.
A closer look at the witness as victim and survivor, as subaltern and a 
marginalized human being draws attention to processes of truth-telling within which 
the witness constructs her/him self vis-a-vis once, the perpetrator, then, the judge as 
representative of the institution(s) of reparation, then again, history written in the 
archive, then also, the need to construct a “first hand” narrative in the public sphere 
that will remember, pass on, recognize and grant the witness-as-survivor her due 
place in cosmologies of sympathy, healing, and recognition.
79 D ori Laub. “B ea r in g  W itn e ss  an d  th e  V ic is s itu d e s  o f  L is te n in g ” In  T e s t im o n y . C r ise s  o f  W itn e s s in g  in  
L ite r a tu r e ,  P s y c h o a n a ly s is ,  a n d  H is to r y ,  5 7 -7 4 . S h o sh a n a  F elm an  an d  D ori Laub. (N e w  York: 
R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 2 ), 6 2 .
These “response-abilities” are tasks the witness must perform in order that 
her subjectivity be restored from the realm of “othered subjectivity” through the 
process of bearing witness. What is more, “the process of witnessing is not reduced 
to the effects of trauma. So, too, subjectivity is not reduced to the effects of trauma”80 
or to one’s ability to make this trauma known, for the latter can erase subjectivity 
right after granting it. Whether, as Jenny Edkins has suggested, some ways of 
speaking are indeed more truthful to trauma (time) than others, the question of 
bearing witness is informed not so much by a sole insistence on the healing, 
recuperative and restorative properties of victims’ testimony but by a recognition that 
insisting on the prescriptive and deterministic nature of scientifically-informed 
testimony does end up presenting the state as a monolithic body, the reference object 
of which is a unified center. Of course all research, trauma research included, is 
influenced by dominant views and ideas, but these are not only the prerogative of 
states, but also the domain of the very victims we sympathize with and relate to.
While “trauma tim e,” as coined by Jenny Edkins, does alert to a memory 
informed by fragmented, painful and irreparable relationships to a past event, it 
should not be depoliticized in an effort to grant victims the chance to reveal and 
experience emotional authenticity which is itself a political tool that aligns spheres of 
influence, power relationships and story-lines one against the other. Linear 
chronologies do in fact help reconstruct a basic timeline that helps position the 
subject vis-a-vis a painful past. The telling of an event is, as such, always somewhat 
violent with relationship to the individual’s actual experience of that event.
Therefore, how we choose to welcome, listen to and comment on both the event and 
the telling of it depends on being holistic and non-discriminatory in our 
methodological approaches. More specifically, this would mean accepting stories and
80 K elly O liver. W itn e s s in g . B e y o n d  R e c o g n itio n . (M in n e a p o lis :  U n iv ers ity  o f  M in n e so ta  P ress,
2 0 0 1 ) , 7
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poems, to give one example, as uniquely positioned fact pieces. Memory, in that 
sense, is not always informed by an appeal to any one psychological category and 
becomes institutionalized and depoliticized when made to fit there. Memory is 
always political, though it is not always politically correct.
Similarly, the process of bearing witness is not simply contained within the 
juridico-political terms of the sta te o f exception and must, in order that it remain 
possible, address the question of recognition beyond theoretical, juridical, or 
historical modes of engagement. Much like Judith Butler’s argument that “no speech 
is permissible without some other speech becoming impermissible,”81 for Agamben 
the ability to bear witness becomes circumscribed within an economy of 
subordination of linguistic to juridical fact. The latter, in turn, ends up engaging the 
subject from within a realm defined by sovereign power. While, as Butler recognizes, 
one’s ability to engage the world in language can be coercive, the choices the subject 
makes vis-a-vis language are not only and always directed by economies of power 
external to the self. If that were the case, overcoming violence would be impossible.
An alternative to this state of affairs would recognize that though the subject’s 
position in the world is not always an autonomous one, though the subject is 
constructed by her longing and melancholia, the former’s decision to speak and bear 
witness is a productive, performative, singular, and positive engagement both with 
language and with the world of juridical rule. Testimony, as Shoshana Felman has 
suggested, is perform ative  and not just cognitive, as far as it “strives to produce, and 
to enable, change .”82 It is a “‘relation of events,” “bits and pieces of a memory,” 
which figures as a “discursive practice” that does not, however, make up “a completed
81 J u d ith  B u tler  q u o te d  in  O liver, W itn e s s in g ,  6 3 .
82 S h o sh a n a  F e lm a n . “E d u ca tio n  an d  C risis, or th e  V ic is s itu d e s  o f  T e a c h in g .” In  T e s tim o n y . C r ise s  o f  
W itn e s s in g  in L ite r a tu r e ,  P s y c h o a n a ly s is ,  a n d  H is to r y ,  1-56. S h o sh a n a  F e lm a n  an d  D ori Laub. (N e w  
York: R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 2 ), 53 .
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statement, a totalizable account of those events. ” 83 The human being in a sta te  o f  
exception  as a non-wo(man) figures mostly in relationship to what cannot be said, 
fulfilling the aporia of bearing witness as a lack, rather than as a possibility unfolding 
anew and on its own terms every time. Subordination, in the sense in which it 
destroys the subject, also denies the process of witnessing. In the same way in which 
the sta te  o f  exception  posits as opposites law and emergency, the sovereign and the 
subject, language and silence only so that it would have to choose one over the other, 
so does an engagement with bearing witness as a process/result of a traumatic past 
foreclose the ability to bring memory of more than traumatic events into language.
ordered subjects
The question of who gets to speak what, when and how is, in its essence, at the 
heart of the process of bearing witness, which occupies the precarious spaces 
inhabited by human beings living on borderlines, on the margins, between zones of 
belonging and among the legal subjects of a state. An exploration of the process of 
bearing witness must, necessarily, concern itself with the ways in which power figures 
in relation to who gets to speak but also, in relation to who does not get to speak and 
why. A juridico-political discourse might give a legal answer to both these questions, 
even in instances where the line between law and exception has been blurred. What 
interests me, however, is the proposition that bearing witness happens often and 
precisely despite exceptions, without being predicated on anything else but its own 
need to unfold its unique singularity.
If economies of power affect who says what, when and how, then language is a 
political activity. Bearing witness as an activity of truth-telling taking place within 
language carries the mark of this politicization as well, though it is a politicization 
that does not take as its reference point the juridical that contains within itself
83 F e lm a n , “E d u ca tio n  an d  C r is is ,” 5.
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Agamben’s exception. In this sense and contra Agamben, the nature of the political 
that is of interest here is contained within everyday acts of speaking and address that 
are not predicated either on the law or on the sovereign inclusion that brings the 
former into the focus of the exception. In this sense, bearing witness alerts to just 
such kind of a politicization. “As a performative speech act, testimony in effect 
addresses what in history is action  that exceeds any substantialized significance, and 
what in happenings is im pact that dynamically explodes any conceptual reifications 
and any constative delimitations. ” 84
Testimony affects the ways in which a story is told; the setting up of 
documented narratives about the past affects the ways in which histories are written; 
the passing of judgment on the past affects the ways in which ethical categories are 
established; the decision about who can say what, when and how determines which 
assignments of identification are constructed and which are not; the establishing of 
guilt, innocence, and culpability affect the ways and modalities through the medium  
of which the law sets up everyday practices of interaction between the sovereign, the 
citizen as human being, and the law. More specifically concerning the relationship 
between calculability and bearing witness, for what information can the poet, political 
scientist, journalist, archivist, investigator, lawyer be responsible? What kinds of 
factual information are they responsible for? And if not for factual information, what 
is their particular relationship to the process of memory reconstruction? In the 
register of the body, the process of witnessing and its relationship to truth-telling is 
hardly ever only an exception, an excess or a lacuna (lack) that is juridically situated.
For Veena Das, shocking narratives can never be recovered without disturbing 
the fabric of everyday relations that help sustain life’s unfolding as such. That is, in 
order to bear witness to the horrors of violence, one must be taken out of the realm of
84 F e lm a n , “E d u ca tio n  an d  C r is is ,” 5.
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everyday relations and into a space on the border between madness and 
phantasmagoria. This is important because a positing of homo sacer as a limit figure 
makes the latter a spectacle. Much like the process of bearing witness, the status of 
the human being is not a question of all or nothing, of an exception or a norm, of 
language or silence, of truth or falsity. The condition of undecidability that 
necessitates a constant interrogation and exchange between dichotomous categories, 
when speaking a language derived from a juridico-political register, underwrites a 
state of affairs where opposites, in order that they be possible, must oscillate between 
“a rational mode and a magical mode of being.”85 The realm of law becomes illegible, 
shot through with ambivalence, and referenced by the exclusions that make possible 
its regulatory character. Or, in Agamben’s terminology: “the sovereign decision 
traces and from time to time renews this threshold of indistinction between outside 
and inside, exclusion and inclusion, nomos and physis, in which life is originarily 
excepted in law. Its decision is the position of the undecidable.”86
As Veena Das recognizes, it is not that in a sta te  o f exception the law is 
suspended altogether, but that the line drawn between the legal and the illegal is 
highly blurred. Justice involves the re-drawing of the boundary between legal and 
illegal, rather than conceding to a state of affairs where the two are indistinguishable. 
For Agamben to be able to maintain that “life, which is thus obliged, can in the last 
instance be implicated in the sphere of law only through the presupposition of its 
inclusive exclusion, only in an exceptio,”8? he must also agree to grant the “law that 
expresses itself in a ban”88 a purpose that is largely negative and disabling relative to 
the possibility of positive, reparatory, socially-conditioned relationality.
85 D a s, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  162.
86 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  27.
87 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  27.
88 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  2 9 .
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The sta te  o f  exception is not a phenomenon that appears suddenly, alters the 
‘normal’ ways of doing business and then, once it has run its course, gives way to a 
new normal way of being until another emergency sweeps through the registers of the 
juridical. For example, illegal immigrants have to negotiate their ability to remain in 
a country and work: a negotiation that is not always directly implicated in relations 
with the central government. Protests around the world (Myanmar, Georgia, and 
Pakistan in 2007) are unproblematically put down by police forces and defined as 
states of emergency. Hurricanes ripping through the Southern United States are 
dealt with so poorly by the United States federal government and its “emergency” and 
“security” agencies that “a state of emergency” might indeed be the norm in those 
parts of the land. The somewhat auspicious and ever increasing funnelling of 
resourses into relief agencies such as FEMA seems to have become exponentially 
dependent on the same agencies’ inability to deal with natural disasters, turning their 
own raison d’etre into a governmentally-fabricated “emergency.” Thus, attention is 
turned away from victims and the bodies of the dead and toward the unfortunate fate 
of ailing and inefficient bureaucratic structures. Nonetheless, to posit a sta te o f  
exception  as norm means to posit a world in which power’s hiding places become 
predicated upon the continuous (re)production of limit figures necessarily mediated 
by processes of exclusion and opposition, filtered always through the prism of the 
juridical that is beyond the human.
The nation-state has, indeed, always been founded upon its ability to exclude 
unwanted subjects, to create illegals (refugees, aliens, migrants) and define the 
coordinates of its proper (juridical and political) universe through the definition of 
difference as dangerous and foreign. The categories of territory, citizen, and nation 
have never actually represented the sovereign center as stable, at least not without 
always being subject to the exceptions borne within and outside of them. It is 
politically problematic that, in a sta te o f emergency, homo sacer can be theorized as
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a “whatever singularity” that is “no longer characterized either by any social identity 
or by any real condition of belonging”8^
Life in camps exceeds its own factual elements much like any bearing witness 
is more than a recollection of past events. Testimony, never simply generalizable, 
relates (to) a single event as a process of retrieval that yields case-specific summaries. 
Through it, the political is recovered and defined beyond the scope of any one 
academic theory, however strong the latter’s external validity and generalizability 
might be. Testimony is, as Shoshana Felman has suggested, a discursive practice, as 
opposed to a pure theory.9°
The sovereign, defined as the signifier of the “zone of indistinction” at the 
limit of the law, is a discursive practice himself, much like a law that is in force but 
does not signify or prescribe anything (as in Kafka’s parable of the law). Once we 
recognize this, sovereign power can be discussed and conceptualized as a dynamic 
performative that exceeds constative or affirmative limitations. Bearing witness, 
itself a performative engagement with a past, evokes the figure of the human being 
beyond generalizations and monolithic representations. The sovereign, thus, is a 
witness to his own humanity as well. The tension here is between the potentiality 
contained within language to testify and the inherent silences and lacunas (borrowing 
Agamben’s terminology) that accompany the work of memory. If “the gesture of 
assuming responsibility is ... genuinely juridical and not ethical,’’91 the gesture of 
bearing witness is also genuinely a question of remaining faithful to the aporia 
contained in the “unassumability” and “unreliability” of witness in language. In the 
sense in which the process of bearing witness is non-generalizable, non-repeatable or
89 A g a m b en , M e a n s  W ith o u t E n d ,  8 7 .
90 F e lm a n , “E d u ca tio n  an d  C r is is ,” 5.
91 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  2 2 .
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identical to anything else but itself, it also figures as a singular engagement within 
language that shows itself in relation to a similarly singular events2
barmti testim ony
If Agamben is correct is maintaining that “sovereign violence posits law and 
conserves it, thus maintaining the link between violence and law even at the point of 
their in d i s t in c t io n ,”93 then the law in its totality works in an inverse relationship to 
the ban , the latter’s ambiguity not so very ambiguous to the living, psychosomatic 
even, bodies of human beings not as easily theorized as homo sacer or conceived of in 
relationship to the “drowned,” the Muselmanner. Testifying to a singular truth that 
at the same time must efface itself, bearing witness enters the political as it relates to 
and is conceived of as an activity not predicated on a juridical understanding of 
history and fact. Paradoxically, the singular has its own ways of being generalized in 
order that it can be said, which is why I will argue that poetry’s acausality offers the 
least bad way of operationalizing the aporetic relationship between the singular and 
the universal. Moving both language and law beyond mere functionality allows for an 
address that is the event of bearing witness to take place. Since, as Martin Heidegger 
knew well, language as representation is always only limited to a human system of 
signification (or, to the metaphysics of the subject) the world must always take place 
before and beyond translation in the very instance of the linguistic event i t s e l f .94 
Bearing witness as a singular event offers the possibility of remaining attentive both 
to the historicity and to the constant unfolding of what it means to be human.
What is paradoxical and, at the same time, axiomatic, is the fact that no 
matter how horrible, indescribable, unthinkable, inhuman, and cruel the treatments 
of the human being can be, s(h)e can and does adapt to them and still survives as
92 M ario n , In E x c e ss , 3 6 .
93 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  64 .
94 Z iarek. T he H is to i' ic i ty  o f  E x p e r ie n c e , 5 6 .
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human. That is, if we acknowledge that being human evolves, changes, mutates and 
defies definition then being human, in addition to being alive, involves also being 
adaptable, supple, and resilient. This means, in turn, that suffering does not reduce 
wo(man) to a category by removing us from the kind of stuff that makes us human.
What is tragic and, at the same time, also beautiful is one’s ability to survive 
not only the m ost unspeakable horrors, but also to inflict them on others. Bearing 
witness tries to think through this seemingly shameful, horrifying, counter-intuitive, 
ethically-challenging state of affairs. It is in this sense that Paul Celan’s realization 
that “nobody bears witness for the witness” makes it ethically problematic to 
distinguish dignity from dishonour, shame from self-respect, the human from the 
non-human. Any concept that deals with categories of Being is inherently both of an 
ethical and of a juridical nature. As a process of unfolding and bringing forth, I argue 
that bearing witness helps recover the humanity that has been lost, compromised or 
suspended (by victim as well as by perpetrator) in instances of war, rape, 
displacement, torture, death, and murder.
By creating the category of homo sacer, Agamben institutes a species of 
human being that, as a “non-man,” makes thinkable (though not necessarily 
justifiable) the violence and sheer beastliness of ‘normal’ people doing things from  
behind the mask of orders, exceptions, weakness, survival, or madness. The figure of 
the human being outside law is contingently tied to the ways in which the former 
theorizes the politics of the event without constituting its own breed of sovereigns.
It is not out of a need to restore order and security that bearing witness can 
act as a cathartic or a healing process. As I have tried to show, in a sta te  o f  exception, 
with the law suspended, the appeal to reparation needs to be to something other than 
the juridical. It is not in service of a juridico-political construction of normal
64
wo(man) that recalling the past does its work; and it is not in order to punish 
‘perpetrators’ that ‘victims’ undergo the difficult task of sifting through and making 
known their (painful) past. Because every survivor also becomes a third party at the 
moment of bearing witness and because, though claiming special knowledge, the 
philosopher him self only ever remains a secondary witness, bearing witness testifies 
to the temporal fracture of an event and not to the erasure of subjectivity. In that it 
speaks for the excess of event over language, but also language over event, bearing 
witness uncovers the fractured nature of all enunciation. The process of recovery 
symptomatic of the ethical responsibility to speak inherent in being human cannot be 
limited to a juridical prescription predicated upon life as bare life in a sta te  o f  
exception.
Therefore, bearing witness to the Holocaust is not just a commentary on the 
Truth of the Nazi camps or on instances and methods of torture and violence. There 
is nothing in the nature of the concentration camp that, recorded and studied, evokes 
a desire or the need for replication. Its repetition serves, rather, as a challenge to the 
theoretical appropriation of naked life (zoe) as a zone of indistinction itself.
anom a-lous subjects
In an important sense, the category of homo sacer allows Giorgio Agamben to 
assign to it all those negative, excessive, abnormal, unthinkable characteristics 
otherwise attributed to madmen, the sick, or the possessed. What makes homo sacer 
even more problematic is the fact that, as the materialization of the sta te o f  
exception, it allows Agamben to state the following: “Life and law, anomie and 
nomos, auctoritas and potestas, result from the fracture of something to which we 
have no other access than through the fiction of their articulation and the patient 
work that, by unmasking their fiction, separates what it has claimed to unite.”95 The
95 A g a m b en , T he S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n ,  8 8 .
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aporia informing the ability to bear witness, while informative of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between seeming opposites, suggests that the firm ground of 
language gives way under the philosopher’s feet as the latter tries to recover the 
infallibility of enunciation, of bringing forth, of explaining events through theory. 
Agamben is correct to recognize that “if, as has been suggested, terminology is the 
properly poetic moment of thought, then terminological choices can never be 
neutral.”96 It is within the very excess of the signified over the signifier in language 
that the figure of the human being bears witness infinitely in excess of witness over 
every universalized signification.
Thinking beyond the juridical character of the concentration camps means 
engaging the “always singular historicity of the event”97 of displacement, 
imprisonment, and genocide that cannot be unproblematically deferred to a 
universal, phantasmal framework of relating or to the law of violence in the “state of 
exception.” At the same time, it also means thinking up the kind of language that can 
speak to this oscillation between the singular and the universal; thinking about the 
general medium through which witness takes place and testimony is delivered. It 
means thinking about the weight and final meaning of the many idioms of 
signification that accommodate the performative nature of bearing witness. Poetry, 
one such idiom, problematizes both the business of truth-telling and the figure of the 
truth teller, alerting to the close relationship between the activity of truth telling and 
the distribution of power.98 Through the language of poetry, the witness “testifies to 
its own impossibility, its own cryptonymic opacity, and its serial persistence.”99 For 
Alain Badiou, this persistence is “where the subject perseveres, the unknowable 
within the truth event, the immanent gap of knowledge the belated subject of a truth
96 A g a m b en , T h e S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n , 4 .
97 Z iarek, T he H is to r ic i ty  o f  E x p e r ie n c e ,  41.
98 M ich e l F ou cau lt. F e a r le s s  S p eech . (C am bridge: M IT P ress, 2 0 0 1 ) , 169.
99 Ian  B au com . S p e c te r s  o f  th e  A tla n t ic .  (D u rh a m , NC: D u k e U n iv ers ity  P ress , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  182.
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can never entirely grasp, a gap that corresponds to the lacuna that both Agamben and 
Derrida situate at the heart of testimony.”100
To suggest that the concentration camp inmates were nothing but bare life,101 
to suggest that we are all refugees by virtue of the fact that the “state of exception” has 
been declared the “norm” can be read as overlooking the material singularity of the 
Shoah, of every instance of displacement one can name in history, and of the ways in 
which there is always a physical aspect of a specific someone being recalled, 
inaugurated as an example of the “exception” that surpasses any and all levels of 
normative or empirical universalization. What I am suggesting is that in the midst of 
every “exception,” life happens precisely because it is not sacrificed, because it is 
continuously produced, nurtured, killed, buried, mourned, and conceived (of) again. 
Yes, the witness, too, is the thinker of that life. In an important way, an exclusively 
juridico-political engagement cannot do justice to just this kind of exception within 
“the state of exception.”
In Chapter Five I will show that the law and the “state of exception” are not 
only distinguishable, for example, inside a refugee camp, but that they are exceeded 
by a reality of relentless making-live what “absolutely cannot be appropriated or 
made judicial.”102 If we accept Agamben and Walter Benjamin’s discussion on the 
normalized “state of exception,” then the figure of the citizen becomes at least partly 
as problematic and de-politicized as that of homo sacer. The latter’s conception is 
supported also by the realization that as a limit figure, it is always in the process of 
arriving in our midst. The juridico-political category of the citizen, still very much 
conceived in relationship to the sovereign nation-state, does not exhaust the myriad
100 Q u o te d  in  B a u co m , S p e c te r s ,  183.
101 A g a m b en , M e a n s  W ith o u t E n d , 19.
102 W alter  B en ja m in  q u o ted  in A g a m b en , T he S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n ,  64 .
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ways in which the displaced human being, once definitive of, then defined by the 
sovereign, actually problematizes the concept of the limit as such.
How can a limit concept call into question “the fundamental categories of the 
nation-state,”103 or any other category at all? Limit concepts, beyond and because of 
the function they serve in exposing the violence inherent in regimes of power, do not 
offer a decision on the monopoly that the concept of “the limit” depends on for being 
possible. If we return to Ziarek’s definition of an event as irreducible to a scientific 
cosmology of space and time, then there is a sense in which this irreducibility to any 
one system of representational or linguistic symbols also projects the political/poetic 
and highly contingent nature of the event as a non-limit concept, properly situated 
“in the interest of that which is unseen and prudently incalculable . ” 104 H omo sacer, as 
the being whose natural life has been transformed as bios, can only be conceived of in 
the image of the citizen as example of calculability.
What Agamben discloses as the (normalised) exception enters the singularity 
of the event as hostage to theory. “The sovereign exception is, thus, the figure in 
which singularity is represented as such, which is to say, insofar as it is 
unrepresentable.”103 Agamben seems to want, and what else can he do, to distinguish 
between the singular and the universal if only to inaugurate, at the same time, the 
survivor at the heart of a biopolitical project of “inclusive exclusion” -  a theoretical 
turn not altogether immune to ideological imperialism. In this sense the claim that 
“we are all refugees” is both a necessary inclusion or ontologization of the refugee as 
the marginalized basis of the polis  and -  in one and exactly the same gesture -  a new 
exclusion or appropriation, which is all the more violent for coming to us under the
103 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r , 134.
104 J o h n  D e w e y  q u o te d  in  H ilary  P u tn a m . E th ic s  W ith o u t O n to lo g y .  (C am b rid ge: H arvard  U n iv ers ity  
P ress, 2 0 0 5 ) ,  11.
10s A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  24 .
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guise of being an admission. In this sense both the Muselmann and the refugee are 
theorized as limit figures and used to move between the singular and the universal 
where politics is absorbed in the juridical figure of the law.
In order that he relate his discussion of nomos106 to the potentiality of 
(sovereign) power as the pure indistinction between violence and law, Agamben 
maintains that “until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality has replaced the 
ontology of the primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality, a political theory 
freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable.”10? In a highly un- 
Schmittean turn of gaze, the impossible passage between potentiality (singularity) 
and actuality (universality) not only denotes a zone of indistinction which, in the state 
of exception, oversees law passing into (unmediated) violence but is, in the camp, 
suspended and exposed as the pure manifestation of life “communicating itself 
immediately.”108 Having named bare life as the threshold of indistinguishability 
between sovereign power (violence) and law (justice), Agamben does not 
operationalize the figure of her/him  who can be killed but not sacrificed beyond the 
death-life dichotomy espoused to by the apparatus making up the ban  and the 
possibility not-to-be the norm. “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history 
that corresponds to this fact. Then we will have the production of the real state of 
exception before us as a task . ” 1Q9
The “concept of history” corresponding to Walter Benjamin’s exception-as-
rule refers to the need for a conception of language able to speak the idioms of arrival
and reception. What Benjamin’s illuminating recognition poses are the ways in
106 “T h e s o v e r e ig n  n o m o s  is  th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  J o in in g  la w  a n d  v io le n c e , th r e a te n s  th e m  w i th  
in d is t in c t io n ” (A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  31, e m p h a s is  in  th e  o r ig in a l).
10? A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  4 4 . W h eth e r  th is  s ta te m e n t  h o ld s  or n o t  w ill b e  ex a m in e d  w ith  g rea ter  
e m p h a s is  in  th e  ch a p te r  th a t  is  to  fo llo w .
108 W alter  B en jam in  q u o ted  in  A g a m b en , T he S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n ,  62 .
109 W alter  B en ja m in  q u o ted  in A g a m b en , T he S ta te  o f  E x c e p tio n ,  55 .
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which the human being, explained as the exception now become rule, comports 
her/him self in a time to-come, a time whose continuous arrival bears witness to a 
past no longer only a remnant. In fact, the answer to the exception is not to remain in 
that condition, recognizing that there is something within the “state of exception” 
that exceeds its own materiality. If “life is ultimately political in its facticity” and if 
“facticity,” after Heidegger, “does not mean simply being contingently in a certain 
way and a certain situation, but rather means decisively assuming this way and this 
situation by which what was given must be transformed into a task,”110 then one 
possible, though easy, outcome of bearing witness is understanding the human as 
constituted through a poetic engagement testifying to a responsibility to be present.
It is at the conclusion of a carefully constructed argument linking Auschwitz 
to the juridical “state of exception,” to homo sacer  and then back to the question of 
sovereign power as the foundation of bare life that Agamben can declare that 
“Auschwitz is, by now, everywhere.”111 Being outside, yet belonging, cannot 
unproblematically be superimposed on just any group of human beings: the refugee, 
the migrant, the illegal alien, the criminal, the homeless, the university professor. 
Beyond being juridico-political in nature, the condition of being in the world also 
implies a spatial-linguistic identification. If the sta te o f  exception engages the excess 
of law taking up residence in the spaces previously unauthorized or suspended within 
‘normal’ law, the latter becomes, beyond a juridico-political concept, the “empty 
space” and “pure being” within language subject to no other condition or end but 
itself.
It is because of this that bearing witness as a process of addressing aporias 
and lacunas is a singular engagement both with language and with lived, everyday
110 A g a m b en , H o m o  S a c e r ,  1 5 3 ,1 5 0 .
111 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  2 0 .
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experience(s). Primo Levi’s take on Paul Celan’s poetry offers a similar insight into 
the nature of poetic language: “If his is a message, it is lost in the ‘background noise.’ 
It is not communication; it is not a language, or at the most it is a dark and maimed 
language, precisely that of someone who is about to die and is alone, as we will all be 
at the moment of death.”112 The lacuna of language collapses in the poetic bringing 
forth in a way that allows for the incommunicable, “maimed” testimony to emerge.
conclusion: poetic w itness and subjectivity
To put it more succinctly: the missing articulation between the living being 
and logos is the event of poetry. Bearing witness, a process both of bringing forth and 
forgetting of facts, is not oriented toward a graspable truth through which the subject 
moves in language; a truth that, if recovered, would reclaim and make the subject 
whole again. Bearing witness informs our engagement with human beings not so 
much by making amends and filling gaps, but by conceptualizing a relationship 
between language and the subject that is unpredicated on any appeal to knowledge 
and verification beyond the obligation to address. What Agamben does in defining 
the concentration camp survivor as a remnant, as the instant of witnessing, sets up a 
theoretical space from within which the survivor’s testimony can be theorized as the 
experience of the impossible. As such, the latter become a non-sensical category.
For Agamben to be able to say that “there is no moment in which language is 
inscribed in the living voice, no place in which the living being is able to render itself 
linguistic, transforming itself into speech , ” n 3 he must predicate the possibility of 
witness on the permanence of homo sacer as a limit figure and define bearing witness 
as a process of operationalization of the ultimate deferral of subjectivity and 
signification. To make the human being subject either to language or to law exclusive
112 P rim o  Levi q u o ted  in  A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  37 .
“ 3 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  129.
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of each other means to subscribe to an ontology predicated on the twin poles of 
inside/outside, singular/universal superseded by a differentiating account of the 
human as locked within the lacuna of language, compromised in the pronouncement 
of the “I.” Establishing a connection between the desubjectified being and language 
through the lens of the exception allows Agamben to define testimony as “something 
like a unitary  center to which one can refer lived experiences and acts, a firm point 
outside of the oceans of sensations and psychic states.”114 Thus, he can endorse a 
virtual rather than a historical singularity only to prove how the former might 
intersect with the historical (something Jacques Derrida is careful not to do).
Once Agamben overcomes the paralyzing realization of the non-articulation of 
language, once he agrees to un-“suspend the I,” once testimony has been made 
possible as “something that cannot be assigned to a subject but that nevertheless 
constitutes the subject’s only dwelling place, its only possible consistency,”us 
somewhere in the dwelling place between the human and the “non-human” appears a 
word, a sound: the advent of the witness. If Hilary Putnam is right in saying that 
“there are neither only particular things nor only universal properties,... [and] ethical 
life accords ill with the ambitions of ontologists,”116 then the poor, wretched, 
excluded, stateless, Agamben’s homines sacri are the very agents that alert to the 
dynamic, ethically-informed and ontologically-singular nature of all witnessing. 
Experience, in its incalculability, allows for the historicity of event to unfold under 
the rubric of bare life only if the latter posits itself not only in man’s “extreme 
potentiality to suffer that is inhuman”11? but also, in an inauguration of an ethics that, 
beyond death and silence, touches upon the ways and idioms through which everyday 
life can be assumed and addressed on its own terms.
n 4 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  122.
115 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  130.
116 P u tn a m , E th ic s  w i th o u t  O n to lo g y ,  2 0 , 33 .
117 A g a m b en , R e m n a n ts ,  7 8 .
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C hap ter Two 
'Ypur question  -  your a n s w e r / 
Bearing w itness, pnetry , and the  debt tn life.
As discussed in the previous chapter, bearing witness is never simply a 
juridico-political process guided by an appeal to truth that results in the codification 
and institutionalization of language. Since no law represents a singular expression of 
justice, though it claims to operate in the name of the latter, a discussion of the 
juridico-political must exceed a discussion of laws. An engagement with the question 
of bearing witness likewise necessitates a discussion both of the juridico-political and 
of the ethico-political dimensions of language informing the nature of 
communicating the memory and meaning of event. What this suggests for the nature 
of truth is that the latter’s accessibility through memory does not always serve the 
end of facts. The relationship between recollection and truth is not self-evident much 
in the same way that the relationship between language and testimony is often 
compromised by the experience of the unsayable. In this chapter, I will examine the 
question of bearing witness in language as it has been discussed by Jacques Derrida.
I hope to be able to establish a connection between singularity, the poetic, 
performativity, and witnessing exemplified in the aporetic, mutually constitutive 
relationship between memory, truth and language. Though Derrida’s work will be my 
reference point, I shan’t limit my discussion of bearing witness to his oeuvre only.
Derrida’s discussion of “the poetic” as an authentic linguistic idiom will open 
the way for a discussion of everyday ways of bearing witness that situate themselves 
outside the universe of the poem proper. In his discussion of Paul Celan, Jacques 
Derrida succumbs to temptation and presents poetic language as autonomous, out of 
our control, and almost beyond the scope of interpretation. Thus, my preliminary 
questions to Derrida: Is poetic witness exemplary of the singularity of ‘event’ in ways 
that are actually informed by lived experience? How resuscitative is the ability of
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poetry if the latter is also undecidable? Is the authentic relationship between 
singularity and truth exempt from being accountable for its ‘mourning’ tendency?
What I suggest in the engagement to follow is that poetry, when it happens, 
does so through the calculable idioms of language that enable communication in 
general. In order to be able to address and/or answer my own questions, I will review 
more closely the thought of Jacques Derrida whose engagements with the nature of 
language and truth offer both a theoretical and a methodological entry point for any 
discussion of bearing witness. I hope to be able to show that the essential moment of 
bearing witness has to do not only with communication, but is also an act of faith 
contingent on, though not defined by, subject-object relations. In an effort to 
problematize the presentation of any one modality of bearing witness as better, more 
suited, truthful or reliable, I begin by engaging the following Derridean question: “In 
what way can any writing at all be exemplary (Celan for example) of a “singularity of 
an idiomatic event,” of a “regulated generality of a schema”?118
introducing the  D erridean  w itness
Even though Giorgio Agamben argues that the example of the Musselman is 
enough to establish a discourse on the exception, his is nonetheless a rather passive 
and appropriated dynamic. As shown, Agamben’s appeal to the Musselman as the 
remnant becomes an ethically-compromised and politically-problematic category 
that takes its lead from an insistence not on life, but on a definitional dependence 
between the “exception” and “bare life,” the latter being both definitive of and defined 
by the exception. Agamben’s contribution to a discussion of bearing witness is, 
though highly revealing, also rather questionable. His desire for the exception to 
work leads him to overlook the ways in which the exception informs rather than
118 J a c q u e s  D err id a . W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e . (C h icago: U n iv ers ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 1 9 7 8 ), 9 8 .
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negates (everyday) being, being itself exceptional. As Geoffrey Hartman has shown,
“To talk about the authenticity of moral life in the camps or similar conditions is
problematic always excepting some remarkable episodes. Moreover, to found
authentic testimony on the silence of the dead, or of the impassive Musselman,
evades the entire question concerning the authenticity of the witness accounts that do
exist . ” n 9 Hartman criticizes Agamben for omitting to mention, discuss and/or
address existing testimonies that engage the Holocaust and that, though arguably
incomplete and factually-disparate in nature, contribute to a large body of material
archives and testimonies relating the (memory of the) Holocaust to the world. In a
similar move, this chapter will pose the poetic not as the best idiom for relating
(traumatic) experience, but as one among many idioms implicated in, unformed by,
and underwriting the process of bearing witness as one of responsibility. Derrida
testifies to the event of the Holocaust thus:
I  do not know whether fro m  this nameless thing that one calls the fin a l 
solution one can draw  something that still deserves the name o f  a lesson.
But if  there w ere a lesson to be draw n, a unique lesson am ong the a lw ays  
singular lessons o f  murder, fro m  even a single murder, fro m  all the collective 
exterm inations o f history (because each individual m urder and each 
collective m urder is singular, thus infinite and incommensurable), the lesson 
that w e would draw  today -  and if  w e can do so then w e m ust -  is that we  
m ust think, know, represent fo r  ourselves, form alize, ju dge  the possible  
com plicity am ong all these discourses and the w orst (here the fin a l 
solution’) .120
What follows from the proposition that bearing witness is not simply a 
juridico-political engagement with a past event is an acknowledgement of the 
dynamic, highly contingent nature of witnessing as such. Hartman’s insistence on 
the need for a ‘caring ear’121 invites us to consider bearing witness as an 
intersubjective experience. What that means is that the latter becomes constitutive of 
the subject’s ability to speak of the past in an authentic and faithful, though often
119 G eoffrey  H a rtm a n . S c a r s  o f  th e  S p ir i t .  T he S tr u g g le  A g a in s t  I n a u th e n tic i ty .  (N e w  York: P algrave  
M a cm illa n , 2 0 0 2 ) ,  91-2 .
120 J a c q u e s  D errida . A c ts  o f  R e lig io n .  (N e w  York: R o u tled g e , 2 0 0 2 ) ,  2 9 8 , e m p h a s is  in  orig in a l.
121 H a rtm a n , S c a r s  o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  8 6 .
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unscientific and/or factually sound, manner. If we consent that there is no neutral 
language as such and that all language carries within itself a meaning that gives it its 
origin, if the relationship between speaking, memory and witness is always 
contingent on an audience, then the process of bearing witness, experienced 
linguistically, necessarily defines and necessitates a subject. This is even more so the 
case when testifying to limit (traumatic) experiences. A breakdown of speech, when 
it does happen, in order that it may be re-articulated as event, must move language 
beyond a limit experience and adopt an idiom understandable by others. Bearing 
witness to limit experiences, posing a linguistic challenge, announces and opens up 
the possibility for alternative modalities of engaging and relating the past. An event, 
here understood as a singular, one-time occurrence in the past, demands a similarly 
singular mode of presentation that cannot always be limited to one or another 
preferred idiom. In addition to archiving the past through writing, bearing witness as 
a process of recovery and re-membering calls forth a number of other idioms, namely 
oral testimony, story-telling, poetry, dance, art. This chapter will examine the 
possibility of language as such and of poetry more specifically to exemplify the 
singularity of an(y) event. A close reading of Jacques Derrida through the lens of 
Geoffrey Hartman, Richard Beardsworth and myself will help guide this journey.
'ev en t' and being in the  world
An engagement with the concept of ‘event’ alerts us to its dual ontological and 
historical nature. The former, the “there is-ness” of event, is supplemented by the 
occurrence of event at a specific point in time. For Derrida, events “are singular, they 
occur just once.”122 What is more, “there is the history and there is the event that 
transforms the situation. Now if this event is a literary one, it doesn’t happen just
122 J a c q u e s  D errida . E th ics , I n s t i tu tio n s , a n d  th e  R ig h t to  P h ilo so p h y . (L an h am : R o w m a n  an d
L ittle fie ld  P u b lish ers, 2 0 0 2 b ) ,  47 .
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once at the moment when it is produced,”125 making the recollection o f ‘event’ 
partially contingent on fiction. From the point of view of bearing witness to this 
ontico-ontological nature of ‘event,’ the historical is always already affected by the 
excess of the ontological -  by the excess of Being over being(s), of event over events. 
For Derrida, “the ontico-ontological difference,” what “Heidegger calls the difference 
between Being and beings, “remains unthought.”124 Lacoue-Labarthe, summarizing 
Alain Badiou, maintains that event is ’’the taking-place of that-which-is-not-being-as- 
being, of the order of the supplement or of the supernumerary... as withdrawn from 
knowledge, undecidable or indiscernible, rebelling against every presentation and yet 
capable of being thought as a truth, actually and after the fact, and thus requiring 
intervention and fidelity.”125 We do not have a way of speaking about the duality of 
event other than by always speaking about it as one or the other, by always referring 
to its taking place in specificity and to its universal implications. Because of its 
specific manifestation, it cannot be represented other than through specific examples. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I read this as saying that bearing witness is language 
as practice. In this sense, “event overflows all works of actualization, justice 
overflows all works of law, the incalculability of surprise overflows all calculability of 
decision ... [what] Derrida calls ‘messianic without m essianism.’”126
The event, because of its constitutive duality, becomes a point of contention 
for writers, (continental) philosophers and researchers, all of whom, aware of the 
relationship between event and time, between theory and temporality, must choose a 
side in this ontico-ontological difference. The specificity of event is what I will refer 
to as singularity that from here onwards will be recruited in speaking about bearing 
witness. On the one hand, the ontological reveals itself as it happens, through
123 D err id a , E th ic s , I n s t i tu t io n s  a n d  th e  R ig h t  to  P h ilo s o p h y ,  4 8 .
124 J a c q u e s  D errida . P o s it io n s .  (C h icago: T h e  U n iv ers ity  o f  C h icago  P ress , 1981), 9.
12s P h ilip p e  L acou e-L ab arth e. H e id e g g e r  a n d  th e  P o li t ic s  o f  P o e tr y .  (C h icago: T h e  U n iv ers ity  o f  
C h icago  P ress , 2 0 0 7 ) ,  19.
126 S atiyab rata  D as. “T h e  M ela n ch o lic  N a m e .” (P a p er  p re se n te d  at L an caster  U n iv ers ity , N o v e m b e r
2 0 0 6 ) ,  2.
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examples, tests, etc. On the other hand, replete with specific examples, a theory of 
event must move beyond specificity in order to save itself from becoming simply 
calculable. Ontology, thus, is always contaminated by what it wants to exemplify.
This has three important implications for bearing witness as the process of 
event-remembering. For Dori Laub, “A witness is a witness to the truth of what 
happens during the event.”127 First, one cannot escape bearing witness; second, one 
has to do it continually and third and following from the previous two, one must 
decide how to comport oneself in the face of the demands that bearing witness places 
on questions of truth, politics and memory. In this sense and depending on one’s 
response to this last imperative, the choices made by the subject regarding bearing 
witness reveal a particular understanding informing the ways in which the world is 
organized, addressed, and studied. In other words, the ontological unfolding of Being 
is mediated through particular modes of testifying to that Being. In the case of 
Jacques Derrida, I argue, a privileging of the poetic reveals an underlying faith in the 
contingency, createdness and dynamism making and re-making the world. “The 
emergence o f  the event ought to puncture every horizon o f expectation. Whence the 
apprehension o f an abyss in these places, fo r  example a desert in the desert, there 
where one neither can nor should see coming w h at ought our could -  perhaps -  be 
y e t to come. W hat is still left to com e .”128 For Giorgio Agamben, a juridico-political 
choice was aligned with the privileging o f ‘exception,’ revealing an underlying 
ontological understanding of the world as the relationship between limit and the 
normalized exception. I argue that, in fact, only the ordinary makes the 
extraordinary possible.
127 D ori Laub. “A n  E v en t W ith o u t a W itn e ss: T ruth , T e stim o n y , an d  S u rv iv a l.” In  T e s t im o n y :  C r is is  in  
L ite r a tu r e ,  P s y c h o a n a ly s is ,  a n d  H is to r y ,  7 5 -9 2 . S h o sh a n a  F e lm a n  a n d  D ori Laub. (N e w  York:
R o u tled g e , 1 9 9 2 ), 8 0 .
128 D errid a , A c ts  o f  R e lig io n ,  4 7 , e m p h a s is  in  orig in a l.
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I will begin my engagement with Jacques Derrida by posing the following 
questions: What is the relationship between an understanding of event as ‘singular’ 
and the modalities through which it finds its expression in the language of witness? 
Does ‘event’ have to be singular for bearing witness to be singular in relation to it and 
vice versa? Is singularity a posture in relation to the excess of event over the witness 
one can bear to it? In order to answer these queries, I will engage ‘singularity’ as 
discussed by Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy and will then explore the 
possibilities of defining the process of bearing witness as a singular activity.
Reading Derrida, Derek Attridge suggests that singularity “can never be 
reduced by criticism or theoretical contemplation” for the relationship between 
singularity and generality is “not merely a paradoxical coexistence but a structural 
interdependence.”129 One account o f ‘event,’ that of Jean-Luc Marion, defines ‘event’ 
as that which gives itself once at the moment of its happening thus making the latter 
unrepeatable and irreducible to anything else but itself.130 For Derrida, both ‘event’ 
and ‘recit’ (witness) alert us to the impossibility of deciding once and for all on “the 
simple borderlines of this corpus, of this ellipsis, unremittingly cancelling itself 
within its own expansion. When we fall back on the poetic consequences enfolding 
within this dilemma, we find that it becomes difficult indeed to speak here with 
conviction about a recit as a determined mode included within a more general corpus 
or one simply related, in its determination, to other modes, or quite simply, to 
something other than itself.”131
What that implies is that an event cannot be reduced to being causally 
determined or predictable and that, when referred to after the fact, its relationship to
l29 D erek  A ttr id g e . “In tr o d u c tio n ” In  A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e .  J a c q u e s  D errid a . (N e w  York: R o u tle d g e , 
1 9 9 2 ), 15.
J3° M arion , In E x cess ,  36 .
131 D errid a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  2 3 9 -4 0 .
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truth is independent of the external guidelines and general prescriptions otherwise 
used in search of truth. Or, in the words of Derrida, “each time an event -b e  it 
linguistic or not, or a written event or not -  each time an event produces more 
universality, [the more i t ] ... opens the way, it is at the same time philosophical and 
poetic.”^ 2 In that sense, event is a specific occurrence reproduced in language 
through the medium of idioms that are, paradoxically enough and in order that they 
may be understood and communicable, necessarily also of a generalized, universal 
kind. This paradox reveals the event’s rhizomatic nature as contingent on a 
multiplicity of interpretations extended through and offered as an address to another. 
By rhizomatic here I mean underwritten by “a play of difference,” “an alliance,” and 
“dimensionality” and thus, an encounter. “Being cannot be anything but being-with- 
o n e - a n o t h e r .”^  The ethical implications of this view any and all pronouncements of 
difference not as dangerous, but as a constitutive part of a polymorphous identity.
As discussed by Edouard Glissant, “the poetics of relation remains forever 
conjectural and presupposes no ideological stability. It is against the comfortable 
assurances linked to the supposed excellence of a la n g u a g e .”134 In that sense, a 
“poetics of relation” exists partially outside a purely theoretic or linguistic 
engagement with an event and is defined by a relationship between life and language 
that is not one of automatic logocentric representation, but that of a situational, 
imaginative construct that “permits us to escape the pointillistic probability approach 
without lapsing into abusive generalization.”^  Thus, despite the fact that non­
generalizing ‘universals’ are non-reassuring and can appear dangerous, they 
nonetheless tell of a way of addressing being as absence that is not pre-determined.
D errid a , E th ic s , I n s t i tu t io n s  a n d  th e  R ig h t  to  P h ilo s o p h y ,  5 2 .
‘33 J ea n -L u c  N a n cy . B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l.  (S ta n fo rd , CA: S tan fo rd  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  3 .
‘34 E d ou ard  G lissan t. P o e tic s  o f  R e la tio n .  (A nn  A rbor, M I: U n iv ers ity  o f  M ich igan  P ress , 1997), 32 . 
*35 G lissa n t, P o e tic s  o f  R e la tio n ,  1 0 0 .
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In this sense, they represent singular coordinates on a plain made up of other equally 
singular coordinates.
bearing w itness to ‘event’
Bearing witness presents one such coordinate positioned vis-a-vis truth and 
memory. What these singular coordinates have in common is that they are not 
contingent on a relationship to a center anymore than they are causally defined and 
represented by a law or a rule of position. These coordinates give rise to the 
possibility of responsibility borne at the outer limits “of the authority and power of 
the principle or reason,” a responsibility guarding against the appropriation of 
thought by techno-scientific reason, a responsibility irreducible to reason, truth or 
the law.136 If we were to follow through with the consequences of such a line of 
thinking, then bearing witness as a singular happening (event) accommodates such 
responsibility, the parameters of which become redefined in light of the limits of 
reason, progress, and truth. Since responsibility implies a certain view of ethics and 
since any discussion of truth implies a certain understanding of justice, a question as 
to the nature of this justice/responsibility arises here.
Reading Derrida, Terry Hoy suggests that “the very emergence of justice and
law, the founding and justifying moment that institutes la w ... implies a
‘performative’ force which is always an interpretive force, neither legal nor illegal in
the founding moment. ” 137 This force exists in a relationship to the plane with each
point an example, if of anything, only ever of itself. “There is proximity, but only to
the extent that extreme closeness emphasizes the distancing it opens up.”138 This
doubly constituted proximity is the very ethical foundation of the subject’s
responsibility toward alterity. In Derrida’s words, “There is an avenir for justice and
136 T erry  H oy. “d errida: p o stm o d e r n ism  a n d  p o litica l th e o r y .” P h ilo s o p h y  S o c ia l  C r it ic is m  19 (19 9 3 ):  
2 4 8 .
H oy, "derrida: p o stm o d e r n ism  an d  p o litica l th e o r y ,” 2 5 0 .
‘38 N a n cy , B ein g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l, 5.
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there is no justice except to the degree that some event is possible which, as event, 
exceeds calculation, rules, programs, anticipations and so forth. Justice, as the 
experience of absolute alterity, is unpresentable, but it is the chance of the event and 
the condition o f  h is t o r y .”^  Event, in this sense, represents a positioning in time and 
space dependent for its recovery always on an originary interpretation. Whether 
without or outside language, this interpretation is guided first and foremost by the 
non-exemplarity. Singularity, bearing witness to this non-generalizability of ‘event,’ 
does not partake in a logic of ends nor is it derived from the subject-object dichotomy 
otherwise defining the modern understanding of scientific knowledge.
Bearing witness, in its relationship to the past, is a process of recollection and 
reconstruction, possible only after the event. Thus, bearing witness is representative 
in addition to being singular which relates both singularity and representation to the 
recovery of memory. What this means is that recollection and the work of memory in 
particular uncover a “singularity” that would not have been possible had not the call 
for revelation been answered in a timely fashion. The excess of ‘event’ over the 
witness one can give to it is accommodated at the outer limits of responsibility that is 
irreducible to the calculability of law, justice or rights. This means that testimony, in 
addition to being representative, is also intersubjective and informed by a 
relationship to alterity. Each reinterpretation coloured by a different intention -  
always singular. If we accept the premise that the “I” is always implied in the first 
person plural “we,” then the ways in which one, be it a refugee, a victim of trauma, a 
mother, or a PhD student, bears witness comments also on the ways in which bearing 
witness as such happens to everyone else. A thesis on language(s) of bearing witness 
is, first and foremost, a thesis on the possibility to bear witness in language at all, as 
well as about the unlimited linguistic potential of the witness herself. “There is no 
pure and simple “one,” no “one” in which “properly existing” existence is, from the
13<) D err id a , A c ts  o f  R e lig io n ,  257.
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start, purely and simply immersed.”140 Thus, there is no independent, specially- 
ordained language of trauma and suffering that is not derived from language as such.
Singularity is contingent on ‘event.’ It is an activity, a process, an unfolding, 
and a going through. It is not a state of being but a state of becoming that is not just 
deconstructive, though both are informed by inquiries into the fragmentary, open- 
ended nature of knowledge. Human beings, too, are singular in the sense in which 
their everyday interaction with the world bears the trace of a repetition that is also an 
initiation, a bringing-forth. Contingent upon generalizable idioms and upon 
universally-derived and applicable modes of inquiry, singularity is nonetheless 
always as many singularities as it takes to bring a singularity into being. In that 
sense, the latter is not totalizing any more than it is exceptional in the Agambenian 
sense of the term. Thus, singularity cannot be founded on a generic identity or a 
similarly-defined category or it will always be dependent upon exclusion and an 
exception that is, as I argued in my previous chapter, violent. Such violence and the 
processes that challenge it, when engaged by everyday life, become what I call 
“performative.” From here onwards, bearing witness will be mirrored by the 
implications of “performative,” interpretive, dynamic, and aporetic (undecidable) 
positing of the world. A question here arises: “If we agree that being is irreducible 
and always also a process of becoming, does that mean that the everyday is singular 
and necessarily irreducible as well?”
on  ‘being singular plural’
I would like to introduce, by way of offering a preliminary answer to the 
question just posited, Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of “being singular plural.”141 What 
this suggests is that “the understanding of Being is nothing other than an
N a n cy , B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l, 7.
141 N a n cy , B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l.
83
understanding of other, which means, in every sense, understanding other through
‘m e’ and understanding ‘m e’ through others, the understanding of one another.”142 In
other words, the essence of Being is co-existence145 and as such, irreducible to any
system of identification that is not also, in its nature, intersubjectively informed.
Presence, lived by each and every human being as part of the sphere of the
intersubjective, is first and foremost an ethico-political category and only then, a
juridico-political one. As an ethico-political category, it is conditioned by a
responsibility toward alterity informed by a structural interdependence between
singularity and universality constitutive of dual categorization as such. Thus,
singularity is once informed by and contained in the person of the other and then,
communicated and engaged in language as an intersubjective tool of communication.
The singular is primarily each one and, therefore, also with and among all the 
others. The singular is a plural. It also undoubtedly offers the property of 
indivisibility... indivisible in each instant within the event of its 
singularization.... A singularization does not stand out against the 
background of Being; it is, when it is, Being itself ...”144
The trace of singularity lies not in its being captured, frozen, or determined in
language, but in its being revealed through an address that is an instance of deciding
and a moment of responsibility.
It is in this sense that “performativity” as the idiom announcing the dynamic, 
interactive relationship between language (speech acts), power and the human being 
in everyday life is directly implied in any discussion of the process of bearing witness. 
As observed by Richard Beardsworth, “In its undecidable relation to the generality of 
law, the singularity of a literary text implies that the ‘literariness’ of literature has to 
do with performativity (in the sense of a performative speech act) and with 
rupture.”145 If every inclusion raises questions concerning exclusions and borders,
142 N a n cy , B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l,  27 .
143 N a n cy , B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l,  3 0 .
144 N a n cy , B e in g  S in g u la r  P lu ra l, 32 .
145 R ichard  B eard sw orth . D e r r id a  & th e  P o litic a l.  (L on d on : R o u tled g e , 1 9 9 6 ), 2 6
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then every instance of beginning to speak, of bearing witness is also an example of a 
necessary exclusion without which, however, no decision would be possible. It is in 
this paradoxical sense that bearing witness is, in addition to being singular and 
performative, also an aporetic activity. The irresolvable contradiction that this aporia 
carries within itself demands an in-appropriable, irredicuble engagement with 
‘event.’ Bearing witness thus represents a mode of address, a way of being in the 
world and not a theory or a methodology. “What is at stake, first of all, is an 
adventure of vision, a conversion of the way of putting questions to any object posed 
before us, to historical objects ... in particular.”146 However, fact and truth are non­
coincidental in the ways in which they address memory or in their end purpose.
Bearing witness reveals itself not as something to be explained or tested but as 
something to be interacted with: as a singular, linguistic and intersubjective activity it 
inaugurates meaning as inseparable from the social nexus which originates it without 
limiting it to a founding set. An interactive, dynamic and contingent understanding 
of bearing witness helps liberate the language of witness from all archaic meanings 
and supposed origins, making the former into a creative, imaginative experience of 
being. Engaged in the business of giving account of practices of everyday life, bearing 
witness should not be understood solely as a linguistic process. Taking lead from 
recent discussions regarding the future of historiography after the ‘linguistic turn,’ 
positing a shared bodily and linguistic responsibility for explaining and experiencing 
the world might inform of the dialectic relationship between, for example, the 
practice of politics on the one hand and the lives and roles of its subjects on the other. 
“As in the case of linguistic competence, bodily competence permits the agent to 
‘perform’ the world, to speak the social, as it were. Understood in this way, social 
practices are routinized bodily performances, incorporating both a way of ‘knowing
'■+6 D errid a , W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e , 3.
85
how’ -  to act, to be an agent, to do something -  and a (practical, unreflexive) 
knowledge of the world.”14?
If we agree that subjects are always written, that they owe their existence to an 
engagement with language, and that a text is always contaminated by what it 
exemplifies, then a certain way of thinking follows, namely, that there can be no one 
pure, meta-language as such, spoken or written. Should the imposition of any one 
system of language be left unexamined, then the result is an understanding of bearing 
witness as certain set of principles and norms natural and not produced, accepted 
and not imposed. The process of researching being in the world, then, must also 
recognize that the very complex, contingent, and highly fragmented nature of 
academic subjects requires that we write about them accordingly. “Writing is not 
arriving; most of the time it’s not arriving. One must go on foot, with the body. One 
has to go away, leave the s e lf .... One must go as far as the night. One’s own night. 
Walking through the self toward the dark.”148 The question of bearing witness, when 
engaged from the point of view of everyday language, challenges the purity and 
irreducibility of singularity by addressing the question of living in the world beyond 
pure presentation. I will address bearing witness not only as an aporetic and singular 
event communicated through a “purer” language, but recognize that one need 
problematize any and every testimony (witness) that claims for itself the title of 
singular or singular-ly other.
Bearing w itness  with D errida
Derrida reserves a privileged space for the poetic  as a preferred modality of 
engaging language in the process of bearing witness. His discussion of the address as
147 G ab rie lle  S p e ig e l (ed ). “In tr o d u c tio n .” In  P r a c tic in g  H is to r y .  N e w  D ir e c t io n s  in  H is to r ic a l  W r it in g  
A f te r  th e  L in g u is tic  T u rn . (N e w  Y ork, R o u tle d g e , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  19.
148 H e le n e  C ixou s. T h ree  S te p s  on  th e  L a d d e r  o f  W r i t in g . (N e w  York: C o lu m b ia  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 9 4 ), 
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an always singular activity suggests that in order for language to be able to 
communicate and accommodate this singularity, a similar idiom ought to be 
recovered in the process of bearing witness. The latter is defined, in turn, as a 
responsibility toward memory that takes its lead, in the context of law, from an 
always fresh appeal to justice.^9 This is not an invitation to improvisation or a 
turning away from precedent and rule, but a recognition that both the nature of 
memory and of the law can only ever be authentic if understood as an engagement 
outside pre-determined ends. Memory becomes undecidable, a responsibility 
towards upholding an ethical relationship to a decision that is never secure and 
always threatened by silence or oblivion “because there is an art of the non-response, 
or of the deferred response, which is a rhetoric of war, a polemical ruse.”1^  A 
decision, then, would not be the same as passing judgment for the former represents 
an evocation to an engagement with alterity predicated not on a recognition of 
difference (suppression), but on an immediate and speedy recovery of voice.
The dilemma of the undecidable that characterizes every decision in Derrida’s 
universe, when left to itself, without an address, has the potential of becoming not 
only violent but also, reducible to and defined by calculability. For Derrida, justice 
represents an excess over law in the same way in which the idiom of bearing witness 
represents an excess over the iterative, representative potential of language. For him, 
this idiom is the poetic. In this thesis, especially in my engagement with Paul Celan, I 
will attempt to show how the poetic helps restore memory through idioms of the 
incalculable that engage, recover, and help secure the singularity of ‘event’ both 
within and outside language. At the same time, I hope to make clear that poetry does 
not engage bearing witness in a better, more authentic or faithful way than other 
singular modalities of witness. What poetry does better, perhaps, is invent and offer
149 D err id a , A c ts  o f  R e lig io n  , 251.
'5° J a cq u es  D errida. O n th e  N a m e .  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 9 5 ), 21.
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novel ways of speaking about, representing and addressing otherwise old, universal 
and violent concepts/truths. It is in this manner that poetry exemplifies a 
performative engagement with the world.
As discussed by Jacques Derrida, the “anxiety of language within language 
itse lf’151 is directly related to what it means to speak about, after, and beyond an 
event. The whole of Derrida’s work poses the question of issuing forth, at any time, a 
responsibility whose origin is neither theoretical nor empirical, neither singular nor 
universal. That these otherwise dichotomous categories are conflated in his thought 
points not to a rejection of difference, but to an obligation to one’s “singular response 
to singularity”152 which, here, will be discussed with relation to ‘bearing witness.’ As a 
singular occurrence, bearing witness does not rely for verification on an originary 
structure of truth-making predicated on processes of falsification and/or 
generalization. The essential moment does not have to do either with communication 
or with enunciation. If, as Derrida maintains, “there is no responsibility that is not 
the experience and experiment of the impossible,”155 the process of bearing witness 
cannot be reduced to calculus, moved entirely toward “the simple undoing of telos,”154 
or charged with the responsibility of delivering truthful discourse. As Geoffrey 
Hartman has alerted, “different witnesses often see things differently /  or even see 
different things. This may also happen with a single witness, whose memory is not 
static but evolves.”155 That is, authenticity, seen as an attribute of truth, is not 
dependent solely on “presence, reliability, and precision.”156
Derrida’s aporia as the “no marked out or assured passage” becomes “the
condition of decision or event which consists in opening the way, in (sur)passing,
151 J a c q u e s  D errid a . P o litic s  o f  F r ie n d sh ip .  (L on d on : V erso , 199 7 ), 3 .
ls2 D err id a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  15.
J53 J a c q u e s  D err id a . P o in ts . I n te r v ie w s  1 9 7 4 -1 9 9 4 . (S tan ford : S tan fo rd  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 1 9 9 5 c), 4 4 .
w  D err id a , W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e ,  26 .
‘55 H a rtm a n , S c a r s  o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  9 2 -3 .
156 H artm a n , S c a r s  o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  93 .
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thus in going beyond.’’^  I f  the power of language to discipline issues forth a 
responsibility whose origin is necessarily informed by a condition of undecidability, 
then a poetic experience of language is both singular and aporetic in being the 
product not only of an a priori state, but of a decision revealing a structured 
commitment to recurrence. This decision becomes, at the moment of its passing into 
being, calculable. In order to resolve this contradiction without, on the one hand, 
espousing to a system of theoretic rationality or, on the other, pronouncing the end of 
the era of critical thinking, bearing witness and responsibility will be addressed as 
commentaries and embodiments of every day practices of life-bearing. What I hope 
to show in this way is that a committed engagement with language necessarily 
presupposes a committed engagement with life as lived practice. Singularity, defined 
as a dynamic, performative mode of engaging the world, becomes implicated in an 
understanding of truth as an open, undecided question. The link between truth and 
memory is not self-evident and spans beyond the universe of replicability through the 
lens of which much of modern techno-scientific research is done. “As soon as it is 
guaranteed, certain as a theoretical proof, a testimony can no longer be guaranteed as 
a testimony.”188 What is more, bearing witness is not, as has been shown in a number 
of studies,1^  always a healing, positive, dignified, or a noble process. In Veena Das’ 
words, “being subjected to violence does not somehow purify us”160 which is true for 
bearing witness to violence as well, if I may suggest a parallel between ‘recollection’ 
and ‘exposure.’
!57 D errrida , W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e ,  54 .
158 J a c q u e s D errid a . S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n . T he P o e tic s  o f  P a u l C e la n . (N e w  York: F ord h am  
U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 5 ) ,  6 8 .
x59 S ee  a lso  F io n a  R o ss , B e a r in g  W itn e s s :  W o m e n  a n d  th e  T ru th  a n d  R e c o n c ilia t io n  C o m m it te e  in  S o u th  
A fr ic a .  (L on d on : P lu to , 2 0 0 3 ) ;  V een a  D as. L ife  a n d  W o r d s .  (B erk e ley , CA: U n iv e r s ity  o f  C aliforn ia  p ress ,
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traum a and the repetition o f language
Derrida would agree that certain forms of existence cannot be easily decided 
upon or defined, that there are experiences that cross the mark of iterability either 
because of their traumatic nature or because of their lingering psychologically and/or 
physically negative effects on the subject. Bearing witness to such experiences, in its 
difficulty, uncovers an important aspect of the process of witnessing -  its ethics. In 
academia, such experiences are often romanticized and made to stand for an 
idealized, ennobled and academically exploited reality of suffering. We are told that 
when something is unsayble, it is somehow beyond our knowledge, something so 
horrific that the mind cannot grasp and/or put it into language. Even though this 
might be the case in certain situations, such a theoretic construction endorses 
rhetorics of silence that help perpetuate, legitimize and disseminate fear. A focus on 
the unsayable, trauma and violence focuses attention away from the myriad ways in 
which human beings do find ways of relating their experiences as well as 
understanding these experiences and passing them down through tim e.161 Derrida’s 
theoretic contribution to just this kind of courage, though elaborated differently, has 
been undermined on purpose by critics pretending not to see that his objective and 
eventual goal has not been the obfuscation and jargonization of knowledge, but the 
making of testimony possible. As much as has been written critically about the 
subject’s inability to speak, not nearly enough has been said about the ways in which 
even sympathetic understandings of silence perpetuate resignation, fear and silence.
Derrida’s concern with repeated, meticulous, and careful readings of texts for 
the purpose both of uncovering their dynamic nature and also, of making a decision, 
addresses the issue of singularity as it figures in the general idiom of language. The 
impossibility of deciding or speaking, for Derrida, leads to the obligation and the
161 R oss, B e a r in g  W i tn e s s ,  49; H artm an , S c a r s  o f  th e  Sp ir i t .
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imperative not to remain with the undecidable162 but to jump toward an urgent 
decision. It is for that reason, as discussed by Terry Hoy, that “we must take justice 
as far as possible beyond the already indefinite zones of morality, politics and law 
beyond the distinction between national and international, public and private. ” l63 
Undecidability, in this sense, is actually a demand for a decision, a sort of an 
“’irruptive violence’ that is no longer responsive to the demand of theoretical 
rationality , ” l64 a responsibility before another and before the ethics of memory, an 
opportunity to take up the risk of language.
As Derek Attridge notes with insight in his introduction to Derrida’s Acts o f  
Literature, it is the latter’s “singular response to singularity that Derrida’s 
philosophical commentators tend, inevitably, to undervalue.”1^  Not only does 
Derrida affirm and argue for the co-existence of the singular and the general, but he 
also invites us to think of every ‘event’ in terms of possibility and an openness into 
existence that is not restricted solely to its immediate linguistic meaning. That is, 
truth outside the “scientific assumption that the world is knowable only through 
words and that to have no voice is not to be without language, unable to 
communicate.”166 In this sense, an appeal for bearing witness to engage alternative 
modalities of speaking falls with Derrida’s own critique of logo and egocentrism.16? It 
is in this sense that literature, when called forth in service of rational, scientific 
assumptions, can and has become institutionalized. Bearing witness, too, can fall 
into the trap of thinking that the world is knowable through words and not at all 
through performative (doing) ways of engaging life whose origin, in addition to being 
irreducible, also always tells about itself from what it has lived through.
162 J a c q u e s  D errid a . D e m e u r e . F ic tio n  a n d  T e s tim o n y .  (S tan ford : S ta n fo rd  U n iv e r s ity  P ress , 2 0 0 0 ) ,  16.
163 H oy , “d errida: p o stm o d e r n ism  an d  p o litica l th e o r y ,” 2 5 0 .
164 H oy , “d errida: p o stm o d e r n ism  an d  p o litica l th e o r y ,” 2 5 0 .
165 D errid a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  15.
166 R oss, B e a r in g  W i tn e s s ,  5 0 .
167 D errida , A c ts  o f  L i t e r a tu r e .
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For Derrida, the relationship between writing and reading is “not a certain 
quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a signifying 
structure that critical reading should produce .”168 In terms of this productive 
dynamic, the enunciation of experience as bearing witness participates in a logic that 
problematizes an understanding of testimony either as a revelatory experience or as 
demarcating healing. Getting in touch with painful memories is seen as one step of 
working through trauma. Survivors are interviewed, hypnotized, taken back to sites 
of violence, medicated - all in an effort to prove that remembering leads to healing, is 
part of a process of working through, getting over and moving on, that “telling one’s 
story was supposed to restore dignity to the victim. ” l6 9 Fiona Ross has shown, in her 
examination of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, that truth 
itself is “presumed to be amenable to discovery through scientific method and 
quantification, and to be accessible through individuals’ memories and the material 
remainders of apartheid. The link between truth and reconciliation was considered 
self-evident and consequential: that disclosing the truth would result in 
reconciliation.”170 Ross points to the fact that bodily experience of pain, the kinds of 
scars that can be seen, shown and acknowledged, do not exhaust the whole story of 
deprivation, suffering and violence and that women’s testimonies in particular speak 
to “the destruction of kinship, of the alteration of time’s expected flow, of the power 
of economies in shaping experience, of the intrusion of the state, and of women’s 
determined attempts to create and maintain families.”171
This, in turn, alerts to the fact that how we use language affects the ways in 
which we communicate intention, belief, policy, violence, love and truth. This use is 
not unbiased, nor is the moment of testimony in the face of the unspeakable, for
168 D errid a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  101.
169 R o ss, B e a r in g  W itn e s s ,  13.
170 R oss, B e a r in g  W i tn e s s ,  12.
171 R oss, B e a r i n g  W i tn e s s ,  4 8 .
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example, a showcase for the interrogation of fact(s) independent of dichotomous
distinctions. Derrida himself alerts to the fact that justice
is announced wherever, reflecting w ithout flinching, a purely  rational 
analysis brings the fo llow ing paradox  to light: that the foundation  o f  law  -  
law  o f  the law, institution o f the institution, origin o f  the constitution -  is a 
' perform ative’ event that cannot belong to the set that it founds, inaugurates 
or justifies. Such an event is unjustifiable w ithin the logic o f  w h a t it w ill 
have opened. I t is the decision o f the other in the undecidable .172
Though testimony is often put to political use through such mechanisms as truth 
commissions, tribunals, trials and public rituals of punishment that serve the purpose 
of re-instating forgotten memories, the recovery of Truth is not the unproblematic, 
unquestionable, end goal of testimony making the latter into the originator and 
carrier of its own vendettas. One would be well advised to recall Derrida’s caution 
against illusions of being able to dominate the system of language within which one 
writes/speaks. “But are other paths not possible? And as long as the totality of paths 
is not effectively exhausted, how shall we justify this one?”^  Derrida’s task here is 
not one of annulling or justification, but of understanding and revealing the multiple 
possibilities behind each decision that, in addition to being an opening, is also an 
insight into questions of boundaries, exclusion, and justice. The potential of every 
decision to become violent, the potential of every text to be subverted, necessitates a 
singularly critical response to every ‘event’ that claims the status of Example.
Derrida’s recognition of the violent potential within language alerts to the 
potentially negative effects of charging bearing witness with the commission of truth. 
“Testimony as a concept has a special, double connotation: it contains objective, 
judicial, public and political aspects as well as subjective, spiritual, cathartic and 
private aspects.”174 Because of its responsibility to answer for and before various
D errid a , A c ts  o f  R e lig io n ,  57 , e m p h a s is  in  o rig in a l.
D err id a , A c t s  o f  L i t e r a tu r e ,  105.
17 4  A gger, T he B lue  R o o m ,  9.
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audiences, bearing witness carries the risk also of initiating distinctions, crises,
oppositions and universalizing appeals to truth and authenticity.
The act of faith demanded in bearing witness exceeds, through its structure, 
all intuition and all proof, all knowledge (“I swear that I am telling the truth, 
not necessarily the ‘objective truth,’ but the truth of what I believe to be the 
truth, I am telling you this truth, believe me, believe what I believe ... What 
therefore does the promise of this axiomatic performative do that conditions 
and foreshadows ‘sincere’ declarations no less than lies and perjuries, and 
thus all address of the other? It amounts to saying: “Believe what I say as one 
believes in a miracle.1^
Story-telling, for example, in addition to being showcased for its open-ended, fluid
and ‘freeing’ nature, is often also made into a privileged, “untainted” and
romanticized modality of bearing witness reserved for specific (indigenous)
geographic locations heavily dependent on oral traditions. This immediately
constructs oral testimony as an-‘other’ mode of speaking, exoticized and eroticized, a
vehicle for catharsis that nonetheless still upholds the primacy of the written word.
This leads to imposing claims of authenticity on oral cultures at the same time that a
politico-cultural reality of unproblematic self-exoticization is upheld for affirming the
worldwide domination of the written over the oral word. A more in depth
engagement with these questions and concerns will be the aim of chapter five of this
thesis.
truth-claim s and ‘linguistic undecidability’
Indeed, narratives are neither inert, nor do they simply oppose themselves to 
fact. To maintain such a simplistic division would be to underwrite a totalizing 
assumption that runs through academic literature, namely that “testimony describes 
the self completely,”1?6 rather than recognizing the latter as fragmentary, incomplete 
and often factually questionable. Derrida extends a similar caution in a commentary 
on Kafka’s fable of the law when he says that law, in order that it secure its own 
existence, informs and necessitates itself independently of any system of applications
175 D errida , A c t s  o f  R e l ig io n .  9 8 .
176 R oss, B e a r in g  W i tn e s s ,  102.
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and/or exceptions. “The law guards itself without doing so, guarded by a doorkeeper 
who guards nothing”177 but a silence that erases responsibility and defers the law to 
itself. Thus, the law initiates violence that is also the law’s singular challenge to the 
subject: to overcome this violence. Likewise, “the text guards itself, maintains itself -  
like the law, speaking only of itself, that is to say, of its non-identity with itself. It 
neither arrives nor lets anyone arrive. It is the law, makes the law and leaves the 
reader before the law.”178 It is because of this idiomatic and self-referential function 
of texts that language cannot fully and impartially address or encompass the singular 
nature of event. If “powers are themselves written, articulated performances based 
upon the circulation and withholding of knowledge in an inscribed manner, the 
decoding of which is not available to all,”179 then a claim to be able to explain the 
world using a system of talking, writing, coding, re-coding, talking and writing again 
makes writing simply the archive from policy to culture. Instead, explaining the 
world through writing will be positioned in light of an engagement with the 
historicity of the event.
Despite the fact that Derrida defends the possibilities for decision contained 
within every instance of engaging the unspeakable, when bearing witness is at stake, 
the question becomes one of accessing experience. There is truth beyond texts, 
beyond the deconstruction of logos, beyond poiesis, beyond the analysis of the 
written word and though the latter is an important tool in uncovering and exposing 
violence and bias, it is often entirely abandoned in the moment of engaging the 
world. In what will follow, I will show that Derrida is being insufficiently Derridean 
when he insists on the ability of language to recover, resuscitate, and re-vive life (as 
biological experience). Taking lead from Richard Beardsworth who argues that 
“Derrida’s philosophy only makes sense politically in terms of the relation ‘between’
177 D err id a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  211.
178 D errida, A c ts  o f  L i t e r a tu r e ,  211.
Ju lia n  W olfrevs. The D e r r i d a  R e a d e r .  (E d in bu rgh : E d in b u rgh  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 9 8 ), 14.
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aporia and decision and neither in terms of a unilateral philosophy of aporia nor in
terms of a unilateral philosophy of decision: in other words, aporia is the very locus in
which the political force of deconstruction is to be found,”180 bearing witness will be
examined as linguistic undecidability on the one hand and the obligation to testify on
the other: the latter engaging memory through the bodily experience of the everyday.
Beardsworth is, in effect, very critical of the ‘literary’ Derrida on the grounds that he
produces an overly formalistic, a-historical version of deconstruction:
Derrida’s argument concerning the irreducibility of subjectal logic looks like 
eliding the mediations between the human and the nonhuman and 
underestimating the speed with which the human is losing its experience o f  
time. The ‘promise’ ends up, therefore, appearing  too formal, freezing 
Derrida’s deconstructions of the tradition into a finite, but open set of ‘quasi- 
transcendental’ logics which turn the relation between the human and the 
technical into a ‘logic’ of supplementarity without history (the technical 
determinations of temporalization).181
If we agree that language makes justice possible, then bearing witness as such always 
charges language with a debt to memory, which is not the same as a debt to truth. 
Methinks Derrida’s examination of the questions of aporia and language remains 
somehow too theoretically informed and fails to account for the human being in 
much the same way in which Giorgio Agamben fails to account for the Musselman 
beyond the exception. What I will do in the remainder of this chapter is read 
Derrida’s theoretical examination of aporia, the poetic and the everyday against the 
implications that bearing witness has for these against the register of the ordinary.
f ir s t  fragm ent: Aporia
For Derrida, an aporia  is an unmarked, uncrossable and/or untreadable path; 
an irresolvable contradiction that, in addition to presenting itself as an impasse, 
suspends judgment while also obliging one to make a decision that always also carries
180 B eard sw orth , D er i ' id a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  xvi.
181 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & the  P o li t ica l ,  154.
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a “political force.”182 An aporia  does not apply to two separate entities but to a single 
entity, which makes it other than a part in a dichotomous cosmology. It is thus that 
an aporia  does not presuppose or necessitate an opposition but, rather, helps lead 
one to the condition of possibility and impossibility of judgment. An aporia  is not 
debilitating or negative in nature, a paradox, or just another clever Derridean twist, 
but is the condition of being itself founding of the possibility of language, justice and 
responsibility. What the aporetic  informs of is not so much a state that defies reason 
and logic, wishing to deny, ridicule and make inconsequential, but of a state of being 
where the absolutely radical obligation to a decision makes possible any and all 
discussion of justice, responsibility, language and witnessing.
An aporia  is not impossibility and it does not subordinate the subject’s 
freedom in a movement wishing to erase all subjectivity. It is violent for being based 
on a logic of ends. It does, however, uncover the potential for violence contained in 
any one decision that, in its determining nature, is always an example of an inclusive 
exclusion. It is ethically informed in that it obliges the human being to accept, define 
and live up to a kind of responsibility. It does, however, also deconstruct any system  
of ethics based on institutionally informed practices of systematicity. An aporia  is 
urgent, beckoning the subject to commit herself, take an uninsured risk. It is the kind 
of risk taking that carries within itself the danger of being called over-simplified, 
nihilistic and refuted for its non-applicability. It is William Blake’s road less taken, 
the unknown that must be faced. An aporia, if not addressed, can become violent, 
destructive and ethically-void. “An aporia demands decision, one cannot remain 
within it; at the same time its essential irreducibility to the cut of a decision makes 
the decision which one makes contingent, to be made again . ” l8 3 An aporia, situated 
on the threshold between politics and ethics, inaugurates the possibility for justice in
182 B e ard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & the  P o li t ica l ,  12.
183 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  5.
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surpassing itself. It is irreducible to the decision which it necessitates, calling forth 
from within itself a need to be engaged repeatedly. Since an aporia  has its own way 
of being addressed, it is singular in addition to being irreducible.
The decision to which bearing witness is obligated is to engage language 
despite the unspeakable that is contained within it and because “the operation that 
amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law, to making law, would consist of a 
coup deforce, of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself it 
neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no earlier and previously founding law, 
no preexisting foundation, could, by definition, guarantee or contradict or 
invalidate . ” l8 4 This aporia, rather than announce itself as an impasse, reveals that 
there is no natural status to language, that language as such is never neutral and that 
every single decision has the potentiality to reveal itself as a different kind of 
decision, irredicuble both to any and to every other decision. It alerts to the fact that 
the world is not knowable solely through words and that an insistence on the 
scientific nature of the causal relationship between language and truth does not hold 
in the face of experience. In this sense, Derrida does not problematize singularity in 
light of the (im)possibilities it offers for political action. This means that there is, 
likewise, no neutral, natural mode of bearing witness and that each instance of 
witnessing is a contingency operating from within a linguistic system of signs that has 
the potential to violate and institutionalize as much as it can heal and enable.
Bearing witness, in addition to being a declarative and affirmative activity, is also 
prescriptive and as such, spans the temporal universe of the past. Shoshana Felman’s 
reading of this, much like Derrida himself with regard to poetry, allocates a special 
place for bearing witness in a universe predicated on narration. In that sense and
l8-> D errid a , W r i t in g  a n d  D if fe r e n c e ,  241.
98
viewed through language, “the event is not that which happens. The event is that 
which can be narrated. ”l8s
Memory, thus, acquires a new dimension of importance regarding ‘event,’ 
alerting us to a privileging of textuality over historicity, of the telling of ‘event’ over 
the living of ‘event,’ of linguistically-informed representations of reality over the lived 
fact of the everyday. Writing, in the words of Richard Beardsworth, “is the name 
given to what witnesses this excess.”186 These decisions, dimensions, coordinates, 
oppositions and dyads, seemingly reserved for the “literary,” carry already important 
political consequences for the practice of bearing witness. Derrida’s aporia, borne out 
of a linguistic impasse, demands a decision rooted in the time and law of ‘event’ as 
“the very locus in which the political force of deconstruction is to be found.”18? In its 
testimonial nature, bearing witness attests, making “way for assumed knowledge, to 
an institution or a practice, a social organization, a ‘conception.’”188 While bearing 
witness relies on attestation and the interactive relationship between language and 
fact, my argument, against Feldman, is that ‘event’ is that which happens before and 
not after the moment of narration. In the sense in which ‘event’ is singular in nature, 
narration and story-telling accommodate this singularity rather than cancel or 
universalize it.
What that means more generally is that bearing witness has the potential both 
to underwrite and to challenge memory, making any truth pronouncement obliged to 
take both these possibilities seriously. The composition of this dynamic, in turn, 
brings out the inescapable political character of the event of witnessing. Peter 
Trifonas suggests that deconstruction itself “is predicated on taking m em ory into
l8s F e lm a n , T e s t i m o n y ,  14.
186 B eard sw o rth , D e r r i d a  &  th e  P o l i t ica l ,  x iii.
187 B e ard sw orth , D e r r i d a  &  th e  P o l i t ica l ,  xiv.
188 J a cq u es  D errida . “A  S e lf -U n se a lin g  P oetic  T e x t.” In  R e v e n g e  o f  th e  A e s th e t ic ,  1 8 0 -2 0 7 . E d ited  by  
M ich ael P. Clark. (B erk eley , CA: U n iv ers ity  o f  C aliforn ia  P ress, 2 0 0 0 b ) ,  187.
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account: accounting for the causality of its effects, its bias, its exclusions -  rendering 
an account of what makes memory, disrupts it, constructs its limits and openings, 
how and who it favors.”189 Memory, in addition to working as recollection and 
restoration, can erase “‘event’ by fixing it either within written or otherwise publically 
recognized sites of archiving by making the dangers of testim ony... thoroughly 
contained”190 in the form of controlled narratives. Language, in the words of Maurice 
Blanchot, has the effect of “weaning memory.” Underwriting (public) memory, 
bearing witness inevitably takes part in an academically and sometimes also 
culturally-endorsed project of suppressing difference in favour of certain kinds of 
truth and knowledge. A closer engagement with the political implications of this will 
be presented in Chapter Four of this thesis.
Challenging the disseminated norm, the process of witnessing has the 
potential to reveal the fact that language is derived from the same process that 
constitutes it as a liaison of representational thinking. What the latter does for the 
process of bearing witness is underwrite its performative, dynamic nature through 
repeated engagements both within language and outside it. What this reveals is that 
every continuous engagement is contingent on the previous one and that identity 
itself depends on the revelation and understanding of difference. Since every 
decision has ethical implications when carried into practice, bearing witness as a 
decision to speak reveals the inherent political charge of any language that claims for 
itself a depoliticized, neutral position. Every aporia  reveals and underwrites the 
possibility for a decision that is only ever possible on condition of honouring this 
aporia.
literary w itness
Bearing witness as an intersubjective activity, dependent on and conditioned
by the presence of a listener, reveals ways of thinking the political and violence that
i89 D errid a , E th ics ,  I n s t i tu t io n s  a n d  th e  R i g h t  to  P h i lo s o p h y ,  72 .
lt)0 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  Po li t ics .  191.
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are informed by everyday practices of affirming, recognizing and living with 
difference. In the sense in which an engagement with language/law is always 
conditioned on pre-established rules, no account of singularity can ever be pure, that 
is, completely free of the violence that constitutes it. The potential of bearing witness 
to encompass and (re)present the singularity of an event is thus not self-understood 
or self-evident. “The literature of testim ony... is not simply a statement (any 
statement can but lag behind events), but a performative engagem ent between 
consciousness and history, a struggling act of readjustm ent between the integrative 
scope of words and the unintegrated impact of event.”191 Derrida’s understanding, 
both of law and of literature, goes beyond the limits of interpretation and theoretical 
definitions and allows for a discussion of both the juridical and the literary and of 
their potential for action and change. It is because “literature and law cross each 
other’s paths regarding an undecidable relation between the general and the 
singular”192 that Beardsworth can conclude that for Derrida, “it is literature which 
points the way to this ‘impossible experience,’ literature points the way because it is 
itself the enactment of an aporetic  relation between universality and singularity . ” 193
I argue, against Beardsworth’s reading of Derrida and perhaps against 
Derrida himself, that it is not just literature that accommodates the experience of 
aporia, but an inherently political relationship between the linguistically-informed 
moment of enunciation (witnessing) and the facticity o f ‘event.’ In that sense, 
Derrida’s endowment of the poetic with the power to “resuscitate” and “revive” an 
otherwise “lethargic” language alerts to a possible definitional violence with respect 
to the constitutive (written) nature of language itself. I will develop this critique
191 F e lm a n , “C a m u s’ T he P la g u e ,  or th e  M o n u m e n t to  W itn e ss in g ,” in  T e s t im o n y  93 -119 . S h o sh a n a  
F elm a n  an d  D ori L aub (L on d on : R o u tled g e , 1 9 9 2 ), 114.
192 B e ard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  25.
193 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  24 .
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further in my engagement with Derrida’s reading of Paul Celan’s poetry. For now, 
suffice it to posit it as a variation on a Derridean paradox.
Since bearing witness as attestation can be viewed both as a juridical and a 
literary process, since no law can be general enough not to be violent and since 
literature acts as the meeting point between the singularity of idioms and the 
universality/generality of the cannon, both law and literature share a degree of 
undecidability. “In its undecidable relation to the generality of law, the singularity of 
a literary text implies that the ‘literariness’ of literature has to do with performativity 
(in the sense of a performative speech act) and with rupture. ” 194 This means that the 
category of the singular, constitutive of testimony, always passes through negotiation, 
through the lens of aporia. This aporetic  relationship, in order that it lead to 
witnessing, must reconcile the calculable and the incalculable. In other words, “The 
tension between eyewitness testimony and bearing witness, between historical facts 
and psychoanalytic truth, between subject positions and subjectivity, between the 
performative and the constative, is the dynamic operator that moves us beyond the 
melancholic choice between either dead historical facts or traumatic repetition of 
violence.”195
Literature, Beardsworth argues, because it does not simply inherit its 
tradition in order that it may repeat and institute it, can “help us to reflect upon the 
structure of decisions as well as upon the structure of a ‘less violent’ decision.”196 
Derrida maintains in “‘Before the Law’ ... that this very irreducibility  of the law to its 
account constitutes the law.”19? The law, neither a rulebook derivative nor an 
offspring of fiction, suggest that justice itself, the singular pre-requisite of law, exists
B e ard sw orth , D e r r i d a  &  th e  P o l i t ica l ,  2 6 .
!95 O liver, W itn e s s in g ,  16.
196 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  26 .
197 Q u oted  in B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  3 3 .
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in a realm that is as dependent on invention as it is on tradition. Since bearing 
witness acknowledges its origin within this very aporia, it accounts for law and for 
justice in ways inaccessible to law and justice themselves. In other words, the 
violence within language is the latter’s desire to found the truth while aware of its 
inability to do so solely from within itself. Richard Beardsworth’s insight into the 
relationship between law and literature is especially useful here: “Literature’s 
exemplarity is threefold: first, the ‘literary’ resides everywhere, although literature is 
only one mode of language; second, when, as in much modern literature, it remarks 
its ‘literariness’, literature is ‘exemplary’ of a particular awareness of the failure of 
law; and third, and consequently, modern literature stands out in its respect towards 
the law.”1^ 8 The responsibility incumbent upon literature to uphold the law makes 
the literary especially appropriate for addressing and pronouncing itself on questions 
of truth. It is in this sense that literature and language bear witness to the political by 
uncovering its aporetic  nature at the very moment they derive judgment from this 
impasse.
I have shown how bearing witness, a linguistic, singular engagement with a 
past event, brings to light the relationship between justice and memory, ethics and 
truth. It carries within itself the potential to address and host justice, revealing how  
justice is not neutral in nature. Or, as Judith Butler has alerted us: “No speech is 
permissible without some other speech becoming im p e r m is s ib le .”^  The 
implications this carries for a discussion of the different modalities of bearing witness 
are threefold: first, bearing witness is never simply a revelatory or a representational 
activity and the traces of memory that it brings forth are, in their inability to 
reconstruct an authentic origin, irresolvable (aporetic) in relation to truth. Second, 
bearing witness has the potential to restore subjectivity, as Kelly Oliver suggests:
198 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  P o li t ica l ,  37.
199 Q u oted  in O liver, W itn e s s in g ,  63 .
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“Witnessing as address and response is the necessary ground for subjectivity.”200 The 
latter, however, is not always unproblematically and/or positively addressed in 
language, just as a speaking, witnessing subject is not always also a “healed” subject. 
And thirdly, bearing witness contains within itself the potential to give rise to a 
multiplicity of idioms and ways of being that recognize the fragmentary, fragile, 
unfinished and thus, politically relevant nature of recovery.
Importantly, this also challenges the idea that bearing witness should be 
reserved for accounts of trauma, violence and subordination. Even mainstream  
International Relations accounts will do well to learn from these implications and 
apply them in its scientific endeavours -  if not in an attempt to shake up its 
groundwork, then in an effort to supplement, double-check and expand its scholarly 
horizons. In fact, I will argue that bearing witness is not a privileged, better or more 
authentic form of truth-telling, nor that the process itself lives only in theoretical 
and/or scientific evocations. The implication these propositions have for bearing 
witness is an invitation to consider the latter as a process of public, communal, 
constant and everyday revelation that sometimes refers to and at other times denies 
language. Testimony can also erase language -  maybe because language, as science, 
is sometimes erasable. It is here that a distinction between history as told by 
historians and history as narrated or performed by people reveals that the “reliability 
of the eyewitness is only limited”201 and that testimony informs this dynamic nature. 
This invites a sensitivity informed not only by an emotive or a personal desire, but 
also by an appeal to recognize the potential within language to host both truth as 
fiction and fiction as truth. Next, I will engage the nature of this relationship in a 
discussion of “the poetic,” situating the latter not simply as a literary form, but as a 
novel way of being in the world.
2°° O liver, W itn e s s in g ,  16.
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the poetics  of b earing  w itness
I will refer to “the poem” as an example of a work of literature. “The poetic,” 
on the other hand, will address more generally the mode of linguistic engagement 
that shares the stylistic and structural requirements of a poem, but that exceeds 
these, manifesting itself rather as a way of being in the world than a way of speaking 
in the world. Poetry, Derrida argues in Sovereignties in Question (2005), 
accommodates the fragmentary nature of language because its open-ended style 
invites the possibility for invention and imagination. For Derrida, poetic language 
has a resuscitative power that brings out the true essence of language as free, non- 
lethargic, innovative, and dynamic. “The poetic a c t ... constitutes a sort of 
resurrection: the poet is someone permanently engaged with a dying language that he 
resuscitates, not by giving back to it a triumphant line, but by sometimes bringing it 
back, like a revenant or phantom.”202 Derrida offers a reading of Paul Celan he insists 
belongs without belonging to the cannon of literature. To say that something 
“belongs without belonging” is not simply to confuse the meaning of belonging, but to 
suggest that even the possibility of deciding on meaning is endlessly more 
complicated than is often presented by social scientific programs.
In a sense, what Derrida is saying is that language, if it wants to claim for 
itself the status of being free, truthful and imaginative, has to be poetic language. 
“Whoever surrenders to the truth o f language, is a poet, whether he writes poetry or 
not . ” 2°3  In the sense in which the poem makes possible an address to the other “by 
keeping quiet, keeping something quiet from him,”204 the poem becomes “attached to 
the singularity o f the signifying body o f language -  or of the body, period -  but 
which, because of such singularity, eludes all possession, any claim of belonging
202 D err id a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n , 106.
2°3  D errida , S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u e s t io n ,  105.
2°4 D errida , S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u e s t io n ,  96 .
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to.”205 However, this body of language is quite removed from the actual bodies of 
people that poetry addresses and that bearing witness recovers. The poem’s death, in 
fact, can only ever be a figurative death in being “forgotten, or not interpreted, or left 
to lethargy” and not the physical death “in crematoria or in flames.”206
In order for his anthropomorphizing of poetry to work, Derrida has to infuse 
the poem with the kind of life that, like the life of the witness, is predicated on one’s 
ability to survive, supersede and later, recall ‘event.’ “Whoever bears witness does 
not bring a proof; he is someone whose experience, in principle singular and 
irreplaceable (even if it can be crosschecked with others to become proof, to become 
conclusive in a process of verification), comes to attest, precisely, that some ‘thing’ 
has been present to him.”20? This allows Derrida to link poetry with the human: 
“poetry... bears witness to the present, to the now, to the ‘presence’ of the human. 
And because to bear witness is always to manifest presence, thereby speech, through 
speech that addresses the other and thereby attests to a presence, well, then, what 
counts here, and what signs, is a presence attesting to a presence, or rather to a 
present, a human present.”208 What is showcased here is the poem’s hospitality 
underwritten by an alterity. If “an act of hospitality can only be poetic” and the 
possibility of address is underwritten by “the unquestioning welcome”20^  of a wholly 
other “before they are indentified, even before they are a subject, legal subject and 
subject nameable by their family name,”210 then poetry itself must be considered as 
wholly other.
In order for the relationship between self and other to be one of
hospitality/address and not of violence, the self must perceive alterity both through
2°5  D err id a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n ,  102.
206 D err id a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n ,  107.
2°7  D err id a , “A  S e lf -U n se a lin g  P o e tic  T e x t,” 190 .
208 D err id a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n , 118.
209 J a cq u es  D errida. O f  H o s p i t a l i t y .  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  U n iv ersity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 a ) ,  29 .
21° D errida , O f  H o s p i t a l i t y , 29 .
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idioms of difference and similarity. That means that the sovereign subject must be 
able to differentiate between entities, both physical and linguistic, based on their 
relationship to his own sense of security. However, as Derrida himself suggests, 
“since there is also no hospitality without finitude, sovereignty can only be exercised 
by filtering, choosing, and thus by excluding and doing violence.”211 If we were to 
take Derrida’s suggestion seriously, then a law of unconditional hospitality embodies 
not so much a real-life unmediated, juridically unsanctioned state of human mobility, 
but rather a state of being where commonly accepted difference markers themselves 
are subjected to re-examination and re-casting in light of the actual insecurity they 
breed among people.
Derrida is asking us to take a hard look at the policies, implementations, 
programs, institutions and theories that bear witness to our understanding of 
relationality in the world. Even though Derrida’s formulation of address can produce 
violence by insisting on an unconditional law of hospitality as “a law without 
imperative, without order and without duty,”212 his call for hospitality offers the 
possibility of conceptualizing exiles, emigres, displaced persons, the homeless, 
refugees, language itself as mobilities that mutate, develop and are defined by their 
interaction with one another, by their portable stability. Bearing witness, likewise, in 
its nature as an address, must be taken seriously for the “political and m ore than 
political” potential it has to “to deconstruct these inheritances or the prevailing 
interpretations of those inheritances.”2^
If the poetic is an opening “by its very virtue to illuminate , ” 214 then what it 
illuminates is “the operation of creative imagination at the greatest possible
211 D err id a , O f  H o s p i ta l i ty ,  55 .
212 D err id a , O f  H o s p i ta l i ty ,  8 3 .
213 D errida , O f  H o s p i t a l i t y ,  139.
2 ,4 D errida , W r i t in g  a n d  D if fe r e n c e ,  6.
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proximity to it.”21s For Derrida poetic language, holding within itself the promise of 
reawakening meaning from its slumber and acting as a power of creation, offers the 
possibility of uncovering a purity that has been given over to verification and 
replicable proofs. This kind of creative, dynamic address/truth, for Derrida, is best 
addressed through poetic language. Since the witness himself “does not bring a 
proof’ by virtue of attesting to an “experience, in principle singular and 
irreplaceable,”216 then bearing witness itself is best accommodated in the language of 
poetry. The language of poetry, in turn, is a performative, that is, “something which 
produces an event while using, organizing a given ... m aterial... at the same time 
shaping and producing.”21? The value of this performativity is that it informs without 
falling into “universality... on the verge of losing its innocence ... prone to become 
functional.”218 This universality and functionality are, for Derrida, the very things 
that make language lethargic and bearing witness -  the other name for proof.
As already noted, no one kind of language is innocent or neutral. As the
repository of meaning, language is never pure and its idioms as well as its toolbox are
always underwritten by the very meanings they try to convey.
In the extent to which what is called ‘meaning’ (to be ‘expressed’) is already, 
and thoroughly, constituted by a tissue of differences, in the extent to which 
there is already a text, a network of textual referrals to other texts, a textual 
transformation in which allegedly ‘simple term’ is marked by the trace of 
another term, the presumed interiority of meaning is already worked upon by 
its own exteriority.219
The poem, for Alain Badiou, “addresses not so much a sunset in general as this
sunset, not so much the colour of the tiles in general as the color of those tiles there.
The poem never succeeds here absolutely, but nevertheless this is its goal.”220 Like
Badiou, Derrida recommends poetry for its ability to interact and exist alongside
215 D errid a , W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e , 8 .
216 D errid a , “A  S e lf -U n se a lin g  P o e tic  T e x t,” 190 .
21? D errid a , E th ic s , I n s ti tu tio n s , a n d  th e  R ig h t  to  P h ilo s o p h y , 41.
218 D errida , E th ic s , I n s ti tu tio n s , a n d  th e  R ig h t  to  P h ilo so p h y ,  5 0 .
219 D errid a , P o s it io n s , 33 .
220 Q u oted  in A sja S zafran iee , B eck e t t ,  D e r r id a ,  a n d  the  E v e n t  o f  L i t e r a tu r e .  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  
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philosophy. “Each time there is a sentence which finally calls for translation, 
provokes translation, becomes legible and attractive and interesting for someone in 
another language, in another country, then there is something philosophical and 
poetic occurring at the same tim e.”221 Like philosophy, poetic language is well suited 
to change, to correcting itself depending on the context of interpretation, on the 
essentialist or non-essentialist climate of inquiry. “The same statements, 
grammatically and in their lexicon, can function here as everyday language, here as 
philosophemes, and here as poems, as poetic sentences. It depends on the context of 
the interpretation -  of the conventions, the agreement or disagreement -  and it’s 
always a matter of discussion.”222 Derrida gives French universities as an example of 
this reproducing tendency that, “without accepting anything new,” legislates the 
university into “a state of censorship.”223 The inherent ambiguity of poetic language 
is what makes it so amenable to dealing with questions of witnessing (fiction), 
indeterminacy (repetition) and performance (interpretation).
on the rom anticism  o f poetry as philosophy
However, the poetic is not limited to the philosophic. Poetry, attentive in its 
style and form to the polymorphous nature of experience, bears witness to those 
modalities of being in the world structured around recognizing, respecting and 
representing the political valence of that which has yet to be decided upon. The 
language of poetry (ordinary language used in novel ways) is especially valuable in a 
discussion of bearing witness, accommodating the simultaneous fragmentariness and 
completeness of testimony. Thus, bearing witness is amenable to being addressed by 
idioms that appeal to traditional and ‘interpretive’ methods alike. As I will argue in 
greater depth in my next chapter, the language of poetry takes its representational 
lead from the world while remaining attentive to the interplay between singularity,
221 D err id a , E th ics , I n s t i tu t io n s , a n d  th e  R ig h t  to  P h ilo so p h y , 52 .
222 D errida , E thics ,  I n s t i tu t io n s ,  a n d  the  R ig h t  to  P h i lo s o p h y , 4 8 .
223 D errida , E th ics ,  I n s t i tu t io n s ,  a n d  the  R ig h t  to  P h i lo s o p h y ,  54 .
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universality, aporia, performativity, and ‘event.’ Poetry, a non-predicative (singular) 
performance, evokes the decision language makes at the moment of bearing witness: 
the institutionalized decision politics must make when faced with the call to justice.
The danger with Derrida is, of course, always one of making the poetic mean 
too much exemplified by an over-reliance on an appeal to romantic abstractions, to 
“language’s peculiar ability to emerge from itself in order to articulate its origin. ” 224 If 
Derrida is correct in maintaining that “Ceremony is doubtless the most precise and 
the richest word to bring together all the aspects of the event,”223 then a danger arises 
of making poetry into one such ceremonial practice, a ritualistic, improvised, ‘literary’ 
discourse on historicity. Poetry has often been recruited by academics for its 
romantic appeal, its anti-scientific nature and its greater affinity for postmodern 
theoretic orientations. Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, 
Geoffrey Hartman, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Walter Benjamin and others all have, in their theoretical engagements, 
each with a certain kind of poetic, made the latter the middle man in underwriting a 
number of ontological and methodological causalities between philosophy, literature, 
and politics. On numerous occasions, these thinkers have been dismissed for the 
elliptical nature of their pronouncements and the fictionality of their work. Hands 
are waved, sighs are heard and conference rooms continue to be filled by scholars 
wooed by reason and method. Derrida’s own complaint that “what I denounce is 
attributed to me, as if one were in less of a hurry to criticize or dismiss me, than first 
to put oneself in my place in order to do so”226 alerts to a painfully real lack of 
academic hospitality. His famous proclamation that there is nothing outside the text 
has failed to produce a serious engagement with the constructed, institutionalized 
nature of language beyond forcing critical theorists to defend themselves against
224 D err id a , P o litic s  o f  F r ie n d sh ip ,  27.
223 D errida , On the  N a m e ,  5.
226 D errida , P o s i t io n s ,  53 .
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accusations of obscurity, practical mediocrity and theoretical difficulty. A better 
translation of “there is nothing outside the text” might perhaps be “there is no 
outside-text,” which avoids the implication that everything is just language and 
nothing else.227
A poetics of bearing witness, as a performative engagement, after the fact, 
challenges the professed possibility of language to write a single history. To say that 
poetry gives language to something beyond language means recognizing the 
constructed nature of language as a totalizing, all-encompassing realm committed to 
the modern dissemination and definition of scientific knowledge. Derrida’s 
‘platform’ proposes a tempting challenge: “What we are attempting to put to the test 
is the possibility, in truth, the impossibility, for any testimony to guarantee itself by 
expressing itself in the following form and grammar: ‘Let us testify that ...”’228 A 
poetics of bearing witness points to “the idiomatic, the irreducibly singular, as a 
necessary aspect of any act of writing.”229 The poet’s “intention toward language,” as 
Peter Szondi, Paul Celan’s brilliant critic and friend discloses, does not lay out the 
subject of inquiry in a graspable, re-presentable way, but offers the possibility for the 
latter’s undoing. However, for poetry to live up to its name as “singular” language, it 
has to address ‘event’ continuously, daily and honestly. In order for the latter to be 
possible without also falling into the trap of abstract theorizing, recognizing here that 
theory is by nature totalizing, the language of poetry needs to address the historicity 
of ‘event’ beyond the implications of its factual nature. In fact, since no language is 
resistant to universalization, no language is innocent or neutral. Derrida’s view of 
poetry, likewise, fails to acknowledge that when it claims to stand for a “pure 
language,” poetry precedes ‘event,’ making it amenable to summary and dissociating 
knowledge from action. As Derrida has suggested, “the language of Western
227 M y g ra titu d e  g o e s  to  Dr. A rth u r B radley  for d raw in g  m y a tten tio n  to  th is  im p o r ta n t d ifferen ce .
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metaphysics... carries with it not only a considerable number of presuppositions of all 
types, but also presuppositions that are inseparable from metaphysics, which, 
although little attended to, are knotted into a s y s t e m . ”23°
In this sense, poetry represents the decision to write and bear witness at the 
limits of language in so far as all limits can be transgressed. The issue here is to 
expose the nostalgia to totality guiding scientific inquiry, both positivist and critical, 
while engaging bearing witness beyond a romantic appeal to undecidability, aporia, 
and fragmentariness. In its nature as a performative unfolding, language is 
anachronistic: it does not impose a definite beginning or closure by introducing to 
living and thinking a structure of finitude(s) that holds. Bearing witness is, in this 
sense, a becoming and never simply a beginning, end, or middle, as every reference 
point, as ‘event,’ is also originary. Seen that way, closures are both unavoidable and 
necessary usurpations of possibilities where the production of knowledge and truth 
serves as a means of control.
As I will show in the last chapter of this thesis, bearing witness as a process of 
accessing, assessing and commenting on ‘event’ can affect similar closure when 
related to refugee experiences. Georgia Albert’s reading of Hans-Jost Frey suggests 
that “the interest in explaining a text implies that the text is ‘lacking’ in some sense, 
that in order to mean  it needs the supplement of a commentary or exegesis. Every 
text is, in this sense, a fragment”^ 1 and declaring itself a fragment, every text, poetic 
texts especially, recover a totality that legitimates it as a negotiation between 
fragment and whole, between singular and plural. In addition, Fiona Ross shows 
that, with regard to women’s testimonies in the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, “stories, testimonies and telling are fragments, parts of
23° D errid a , P o s itio n s , 19.
G eorgia  A lbert. " Introduction ."  In I n te r r u p t io n s .  H a n s-J o st  Frey (A lbany, NY: S ta te  U n iv ersity  o f  
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people’s narration of their lives. ”232 Language’s resistance to translation, to being 
made a tool in the service of universals indebted to the demands of necessary ends, 
understands being as “evental” and bearing witness as constitutive of this fact.
“Left here to itself, to its essential solitude, in its performance or in its 
happening, the poetic act of the work perhaps no longer derives from the 
presentation of the self as s u c h ,”233 but unveils an intention toward language 
irreducible to a framework of representation. The singular as that which “could never 
be a mere e x a m p le ”23!  realizes, paradoxically, that the saying of the unique has its 
own way of being said, over and over again, in a structured commitment to 
recurrence. If it is to serve life - final, fragmentary and experimental -  bearing 
witness must be other than swearing or truth telling and language must enter its own 
performativity, its own re-creation. Such a suspension relocates responsibility from 
fixed systems of knowledge toward a different intention toward language. To say that 
language moves beyond the interplay between sign and signified does not mean, 
however, that “as soon as it is guaranteed, certain as a theoretical proof, a testimony 
can no longer be guaranteed as a t e s t im o n y  ”23s in the sense which would make the 
latter fictional, not to be trusted or endowed with the quality of truth.
Bearing witness, understood as a performative engagement with ‘event,’ 
cannot only be a determinable, permanent system of truth. Fiona Ross has alerted us 
to the fact that against the common belief that testimony yields authenticity the 
former, used as reportage and data, is not neutral but is interpreted depending on the 
information one is trying to solicit from the past. “Voice implies authenticity: 
speaking is considered to be an act that fully, completely and absolutely describes the
232 R o ss, B e a r in g  W itn e s s ,  102.
233 D err id a  q u o tes  in  B a u com , S p e c te r s  o f  th e  A t la n t ic ,  3 0 3 .
23-t D errida, P o in t s , iii.
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self. This is clear in the Commission’s assumptions about the relationship between 
“experience” and “story”: the narration of experience was assumed to be a simple 
fact, a release of ‘stories’ of pain that already existed intact within those who has 
experienced violations.”236 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (1992) have argued 
along similar lines that even those who were in the Nazi concentration camps, for 
example, could not see what was happening there. As Kelly Oliver sums up: “From 
the inside, victims were not only empirically annihilated as witnesses -  murdered -  
but also cognitively and perceptually destroyed as witnesses because they were 
turned into objects and dehumanized.”23?
the way o f fable
To maintain that testimony cannot be guaranteed as testimony if guaranteed 
as theoretical proof invites one to re-define bearing witness both as performative and 
as constructed event. Bearing witness does not necessarily interrupt or resist any 
deployment of a program of knowledge intended to close off the possibility for the 
kind of recurrent decision-making that underwrites a responsible relationship 
between truth, power, memory and fiction. Indeed, Thomas Keenan engages the 
productive potential contained in a serious engagement with ‘fable,’ which he defines 
as “‘a saying pure and simple’ -  thus renders secondary, irrelevant the division of 
language intro true and false, m ythos and logos.”238 Keenan takes this a step further 
by introducing a relationship of responsibility between fable (m ythos)  and truth 
(telos) as “the interpretation and practice of responsibility -  our exposure to calls, 
others, and the names with which we are constituted and which put us in 
question.”23? Unlike Derrida, who privileges the poetic for its resuscitative potential, 
Keenan recruits the idiom of the ‘fable’ in an effort to formulate a theory of 
responsibility constituted not “as a matter of articulating what is known with what is
236 R o ss, B e a r in g  W itn e s s , 79.
237 O liver, W itn e s s in g ,  8 9 .
238 T h o m a s K een an . F a b le s  o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i t y .  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1997), 55.
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done” but rather, “as an asymmetry or an interruption between the orders of
cognition and action.”240 No more are undecidability and contingency ruled out from
the political imaginary. What Keenan does with great mastery and sensitivity to the
political, ethical and linguistic imaginations of post-modern thought, is offer a theory
of responsibility derived from an ontological im passe  as the necessary condition for
any and all political action and decision. Keenan posits literature
as the experience of risk, chance, the undecidable. Not the decisionist 
celebration of the pathos of pure resolution, of having to decide once and for 
all, without reason, but with firmness and conviction. ... thinking about what 
happens in language can only begin to take the measure of its enigmatic 
character if we suspend our cheerful confidence in the fact that it does or has 
to make sense and perform. Literature tells us that letters can always not 
reach their destination, as Derrida said to Lacan, and this originary dispersal 
is the condition or the chance of anything (new) happening at all.241
Keenan’s literary does not save or revive a dying, lethargic language. It is not the
opposition between scientific and literary language that gives clarity, but an
understanding of the underlying insecurity of language as such that allows for
decision to arrive, for responsibility to be had.
The recognition of language’s insecurity is not synonymous with primitiveness 
of thought, but is a weapon against complacency of thought and faith, against the 
obligation to bear witness against one’s will and because of an obsessive insistence on 
finding proof reducible to verification. If Derrida is correct in maintaining that “good 
conscience as subjective certainty is incompatible with the absolute risk that every 
promise, every engagement, and every responsible decision -  if there are such -  must 
run,”242 then bearing witness cannot offer a monolithic theory of responsibility, but 
only the kind of responsibility borne out of encounters, between borders, as risk and 
undecidability. While the relationship between knowledge and language is dictated 
as much by the latter’s undecidability as by an appeal to transparent reductionism,
24° K een an , F a b le s  o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty ,  l .
--*1 K eenan , F a b les  o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  5.
2-+2 J a cq u es D errida. A p o r i a s .  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  U n iv ersity  P ress, 1 9 9 3 ), 19.
115
the saying of the unique and the ordinary both have, paradoxically, their own ways of 
being said. If “the limits of knowledge ... call into question ... the validity of 
t e s t im o n y ,”243 as Dori Laub suggests, then testimony cannot always be about knowing 
things. For Laub, the pure facticity of ‘event’ is made up of the process of going 
through and listening.244 Bearing witness, in addition to being an engagement with 
historical and linguistic singularity, is also an engagement with the internal witness 
contained within every witness: an internal witness that reveals the possibility for an 
address conditioned not on an erasure of singularity but on a play of difference. Kelly 
Oliver defines the “inner witness” as “the necessary condition for the structure of 
address-ability and response-ability inherent in subjectivity. ”24s For Dori Laub, 
“testimony is ... the process by which the narrator (the survivor) reclaims his position 
as a witness: reconstitutes the internal “thou” and thus the possibility of a witness or 
a listener inside himself.”246 Bearing witness realizes that every singularity is 
contained within a universality, that the performative potential of the testimony of a 
Holocaust survivor, a refugee, a rape victim, a single mother, a prisoner of war, an 
academic is the creative aspect of memory that makes irrelevant the line between fact 
and fiction, making any insistent appeal to truth not only violent, but also impossible.
second  fragm ent: singu lar w itness
If “the force of our weakness is that impotence separates, disengages, and 
emancipates,”24? then the conflation of the otherwise dichotomous categories of the 
singular and universal in Derrida’s thought points not to a rejection of difference or a 
failure to honour opposition, but to a kind of methodological obligation to one’s 
“singular response to singularity.”248 In reading literature, this obliges remaining
243 Laub, “B earing  W itn e ss  an d  th e  V ic is s itu d e s  o f  L is te n in g ,” 61.
244 L aub, “B earing  W itn e ss  an d  th e  V ic is s itu d e s  o f  L is te n in g ,” 6 2 .
245 O liver, W itn e s s in g , 87 .
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truthful to the “structural in t e r d e p e n d e n c e ”^  between singularity and universality.
It is a structural interdependence that manifests itself on every level of reading a text. 
The singular, here, is not the solitary, though in an important sense it stands alone. 
To engage the singular in a system of knowledge does not, however, mean assigning 
to it a fixed place in a universe of prescriptive, assimilating thought. Despite the 
temptation to idealize, I would like to alert the reader to the fact that singularity is 
not a more worthy or purer lens through which to view the world. In its nature as a 
linguistic idiom, it is a representation and an aide. The relationship between 
language (saying) and knowledge (the said) is inherently a poetic relationship. It is 
important to note that all competing epistemological orientations commit their 
responses as the product(s) of a particular, singular kind of engagement with 
language, meaning, and truth economizing on “a system of metaphysical 
oppositions.”250 In the moment of bearing witness, the irreducible singularity of each 
example is derived from the exemplarity (universality) of the law that “articulates 
itself as an obligation to decision.”251
Singularity, in order that it does not become self-referential, needs to link up 
to that which exceeds its onto-theoretical boundaries. The poem, accommodating the 
singularity of language, bears witness to the possibility of justice to come. The 
singular is thus not an a priori state but the product of a decision. What the 
singularity of bearing witness as a process illuminates is a debt to a singularity of 
expression that, in turn, underwrites (in)security. Writing, both academic and 
otherwise, is inherently singular in nature, making problematic the very notion of a 
unified, universal community of scholars. Thus, “each speaking [parole] is 
independent”252 and reveals a limit to the essence of being beyond which being in the
249 D err id a , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu r e ,  15.
2s° D err id a , P o litic s  o f  F r ie n d sh ip , 17.
251 B au com , S p e c te r s  o f  the  A t la n t i c ,  3 0 2 .
252 D errida , On the  N a m e ,  4 2 .
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world recognizes both possibility, promise and its insecure, indeterminate nature.
Derrida goes on to suggest, emphatically that
there is another death, the death that comes over language because of what 
language is: repetition, lethargy, mechanization, and so forth. The poetic act 
therefore constitutes a sort of resurrection: the poet is someone permanently 
engaged with a dying language that he resuscitates, not by giving back to it a 
triumphant line, but by sometimes bringing it back, like a revenant or 
phantom .253
What Derrida unveils as the resuscitating function of poetry becomes problematic 
with respect to the poet’s ability to engage the historicity of events. Language, a 
vehicle for the recovery of memory and the communication of fact, is likewise unable 
to fully address or contain events outside of their own performative interpretations.
th ird  fragm ent: daily acco un ts
“an event, if I understand right... would have the form of a seal, as if, 
witness without witness, it were committed to keeping a secret, the 
event sealed with an indecipherable s ig n a t u r e .”254
So far in my engagement with Derrida, I have discussed his view of poetry’s
relationship to bearing witness in light of the former’s ability to accommodate
language’s innovative, performative potential and in light of Derrida’s self-referential
romanticization of poetry’s actual ‘role’ as a catalyst for political action. Poetry
becomes, for Derrida, the single most irreducible idiom that cannot be possessed,
owned or disowned either by language, by country or a people. It is in this sense that
bearing witness can open up the possibility for interpreting and engaging difference
as multiplicity without, at the same time, appropriating or reducing it to a
manageable, knowable, determinable or, for that matter, poetic system. If we agree
that there is no natural status to language before it is engaged by a subject, then
bearing witness becomes implicated in repetitive decision-making that, engaged
within strict theoretic boundaries, threatens to grow into idealized abstraction.
253 D errida , S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u es t io n .  106.
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118
Poetic language, in order to avoid such a fall, must project the beginning of thought 
alongside a beginning of action -  something that Derrida does not explicitly address.
This suggests an understanding of the process of memory recovery beyond a 
linguistic (poetic) activity predicated on the subject’s ability to think identity in terms 
of iterability. If what can be thought can also be reduced, then neither language nor 
singularity as concepts can be posited as pure. The question arises: “What is the 
nature of this language since already it no longer belongs, no longer belongs simply, 
either to the question or to the response whose limits we have just verified and are 
continuing to verify? Will one call this a testim ony... as with every testimony, 
providing that can never be reducible, precisely, to verification, to proof or to 
demonstration, in a word, to knowledge?”2^
An event in language represents a coming after death, a coming in lieu of 
absence. It is perhaps in this sense that bearing witness can be called resuscitative. 
The problem with Derrida’s reading of the poetic potential to revive, however, is that 
he does oppose life and death when no strict deconstructive project could oppose the 
living to the non-living. That is, he is not being sufficiently deconstructive because he 
is still attempting to oppose life to death in the concept of resuscitation. It is in this 
sense that his poetic project perhaps fails to fully address the very real-life, actual 
deconstructive and expository logic contained within the body of the poem. What 
comes after resuscitation, as we will see with the work of Paul Celan, is the actual 
example of the poem, breathing, living but also indebted to memories of death, to 
death itself. It is not because they are opposed that they evoke meaning, but because 
life and death are simultaneously contained, containable rather, in the poem that the 
latter offers a space for an address, a space that is ontologically and historically 
singular and not predicated either on exclusion or on dichotomies.
5^5 D errida, P o in ts ,  2 2 -3 .
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What I am trying to show is that there is, in the process of bearing witness, 
something beyond the linguistic -  authentic precisely because of its daily lived 
singularity. What I am suggesting here is that the latter experience is overlooked by 
Derrida in favor of the resuscitative potential of poetry. In that sense, language 
(poetry) bears witness to a truth that exceeds it, to a confession that does not aspire 
to make known, “for one will never reconcile the value of testimony with that of 
knowledge or of certainty.”256 For practical reasons, it is important to stress, once 
again, that a discourse on singularity and undecidability is also a discourse on justice 
since it relates to a moment of making a decision, thus making the founding of law a 
performative process. If that were not the case, then a discourse on singularity and 
conversely, a discourse on bearing witness, would remain locked in a purely 
speculative universe. Failing to account for the productive potential of his 
understanding of singularity, Derrida’s reading of poetry needs to be supplemented 
by a discussion of the actual implications for a responsible decision-making inherent 
in an engagement with the insecurity, contingency and irreducibility o f‘event.’ One 
way of doing that is by engaging actual testimonies in an effort to examine the 
‘applied’ resuscitative power of language vis-a-vis both academic and policy work.
Allow me to address summarily once again two implications of the 
relationship between testimony and truth as found in academic writings on the 
subject. This will allow me to return to Derrida and derive a few suggestions for 
refining the scope of his resuscitative discourse. First, James Booth endorses a view 
of witnessing as an imperative decision to speak. On the other hand, Veena Das, 
Jenny Edkins, Kelly Oliver, and Fiona Ross all caution against the unproblematic, 
linear transcription of memory into speech, against the “scientific assumption that 
the world is knowable only through words and that to have no voice is to be without
256 D err id a , On th e  N a m e ,  31.
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language, unable to communicate.”25? In addition, Michael Lambek and Paul Antze 
defend the thesis that “memories are never simply records of the past, but are 
interpretive reconstructions that bear the imprint of local narrative conventions, 
cultural assumptions, discursive formations and practices, and social contexts of 
recall and commemoration.’’258 A discussion of bearing witness as a linguistic idiom 
can only be made alongside an account of the political and ethical implications 
producing, securing but also problematizing the relationship between bearing 
witness, truth and the ways in which we comport ourselves in the world. My next 
chapter engages the poetic oeuvre of Paul Celan in an attempt to see whether 
Derrida’s characterization of poetry does indeed provide an opportunity for a 
discussion of political action.
Second, because there is an aporetic relationship between singularity and 
universality, bearing witness as a singular activity presupposes a generality of tools 
which allow the singular to be spoken, addressed and engaged. Justice addressed to 
singularity reveals the fact that there is no singular, private theory of justice that is 
not derived from justice in general. While this might suggest a possible disdain for 
the plethora of everyday, local decisions that underwrite the interactions of self with 
other, I would like to suggest that the “’ordinary’ is always exceptional, however little 
we understand its character as origin.”259 Nancy understands ‘origin’ as that which 
“does not signify that from which the world comes, but rather the coming of each 
presence of the world, each time singular.”260 In that sense, a discussion of bearing 
witness, as a performative (coming of presence) enunciation o f‘event,’ must address 
a kind of unity made up of a multiplicity of events. Bearing witness, in addition to 
forging a theoretical exploration into the nature of Being, addresses the singularity of
257 R oss, B e a r in g  W itn e s s ,  5 0 .
258 L am b eck  an d  A n tze , T en se  P a s t ,  vii.
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events via an ethico-political question(s) of living in the world. Poetry does not, then, 
recover or resuscitate language from its dying bed, if such a bed were conceivable, nor 
does the poet have the role of a prophet, a messiah, or as someone who “has an 
intimate, bodily experience of this spectral errancy, whoever surrenders to this truth 
of language ... whether he writes poetry or not.”261 What, then, is this ‘truth of 
language’ referring to?
Does a relationship between bearing witness and poetry make language 
visible as non-predicative, that is, as defined by and defining nothing else but itself? 
Not exactly. Both speaking and writing represent (universalize), despite the fact that 
they are wished and theorized away from such a formulation. In theory, ‘event’ is a 
singular occurrence in time and language in that ‘event’ is not recoverable with the 
kind of precision that can communicate or contain within itself the essence of this 
singularity. As already suggested, bearing witness as a singular engagement with 
‘event’ is not an end; it (sur)passes language in the moment of its occurrence. This 
means that bearing witness uproots itself from the language of ‘event’ in order to 
address the nature of events. The latter is both the product of a decision informed by 
the desire for truth and an unveiling that “belongs, without fulfilling, to the space of 
the philosophical or onto-theological promise that it seems to break.”262 This desire 
for truth is supplemented by a desire to transgress the literality of meaning. This is 
its aporia.
Thus, the aporetic character of every and any instance of bearing witness: 
always after the fact, always other than “the whole truth and nothing but the truth,” 
always a possible recruit for a discourse on the limit. The poetic (as an orientation 
within language), Derrida’s preferred testimonial idiom, is a product of the
261 D errida, S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u es t io n ,  105.
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relationship between enunciation on the one hand and the excess of ‘event’ that defies 
enunciation on the other. If testimony bears witness to the historicity of ‘event’ and if 
poetry bears witness to the novelty of language, then the relationship between the two 
always remains a mutually constitutive one. Despite “the idiomatic, the irreducibly 
singular, as a necessary aspect of any act of writing,”263 one need problematize 
singularity’s autonomy in an attempt to avoid falling into cultural, historical, socio­
political or theoretical boundaries. Derrida’s poetic, I argue, is one such boundary.
cnnclusm n: on authenticity
In an effort to conclude without getting stuck in bounded spaces myself, I 
wish to engage shortly Geoffrey Hartman’s metaphor of “authenticity.” I would like 
to suggest that bearing witness, much like authenticity itself, is subject to certain 
criteria that place both in a relationship to truth that is directly implicated upon an 
evolving public consciousness. Authenticity, especially when related to bearing 
witness, appeals to a similar resuscitative, true-to-language role that Derrida reserves 
for poetry. The poetic, in order to remain faithful to the memory of ‘event,’ must be 
understood beyond a private language. Actual testimonies do not affect change or 
raise public awareness simply because of their dynamic, non-apathetic and/or 
performative nature. Trauma narratives, for their part, are allowed an emotive 
quality for their appeal to an understanding of subjectivity predicated on resistance, 
resilience and survival. These should only be the starting points for a serious 
engagement with memories of war, violence and suffering as intricately more 
complex and polymorphous than any single discourse/idiom might disclose them to 
be. What I am suggesting here is that trauma narratives are as fictional and highly- 
emotive as they are an appeal to particular kinds of truth and justice. The reason we 
do not weigh recent testimonials against the archive of knowledge we already possess
26:i D errida, A c ts  o f  L i t e r a tu r e ,  14.
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is because we recognize that every instance of witnessing testifies to a singular 
experience that is absolutely irreducible to another system but the one set up by itself.
So far in this chapter I have examined the issue of bearing witness against the 
thought of Jacques Derrida. Bearing witness was first introduced as ethico-political 
in addition to being a juridico-political activity. The questions of aporia, singularity 
and the poetic were engaged in light of the question of bearing witness addressed as a 
singular and performative recollection of ‘event.’ I suggested that Derrida’s argument 
in favor of poetry’s resuscitative function vis-a-vis language was an idealized, 
romanticized and politically limiting deduction. I also suggested that Derrida seems 
to privilege the poetic as a preferred idiom of language, while somehow overlooking 
the equally important function of witnessing in recovering public consciousness and 
political potential. What is more, Derrida’s opposition of life to death was challenged 
for its insufficiently deconstructive nature. I suggested that, in addition to recovering 
the singularity of ‘event,’ bearing witness must also inform and enable an 
engagement with bodies, “their states, their movements, their transformations.”264
Next, I will offer an engagement with the work of Paul Celan in an effort to 
show that the value of individual testimonies is not only comparable to a CPR 
manoeuvre, but to a certain relationship to historical time informed by a novel 
engagement with language. It is this relationship to novelty that offers singular tools 
for coping with (traumatic) memory. I hope to show that poetry, unlike any other 
scientifically-endorsed idiom, goes a long way in offering an alternative way of 
articulation, sensitive at once to the fragile nature of memory and to the fragmentary 
nature of inscription. However, what the poetic does is not so much resuscitate as 
create for memory a niche in which the work of recovery begins and ends with 
language. While this is useful for a linguistic and/or theoretic discussion of
264 N an cy , B e in g  S in g u l a r  P lu ra l ,  18.
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testimony, it hardly measures up alongside Derrida’s resuscitative prescription 
against instances of non-linguistic, life-informed modes of witnessing. Recognizing, 
with Geoffrey Hartman, that survivor narratives are both informative and 
performative, that they are often silenced for fear of retaliation, shame, or the advent 
of new and different traumatic memories poetry, an alternative way of bearing 
witness within political science, does offer new ways for the transmission of truth and 
for enabling healing to happen. 26s Likewise, James Booth has argued that 
remembering recovers a lost connection to the past, grounding us in our relationship 
to family, friends, and community. What he does not problematize, however, is the 
potentially fractured, painful nature of linearly-evoked narratives that end up 
endorsing and perpetuating a sense of loss. What Booth idealizes with regard to 
language’s potential to keep the past “among the unlost,”266 Derrida does with poetry. 
I will argue that the latter is not immune to falling into the trap of an idealized 
exemplary. I will also examine academia’s accusation that poetry does not raise 
public awareness as other idioms of witness and politics do. My starting point is a 
hypothesis that poetry problematizes direct access to painful memories designed to 
define authenticity and truth by exposing scientific language for being just as private, 
violent and preferential as it claims to be universal, redeeming and neutral.
265 H artm an , S c a rs  o f  th e  S p ir i t ,  95 .
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C hapter 3:
"All is le ss  than  /  it is, /  all is m ore ."267 Paul Celan 's singu lar w itness.
The poem has always hoped... to speak also ... on 
behalf of the other, who knows, perhaps of an 
altogether other. (Paul Celan)
Came, came.
Came a word, came,
came through the night,
wanted to shine, wanted to shine.268
This chapter will bear witness to a poet. The poet’s name is Paul Celan.
My argument will unfold in a threefold procession. First, I will introduce Paul 
Celan and explain why I have chosen to read him alongside the work of Giorgio 
Agamben and Jacques Derrida. I hope this will answer potential questions pertaining 
to my intentions and/or partiality. Second, I will continue my discussion of the 
process of bearing witness by providing parallel accounts of Giorgio Agamben’s 
juridico-political and Celan’s poetic witness. This will allow me to re-introduce Veena 
Das’ concept of a “descent into the ordinary” and weigh its everyday implications with 
the nature of poetic witness Celan gives. Bearing witness in cases of trauma and 
violence will be discussed in light of the traditional understanding and implications 
that “limit experiences” have had both for the process of bearing witness and, more 
specifically, for the discipline of political science itself. An insistence on truth and 
facticity, generally associated with scientific and academic pursuits, will be 
juxtaposed to the implications that the process of bearing witness, defined as a 
singular, performative and dynamic engagement with a past event, has for the nature 
of knowledge as the dissemination, testing and confirmation of information. Last but 
not least, I will return to Jacques Derrida in an attempt to clarify the implications his 
theoretic engagement with Celan’s poetry has for an understanding of the process of
Paul C elan. “C e llo -en try .” In S e le c t io n s  (B erk eley , CA: U n iv ers ity  o f  C aliforn ia  P ress, 2 0 0 5 ) ,  201.
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bearing witness. Because Derrida has been especially vocal on the role of language 
for the creation of meaning, on the aporetic nature of all enunciation, and on 
singularity, I hope that by relating bearing witness as a process of remembrance, I 
will be able to examine the potential that poetic language has for engaging the 
singularity of an event. This is important in light of the fact that an academic 
category of “poetry of witness” has emerged challenging the enunciation of the 
Holocaust and similar events from the standpoint of an academically-informed, 
morally-invested and sympathetic bystander.
f ir s t  frag m en t - why Celan?
"... at times when only the void stood between us we got /  all the way to each other.” (Celan)
Asked why he wanted to climb Everest, George Mallory responded: “Because 
it’s there. This is the only irrefutable reason for climbing Everest that I know of... but 
it didn't work with Mom.” To the accusation that Paul Celan lends himself to 
appropriation by post-modern theory and thus does lip-service to Derrida&co-esque 
projects, my responses are two. First, any claim to fame earned someone by the favor 
of his critics is, on the one hand, commendable and on the other, often informed by 
less than noble intentions and not to be taken at face value. Further critique based on 
allegations of uselessness and madness should refer to the insight in George Mallory’s 
quote and remember that usefulness and practicality are not the main tools of artists. 
Beauty, joy and communion are. “It is very common today to complain of the 
‘obscurity’ of poetry. ... This obscurity, if it is not congenital, has been bestowed on 
poetry by strangeness and distance (perhaps of its own making) and for the sake of an 
encounter.”269 Paul Celan is perhaps even more intriguing because he has been the 
focus of so much both positive and critical debate. The challenge for any future 
interpretation would be to ask why has that been and continues to be the case?
269 Paul C elan , C o l le c te d  Prose .  (L ondon: C arcanet, 1 9 9 9 ), 4 6 .
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Second, it is precisely because Celan is an over-analyzed and highly lauded 
poet that any further engagement with his oeuvre must commit itself either to the 
goal of critical novelty or to the rather more challenging end of a close reading of his 
work. Celan’s relationship to the question of bearing witness has been taken for 
granted because of his status as a concentration camp survivor, because he wrote 
while many others did not, and because he was very familiar with the philosophical 
debates at the time. His work has inspired painters, literary critics, philosophers, 
composers other poets and writers and has been appropriated to speak on behalf of 
the survivor, the victim, the father, the husband, the friend, the Jew, the writer in 
German, the translator, the poet. Because of his eclectic and often difficult style, he 
has been implied, both during his lifetime and posthumously, in heated discussions 
spanning from the nature of being, to the evolution and usurpation of literary form, 
to the limits of language, to the difficult task of the translator, to the transformation 
of the German language after World War II, to his 1970 suicide and its bearing on his 
message, to his relationship to Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Holderlin and Walter 
Benjamin, to accusations of plagiarism. Working with Celan’s poems has been, in the 
words of Edmond Jabes, like moving “at the edge of two languages at the same time -  
that of renouncement and that of hope. A language of poverty, a language of riches. 
On one side, clarity; on the other, obscurity. But how to distinguish between them 
when they are blended to such a degree?”270
Because this is not strictly a literary study and because I am writing within a 
political science department, I will not limit my discussion to an engagement with a 
few select poems in an attempt to sing praise to the ways in which Celan’s often 
fractured and formally non-traditional language does a better or worse job of 
addressing the specific question of bearing witness. I will anchor Celan by engaging 
him alongside the writings of Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida on bearing
~70 In C elan , S e le c t io n s ,  219.
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witness. The latter has thus far been defined as a singular, dynamic, performative 
process of (re)calling ‘event.’ The purpose of this recollection is not strictly limited to 
the recovery of facts in service of Truth for no event is ever simply representable 
either through the medium of data or through narration. An exemplary or an 
ordinary witness, I would like to suggest that Celan bears witness in a way that is 
unique to and derived from his particular, singular modality of engaging the historic 
period he lived in. Bearing in mind that the Holocaust has not produced, for the most 
part, novel literary styles and forms, what Celan does is offer a way of conceiving and 
representing the relationship between loss and hope, suffering and redemption, 
silence and witness, in poetry. His work brings forth a resistance to vocalization and 
oral expression and a certain “materiality of writing, which cannot be translated into 
the spoken language of voice without an unaccountable remainder.
'p o e try  of w itn ess ' and the  q uest fo r tru th
A few general introductory remarks might help situate my discussion of Celan 
vis-a-vis the particular question of witnessing. If we theorize that all experience is 
singular in that it cannot be reproduced, relayed or played back completely faithfully, 
and if language needs to be recovered and mobilized in order for communication to 
occur, then there must be a linguistic medium through which singular experiences 
can be transmitted. In an important sense language is necessarily also generalizable 
or it would never be possible. Bearing witness to a past event, then, turns into a 
process of materialization, reconstruction, and representation. As such, it is an 
approximation of an event that is transmitted through the generalizable tools of 
language. Thus, while bearing witness itself is singular (exemplary of itself, taking 
place over and over again), the linguistic devices used to address it partake of a 
universal framework of reference.
-71 A ris F ioretos , W o r d  T ra ces .  R e a d in g s  o f  P a u l  C e lan .  (B a ltim ore: J o h n s  H o p k in s U n iv ers ity  P ress), 
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At the same time, the interpretative outcomes of bearing witness are singular 
in that every time witnessing occurs, it yields a novel and original interpretation 
despite the fact that each repetition might be related to and derived from one and the 
same event. William Allen, reading Heidegger, Blanchot and Holderlin, has 
commented on this paradox thus: “On one side a poem is pre-eminently the trace of a 
singular encounter; its existence rests in this singularity, the utterly unique ad 
irreducible moment of which it is the record. However, a poem is inhibited from 
becoming this singular work only by way of its endless repetition.”2?2 Thus we can 
have a whole library of Holocaust accounts without any one of them being entirely 
comparable to any other, without the knowledge imparted as a whole coming close to 
the actual experience of having been in a concentration camp. What all this suggests 
is that in order for bearing witness to occur, it must be operationalized by universal 
linguistic tools that nonetheless serve a singular end. Is this possible? Can a general 
and schematic toolbox address testimony’s irreducible singularity? Moreover, how is 
this paradox to be demonstrated without resolving it in favor of either singularity or 
universality?
These puzzles will be addressed in a discussion of the ways in which poetry 
bears witness to the performative dimension in all language, ordinary language 
included. The latter will lead to a consideration of the fact that no single linguistic 
(re)presentation occupies a privileged space with regard to the mediation between 
language, history and truth. In that sense, an experience of a concentration camp 
survivor, while it helps reconstruct a particular kind of concentration camp, cannot 
teach about concentration camps as such. Similarly, being a refugee in Afghanistan is 
not the same as being a refugee in Nepal, nor does it inform of the nature of “refugee- 
ness” proper. Those states of being are not like Plato’s ideal Forms, theoretically
~7'2 W illiam  A llen . E ll ip s is .  O f  P o e t r y  a n d  the  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  L a n g u a g e  a f t e r  H e id e g g e r ,  H o ld e r l in ,  a n d  
B la n ch o t .  (A lbany, NY: S tate  U n iv ersity  o f  N ew  York P ress, 2 0 0 7 ) , 51.
130
accessible only ever as an approximation of the (real) world. On the contrary, every 
event is its own ideal form. Bearing witness happens not with reference to an 
impossible idea, but with reference to the nature of ‘event’ as a singular, authentic 
happening. The fact that no event can be recreated in its fullness does not make 
bearing witness futile, but allows the process of witnessing alongside the event in 
question. Thus, event and interpretation are equally independent and contextually 
original. What an experience of being a concentration camp survivor teaches is 
something about the ability of the human being to overcome adversity and rise above 
inflicted loss of dignity and faith, something about the ability to remain human.
In that sense, Paul Celan also relates his experience as a concentration camp 
survivor. The poetic nature of his testimony is at the core of his unspoken promise 
that he is telling his story as faithfully and truthfully as possible. Derrida elaborates 
on the nature of this performativity thus: “The witness marks or declares that 
something is or has been present to him, which is not so for the addressees to whom 
the witness is joined by a contract, an oath, a promise, by a pledge of sworn faith 
whose performativity is constitutive of the witnessing and makes it a pledge [gage], 
an engagement.”273 Celan’s poetic oeuvre is in no way more true because lived 
through as the dehumanization bred in the camps. To compare different accounts to 
Celan’s own on the basis of their truthfulness would be to reduce the process of 
bearing witness to an activity of fact-recording and evidence collection. His style - 
‘stuttering,’ ‘fragmentary,’ ‘self-evolving,’ ‘philosophical,’ and ‘abstract’ -  “maybe 
understood as the wish to restore order by reducing to the most simple lines and 
shapes a world that seems to lack an inner principle and coherence.”2™ The 
experience of being branded is communicated with a reference to the 
fragmentariness of a whole: fingers stand for an arm, a letter represents the alphabet.
2y3 J a cq u es  D errida , “’A  S e lf -U n s e a lin g ’ P o etic  T e x t,” 190 .
274 U lrich  Baer, R e m n a n t s  o f  S o n g .  T r a u m a  a n d  th e  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  M o d e r n i t y  in C h a r le s  B a u d e la i r e  
a n d  P a u l  C e lan  (S tan ford , CA: S tan ford  U n iv ersity  P ress, 2 0 0 0 ) ,  2 3 4 .
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ETERNITIES, died 
over and above you, 
a letter touches 
your still un­
wounded fingers, 
the shining forehead 
vaults hither 
and beds itself in 
odors, noises.275
This parceling and picking apart signals both to an inability to speak of the whole and 
to a request for the reader to find the whole contained in each of its parts. Celan’s 
repeated allusions to body parts, milk, ashes, boots, heart, and darkness evoke also 
pictures of bodies, innocence, death, violence, love and daylight. Celan’s seemingly 
paradoxical and contradictory ways of seeing the world are expressed in his poetry 
with acute sensitivity to the cyclical, experimental potential of writing itself.
THE TRACE OF A BITE in the nowhere. 
It too
you have to fight, 
from here on out.276
Despite the “thousand darknesses of murderous speech,”277 there is hope, even 
among the most entangled and desolate of poetic landscapes. As Pierre Joris has 
pointed out, Celan’s poetry is a commentary not only on his life but on humanity’s 
“shared reality” bearing witness to “the starkness and the darkness of the place we 
live in.”278 The hope that Celan describes is ours as well. It is real.
‘the real’ world and the event o f writing
Celan himself insisted that his “poetry was directly linked to the real, and 
arose from, the real.”279 Thus, his style cannot be dismissed as eccentric or sur-real, 
but needs to be understood as a commentary on the kind of world that would call for
275 P aul C elan . T h re a d su n s .  (L os A n geles: G reen  In teger , 2 0 0 5 a ) ,  9 7 , e m p h a s is  ad d ed .
276 C elan , T h r e a d su n s , 45 .
277 C elan , C o lle c te d  P ro se ,  3 4 .
27« Joris in C elan , T h r e a d s u n s ,  17.
2711 J o r is  in C elan , T h r e a d s u n s ,  17.
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a fragmentary, dis-jointed style. The two are not dissociated and for Celan, the post 
World War II world demanded an accurate linguistic presentation. It is for his bold 
strokes and his heightened sensitivity to the daily work of irreparable memories that 
Celan’s oeuvre remains incomparable. “For even if incomparability may elude 
conceptualization -  and what is a concept if it does not erase, in the name of 
generality, the singularity of that which cannot be compared? -  it still remains 
possible to address it critically.”280 While clarity, comprehensibility, and accessible 
language are necessary when attempting to communicate with an audience, Paul 
Celan’s ‘abstract’ language in fact develops the concept of ‘truth’ further by exposing 
it to the limits of language. Ulrich Baer has suggested that Celan’s poetry should be 
read as “a poetry of exposition” for all the ways in which it exposes us to an openness 
that demands a response as well as for the ways in which it exposes “itself also to the 
possibility that it may cease being poetry; become external, or other, to poetry; stop 
making sense; and no longer be either poetry or exposition at all.”281 Celan achieves 
this exposition by writing the ‘unreadability of this world’ using poetry’s affinity for 
aporetic performance.
UNREADABILITY of this 
world. All doubles.
The strong clocks 
back the fissure-hour, 
hoarsely.
You, wedged into your deepest, 
climb out of yourself 
for ever.282
The poet as witness evokes a world defined by “the devastating aporia constituted by 
World War II, its concentration camps and nuclear wasteland”283 leading to “the
28° F io reto s , W o r d  T ra c e s , x.
281 B aer, R e m n a n ts  o f  S o n g ,  162.
282 C elan, T h r e a d s u n s ,  131.
28:* J o r is  in C elan , T h r e a d s u n s ,  16.
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shape of our certainties”28! to be altered radically, to a state where “our, man-and- 
woman’s, finitude is our measure -  and ... hangs by a thread.”285 Suns are threaded.
In addition to being singular, Celan’s poetry constitutes an ongoing discourse. 
Celan has been appropriated by a number of disciplines and because his work, if read 
with care, touches upon painful personal experiences, it could be interpreted as 
apocalyptic, gloomy, the product of a mentally-ill, heavily-medicated man’s ravings. 
The circumstances under which Celan wrote a number of his later poems were, it is 
true, informed to a great degree by his self-imposed psychiatric commitment. Note 
his sarcastic, biting and extremely lucid description of the universe of extermination: 
the ways in which it echoes a self-implication and refers to his present condition are 
everything but the work of a madman.
The completely glassed in 





the anxieties, iceture, 
flightclear





A poetics of witness, when defined according to its truth-content, threatens to 
morally identify with victims of mass destruction or with our own idealization of the 
poetic art itself. There is a tendency to grant favorable reviews to ‘true’ accounts of
284 J o r is  in  C elan , T h r e a d su n s ,  18.
Jo r is  in C elan , T h r e a d s u n s .  18.
2iS,> C elan, T h r e a d s u n s ,  118-9.
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the Holocaust as opposed to their ‘fictional’ counterparts. What is more, the nature 
of academic writing on bearing witness, often informed by sensational, extreme 
suffering, seems also to want to justify efforts that are frequently as morally 
ambiguous and ethically compromised as they are redeeming. The case of Paul Celan 
intersects this emphasis on over-determined truths by actively engaging what are 
seen as the empty spaces of painful memories through a framework of singular, 
necessarily singular linguistic performativity. It is important to note here that Celan’s 
work cautions against the unproblematic charging of remembrance with healing, as 
the former exemplifies a ‘breach in language’ where “every word risks glossing over 
the fact that language has been robbed of its power to lend coherence to an 
individual’s experience.”28?
second  fragm en t - frnm  w itness to poet to w itness t o ...
I would like to continue my discussion of bearing witness by suggesting that 
however indeterminate and abstract some poetry may be, what it does better than 
other linguistic forms is free itself from the functional demands of ends in actually 
approximating itself to greatest degree of singularity allowed language, a singularity 
“not defined merely in antagonistic opposition to others.”288 Whether Celan has 
anything interesting to say or not is not an altogether irrelevant question for, in 
addition to being informative, bearing witness relates the past in ways that surpass 
the mere dissemination of information. Celan “moves through” silence by trying the 
limits of language against the latter’s need and obligation to be comprehensible and 
objectively clear. “You be like you, always”28? is the advice he gives both his readers 
and language: be singular and faithful to yourself. If we heed Aris Fioretos’
287 B aer, R e m n a n ts  o f  S o n g ,  183.
288 Baer, R e m n a n t s  o f  S o n g ,  186.
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proposition that “designation seems only another name for disposal,”290 then the goal 
of inquiry can be re-defined as a reaching out, moving to open spaces of exploration, 
being on the way even through loss.
What are we left with here -  a poet, ‘event,’ the memory of both? Celan’s 
unique style breaks down the traditional conventions and prescriptions of romantic 
poetry by challenging both the position of poetry within the canon of literature and by 
offering the poem as a tightly-woven, almost incommunicable, self-transformative 
and summary-defiant unit. Yet, Celan testifies to the “loss within language by relying 




and watch my hand
as it draws the one
single
circle.292
This circle, this joining together of coordinates, this something “earthly, terrestrial, in
the shape of a circle which, via both poles, rejoins itself and on the way serenely
crosses even the tropics” is Celan’s own metaphor for encounter: his “meridian. ”293
However, Celan is not content with the traditional interpretations the metaphor of
the circle yields for an understanding of being. In his poem ‘Threadsuns,’ he revokes
and discloses the now compromised recuperative wholeness of the circle in order to
disclose the world’s broken relationship to its life-source -  the sun’s light.
THREADSUNS
above the grayblack wastes.
A tree- 
high thought
grasps the light-tone: there are 
still songs to sing beyond 
mankind.294
290 F io reto s , W o r d  T ra c e s , 3 3 3 .
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Celan’s thread-like suns are fragile, broken and overrun by the waste of humanity. 
This new situation echoes Celan’s insistence on the need to re-examine, re-coin and 
re-invent all concepts and ideas informed by the binding, recuperative and life-giving 
qualities of the sun. The seed of that change, the potential to affect and think through 
this obligation rests, in Celan’s analysis, with mankind. Here is the dually specific 
and universalizing quality to Celan’s work: its power to resist appropriation as well as 
its potential to politicize and revolutionize. Celan’s “holocaust” was as much the 
Nazi-inflicted genocide of his youth as was the fact of his troubled literary and 
personal life in post-war Europe. Celan never once uses the word “Holocaust” in his 
poetry, making hardly straightforward the relationship between his work and the 
Shoah. In an important sense, however, the latter lives in the urgent, dynamic, 
audience-driven ways in which Celan lived and re-imagined his own life in post-war 
Europe. “Stop reading: look! /  Stop looking: go! ... /  you are - /  are at home.”29s 
Reading must be more than reading in Celan’s world, must be more than observation. 
The thread-like suns testify not to “something that exceeds the power of 
representation,”296 but to a strong “intimation of hope,” to a heeding for action: 
cautionary as well as forward-looking.
In its testimonial undertones, Celan’s poetry has been appropriated by many, 
making him widely recognized as the poetic example most academically-sensitive and 
theoretically-attuned to the question of bearing witness not because he 
communicated something people didn’t already know, but because he pushed the 
limits of poetry beyond the mimetic and/or the (auto)biographical. Although Celan’s 
work has done a lot to break down (linguistic) conventions and allowed the freedom 
of (poetic) expression, it has also been made to speak on behalf of ordinary language, 
as if poetry were somehow reducible to the latter. Celan’s ‘ordinary witness, however,
295 C elan , S e le c tio n s , 67.
29,1 T h o m a s V ogler. "Poetic W itness: W riting  th e  R ea l.” In W itn e s s  a n d  M e m o r y .  The D is c o u r s e  o f  
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is measured in his ability to weave together his poems into a complete narrative 
thread aiming, always, at clarity and readability: at an address. “This obscurity, if it is 
not congenital, has been bestowed on poetry by strangeness and distance (perhaps of 
its own making) and for the sake of an encounter.”297
While Celan’s metaphoric and referential diversity lends itself to confusion, it 
is perhaps more importantly an example of a certain desire on his part to re-write the 
relations within language while still remaining within it. Celan does not specify a 
moral role for his poetry short of insisting that it be read and re-read in an effort to 
unearth its violent, stubborn and potentially liberating nature. Lacking an explicit 
title-denoted-meaning, Celan’s poems absorb and relate one image to another with 
the frenzy of a prophet.
Unexpiated, 
narcoleptic, 
stained by the gods:
your tongue is smutty, 
your urine black, 
watery-bilious your stool,
you hold forth 
as I do,
lubriciously.298
Though the poet’s addressee is unclear, the message is there, in the form of a 
question: who is the bearer of this unappeased, unending guilt veiled in religious 
piety unable to remain awake and aware of itself long enough to repent and cleanse 
its body? Could Celan be talking about language itself -  of how easy it leads away, of 
its slippery, treacherous, untrustworthy balance?
29~ C elan, C o l le c te d  P ro se ,  4 6 .
29s From  “H aut M ai” in C elan, T h r e a d s u n s , 2 4 9 .
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poetry at the lim its o f language
What is so moving and at the same time, so politically potent in Celan’s work,
is not only what he says in his poems, not even the weight of his oeuvre in the
collective Shoah memory but rather, the force of the word that at once knows that is
cannot stand for the history it has lived through and, at the same time, wants to make
itself heard even at the limits of language. Celan’s style addresses “the written
hollows itself... /  in the liquefied n a m e s ,  ”299 how “the language of man will never
provide any sustenance other than a meaning that runs the risk of always being
further dispersed, an erring without semantic stability.”300 This dispersal, this erring
is not antithetical to a reaching out and its instability suggests the insecure, unstable
nature of truth itself. Celan’s reaching out to meet the other translates into a
readiness to confront and be confronted by the loss associated with the Holocaust:
“Silence, old hag, ride me through the rapids. /  Lids’ fires, light up the way.”301
COME, make the world mean with yourself 
come, let me fill you up with 
all that’s mine.
One with you I am, 
to capture us,
even now.302
“Even now,” after the Holocaust. “Even now,” faced with a language that will always 
remain “inadequate to the full horror of the event.”303 The single poem, despite 
language’s “lubricious” nature, answers the call for originality and imagination, “and 
reproduces itself /  through budding”30* because “the time of this movement is the 
time of hope and thought. ”3°5 For Celan, poetry’s power to save did not lie in the 
composition of beautiful verse. Poetry’s saving power is in becoming a site of
299 C elan , S e le c tio n s ,  105.
3°° F io reto s , W o r d  T ra c e s ,  xvi.
301 C elan , T h re a d su n s ,  155.
3°2 C elan , S e le c tio n s ,  140 .
3°3 V ogler, “P o e tic  W itn e ss: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 183.
3°9 C elan , T h re a d su n s ,  135.
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resistance, despite Lawrence Langer’s insistence that the poem “does not ‘resist’ 
genocide; it is born of it.”306 Thomas Vogler calls Langer out on his “narrow and 
superficial reading of the poem” that, “instead of inspiring resistance or anger or 
revenge in the reader, its function is to ‘immortalize anguish’ and ‘to mourn verbally’ 
what must be accepted as ‘an irretrievable loss.”30? Because of poetry’s potential to 
bear witness, offer resistance and address, it testifies to all language’s performative 
dimension. It is in this sense that Paul Celan supplements our reading of Giorgio 
Agamben by disclosing the relationship between language and exceptionality for 
being an inherently poetic one.
the  poet and the  law -giver nr, 'How do you b ea r  w itness tD 'm u te '?
Giorgio Agamben’s intimation into the juridical nature of witnessing opened 
this thesis. His engagement with the ‘exception’ and ‘bare life’ as the products of the 
relationship between law, sovereign power, and human life informs, in addition, the 
addressability o f‘event,’ something which underwrites the entirety of Celan’s oeuvre. 
In my engagement with Agamben, I suggested that a juridico-political engagement 
with bearing witness was insufficient for a discussion of witnessing if only because of 
its self-referential theoretical framework. Rather than pose the political “exception” 
as a category of identification, as more than a state one endures, Agamben poses the 
former not only as a logical derivative of suspended law, but also as the catalyst for 
the production of homo sacer. I am interested in weighing that figure against Celan’s 
own shattered shadows. As we have already seen, Agamben maintains that “In the 
system of the Nation-State, what are sacred and alienable rights are conceived of as 
such only when they relate to the figure of the citizen, stated  individual. The rights of 
naked life are not endorsed by the state.”308
3°6 V ogler, “P o e tic  W itn ess: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 195
307 Q u oted  in V og ler , “P oetic  W itn ess: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 195
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The “rights of naked life” are discussed only so far as they are guaranteed or 
denied by a sovereign. Not only does Agamben fail to address the potential of 
language to recover subjectivity, but he discriminates in assigning the status of true 
Holocaust witness to the dead, Primo Levi’s “drowned,” the Muselmanner. I will 
argue that the category of homo sacer finds its strongest expression not in a 
negatively informed relationship to “exceptionality,” but in poetic performativity 
accompanied by a silent promise guaranteeing the truthfulness of witnessing.
Recall that in Chapter One Agamben’s writing on the ‘exception,’ homo sacer, 
and law was juxtaposed to Veena Das’ concept of “a descent into the ordinary.” Her 
proposition that the unsayable, paired with memories of violence and trauma, 
reaches the point of engagement when approached through everyday, ordinary acts of 
witness will here serve as a link between Agamben and Celan. Veena Das cautions 
against the automatic translation of an event into methodological and theoretical 
frameworks informing and derived from other events. “I would submit that the 
model of trauma and witnessing that has been bequeathed to us from Holocaust 
studies cannot be simply transported to other contexts in which violence is embedded 
into different patterns of sociality.”3°9 What Das brings to light is the non-causal, a- 
temporal and non-generalizable nature of testimonies borne out of violence and 
trauma, derived from the single instant of which they speak and not for the purposes 
of scientifically-significant ends. These testimonies question any universal references 
drawn from them as well as any sweeping theorization based on the schematic, truth- 
establishing endorsement of an idealized silence.
Paul Celan’s poetry bears witness to a different register of exceptionality: the 
linguistic. Every one of Celan’s poems addresses the relationship between a norm 
(peace, linguistic coherence, life) and an exception (the camps, broken language,
3°° D as, Life a n d  W o r d s .  103.
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death). However, the exception(s) he addresses are not Agamben’s passive, 
normalized states of being imposed upon the human being from a sovereign, a higher 
force, an order, or a Master. He addresses the relationship between language and 
witnessing -  the need for new, not exceptional or extraordinary, idioms.
THE WRITTEN hollows itself, the 
spoken, seagreen, 




in the eternalized Nowhere, here, 
in the memory of the over- 
loud bells in—where only?310
“Celan tells us where we have to stop and knock -  or beg -  for entry: in front of the
word.”311 Celan’s work is a constant bearing witness to the atrocities of the Holocaust,
to his fate as a survivor in a ‘serial’ narrative whose anthologized fashion runs
through his poetry as a cycle. Within these cycles, the weight of the poem’s meaning
“hollows itself’ and is carried by singular words, derived, altered and re-invented
from a German of the Nazis. The “liquefied names” of the dead are not Agamben’s
Muselmanner. The memory of these names, their loss, is evoked in the image of
dolphins darting -  now here, now gone -  unpredictably. As George Steiner, among
others, has observed, “Such words must be quarried from far and stony places----
Their authority is, in the true sense, radical, of the root (etymological). Or it springs
from fusion, from the poet’s right and need to weld neologisms.”312
HALF-GNAWED, mask- 





310 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  197.
311 J o r is  In tro d u ctio n  in C elan, B r e a t h t u r n , 17.
312 J o r is  In tro d u ctio n  to  C elan , B re a th tu rn ,  18.
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where you break up heaven, again and again,
into furrow and convolution
he plants his image,
which outgrows and outgrows itself.s^
The addressee of the poem is introduced as a ‘half-gnawed mask-miened corbel
stone,’ -  hidden, buried in a crypt. The image is planted in a trench, into a narrowing
of the road, underground where it ‘outgrows and outgrows itself into a series of
complicated turns, a maze -  suggesting difficulty in finding one’s way or exiting. The
meaning of the word ‘furrow’ also suggests a piece of plowed land, a field where crops
grow, where food and life are nurtured. The mask is not even a mask, for it only
appears as such -  suggesting an unknown identity, a stranger, something hidden, a
secret, a lie. Celan’s reliance on single words, on their aporetic charge, on a series of
verbs and adverbs pointing to active states of being results in a heightened accuracy
of expression -  succinct, measured, and sober.
Viewed in this way, Celan’s language is not a language of closure, of 
definitional certainty, of accuracy of fact. Rather than defined as an exception or as 
something extraordinary, Celan’s work offers a step forward, a Breathturn symbolic 
of the intention of all of his later work. On the other hand, we have Giorgio 
Agamben’s juridico-political discussion of witness as predicated upon the kind of 
state of exception where human life is represented, encompassed and seduced by a 
force of law in suspension, by a no-step. While modernity is ripe with instances of 
violated human rights and forced statelessness as examples of juridical exceptions, 
the latter represent a passive ‘exception’ that, once imposed upon a people, is 
normalized. As we have already seen, Agamben’s theoretic addressing of the 
restitution of human dignity and the exposing of injustice, though commendable, 
does not move beyond examining the particular examples of human life under 
exception or towards ways to overcome the exception. By way of responding to this
:’1:i C elan, B r e a th tu r n ,  177.
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impasse, I offer an excerpt from Celan’s ‘Meridian’ speech where he addresses the 
nature of poetry as a setting free of an encounter.
The poem holds its ground on its own margin. In order to endure, it 
constantly calls and pulls itself back from an ‘already-no-more’ into a ‘still- 
there.’ This ‘still-there’ can only mean speaking. Not language as such, but 
responding and -  not just verbally -  ‘corresponding’ to something. In other 
words: language actualized, set free under the sign of a radical individuation 
which, however, remains as aware of the limits drawn by language as of the 
possibilities it opens. ... This shows the poem yet more clearly as one 
person’s language becomes shape and, essentially, a presence in the present. 
The poem is lonely. It is lonely and en route. Its author stays with it.3J4
The passage reveals a dynamic, meditative side of Celan’s thought -  alongside the
definitive, affirmative statements one can also extract a hesitation, a tentativeness, a
groping forward if you wish, in an effort to make clear the poem’s intention -  heading
“straight for the ‘otherness’ which it considers it can reach and be free, which is
perhaps vacant and at the same time ... let us say, turned toward it, toward the
poem.’^ s Celan’s insistence on poetry’s intention marks his work’s dynamics.
the w ork o f poetry
Recall that with regard to the question of bearing witness, too, Agamben 
wants to make sure that the authenticity of the Muselmann as “the true” witness is 
upheld and recognized. However, he fails to give account of the fact that despite 
states of exception, despite exclusion and oppression lived by human beings, despite 
the suspension of law and order characteristic of modern politics, the human 
him/herself engages the historical performance of exceptionality. Language, in that 
sense, “reclaims the horizon of experience ... which language seemed no longer able 
to offer.”316 The insight of Agamben’s analysis is undermined by a sensationalization 
of the exception when indeed, I argue that there is no exception as such -  only the 
specific instances of people engaging and living versions of it. As already alluded to, 
Agamben falls into the trap of the exceptional as a general category of identification.
3*4 C elan, C o lle c te d  P ro se , 49 .
C elan , C o l le c te d  P r o s e , 4 8 .
3 "’ Baer, R e m n a n t s  o f  S o n y .  182.
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By that I mean two things: first, Agamben derives his categories from the Holocaust, 
an event made into an exceptional site of witnessing, suffering and injustice; second, 
he falls into the trap of simulating “sacred life” at the expense of the efforts of living 
human beings who, marked by trauma and violence, face the task of rebuilding and 
making sense of their lives. In their everyday confrontation with life, the ordinary 
becomes extraordinary and then ordinary again in repeating cycles.
This questioning of the ‘extraordinary’ puts other things, such as man, 
language, and witnessing into question as well. That is why the problematization of 
the exception is not entirely separate from similar problematizations of the law, 
power and the sovereign. This (self)problematization is a process that underwrites all 
of Celan’s later writings concerned at their heart with the future of poetry, with the 
possibility of poetry as an art, and with the staying power of language as such.
I am talking about a poem that does not exist! The absolute poem -  no, it 
certainly does not, cannot exist. But in every real poem, even the least 
ambitious, there is this ineluctable question, this exorbitant claim.317
In that Paul Celan teaches about the limits of language to signify and speak 
definitively on behalf of the witness, he occupies the intersection between silence and 
writing, exemplary in turn of the tendency of the language of memory towards 
silence. “It is true, the poem, the poem today shows -  and this has only indirectly to 
do with difficulties of vocabulary... the poem clearly shows a strong tendency toward 
silence.”318 If Celan’s language is spectrally enigmatic because it does not assign itself 
the role of a truth-sayer, then it is also from within this ghostliness that the singular 
encounter (through every poem) with ‘event’ is borne. Meaning, “the work of poetry
31_ C elan , C o l le c te d  P rose ,  51.
318 C elan, C o l le c te d  P ro se ,  4 8 .
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is to be done on the word itself,” a word that is “nothing solid diorite or opaque, but a 
formation with its own internal complexities and crevasses.’^
LINE THE WORDCAVES 
with panther skins,
widen them, hide-to and hide-fro, 
sense-hither and sense-thither,
give them courtyards, chambers, drop doors 
and wildnesses, parietal,
and listen for their second
and each time second and second
tone.320
The ‘wordcaves’ and the ‘pantherskins’ both can be associated with something pre­
historic, as well as with a sense of being locked, imprisoned, made into a relic, 
covered with a foreign element. As suggested by Pierre Joris, the ‘wordcaves’ are 
empty words, words emptied of meaning. The second stanza of this poem turns the 
gaze to an active working through, unlike the prehistoric, static images of the first 
stanza. The poem is reworked, sensed hither and thither, in the heart (evoked in the 
third stanza). The heart’s ‘wildnesses’ is not programmatic of a lining up or of an 
orderly constructed world. It is ‘parietal’ in the sense in which it has the potential to 
be read and/or become institutionalized into a law. The last stanza of the poem, for 
me the most interesting one, speaks of music, a repetition, a second chance, a second 
reading ... of being attentive. “An ear, severed, listens. /  An eye, cut in strips, /  does 
justice to all this.”s21 What is the justice Celan refers to? Is he addressing himself, the 
need to pay attention, listen to language’s nuances, to the witness? Or is his justice 
one borne out of the ability of the eye to see many-ways, of the ability of the deafened 
ear to hear, still?
3^  J o r is  In tro d u ctio n  in  C elan , B r e a th tu r n , 2 8 .
120 C elan, T h r e a d s u n s , 2 0 7 .
C elan, B r e a th tu r n ,  83 .
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William Allen has suggested a relationship between allegory and openness 
allowing for a relationship of language and world “as open and ungrounded,”322 as 
relation. Celan’s ability to make his varied physical, biological, psychological, 
historical, religious, and linguistic analogies impart meaning is possible because he 
inverts their accepted meaning and transforms it into many meanings, each singular. 
Celan achieves this musicality, this image-concoction by being sensitive to and 
accommodating both the primary and the secondary and, if you wish, the tertiary 
meaning contained in the generation and use of language. “Single counter- /  
swimmer, you /  count them, touch them /  all.”323 That does not mean that poetry 
offers the best way of bearing witness: only that its witness, attentive to the nuances 
of language and to the aporetic character of all expression, remains faithful to the 
incalculable, inconclusive character of memory. What makes the poem appeal as 
unmediated testimony is not the triumph of imagination over pure intellect, but the 
simultaneous working of a number of different languages, “standing-for-no-one-and- 
for-nothing. /  Unrecognized, /  for you /  alone. /  With all that has room within it, /  
even without /  language.”324 “Standing-for-no-one-and-nothing” -  it is as if the 
words themselves do not mean anything on their own, cannot be isolated from their 
relationship to each other.
The poem, despite my own attempts, irreducible to a single interpretation, in 
its repeated reading, speaks with a multiplicity of voices. In this way, Celan’s work 
testifies to the potential of language to unfold continuously. “To exist is to be 
haunted by a voice (a lover, a father, God) whose source can never be recovered and 
from whose body we are irreparably divorced. All we are left with is the echo, the 
sound, which explains ‘why’ we are still and always negotiating.”323 If “poetry is a
322 A llen , E llip s is , 3 9 .
323 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  77.
32-1 C elan, B r e a th tu r n .  91.
323 Carl Lavery, "A udiology," h ttp : //w w w .p a c itt ic o m p a n v .c o m /a u d io lo g v -r e v ie w .h tm l.
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commitment of the soul,”326 then a poetic witness deals with the question of 
recovering this soul’s voice. Celan is a perfect example of language’s “compulsion 
toward truth” in holding on “to what is human.”327 Unlike Agamben, with Celan one 
should associate ‘remnants,’ fragments and/or traces with a process of going through, 
with the possibility bearing witness offers for understanding the world not by 
reducing it to data, but by engaging the emergent performativity of its singular nature 
in the body of individual poems. This performativity is not predicative, that is, 
directed toward something else, but refers to what lies within its own closure.
“Celan’s poem is no example of hermetic poetry locked away into an ivory tower, but 
rather a way of writing marked by that unnameable linguistic ‘enrichment’ 
constituting its particular history.”328 This “unnameable linguistic ‘enrichment’” 
contained within the poem represents the transformative potential of language (as 
poiesis) and “defined equally by the limitations of language as by the possibilities of 
something yet to come -  the promise of an ‘approachable reality.”329 
It is time that they knew!
It is time that the stone grew accustomed to blooming, 
that unrest formed a heart.
It is time it was time.
It is time.330
on the nD-mDre-Bxtra-nrdinary-witness
The performative nature of the language of poetry alerts to the fact that 
language does things. In the work of Agamben, ‘limit experiences’ are derived from a 
discussion on the exception and its relationship to homo sacer. He treats the latter as 
an incommunicable remnant, an extra-ordinary being borne out of the suspension of 
the law, yet the reason why the law cannot be restored. The exception is not,
s26 G aston  B achelard , T he P o e tic s  o f  S p a c e  (B oston : B eacon , 1 9 9 4 k  xvi.
3'2? C elan , C o lle c te d  P ro se , 5 7 -8 .
328 H a n s J o st-F re y , “In tertex tu a lity  in  C elan ’s P o etry ” In  W o r d  T ra c e s . R e a d in g s  o f  P a u l C e la n  ed isted  
b y  A ris F io r e to s , . (B a ltim ore: J o h n s H o p k in s U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1 9 9 4 ), 319.
32t) F io reto s , W o r d  T ra c e s ,  xvi.
33» C elan , S e le c t io n s , 4 4 -5 .
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however, like the periodical lining up of planets or like the occasional wildfires that 
ravage the land -  it is, as already suggested, contained in the ordinary.
Allow me to explain this a bit further. As I have already suggested, bearing 
witness reveals the singular example contained and derived from every extra­
ordinary (event) that, brought forth through the example of each poem, reveals the 
transformative potential of language. In the case of Veena Das, women’s ‘extra­
ordinary’ experiences during the 1947 India/Pakistan partition are witnessed through 
speech. With Celan, these experiences are addressed in the example of every single 
poem, positing the irreducibility of the remnant, of life, to an ‘extra-ordinary’ event.
SINGABLE REMNANT -  the outline 
of him, who through 
the sicklescript broke through unvoiced, 
apart, at the snowplace.
-Disenfranchised lip, announce, 
that something happens, still, 
not far from you.331
In other words, the poetic bears witness to the performative potential contained in all 
language. In the case of Agamben, the Muselmann cannot speak not because s/he is 
a homo sacer, but because s/he has been reduced to an ‘extra-ordinary’ witness and 
thus, an impossible witness. This performative potential itself will, later on in the 
thesis, open the doors for a discussion of the nature of social scientific language as 
active, polymorphous, heterogeneous, and alluding to the possibility of writing poetry 
and politics together without privileging one or the other.
hope and arriving
Allow me to explain why I see the nature of poetry as a transformative moving 
forward, a going through. What poetry as linguistic form does is use otherwise
C elan, B r e a th tu r n ,  113.
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ordinary language in a novel way. What Celan’s ‘going through’ represents for me is a 
movement back and forth between the ‘ordinary’ and the ‘extra-ordinary,’ starting 
with a ‘limit experience’ that is converted into singular poems. By using language in a 
novel way, Celan communicates the extra-ordinary in the single poem. Celan on love:
SOWN UNDER THE SKIN of my hands: 
your name comforted 
by hands:
When I knead the lump 
of air, our nourishment, 
it is leavened by the 
letters’ shimmer from 
the lunatic-open 
pore.3^ 2
Love, feeding on air, is starved, “sown under the skin” to remain invisible. It is a 
revelation of emptiness, of distance nourished by letters. The metaphor of bread- 
making here does not symbolize real food, though in the absence of real food Celan 
evokes the desolate landscape of his own life perhaps.
Used in novel and originary way, language makes the extra-ordinary 
intelligible without doing injustice to its singular nature, pointing to poetry’s dynamic 
and performative tools of engaging the world.333 it is not surprising that Agamben 
associates the exception with the Muselmanner, for their silence allows him to reduce 
them to impossible witnesses. Recall my earlier discussion on the relationship 
between ‘limit experiences’ and language. I suggested that ‘limit experiences’ must 
pass through a plane of corporeality that “does not give way to anything else; it is 
irreducible to its signification,”334 meaning that an ethical imperative is born because 
at the limit of language there is ‘something rather than nothing.’335 ln making the 
extra-ordinary intelligible, Celan’s work offers an insight into the relationship
332 C elan , B r e a th tu rn ,  143.
333 M y g ra titu d e  g o es  to  D arren  S trub le  for h e lp in g  m e  th in k  th is  th ro u g h  all th e  w a y  to  its c o n cep tio n .
334 G erald  B run s In tro d u ctio n  in H an s-G eo rg  G adam er, G a d a m e r  o n  C e la n . ‘‘W h o  A m  I  a n d  W h o A r e
You?" a n d  o th e r  e s s a y s  (A lbany, NY: S tate  U n iv ersity  o f  N ew  York P ress, 1 9 9 7 ), 6.
333 A llen , E llip s is , 18.
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between ‘event’ and the question of time. Why is that important? Because, as already 
discussed in Chapter Two, continental philosophy’s desire for knowledge is informed 
by understanding, representing and writing about ‘event.’ In a sense, and as Celan 
shows, this is not a new discussion, since the nature of ‘event’ has already been and is 
continuously addressed through specific examples.
‘Event’ always takes place in specificity. Bearing witness must also address 
‘event’ through specific examples. This means, moreover, that there is always more 
than one mode of engaging ‘event,’ leading to a certain excess of ‘event’ over events. 
This underlies the ontico-ontological difference between theory of ‘event’ on the one 
hand, and the history/study of events as process-driven practices on the other. As 
William Allen has suggested, “there is something peculiar about the language of 
poetry or literature that seems to exceed or undermine the attempts of philosophy to 
pursue an ontological inquiry, that is, to try and bring to language an understanding 
of the meaning or nature o f  b e i n g ” 336 as poiesis and theoria rather than as praxis. At 
the same time and in relation to the question of bearing witness, it seems that the 
latter necessarily has to be reduced to something (Agamben’s ‘exception,’ Derrida’s 
‘poetics,’ Das’ ‘ordinary’) in order for it to be possible. This reduction, in the work of 
Celan, takes the form of a particular relationship to language.
Only one thing remained reachable, close and secure amid all losses: 
language. Yes, language. In spite of everything, it remained secure against 
loss. But it had to go through its own lack of answers, through terrifying 
silence, through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech. It went 
through. It gave me no words for what was happening but went through it, 
went though it and could resurface, ‘enriched’ by it a l l . 3 3 7
Celan’s writing is a craft, meaning “handiwork, a matter of hands. And these hands
must belong to one person, i.e. a unique, moral soul searching for its way with its
voice and its d u m b n e s s . ”338 The corporeality that Celan evokes continuously in his
336 A llen , E llip s is ,  3
33" C elan, C o lle c te d  P ro se . 34 .
33's C elan, C o lle c te d  P r o se , 25.
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work is symptomatic to his understanding of the essence of language as a living, 
breathing, dynamic, evolving, moving thing that demands both the attentiveness and 
the commitment of its readers. What Celan does with the memory of ‘event,’ and 
where Agamben fails, is evoke the corporeality of language through the poem’s 
essence as “remembrance of language.”339
The singularity of Celan’s oeuvre does more than bear witness to the 
Holocaust. In his poetry, prose and translations, he brings out the transformative 
power of language borne out of the experience of the limit. Moreover, he recruits and 
perfects the limit of intelligibility in the form of summons. “Through this shaft you 
have to come - /  you come.”340 Celan bears witness by moving forth toward a 
particular encounter, “an Atemwende, a turning of our breath”341 and thus, reveals 
the inevitable failure of poetry to bear truth-ful witness when the poetic is made to 
bear too much witness. In its essence as singular, this encounter poses, continuously, 
the question: “What/Who is to be addressed?” and answers guided by the realization 
that “Language is not simply the medium of something that happens, of speech or 
dialogue or understanding; it is the event itself.”342 As already suggested, language 
posits ‘event’ as a performative utterance containing the potential to deliver a 
promise, “I swear that I have seen, I have heard, I have touched, I have felt, I have 
been present”343 and initiate an encounter.
In an effort to examine the nature of this promise, I would like to introduce to 
my discussion, again, Veena Das’ concept of a ‘descent into the ordinary.’ My 
reasoning for this is twofold. First, this will allow me to examine the proposed 
performativity of Celan’s language and Veena Das’ theory of ordinary witness against
339 B runs In tro d u ctio n  in  G adam er, G a d a m e r  on  C e lan , 6.
340 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  157.
341 C elan , C o lle c te d  P ro se ,  47 .
34^  G erald B runs In tro d u ctio n  in G adam er, G a d a m e r  on C elan , 15.
344 D errida, "A S e lf-U n se a lin g  P oetic  Text," 18 8 -9 .
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the concept of ‘limit experiences.’ Secondly, it will enable me to address the 
relationship between truth derived from bearing witness as experienced by Das and 
Celan on one hand and as experienced within the discipline of International Relations 
on the other. I am guided by the recognition that just as “the legal concept of witness 
is inextricably linked to the formally established legal process designed to determine 
rules of evidence and determinations of fact, so the literary discourse of witness has 
evolved its own procedures and rules of evidence, with critics functioning as judges 
who instruct the reader-jurors in the proper performance of their duties as witnesses 
of witnesses.”344
the ex tra -o rd inary : p oetry  in no w o(m an)'s land
Writing about women’s experiences during the India/Pakistan partition of 
1947, Veena Das admits: “The absence of any standing language of pain is perhaps 
symptomatic of the fact that I cannot separate my pain from my expression for it -  
another way of saying this is that my expression of pain compels you in unique ways 
-  you are not free to believe or disbelieve me -  our future is at stake.”343 Paul Celan 
alerts to a similar linguistic incompatibility between the experience of pain and the 
ability to express it in words. He speaks of just this kind of pain as standing “in the 
shadow /  of the stigma in the air. /  Standing-for-no-one-and-nothing. /
Unrecognized /  ... /  with all that has room in it, /  even without /  language.”346 The 
lack of recognition does not evoke anonymity as safety, but rather suggests 
displacement, being cast-out, struck mute. Despite this “stigma in the air” and 
absence of language, man still stands and by standing, bears witness to “you alone.”
Testimony is posited amidst a tension that calls into question even the most 
benevolent reduction of language to fact. For both Das and Celan language is a living
3 4 4  V ogler , “P o e tic  W itn e ss: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 184.
:!t5 D as, Life a n d  W o r d s ,  39 .
C elan, S e le c t io n s ,  9 7 -8 .
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thing “whose mode of existence is the event, a language of Erfahrung [going through] 
that lives through or undergoes the experiences of all those who speak it and hear it, 
and which is therefore never self-identical but always on the way.”347 Whereas Veena 
Das speaks on behalf of Indian women whose “breaking the silence” is seen as an 
empowerment, Celan’s whole oeuvre and especially his later poems thread the 
tenuous line between taking a breath and letting go. “We live under dark skies and 
there are few human beings. Hence, I assume, so few poems. The hopes I have left 
are small. I try to hold on to what r e m a in s .”348 The tension in Celan’s poems is borne 
out of the tension between the desire for an encounter and the realization that his 
adoptive (German) language remains wounded, carrying within itself both the weight 
of history and a momentum urging it on “clockwise,” toward “rivers north of the 
future. ”349
Both Veena Das and Paul Celan recognize that violence and pain are not 
always narratable and that to render them into language, one has to contend with 
their tendency to construct the human in relation either to a “normal” or to a “limit” 
state. The “unsayable within the forms of everyday l i f e ”3so Das refers to is a kind of 
violence that defines the limits of life, such in-human violence that is not generally 
representable within the realm of acceptable social relations. To represent such 
suffering, for Das, without the proper amount of ethical sensitivity, is equal to 
desecrating the dignity of the human being by showing her in all her vulnerability, 
finality and helplessness. At least that is one way of looking at things. The other way 
is to approach the “unsayable” and the “uncanny” from a point of radical moral 
departure and speak, in spite of the “unspeakable,” not of representations but of 
“actual trace[s] of experienced w o r ld / ’ss1 For Veena Das as for Celan, the
347 G erald  B run s In tro d u ctio n  in G adam er, G a d a m e r  on  C e la n , 16.
3-*8 C elan , C o lle c te d  P ro se ,  2 6 .
349 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  73.
33° D as, Life a n d  W o r d s ,  9 0 .
33' V ogler, "Poetic W itn ess: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 190.
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transmission of ‘extra-ordinary’ accounts of violence allows, if only momentarily, for 
a way to move beyond the silence of (violated) words and into a realm that bears 
witness through the words at work, engaged by the everyday unfolding of life. For 
Das, the shocking and inhuman accounts of violence cannot figure into the life- 
mosaic without disturbing the fabric of everyday relations that is, however, never 
either totally protected nor totally destructible. The tension between a pain and its 
communicability presents an almost Derridean paradox in which, on one hand and in 
order for the life network to remain intact, one almost has to remove oneself from the 
violence lived through while, on the other hand, the silence borne out of trauma must 
bear witness and be respected.
This implies a paradoxical correlation between, in Das’ words, “a life and life,” 
that is, “life as lived in the singular” and the lives (and deaths) of others.352 Though 
‘life’ as a philosophical category of reference exceeds the ‘being told’ as ordinary lives, 
the latter are nonetheless important in making the telling of ‘life’ possible beyond 
abstraction and silence. This is important in making sure that the literary is not 
idealized as somehow providing a more ‘natural’ access to truth because of its affinity 
for metaphor, itself defined as an indirect relationship to truth, as if the opposition 
were between knowing on one hand (done through testing and proof), and the 
assessment of ‘emotion’ through literature on the other. Literature is not better 
equipped for dealing with trauma and pain nor does it embody a special affinity for 
empathy. What literary language, poetry more specifically, does when faced with the 
‘extra-ordinary’ is, through each particular poem, engage the singularity o f ‘event.’
This does not make witnessing easier, though it does invite a relationship 
between experience and language. As Thomas Vogler suggests regarding Celan’s 
style: “The ‘breaking of form’ is not evidence of a loss of control, but of an exercise of
^  D as, L ife a n d  W o r d s , 92 .
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control designed to produce particular effects.”353 Talking of the nature of his own 
linguistic commitments, Celan says: “As for my alleged encoding, I’d rather say: 
undissembled ambiguity... I try to reproduce cuttings from the spectral analysis of 
things, to show them in several aspects and permeations at once ... I see my alleged 
abstractness and actual ambiguity as moments of realism. ”354 What both Veena Das 
and Celan teach is that truth does not just come over a person like a lightning, 
accidentally, but is acquired through convention and learned behavior.
LAVISH MESSAGE 
in a crypt, where 
we flat with 
our gasflags,
we stand here 
in the odor 
of sanctity, yep.355
your tru th , my tru th
What Celan saw as an assault on his name and oeuvre when accused of 
plagiarising Ivan Goll’s work is something similar to Das’ own experiences of 
academic and theoretic violence resulting from naming, defining, and establishing 
truths, categories, affinities, and facts. She argues that once you define a term as 
being made of certain characteristics, then it is easy, when necessary, to include or 
exclude as needed. This is not to suggest that once assigned to a category/theory, 
examples need remain there forever. It does, however, suggest that categorization 
contributes to the creation of networks of political, moral and military power that, 
even from within the law, deal meaning and construct powerful allegiances and 
exclusions between events, documentation, history and truth. “Being subjected to 
violence does not somehow purify us,”356 Das says, nor does it guarantee a better look
3 5 3  V ogler , “P o e tic  W itn e ss: W riting  th e  R ea l,” 196.
35-1 Q u oted  in J o h n  F e lstin er , P a u l C e lan . P o e t, S u r v iv o r , J e w  (N e w  H aven: Y ale U n iv ers ity  P ress,
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at whatever the real nature of truth might be. Thomas Vogler recognizes that “both 
witness and confession are culturally agreed on systems for the production of 
truth”357 and therefore, exist within culturally defined, singular modalities of 
testimony. What this suggests is that Truth is a made-up compilation of many truths: 
singular and non-generalizable. A puzzle.
The implications this has for the academic discipline of international relations 
are two. The first one has to do with the relevance of poetry to the practice of politics. 
Though political science would like to claim that the soundness, predictability and 
replicability of its models are, because lodged within hard science, not the stuff of 
literary studies and emotion, there are important implications that follow for the 
practice of political science from taking the ‘linguistic turn’ seriously. If there is one 
thing that the latter makes apparent, it is the fact that writing is unsettling if only 
because it always privileges certain stories and subjects over others. However, 
modern International Relations (IR) theory has continued to perpetuate a positivist 
discourse within which it upholds the autonomy of sovereign truth-telling as Master 
meaning it has not really taken the ‘linguistic turn’ seriously at all. This thesis, 
challenging IR to engage poetry as an idiom of address, is another example, 
unheeded, of the continued thick-headedness of politics with regard to literature.
Second, despite the fact that academic politics rejects poetry as a legitimate 
tool for looking at the world, real life evidence shows that political science as we know 
it has not improved either the predictability of its models or the scientific weight of its 
theories. Therefore, the language of poetry, story-telling and literary witness might 
teach political science a thing or two about the performative, elusive nature of truth 
and knowledge. If there is always an official, an unofficial and a thousand other 
versions of any story, the ‘linguistic turn’ draws our attention to the moral charge of
V ogler, "Poetic W itn ess: W riting th e  Real," 2 0 0 .
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each of these versions that, when engaged, can indeed move (political) science 
beyond blind appropriation. “Poetry,” as Celan reminds us, “should have a moral 
basis.”358 A closer look at political science’s ‘official’ dealings with refugees and other 
displaced people will be the subject of the last chapter of this thesis.
In addition, the process of bearing witness alerts to the nature of language vis- 
a-vis the human being as finite, flawed, inconstant, and informed by imagination and 
experimentation. Bearing witness, conceived as a performative linguistic 
engagement, helps negotiate the move between the singularity (historicity) and the 
universality (theory) of language that positivism’s toolbox does not accommodate.
The question to ask of International Relations is the following: how are we to address 
our experience with language without reducing the singularity of ‘event,’ 
operationalized as example for the purpose of social science inquiry, in the process? 
Often, the generation of social science narratives is considered unacceptable unless 
the authenticity of the latter has been established against an inevitable 
sensationalism that accompanies the extreme. Likewise, poetry is not somehow 
superior to other forms of expression or better suited to address human experience. 
Indeed, poetry as a literary form is not given as something that can be addressed as a 
‘what.’359 “Rather ... poetry alters our relation to language. Poetry is an event -  
Gadamer calls it a ‘speculative’ event -  in which language interrupts our attempts to 
reduce it conceptually and instrumentally; it takes itself out of our hands.”360 Paul 
Valery, too, comments on the ‘musical,’ intransitive nature of poetic usage that 
situates and finds its meaning vis-a-vis intelligence because and not despite of its 
performative appeal.361 In an effort to situate poetic usage better, I will engage 
Jacques Derrida’s readings of Paul Celan and, more specifically, Derrida’s
358 Q u oted  in  F e lstin er , P a u l C e la n , 154-
359 A llen , E llip s is ,  2.
B runs In tro d u ctio n  in G adam er, G a d a m e r  on Celan,  7. 
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understanding of the role of poetry in reading the political, the literary and 
witnessing.
th ird  frag m en t - the philosopher and the poet
“Hypothesis to be verified: all responsible witnessing engages a poetic 
experience of language.” (Jacques Derrida, Sovereignties in Question, 66).
For a thinker as heavily invested in the study of language as he is, Jacques
Derrida offers a surprising number of insights pertaining rather to processes
challenging enunciation, writing and speech. A question regarding the implications
this has for bearing witness arises, and correctly so. It is Derrida’s insistence on the
possibilities contained within language that allows him to offer his otherwise
“irresolvable aporias” as opportunities for bearing witness. In addition to
maintaining that writing gives flesh to meaning, Derrida knows that because
language is inaugural, “it is dangerous and anguishing ... it does not know where it is
going.”s62 His insistence on the creation of meaning through the medium of
enunciation and inscription at once reaffirms the performative role of language in
relation to the process of bearing witness while positing as paradoxical the
relationship between speaking and truth-bearing.
In testimony, truth is promised beyond all proof, perception, all intuitive 
demonstration. Even if I lie or perjure m yself... I promise truth and ask the 
other to believe that I am, there where I am the only one able to bear 
witness and where the order of proof or of intuition will never be reducible to 
or homogeneous with the elementary trust, the ‘good faith’ that is promised or 
demanded. The latter, to be sure, is never pure of all iterability nor of all 
technics, and hence of all calculability. For it also promises its repetition for 
the very first instant. It is involved in every address of the other.363
Derrida correctly identifies that the meaning of testimony is not contained in its
truth-bearing capacity for “as soon as it is guaranteed, certain as a theoretical proof, a
testimony can no longer be guaranteed as testimony. ”364 Derrida, unlike Agamben,
knows that equating life with natural life as bare life means overlooking the potential
362 D errida , W r itin g  a n d  D iffe re n c e , 11.
D errida , A c ts  o f  R e l ig io n ,  98 .
D errida, S o v e r e ig n t i e s  in Q u es tion ,  68 .
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contained within the human to bear witness. That is, Derridean life exceeds the 
definition of biological life only insofar as it mourns that excess, casting being itself as 
nostalgia. This life “is sacred, holy, infinitely respectable only in the name of what is 
worth more than it and what is not restricted to the naturalness of the bio-zoological 
(sacrificeable) -  although true sacrifice ought to sacrifice not only ‘natural’ life, called 
‘animal’ or ‘biological,’ but also that which is worth more than so-called natural 
life.”365 What Derrida is left with here is a preliminary definition of the process of 
bearing witness as a “kind of resurrection.”366
In addition to being an opening toward a decision, every interrogation of a 
text/event becomes, for Derrida, susceptible to a number of delimiting factors that 
structure and construct reality according to rules that preclude engagement from 
being openly, truly limitless. In order for him to be able to speak on behalf of 
singularity, defined as the non-exemplary, one-time, non-generalizable and authentic 
face both of ‘event’ and of the latter’s presentation in language, I show that Derrida 
adopts a limiting reference point leading him to idealize linguistic bearing witness as 
such. While it is true that “bearing witness is not proving,”36? it is questionable 
whether the following sheds much light at all on the nature of poetic witness: “The 
poem bears witness. We don’t know about what and for what, about whom and for 
whom, in bearing w itness/or bearing witness, it bears witness. But it bears witness. 
As a result, what it says of the witness it also says of itself as witness or as bearing 
witness. As poetic bearing witness.”368 Is this language of tautology “grounded in the 
singular experience of our own finitude” and if so, “how it is possible for a relation to 
occur between finitude and repetition, as the former is both the condition of 
possibility and impossibility for the latter?”361? What is this poetic bearing witness?
36s D errida , A c ts  o f  R e lig io n ,  87 .
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Wherefrom is it derived and what is its role in our understanding of bearing witness 
more generally? Derrida would perhaps answer this with a confession that “what 
matters most is the strange limit between what can and cannot be determined or 
decided in this poem’s bearing witness to bearing witness.”370 I offer a preliminary 
answer to these questions with a Celan poem, exemplifying a  specific instance of 
witnessing a particular ‘event’ in a singular poem .
ETCHED AWAY from 
the ray-shot wind of your language 
the garish talk of rubbed- 






your way through the human­
shaped snow, 
the penitents’ snow, to 
the hospitable 
glacier rooms and tables.
Deep
in Time’s crevasse 
by
the alveolate ice 
waits, a crystal of breath, 
your irreversible 
witness.371
Recall my discussion of the constitutive relationship between ‘ordinary’ and 
‘extra-ordinary’ witness where poetry, a medium of communicability, was 
emphasized not so much because of its resuscitative function, but because of its 
transformative (performative) potential, because of its quality as ‘actualized 
language,’ as praxis. While Derrida may be intuitively correct that the poem bears 
witness “in bearing witness fo r  bearing witness,” it is important to remember that the
r ” D errida, S o v e r e ig n t i e s  in Q u es t io n .  70 .
r ‘ C elan, P o e m s  o f  P a u l  C e lan ,  215.
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singularity implied, while it has its own ways of being said, exceeds “the politico- 
philosophical seizure of the r e a l . ”372
An appraisal of the poetic as a preferred, better mode of engagement with
‘event’ results in predicating bearing witness on the professed authenticity of a
certain idiom of language over all others. For Derrida, literature points the way to
the ‘impossible experience’ of bearing witness because it is the enactment of an
aporetic relation between universality and singularity. “In its undecidable relation to
the generality of law, the singularity of a literary text implies that the ‘literariness’ of
literature has to do with performativity (in the sense of a performative speech act)
and with rupture.”373 Richard Beardsworth is openly critical of the ‘literary’ Derrida
on the grounds that he relies on an overly formalistic, a-historical version of
deconstruction.374 In this sense, both aporia and bearing witness are irreducible to
any one linguistic form or another. Derrida, much like Agamben’s circular dealing
with ‘exception,’ privileges poetic language in order to bring it forth as the true idiom
for engaging ‘event.’ The experience of being a refugee, for example, is singular in its
everyday facticity that, beyond its theoretically-recovered nature, testifies to the
physicality of being displaced that surpasses any and all literary discussions of the
nature of the singular and the universal. It seems to me that with Derrida, the poetic
is made to bear too much witness in its bearing witness. Allow me to supplement this
proposition by referring the reader to Derrida’s reading of Celan:
And then there is another death, the death that comes over language because 
of what language is: repetition, lethargy, mechanization, and so forth. The 
poetic act therefore constitutes a sort of resurrection: the poet is someone 
permanently engaged with a decaying language that he resuscitates, but by 
giving back to it a triumphant line, but by sometimes bringing it back, like a 
revenant or phantom. ... Each poem is a resurrection, but one that engages 
us to a vulnerable body, one that may be forgotten again. I believe that all 
Celan’s poems remain in a certain way indecipherable, retain some
372 B e ard sw orth , D e r r id a  & th e  P o litic a l,  xiii.
373 D errida  in B eard sw orth , D e r r id a  & th e  P o litic a l, 2 0 .
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indecipherability, and the indecipherable can either call endlessly for a sort of 
reinterpretation, resurrection, or new interpretative breath, or, on the 
contrary, it can perish or waste away once more. Nothing ensures a poem  
against its own death ... Oblivion is always possible.375
Considering the fact that “resurrection” and “resuscitation” suggest a different 
relationship between language and life/death, it is important to point out the 
implications this difference has for our reading of Derrida’s reading of witnessing. 
‘Resuscitation’ alludes to the bringing back to life that which is nearly dead while 
‘resurrection’ alludes to the mechanic and cyclical nature that characterizes the 
organic, the singular. The latter is also the aporia of bearing witness. What this 
makes clear is the fact that Derrida succumbs to certain romanticism by opposing life 
to death when he evokes the resuscitative potential of language. This fact is 
important not only in offering a thematized, deconstructive critique of Derrida, but 
also for bringing my earlier discussion of the singular, contained in every single poem  
(of Celan), to bear against Derrida’s reading of the ‘poetic’ as a universal category.
Derrida situates the originality of language within a novel engagement with 
the ‘poetic.’ He does that by posing the resuscitating potential of poetry vis-a-vis a 
language o f ‘repetition, lethargy, mechanization, and so forth.’ Here, the suggested 
meaning of ‘repetition, lethargy and mechanization’ falls into the trap of literality -  
they suggest a lack of creativeness, inauthenticity, and banality. Mechanization, 
however, as the condition of the organic and the singular is anything but banal. In 
addition, Celan himself was extremely fond of repetition which he understood as the 
practice of an encounter with the limit(s) of language. Thus, the poet does not bring a 
decaying language back to life, but reveals the performative potentiality of language: 
a potentiality to be found even among the death-camps. A poet bears witness 
through tautologies; through the use of mechanization and repetition in an effort to 
push reading and interpretation to the limits of language. With regard to the
D errida, S o v e r e ig n t i e s  in Q u es t io n .  106-7 .
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witnessing of trauma, the need for repetition becomes even more imperative. As 
William Allen has suggested, the ‘experience’ of trauma as that “which is not 
experienced in any mode of comprehension or representation” is a “recurrence, of 
that which was not experienced by way of something else ... is this evanescence that 
constitutes its singularity, for it renders it irreducible and unrecountable.”376 Celan’s 
experience of this ‘recurrence’ is imperative in order to bear witness to “the count- /  
less to-be /  named un- /  pronounceable /  names.”377
Derrida, though an adamant defender of the irreducible nature of bearing
witness, nevertheless reduces it by implicating it in a predicative relationship to the
‘poetic.’ Furthermore, he identifies poetry’s testimonial appeal as situated within a
meta-language, thus failing to recognize that the incalculability of the poetic  is
contained in the example of every single poem. “The poet is someone who is
permanently involved with a language that is dying and which he resurrects, not by
giving it back some triumphant aspect but by making it return sometimes, like a
specter or a ghost: the poet wakes up language.”378 The novelty implied in poetic
engagements, the organic nature of poetic language, do not constitute a resuscitation
but a repetition, explaining the ‘always-to-come’ as an underlying characteristic of
poetry. Derrida’s claim that the poetic is able to encompass, resuscitate and speak for
the singularity of language, reduces the poetic to a constative instance. Celan’s own
belief that “a poem does not stand outside time”37? alerts to a different dynamic -
namely, one of witnessing presencing, an arrival.
COME, make the world mean with yourself 
come, let me fill you up with 
all that’s mine.
One with you I am, 
to capture us,
376 A llen , E llip s is , 214.
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even now. 380
Even now “the prayers /  gone up in smoke /  ... singing across /  open-, open-, open”381 
are still to come.
In his discussion of Celan’s “Aschenglorie,” Derrida again makes the claim 
that “the poem speaks of bearing witness in general, ‘but above all about the poem 
that it is, about itself in its singularity, and about the bearing witness to which every 
poem bears witness.’”382 Does that mean that the poem resuscitates and resurrects at 
the same time and that sometimes it resurrects more than it resuscitates? Or does it 
go the other way around? Celan offers an answer to this puzzle by focusing our 
attention, once again, on the historicity of the poem. “The poem speaks. It is mindful 
of its dates, but it speaks. True, it speaks only on its own, its very own behalf.”383 
Derrida’s ‘truth of language’ must make reference and inform itself in specificity. 
Running the risk of sounding simplistic, the poet cannot very well save a dying 
language if only because that would presuppose the fact of the death of language. 
What Derrida is referring to, perhaps, is Celan’s own relationship to German: his 
lifelong effort to reshape and re-new the language of the Nazis so that his witnessing 
did not end in “two mouthfuls of silence” -  the mark of an impossible address. “It is 
this language I have sought, during those years and the years since then, to write 
poems: so as to speak, to orient myself, to find out where I was and where I was 
meant to go, to sketch out reality for myself.”384
THE SILICIFIED SAYING in the first, 
you forget that you forget,
blinking, the punctuation marks 
crystallize at the wrist,
380 C elan , S e le c tio n s ,  140 .
381 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  211.
382 D err id a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n ,  9 6 .
383 C elan , C o l le c te d  P ro se ,  4 8 .
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through the earth 
cleft to the crest 
the pauses come riding,
there, by
the sacrifice-bush, 
where memory catches fire, 
the One Breath 
seizes you.383
Language is lost and then found through the fabric of memory, turning the 
moment of recollection (as remembering) into an invention: trauma is not something 
we learn to recall, it is not something we learn at all, it is not what we usually refer to 
as ‘experience.’386 So in speaking of “that which happened,” we experience it as if for 
the first time through “tiny sheaves of hope.” What the resuscitation Derrida 
attributes to poetry discloses is the attention poetry pays to the relationship between 
the singular nature of an event and the ways in which this singularity and its excess 
are communicated through language. Celan’s way of seeing the world and of seeing 
language are implicated in one another as “the body of language becomes 
indistinguishable from that of the world,”387 calling into question the ability to fix the 
‘fragmentarity’ of one on the model wholeness of the other. “Your chant -  what does 
it know?”388
Celan poses this relationship as an unresolved one, as a reoccurring exchange 
between bearing witness and the need to reaffirm life through language, “even now,” 
in the face of inhuman, life-negating forces. The poem, “etched away from /  the ray- 
shot of your language /  ... Whirled /  clear, /  free /  ... Deep /  in Time’s crevasse /  by /  
the alveolate ice /  waits, a crystal breath, /  your irreversible /  witness.”389 His 
invitation to an encounter is anything but straightforward: “No one person is ‘like’ 
another ... only ‘distanced’ can my reader understand me ... always grasping only the
3§5 C elan , B r e a th tu r n ,  2 0 7 .
386 A llen , E llip s is , 214 .
387 D as, L ife  a n d  W o r d s ,  2 0 6 .
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grilled bars between us.”390 Celan refers to the difficult, though not irresolvable, 
aporia of speaking about ‘that which happened,’ to the difficulty of straight talk at all.
Speak, you also,
speak as the last,
have your say.
Speak -
But keep yes and no unsplit.
And give your say this meaning:
give it the shade ...
He speaks truly who speaks the shaded
Here, language engages ‘event’ over and over again. Celan’s poetry, as already 
suggested, does that by inviting a repetitive, continuous witness, by bearing witness 
to ‘that which happened’ in bearing witness “to the now, to the ‘presence’ of the 
human ... a presence attesting to a presence, or rather to a present, a human 
present. ”392 For Derrida, on the other hand, “the poetics of a poem is that which 
occupies the impossible position of the witness, who has to answer for the 
impossibility of answering, to speak of the impossibility of speaking, thereby bearing 
the poem to us but in doing so finding its own position undermined, for while the 
pain of a poem needs a witness, ‘no-one /  bears witness for the witness. ”393 Derrida’s 
reading of this famous last phrase leaves me questioning his interpretation for being 
too narrow, not nuanced enough, again, perhaps not Derridean enough.
WHAT OCCURRED? The boulder left the mountain.
Who awakened? You and I.
Language, language. Co-earth. Fellow-planet.
Poorer. Open. Homelandly.
The course? Towards the unsubsided.
Your course and mine was the boulder’s flight.
Heart and heart. Adjudged too heavy.
Grow more heavy. Be more light.394
390 Q u o ted  in  F e lstin er , P a u l C e lan , 1 08 .
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Your course and mine - the course of language - language as boulder. The cold, 
death-carrying stone from Celan’s earlier poetry here becomes a boulder in flight, 
digging its “paths upward.” Whether or not the poetic as “a singular act, concerning a 
singular event and engaging a unique, and thus inventive, relationship to language”393 
can access the singular historicity of ‘event’ is not what measures the value of poetry. 
It is rather something like the following Celan confession:
WHEN WHITENESS ASSAILED US, at night:
when from the libation-ewer more
than water came;
when the skinned knee





concluding re m a rk s  -  on the  way to m em ory
Thus far, I have argued that the “mortal body, fragile and at times 
indecipherable”39? of the poem does need saving or resuscitation. Its partaking into a 
mechanic repetition indeed enables the carrying out of witnessing. What that 
suggests is that every truth depends on the fact of being re-written, re-inscribed, 
spoken and performed again and that no truth, however theoretically sound, precedes 
the moment of its repeated conception in language. With regard to everyday 
instances of bearing witness, unconditioned either by theoretical aspirations or by 
policy-setting prescriptions, the performative nature of witnessing questions all ends. 
Whether we are talking of concentration camps, refugee camps, ethnic wars, famine 
or of the daily goings about of people, what is absolutely singular about witnessing is 
its potential to engage, address and disclose the human potential to out-live suffering, 
trauma and violence. “This makes clear that the claim of language is inherent to
395 D errid a , S o v e r e ig n tie s  in  Q u e s tio n , 8 8 .
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trauma, a claim to speak or write where this cannot be done,” a demand “to 
interrogate the limits of language as a means to respond to its recurrent absence.”398 
Derrida, though highly sensitive to the relationship between language and truth on 
one hand, and aporia and decision on the other, falls into the trap of idealizing the 
very thing that lets him announce the performative potential of language -  poetry.
At the end of this chapter I would like to posit the following possibility: 
perhaps there is no way of engaging bearing witness without reducing it to something 
or to someone. If we agree that no matter what the linguistic format, no matter what 
the stylistic and phonetic arrangements, the nature of every representation is 
reductive, then no privileging either of the juridical, the linguistic, or the poetic 
could/should ever function as final. What I hope to have demonstrated in my 
engagement with Celan are the implications that language carries for the recollection 
and construction of memory by pointing out the possibilities for “turning of the 
breath” contained within the poetic idioms through which wo(man) recovers and 
reinvents ‘event.’ What will follow is an engagement with the role of memory in 
mediating witnessing. Later, an exegesis of the figure of the refugee and its 
relationship to sovereign power will supplement my inquiry into the nature, workings 
and implications that witnessing has for the practice of International Relations.
A llen , E llip s is , 215.
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C hapter Four 
Memory, the  'linguistic tu rn ,' and the  'singularity  of political novelty.'
Before proceeding with my next chapter, I would like to make a detour and 
talk briefly about the implications the current project has had for my understanding 
of the nature of remembering. It was not from the outset that I was aware of the 
important connections between testimony/bearing witness and memory. In fact, it 
was only after a significant number of my academic books were lost in the trans- 
Atlantic mail and I was forced to recover their names from a long list of bibliographic 
material that I was made aware of the role of memory in research. Since I had never 
been one with a good memory, not only was I unable to remember the titles of all the 
books, but by this point I was only partially certain of the books’ relationship to my 
thesis. As a consequence, I was faced with the task of piecing back into a whole the 
remnants of my compromised memory for names, facts and dates on one hand, and 
my altogether disrupted relationship to my project’s future on the other. A process of 
careful reading selection turned into a tabula rasa  and I was only doubtfully 
optimistic about my actual ability to fill in the blank spaces of my impoverished 
mental archive.
In the months to follow, I read new books, wrote various outlines, becoming 
the anti-product of what had been a professionally nurtured reliance on knowing 
through reference, archiving, summary, and past experience(s). The following 
chapter on the relationship between memory and bearing witness will be based both 
on research experience and on my ideas regarding the nature of truth-claims. I am 
driven to these topics because of a belief that if we agree to view testimony as the 
conscious effort to make past experiences iterable, then an equally conscious effort is 
needed to understand the nature of “iterability” vis-a-vis one’s relationship to the
170
past. This chapter will argue that different contexts give rise to different modes of 
remembering and bearing witness.
Recall my discussion so far. Chapter One addressed the juridico-political 
‘exception’ and the nature of bearing witness to being a homo sacer  as envisioned by 
Giorgio Agamben. Chapter Two demarcated the philosophical potential of literature 
and testimony reflected through the prism of Jacques Derrida’s singular engagement 
with the event of poetry. Chapter Three discussed the specific instance of Paul 
Celan’s poetic oeuvre as a moving forward, going through, and an address. I 
suggested that the work of poets has important implications for understanding how  
the human being comports itself both privately and as part of a collective, as well as 
for our relationship to the language of witness. The last, Chapter Five, will 
problematize the engagement of academic political science with the refugee regarding 
questions of singularity, security, everyday performativity and the nature of 
situational testimony to being and getting along in the world.
Though not stated explicitly, so far I have been earning the right to interrogate 
the academic practices and beliefs of International Relations against what I will 
address as a “politics of singular novelty” defined as the interplay between an 
understanding of the world as dynamic, messy and unpredictable realm and the 
human making up this universe as a singular, finite, and insecure being. I believe 
that these premises do not lead the researcher to anarchy, apocalyptic thoughts, 
negative conceptions of the world, or abstract theoretical renditions of real life 
events, but to a potentially and infinitely contingent, multi-faceted, individually- 
informed conception of the political universe within which we work and that defines 
the boundaries of our inquiries. Following from my discussion so far, what I will pose 
as the puzzle in this chapter are the following two questions: first, why is it that 
neither Derrida nor Agamben address more closely the question of m emory and
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second, what are the specific implications a discussion of memory (and bearing 
witness) has for the study and practice of international relations?
Though seemingly unrelated, these questions are derived from the same 
premise, namely, that an understanding of the ways language and memory work to 
constitute the process of bearing witness is directly related to how one addresses the 
subjects that make up the inquiries of international relations. That is, if “the 
productive power of language makes meaning unlimited, ”399 then the task of thinking 
politics differently alerts to the interactive, heterogeneous relationship between 
theory and practice. The task of thinking politics differently also means asking the 
following basic questions: “What is it that political scientists do as political scientists 
and toward what end?” and “Where do we as political scientists come from and where 
are we headed anyway?” Ivan Brady answers the last question thus: “The same 
places as the rest of us (including poets), through the same formative processes as 
human beings, anchored in the same heavily constructed, self-defining, cultural 
fields.”4°° The task of thinking politics differently means thinking the experience of 
being human differently.
So far my engagement with Derrida and Agamben has been quite theoretical, 
though important practical implications were drawn from Agamben’s “remnants” and 
Derrida’s linguistic “resuscitation.” Paul Celan’s “going through language” alerted to 
the factual, theoretic, poetic and rhetorical elements that help turn all lists into 
stories. What is more, he alerted to the fact that “poetry can ground theories of the 
world that actually involve our interactions with it, not just abstractions from it.”4Q1 
Next, I will examine the question of memory beyond the theoretical implications 
derived from the work of the two continental philosophers of interest here and enter
399 Ivan  B rady. “In D e fe n se  o f  th e  S e n su a l.” Q u a lita tiv e  I n q u ir y  19, no . 4  ( 2 0 0 4 ) ,  6 2 3 .
Bradv, “In D e fe n se  o f  th e  S e n su a l,” 6 2 4 .
9111 B rady, “In D efen se  o f  th e  Sensual,"  6 2 2 .
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in an engagement with the methodological, theoretical and practical implications that 
a capricious concept such as ‘memory’ can offer for the study of politics.
I will limit my discussion of political science to International Relations (IR), 
though my engagement with general concepts such as the nature of being, truth- 
claims, and sovereign power will be informed by political science as such. For 
example, sovereign power will be addressed not as a “technology of governance”402 
but rather, as “thought which poses a particular kind of challenge to thinking about 
politics” that “requires a form of political philosophizing in which the project of 
thought (politics) is in question because the very form of thinking (philosophy) is 
itself at issue.”403 The political itself, after Richard Beardsworth, will be understood 
as “a moment of transformation.”404
I will take to task IR’s underlying assumptions as a positivist, deterministic, 
and rational discipline whose commitment to the business of truth-telling follows its 
causally-informed methodologies, security-conscious thinking and an Enlightenment 
idea of progress. In an effort to build bridges between the various levels of my 
engagement so far, “memory,” a fluctuating though unavoidable link to the past, will 
serve as a mediator between the Derridean concept of singularity on the one hand, 
Agamben’s juridico-political exception on the other and finally, what I see as the 
generalizing facticity of academic political science. The inclination to extreme 
objectification characteristic of IR will be addressed critically for its claims on 
objectivity, on being able to predict, calculate and appeal to the affirmative power of 
truth-claims without accounting for the inherent distortions and reductions of its 
subject matter.403 I will begin my discussion by briefly referring to the thought of
402 J e n n y  E d k in s. P o s ts tr u c tu r a l is m  a n d  I n te r n a t io n a l  R e la tio n s . (B ou ld er , Co: Lynn R ein n er, 1 9 9 9 ), 5.
4°3 D illo n , P o litic s  o f  S e c u r ity ,  3.
404 B eard sw orth , D e r r i d a  & th e  Poli t ica l .  255.
4"-4 Bradv, “In D e fe n se  o f  th e  Sensual,"  6 23 .
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Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben and by immediately asking the following 
question: “What form does memory take in their historical, politically-informed, 
philosophical oeuvres and to what purpose?”
singu larity  rem em b ered  -  the iterability Df fac t
Language is ... the possibility of subjectivity because it always 
contains the linguistic forms appropriate to the expression of 
subjectivity, and the discourse provokes the emergence of subjectivity 
because it consists of discrete instances. (Emile Benveniste)
I will recall Derrida in an effort to clarify his understanding of memory and, in 
turn, my own reading of his reading of memory. This is important because he 
provides a pillar on which I rest my theoretical argumentation, though it is 
sometimes a pillar less valuable for its constant support than for its unreliable 
foundation. What Derrida demands is that I find my own readings, my own voice 
and my own pillar(s), for I well know that it is not an authoritative voice that he 
lends, but the space for a discussion, the opportunity to think about my own work 
and the very shaky foundations on which it rests. Derrida is thus singularly 
important for making sure I remember to check my bearings. Every time I check 
them, every time I embark on a new direction, a new idiom, a novel reading, I have to 
look where I have been, to the places, battles, storms without whose direction and 
misdirection my present position would not be possible. Looking back to Derrida 
now, perhaps I will see more clearly.
Recall my discussion of Jacques Derrida’s writing on singularity. I tried to 
make clear that for him, singularity was at once a state of being that exceeded 
theoretical limits and one that, in order that it did not fall into abstraction, had to be 
met by language’s general tools. In addition, every singular instance (the poem for 
example) is the by-product of a decision to address an audience, an “other.” It is in 
this sense that a poetic engagement with experience informs of the political stakes of
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witnessing: at once irreducible to any one example and, at the same time, brought 
forth through the prism of repeatability. Indeed, “the force that the singular 
mobilizes is both differential and formalizing”406 in that it contains a productive force 
that alerts to an origin defining but also challenging literary institution.
Timothy Clark discusses this double-bind in the following manner: “Too much
of the standard defense of the literary as singular comes down to highlighting our not
being able to finally identify or fix the meaning of something, and then vaunting this
inability of resistance as a kind of vaguely democratic challenge to dogma.”407
Furthermore, in his response to Cathy Caruth’s book Unclaimed Experience:
Trauma, N arrative and H istory, Dominick La Capra says:
The apparent implication is that literature in its very excess can somehow get 
at trauma in a manner unavailable to theory -  that it writes (speaks or even 
cries) trauma in excess of history. It is not altogether clear what the relation 
of theoretical discourse on the literary is to psychoanalytic theory and to 
literature. It would seem at the very least that this discourse somehow marks 
... the excess of the literary vis-a-vis the theoretical, thereby seemingly 
escaping or outwitting the limits of theory with respect to excess.408
Even though literature has been paired with singularity time and again, I would like 
to suggest that it is not necessarily better suited for hosting the singular, even if much 
of memory literature (trauma, autobiographical, and experiential literature) insists 
on being able to provide the singular with a territorial and theoretical safe havens. 
This chapter will show that an engagement with the work of memory allows, also, for 
the creative, performative potential of international relations to unfold.
At the same time, bearing witness has become increasingly sublimated 
through processes of purging, revelation, spiritual, communal and/or personal 
healing. Transference (by which I mean one’s identification with another) between
-t°6 S za fran iec , B e c k e tt , D e r r id a  a n d  th e  E v e n t  o f  L ite r a tu re ,  17.
407 T im o th y  Clark. T he P o e tic s  o f  S in g u la r ity .  (E d inburgh: E d in b u rgh  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 2 0 0 5 ) ,  8 . 
t°s D o m in ic  LaCapra. W ritin g  H is to r y . W r it in g  T ra u m a . (B a ltim ore: J o h n s H o p k in s U n iv ers ity  P ress,
2 0 0 1 ) , 185.
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observer and observed, writer and subject, past and present, fiction and fact has itself 
become symptomatic of a reality of appropriating others’ pain which, in turn, creates 
binary oppositions such as victim and perpetrator, guilty and innocent, deserving and 
condemned. The postmodern insistence on repetition, rereading and reiteration has 
also had a calcifying, rather than a liberating effect for understanding singularity in 
the sense that the latter has been viewed as a ritual construct informed by a desire to 
perpetuate and affirm a reality marked by irreproducibility and the unspeakable.
What should rather be taken away from these engagements is an 
acknowledgement of “a social setting structured deeply by socialization, 
enculturation, and individual experiences in which some messages are bound to be 
unclear, confusing, and contradictory, whereas others appear to define precisely for 
us what the world is about through widely known and shared codes.”409 The process 
of truth-finding is revealed for its incompletion and gaps in knowledge always more 
numerous than the words and theories plugged alongside it at any one time. Within 
positivist IR, the mark of truth has been defined by a drive toward external validity 
and generalizability rather than as interplay between grand narrative constructs and 
causally-informed laws. In an effort to counter the grip of the mainstream, this 
chapter addresses the process of meaning-making not as given, but as an agenda- 
setting construction offering a mobilizing potential relating to the ways and 
modalities through which individuals are studied, represented and understood. I will 
elaborate on this subject by way of an unorthodox mediator: Jacques Derrida.
d e rrid a  and the  tex tu re  of experience
"You cannot stay on the summit forever; you have to come down 
again. So why bother in the first place ? Just this: What is above 
knows what is below, but what is below does not know what is above. 
One climbs, one sees. One descends, one sees no longer, but one has 
seen. There is an art of conducting oneself in the lower regions by the 
memory of what one saw higher up. When one can no longer see, one
•t°11 Brady, "In D efen se  o f  th e  Sensual,"  625 .
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can at least still know." Rene Daumal
I will have Derrida introduce himself to my discussion of memory thus: 
“There is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory.
Effective democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the 
participation in and the access to the archive, its constitution and its 
interpretation. ”410 What he is saying is that a certain appeal to a politics of 
knowledge-control informs the drive toward progress characterizing Enlightenment 
and liberal humanistic rhetoric. Derrida calls this “archival v io len ce”*11 In addition 
to being a depository of preserved or recovered facts, an archive is also a museum of 
memory, an ‘imprint.’412 As a museum, it contains information that is controlled, 
edited and represented with regard for the particular message intended for 
communication and with regard both for its particular keepers and for its audience.4^
Furthermore, as suggested by Michael Lynch regarding the relationship 
between archiving and truth-claims, Derrida’s remarks on the archive
also point the way to a critical examination of the belief that archives provide 
a home for primary sources and that such sources provide the raw data for 
writing history... By situating archives in historically specific arrangements 
of ‘archontic power’ -  offices, institutions and practices for gathering, filing, 
authorizing, certifying, classifying and redacting records -  Derrida’s 
etymology enables us to recognize that archival data are never ‘raw.’414
That is, the business of making truth is always informed by the ethnography and 
genealogy of data itself. This will be important in thinking through the disciplinal 
intentionality toward objectivity underwriting the drive toward scientific knowledge 
resonant within international relations.
410 J a cq u es  D errida. A r c h iv e  F e v e r . (C h icago , IL: T h e U n iv ersity  o f  C hicago P ress , 1995 a ), P4 - 
4“ D errid a , A r c h iv e  F e v e r , 7.
412 D errida , A r c h iv e  F e v e r , 3 0 .
■t'i E d k in s, T ra u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litics . 191.
i‘ t M ich ael L ynch. “A rch ives in F o rm a tio n .” H is to r y  o f  th e  H u m a n  S c ien ces  12, n o .2 (19 9 9 ): 67.
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“To discipline” is understood not only as an outcome of an uneven 
relationship between an authority figure and a subordinate, but also as always 
underwritten by a desire to impose, solidify, and perpetuate the kind of ‘normal’ 
power relations that inform the drive toward progress, development, and security. 
Archives are disciplined. Memory is disciplined. Truth-claims are definitely 
disciplined. An exegesis on how this works will inform the remainder of this chapter.
The practices recruited to assemble, control and determine the access to 
information play an important role in the reconstruction of memory as testimony.
The need to problematize this relationship goes hand in hand with a responsibility to 
examine the role of language in the production of justice. In this sense and taking 
lead from Linda Hutcheon, my subsequent use of terms such as “problematization,” 
“deconstruction,” “contextualization,” and “totalizing” will be understood as part of 
working within a postmodern rhetoric. The latter will be discussed as “fundamentally 
contradictory, resolutely historical, and inescapably political.”4^  This carries potency 
not only for questioning the given nature of deterministic assumptions, but also for 
an engagement with how we write and use language to help exemplify and honour the 
relationship between singularity, politics, bearing witness and memory.
Being documented is built into writing and depends as much on idioms of 
generalization as it does on idioms of invention and performance. In the next 
chapter, means of documentation with respect to refugees will be shown to exceed the 
prescribed legal parameters of nation-states or international organizations. What is 
more, if we concede that “the world of signs and meaning is made,”416 then how we 
bear witness to that world is a question of interpretation, re-production and 
engagement of these signs. Testimonies to trauma, made public through exhibitions
-i's L inda H u tc h e o n . A P oe t ic s  o f  P o s tm o d e r n i s m .  (L ondon: R ou tledge , 1 9 8 8 ), 4.
-i1'’ Brady, “In D efen se  o f  th e  S e n su a l,” 6 2 4 .
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and memorials, point to the fact that museums not only enable but also, delimit 
testimony by “making the dangers of testimony ... thoroughly contained”417 in the 
form of controlled narratives. James Booth calls this the “willed silencing” we 
“encounter... in our museums and libraries, and in our curious cannons, all of which 
are, in part, exercises in determining what will be left in silence and what will occupy 
a place in our collective memory.”418 Mainstream IR showcases one grand narrative.
Memory, addressed as an idiom of bearing witness, problematizes otherwise 
taken for granted, common-sensical, and “natural” historical, literary or political 
research testifying to the fact that “all cultural practices have an ideological subtext 
which determines the conditions of the very possibility of their production of 
meaning. ”419 In that sense, it offers a sensitivity to a world where post-modern and 
critical engagements are “especially significant politically in undoing pure binary 
oppositions that subtend and are generated by a scapegoat mechanism involving the 
construction as well as the victimization of the other as a totally, external, impure 
contaminant or pollutant.”420
Postmodern concerns offer a critique of opaque representational models not 
simply by substituting fact with fiction, but by challenging the “common-sense 
naturalness” of the assumptions of totalizing theoretical and practical approaches.421 
A critical engagement with questions of memory and bearing witness, in turn, poses 
as problematic the ways in which knowledge is preserved, interpreted, quantified and 
used in the service of ends. By offering one such engagement, this chapter shows that 
as a discipline directly implicated in the study of real-life events, it behooves 
International Relations to examine the ways and practices through which it comes to
E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s ,  191.
418 B ooth , C o m m u n itie s  o f  M e m o r y ,  76.
419 H u tc h e o n , A  P o e tic s  o f  P o s tm o d e r n is m ,  x ii-x iii.
t-° LaCapra, W r i t in g  H i s t o r y , W r i t in g  T r a w n a .  68 .
-t'-1 L inda H u tc h e o n . The Poli t ics  o f  P o s tm o d e r n i s m .  (L ondon: R ou tled ge , 1 9 8 9 ), 3 2 .
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know what it knows. Next, I will comment on a weakness of Derrida’s regarding 
memory which will, in turn, be discussed as “politics of singular novelty.”
re -m em bering  d errid a
My end goal is not to place Derrida on the pages of political science syllabi, 
but rather to suggest that in relation to the problematic of bearing witness, Derrida’s 
thought alerts to the tension between a desire to be enlightened (through methods of 
replicability, generalizability, and truthfulness) and the fact of the singular, 
performative ‘event’ that language accommodates. While scientific inquiry is 
informed primarily by a drive for predictability, the heterogeneous nature of being in 
the world alerts to the symbiotic relationship between theory and example, 
authenticity and repeatability, fact and fable, the individual and the community.
Ivan Brady, too, has alerted us to the fact that “The constructive process of 
analyzing, comparing, conjecturing, and inferring facts about the nature of the world 
makes life polysemous, polyvocal, ripe for alternative interpretations even as it 
guarantees a lack of closure in any absolute sense.”422 This leads to the realization 
that engaging singularity within international relations not only introduces a closer 
relationship to the subjects studied, but it also raises awareness of the solid, non- 
critical material underwriting much of academic politics. Extreme objectification, in 
this sense, accommodates reducibility as far as the differences underwriting the 
experience of language and life go. Derrida’s neologism of differance reveals the non 
self-evident nature of enunciation as such in that the difference between differance 
and difference is non-audible.42s What this reveals is the fact that “language, or any 
code, any system of referral in general, is constituted ‘historically’ as a wave of
422 B rady, “In  D e fen se  o f  th e  S e n su a l,” 6 2 5 .
423 P eggy  K am uff (cd ). A D e r r id a  R e a d e r . B e tw e e n  th e  B lin ds . (N e w  York: C olum bia  U n iv ersity  P ress,
1991), 6 0 .
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d if f e r e n c e s .”424 Evoking language thus has the effect both of presupposing this 
difference and of reducing it. However, as Derrida makes clear in “Signature Event 
Context,” his is not an all-out attack on intentionality.
A brief summary of Derrida’s engagement with memory is due. Derrida 
addresses memory as an ‘imprint’ that “inscribes an impression in language and in 
d is c o u r s e .”425 Memory is discussed both as a linguistic and as a physical impression: 
a scar on the body, in time, and in language. Memory evokes “pure repetition without 
proper identity or s u b s t a n c e . ”426 Talking about the case of the pharm akon  (meaning 
remedy as medicine but also, as poison) in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida’s reading of 
Plato’s Phaedrus addresses the fact that the process of translation is a process of 
appropriating and choosing one meaning among a multitude of available meanings. 
However, this single meaning represents a multitude of other relations as w e l l . 4 2 7
Plato accuses writing for replacing living memory with a mnemonic device.
For him, speech remains the purest ways of recovering any sign, that is, event. Plato 
talks of two kinds of memory: ‘anamnesis’ and ‘hypomnesis.’ The first kind literally 
translates as memory raised up, as in memory brought in focus, in sight, as 
something seen clearly and for the truth of what it is. An experience of anamnesis is 
part of the original story, a part of what we live and know as truth. This is, in some 
ways, similar to a religious experience and to the faith we have in the word of God 
serving as our own belief. Hypomnesis, on the other hand, signals something close to 
a technical aide-memoire, an instance of imitation or, in the case of Plato, writing.
424 K am uff, A  D e r r id a  R e a d e r ,  65 .
425 D errida . A r c h iv e  F e v e r , 3 0 .
426 J a cq u es  D errid a , “P la to ’s P h arm acy” in  A  D e r r id a  R e a d e r ,  ed ited  b y  P eggy  K am uff, 113-139- (N ew
York: C olu m b ia  U n iv ers ity  P ress, 1991), 122.
D errida, "Plato’s Pharm acy,"  127.
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“The problem starts where the mneme, instead of being present to itself, is 
supplanted by archives, lists, notes, tales, accounts, chronicles: memorials instead of 
memory. But, as Derrida indicates, the 'evil' slips in within the relation of memory to 
itself, in the general organization of the mnesic activity. Memory always needs signs 
in order to recall the non-present, with which it is necessarily in relation.”428 Thus 
both mneme and hypomnesis are dependent on repetition and contained within each 
other. Derrida admits that Plato’s project fails because writing always contaminates 
and supplements memory and in doing so, affects as well as infects memory. The 
existence of hypomnesis inside anamnesis inscribes an originary level of violence -  a 
disruption of life by the non-living -  right at the heart of life itself. Writing becomes 
“that dangerous supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to 
do without it yet lets itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced, 
completed by the very trace through which the present increases itself in the act of 
disappearing.”429 The pharm akon  is that dangerous supplement. Bearing witness is 
that pharm akon. Memory for Derrida takes the shape of the very thing it resists, 
writing, by representing a constant passage between ‘anamnesis’ and ‘hypomnesis,’ a 
passage between opposites -  the undecidable.
Memory is discussed in opposition to writing. In other words, “writing is 
essentially bad, external to memory, productive not of science but of belief, not of 
truth but of appearances.”43° In that sense, memory as anamnesis is living, 
developing and dynamic engagement with ‘event.’ Writing, on the other hand, is a 
representation of memory; a violence inflicted on an original level for there can be no 
knowing of remembering, no meaning to remembering without writing. What is 
more, “it is this life of the memory that the pharm akon  of writing would come to 
hypnotize: fascinating it, taking it out of itself by putting it to sleep in a
2^8h ttp : /7  w w w .c o b u s se n .c o m /p r o e fsc h r if t /2 0 0  deconstruction/250 supplement/251 p lato  s su p p le
m e n ts /p la to  s su p p le m e n ts .h tm  a ccesse d  O ctob er 18th, 2 0 0 8
4:9 D errida, Jacq u es. D is s e m in a t io n .  (C hicago: U n iv ersity  o f  C hicago Press: 1 9 8 3 k  n o .
D errida, "Plato's Pharm acy," 129-130.
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monument.”431 Writing as a tool of archiving compromises the originary intact
texture of memory and condemns it to apathy and to not being able to disseminate
the truth of what is. Letting itself get stoned by its own signs, its own 
guardians, by the types committed to the keeping and surveillance of 
knowledge, it will sink down into lethe, overcome by nonknowledge and 
forgetfulness. Memory and truth cannot be separated.432
Yet, memory is writing. For Derrida, the work of memory is the overseeing of the 
active production and continuous disseminations of knowledge aware of “the truth of 
what is.” What does all this mean?
Memory, the sign of a sign, has to resort to the aid of signs (language) in order 
to recall the already past ‘event’ that it commemorates. This is also the paradox of 
bearing witness: singularity communicated through the general tools of language. 
Writing is considered suspicious, unreliable and fickle, evoking false knowledge, 
lethargy, something akin to Derrida’s discussion of language in Sovereignties in 
Question as lethargic, repetitive, apathetic and dying. The function of writing, 
however, is to supplement memory, to build upon it, to inscribe it in generational 
archives. Speaking is not writing, yet anamnesis is impossible without hypomnesis -  
the living impossible without the non-living. The definition of simulacrum attributed 
to writing is indeed symptomatic of all (re)presentation, even self-presentation. 
Writing becomes an aid to memory while, informed by differance, it challenges the 
‘alert exercise of memory.’
In short, memory is defined as the reproduction, the revival of knowledge in 
the present: “a movement of truth.” The language of signs, because of its function as 
aide-memoire is denied its constitutive role in the production, interpretation and 
dissemination of truth. Yet, since memory needs the sign, it is always already defined
431 D errida , “P la to ’s P h a rm a cy ,” 130.
-1;^  D errida, “P la to ’s P h arm acy ,” 130.
183
by the supplement. Important implications for a discussion of bearing witness follow  
from this.
First, despite the fact that Plato assigns a ‘superior,’ ‘idealized’ role to ‘living 
memory,’ writing is surrogate to both memory and knowledge. Second and following 
from Derrida’s discussion of the pharm akon, it becomes clear that the act of 
recording is a simultaneous engagement both with presence and absence, inside and 
outside, ‘pure’ knowledge and ‘supplemented’ one. Writing itself makes possible the 
play of this differance and also, the subsequent dual relationship of constitution on 
the one hand and erasure on the other between memory and writing.
Thus, even though writing is external to (internal) memory, even though 
hypomnesia is not in itself memory, it affects memory and hypothesizes it in
its
very inside. That is the effect of this pharm akon. ... The pharm akon  is that 
dangerous supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to 
do without it yet lets itself a t once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and 
replaced, completed by the very trace through which the present increases 
itself in the act of d i s a p p e a r i n g .433
This allows Derrida to conclude that because living memory is finite, writing is
necessary because the existence of hypomnesis inside anamnesis inscribes an
originary level of violence -  a disruption of life by the non-living -  right at the heart
of life itself. This relationship is a violent, though an unavoidable one. With regard
for the process of bearing witness and my discussion of singularity, truth is defined as
the re-enactment of repetition, as the always singular evocation of the performative
translation of memory into language/writing/the supplement.
falling out with derrida
A point of contention within Derrida’s oeuvre is a certain ultra-theoretical 
setting up of the singular (addressed as memory) as unique and authentic while, at 
the same time, making it amenable to being dealt with properly through examples,
4"  D errida , “P lato's Pharm acy,"  135.
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poetry (written language) showcased as the most appropriate among them. There is 
in addition an unambiguous drive toward constructing concepts such as “loss,” 
“mourning,” and “death” as particularly well-suited to be addressed by singular 
linguistic idioms and forms giving the latter the authority to speak for, represent and 
understand better the nature of “subaltern” narratives as nostalgic. What I mean by 
this is that Derrida’s work constructs a certain self-referential, circular framework 
that allows him to set up questions of “loss,” “mourning,” and “death,” for example, in 
such a way as to make them addressable only by singular idioms. These are set up 
rather than as “dilemmas of intelligibility, ”434 as products of an affirmative 
contestation. “The life of language is also the life of specters; it is also the work of 
mourning; it is also impossible mourning.”435
However, the singularity of ‘event’ borne witness to in language is not an a 
priori state but the product of a decision informed not by the “ghost of melancholy” 
but, as Ian Baucom suggests, by the “practice of interest fundamentally at odds with 
disinterested practices central to the emergence of occidental modernity, its universal 
philosophy of history, its theory of justice, its practices of empire and its dreams of a 
universal and homogeneous state of history.”436 Memory, in that sense, becomes a 
supplement, a mimetic tool for the translation and transcription o f ‘event.’
Problems of ‘forgiveness’ and ‘mourning’ cannot function from within an 
internally sublimated aporia that honors the singular while, at the same time, 
signifies the nature of language as universalization. That is, if mourning is also an 
impossible mourning, how can one affirm a democratic politics capable of foreseeing 
a future (agency) without arriving at “a dual allegiance and perpetual uneasiness” for
434 E xcerp t from  R o u n d ta b le  D isc u ss io n  on  th e  leg a cy  o f  J a cq u es D errida  in  M ille n n iu m  34(1): 2 3 7 -2 5 8 .
43n D errida, S o v e r e ig n t i e s  in Q u es tion .  103.
433 B au com , S p e c t e r s  of  the A t la n t ic .  3 0 0 .
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“the decision you arrive at will necessarily be insufficient to the course of that 
oscillatory process of gesturing in both directions?”43?
Take, for example, the following conditional: “If forgiveness forgave only the 
forgivable, then ... the very idea of forgiveness would d i s a p p e a r . ” 4 38  While this 
potentially negative tautological formulation does offer insights into the conditional 
nature of justice as well as into the practical consequences of its paradoxical essence, 
at once yielding justice while producing its own exceptions, one wonders how 
forgiving the unforgivable and then, Derrida’s framework of “undeconstructable 
concern for justice”439 remain at all informative of the nature of justice, forgiveness, 
retribution, and so on. Yet, Derrida calls forth an urgent demand that “today one 
should be able to cultivate linguistic differences without yielding to ideology or to 
state-nationalist or nationalist politics,”440 forecasting justice as the ethical product of 
an ethos of questioning and negotiation, not melancholy. Derrida himself confesses 
in an interview with Richard Kearney: “I have never succeeded in directly relating 
deconstruction to existing political codes and programmes.”441 Does that nullify his 
own programme? Does it discredit his lifelong project of philosophical 
deconstruction? I hope to be able to show that what he does is give us other kinds of 
bearings in addition to those we get from a “programmatic” political science 
approach. For one, Derrida posits justice as the result of a decision that must exclude 
and simplify in order to yield a ruling. That is, it is possible, necessary and real.
Language, serving law through its communicative, factual quality, becomes an
important medium of that decision. Taking lead from this statement and in an
attempt to discuss the process of bearing witness as something which exceeds the
4 3 7  C am p bell, ‘R ou n d ta b le  D isc u ss io n  on  D err id a’s leg a cy ’ M ille n n iu m : J o u r n a l  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  S tu d ie s  
3 4 , n o . 1 (2 0 0 5 ):  2 3 9 .
J a cq u es  D errida. O n C o s m o p o li ta n is m  a n d  F o rg iv e n e s s .  (L on d on : R o u tled g e , 2 0 0 2 a ) , vii.
4 3 9  D errid a , O n C o s m o p o li ta n is m  a n d  F o rg iv e n e s s ,  v iii.
440 D errida, S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u es t io n .  102.
1,1 Q u oted  in C am pbell, “R ou n d tab le  D iscu ssio n , 2 3 9
186
political while it is underwritten by it, as something that is not defined through and 
through by the political and yet, recognizes itself as occurring within the frameworks 
of sovereign power, I wish to examine whether both memory and witnessing are 
perhaps irreducible to empiricist, relativist, postmodernist claims or to themselves.
The extent to which Derrida informs of the paradoxes inherent in every
attempt to make language represent irrefutability alerts us to the tension defining
language at once as communicative and then as unavoidably deconstructive.
To write is not only to know that through writing, through the extremities 
of style, the best will not necessarily transpire ... nor will the transition to 
what transpired always be wilful, nor will that which is noted down always 
infinitely express the universe, resembling and reassembling it. It is also to 
be incapable of making meaning absolutely precede writing: it is thus to lower 
meaning while simultaneously elevating inscription.442
As already discussed, Derrida does seem to fall into an unchecked romanticism
regarding issues of witness, poetry, and singularity. Not only does he privilege
written over spoken language, but he is not Derridean enough first, by not
problematizing singularity in light of the (im)possibilities it offers for political action
and second, by still attempting to oppose, against the deconstructive logic, physical
life to death in the concept of resuscitation. “Because language can be desired but not
appropriated,”
“the idiom is what resists translation, and hence is what seems attached to the 
singularity of the signifying body of language -  or of the body, period -  but 
which, because of such singularity, eludes all possession, any claim of 
belonging to.443
While Derrida’s project is concerned with the question of how  to read texts 
against and despite already existing hegemonic, sovereign and mainstream 
interpretations, it is at the same time informed by an understanding of the modes, 
tropes and criteria of expression most suitable for engaging questions of power, 
transformation, and the political. In other words, Derrida’s making-sense is
-i-'2 D errida , W r i t in g  a n d  D if feren ce ,  10. 
an  D errida, S o v e r e i g n t i e s  in Q u es tion .  101, 102.
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underwritten by a poetic sensitivity that, though informed by an intuitive grasp of 
differance, nonetheless creates its own universe. The end goal of this kind of 
thinking, like the end goal of philosophy, is to be secured, though the kind of security 
I am referring to here is informed by the contingency of chance and luck: au hasard.
My engagement with Paul Celan alerted to the negative outcomes of linking
poetry to philosophy. Writing at the limit of language, Celan comments on the
representative potential contained within historic singularity. The latter was
recognized as “acausal discontinuity” that “cannot be expected or objectified,”444
meaning that to anticipate a representational faculty in poetry’s relationship to the
singular means to romanticize poetry and history by ignoring their tendency to
discipline, control and naturalize. They are informed by an indebtedness to each
other that, if and when unrecognized, is the kind of omission that precludes a
relationship between, for example, poetry and the social sciences. Thinking about the
relationship between history and memory, Dominick LaCapra has argued that
Absence and loss could not form a binary in that the opposite of absence is 
presence and that of loss is gain. ... The problem, which cannot be formulated 
in binary terms, is the mutual interaction and marking of presence/absence 
and gain/loss in what Derrida terms a larger economy, and the difficult issue 
is to elaborate the distinctions that do not function as binaries or sheer 
opposites.445
Because the singular as historical, temporally-specific occurrence is non-reproducible 
but only repeatable, it remains singular only in the moment of its taking place which 
is not to say that an experiential event, because it happens only ‘once,’ is random, 
unexpected, and marked by its fleeting presence. Derrida’s insistence on the role of 
language for the communication of meaning, his recognition of the aporetic nature of 
all enunciation, and his subsequent entrusting of poetry with the task of speaking for 
the singular make certain things follow.
" '  Clark, The P oe t ic s  o f  S in g u la r i t y ,  3.
*->■’ LaCapra, W r i t in g  H is to r y ,  W r i t in g  T r a u m a ,  4 8  (ftn . 6).
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First, singularity in language is best addressed through the singular idioms of 
poetic language. Second, bearing witness can only ever approximate a singular event 
by engaging it in authentic ways that, in turn, yield unique and novel information. 
Third, memory (as access to a past event) works by establishing a connection between 
a theoretically-informed ontology and a factually-constructed singularity. As a result, 
this thesis posits that there are important implications that Derrida’s thought on 
singularity, iterability, reading and witness has for the ways in which being is 
experienced by those who live the political (everyday). To this end I offer the 
following hypothesis: Rooted in the historical nature of politics, the singular is 
inescapable.
the  linguistic tu rn , fo rm alist beliefs and the "gu aran tee  of meaning"
There can’t be any doubt about it any longer: the struggle 
against ideology has become a new ideology. (Bertold Brecht)
The positivist ontology of the realist project within academic international 
relations has been, for a long time now, underwritten by a number of foundational 
dichotomies and dualisms “which distinguish what is ... real from what is merely 
ephemeral and superficial (i.e. subject/object, theory/practice, fact/value, domestic- 
inside/international-outside, and egoism-ethics).”446 The appeal is to a sovereign 
center that gives a sense of order, truth, meaning and certainty, a sovereign center 
that becomes the se lf-re feren tia l product of its own illusory attachments. The 
ontological commitment of Political Realism to the centrality of “the sovereign state” 
posits the relationship between units as competitive, strategic and power-maximizing 
through orderly, self-interested methods of explaining reality. In an anarchic 
international environment, states exist in a system of self-help that obliges them to
•«6 J im  G eorge. “R ea list E th ics ,’ In tern ation a l R ela tio n s an d  P o st-M o d e r n ism .” M ille n n iu m : J o u r n a l  o f  
I n te r n a t io n a l  S tu d ie s  2 4 , n o .2 ( i 9 9 5 ) : 19 9 -
f '7 R ichard  A sh ley . “L iving on B o r d er lin es” In I n te r n a tio n a l/T n te r te x tu a l R e la t io n s , ed ited  b y  J a m es  
d cr D orian  and M ich ael Shap iro . (M assach u setts: L ex in gton , 1989): 2 3 0 -3 1 .
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care for their own survival by making sure they have sufficient material capabilities to 
guarantee the security of their grand narratives.
Whether major war is caused by the desire of a declining state to overt its 
further declined48 by disruption of the balance of power in a dyadic balancing 
system ,449 by one state’s claim to hegemony,450 by industrialization of a rising state or 
by the perceptions of leaders regarding threatening behaviors on the part of their 
opponents,451 the starting and ending assumptions point to “the state” as the subject 
of international politics.
In light of my criticism of the prevailing opposition of fact to fiction, science to 
narrative, truth to speculation, an insistence on problematizing the relationship 
between language and fact should not come as a surprise. If we accept that one is 
always implicated in questions of language use, that the subject of IR is written and 
owes its existence to an engagement with language, then certain things follow, 
drawing attention to the ways in which things, events and people are represented 
with attention not for their differences, but for the ways in which differences 
compliment and inform similarities. While the positivist insistence on “good social 
science” situates the subject(s) of its inquiry amidst an engagement with language 
that has already been decided upon in favor of replicability, “the paradoxes of 
postmodernism work to instruct us in the inadequacies of totalizing systems and of 
fixed institutional boundaries (epistemological and ontological) .452
If we recognize that language is not neutral, then the implications for doing 
research become as important as any conclusions drawn, namely, that (poetic)
448 D ale C. C op elan d . The O r ig in s  o f  M a jo r  W a r . (Ith aca , NY: C ornell U n iversity , 2 0 0 1 ) .
449 S te p h en  W alt. The O r ig in s  o f  A llia n c e s . (Ith aca , NY: C ornell U n iversity , 1 9 9 0 ).
450 R ob ert G ilp in . W a r a n d  C h a n g e  in W o r ld  P o litic s . (C am bridge: C am bridge U n iv ersity , 2 0 0 3 ) .
4-^  S tep h en  V an Evera. C a u ses o f  W a r . (Ith aca , NY: C ornell U n iversity , 2 0 0 1 ).
4.^ H u tc h e o n , A P oet ic s  o f  P o s tm o d e r n i s m .  2 24 .
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language “is experimental, consciously manipulating semiotica in speech and writing 
for meaningful effects in an effort to say new things, old things in new ways, special 
things about Being-in-the-World.”453 Contrary to a desire for an objective closing in 
upon signifieds and not signifiers, the “linguistic turn” alerts to the fact that language 
is open to accidents that do not and cannot participate in a logic that exceeds the very 
thing language thinks “within its closure.”454 i n that sense, both writer and the 
written subject are inevitable bearers of statecraft which implies that power is 
inherent in any engagement with language. Being aware of different ways of reading, 
interpreting and using language is only one way of dethroning dominant power- 
constructions. Subsequently, even mainstream, positivist international relations has, 
despite its truth-hysteria, acknowledged the fact that the subject of politics is a 
written subject and as such, a signature of talk and text.
What this realization does is bear witness to the tension between the 
discipline’s desire to be enlightened and the singular nature of the experiences of 
those who live the political.455 In that sense, the kind of linguistic turn that has been 
underwritten by mainstream IR has remained a monolithic turn that, rather than 
acknowledge the specific idioms that inform an engagement with ordinary 
experiences has, for the most part, endorsed a meta-theoretical privileging whose 
short-sighted nature has failed to follow through with the implications of the idea 
that “how something is expressed enables certain meanings while construing others 
... dem onstrating] alternative conceptions of the relation between space, time and 
identity by highlighting the relation between form and content.”456 In that sense, 
memory as a mediator of past experience becomes singularly important as the site of 
the possibility of bearing witness with attention to the ‘linguistic turn.’
453 B rady, “In D e fe n se  o f  th e  S e n su a l,” 6 2 8 .
454 D errida , A c ts  o f  L ite r a tu re ,  81.
455 A  m o re  in d ep th  e n g a g em en t w ith  th e  refu gee  w ill b e  th e  su b ject o f  th e  n ex t ch ap ter.
155 P rem  K um ar R ajaram  and Carl G rundy-W arr. “T h e Irregular M igrant as H om o S a cer .” In te r n a tio n a l
M i g r a t i o n  4 2 , 110.1 (2 0 0 4 ):  2 0 3 .
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What is more, “A necessary condition for memory is ‘forgetfulness’ -  if 
memory were complete, it would not be memory but something else. ”457 With any 
discussion of memory comes also the concern for practices and discourses of 
memorialisation, an issue that will be taken up later in this chapter. Jenny Edkins 
has shown that questions of how, why and what we remember all have important 
implications for narratives whose content often reinforces state agendas. Memory is, 
thus, a political activity of the present and, as such, can both aid and depoliticize our 
engagement with the past. Memory as opposed to history, Pierre Nora argues, is 
“alive, evolving, negotiated and belongs to the present and to particular groups.”458
Memory’s incalculability and frequent historical inaccuracy contribute rather
than to the unreliability of fact, to the dynamic, disorganized nature of history itself
that informs the relationship between the political implications of archiving and
questions of doing research. In that sense, historical analysis based on discontinuity
and difference is not “a murdering of history”459 but rather, after Michel Foucault,
what is being bewailed with such vehemence is not the disappearance of 
history, but the eclipse of that form of history that was secretly, but entirely 
related to the synthetic activity of the subject; what is being bewailed is the 
‘development’ (devenir) that was to provide the sovereignty of the 
consciousness with a safer, less exposed shelter than myths, kinship systems, 
languages, sexuality, or desire.460
The problematic, often double, sometimes even multiple nuances to memory point to 
the linguistic foundations of subjectivity and to the inherently heterogeneous nature 
of every singularity, of every story told as history.
When faced with the task of translating memory either as truth or as fiction, 
one recognizes the inherent ethical implications these choices hold. “For many
457 E d k in s, P o s ts tr u c tu r a l is m  a n d  In te r n a t io n a l  R e la tio n s , 72.
458 Q u o ted  in E d k in s, T ra u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s , 31.
4'  ^ H u tc h e o n , A  P o e tic s  o f  P o s tm o d e rn is m , 159.
400 M ichel F oucault. The A r c h a e o lo g y  o f  K n o w le d g e .  (N ew  York: P an th eon , 1972), 14.
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people the issue about memory is one about truth or falsehood. Something happened 
in the past: how accurately do we remember what happened? ... Both sides of the 
debate share the assumption that the past is determinate. It is over, and what 
happened happened, independent of our memory of it. The past exists prior to 
memory in this understanding.”461 Rather, memories can be viewed as “slices of 
truth”462 that always exist and take their lead from a multi-dimensional universe.
Within mainstream IR, the discourse goes something like an Aesop fable, 
where a concealed sense of the allegorical guides interpretation. Character roles are 
clearly drawn out and their interactions structured so as to move closer to an end in 
service of purposive truth. It is important to recognize that no academic is immune 
to the telling of fables and that gate-keeping is just as much a part of mainstream as it 
is of critical scholarship. The search for irrefutable conclusions through the tools of 
quantitative confirmation is, contrary to what positivist scholars claim, very much a 
theoretical endeavor. The totalizing gestures that characterize the search for 
knowledge and the theoretical schools of thought that claim scientific validity are, in 
fact, as far away from explaining (our known) Reality as is any writer of (science) 
fiction, especially since postmodern thought from Foucault, to Baudrillard, to Lacan, 
to Derrida has shown that relationships between subject and object, theory and 
practice, history and reality are first of all productive and only then representational.
As already argued in my engagement with Paul Celan, dismissing non- 
scientific approaches has not substantially improved IR’s understanding of the stories 
told and lived by its subjects. My engagement with Derrida made clear the dangers of 
romanticizing the potential of language to offer renewal, but what about a similar
161 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  Po li t ics ,  33 .
162 Brady, “In D efen se  o f  th e  Sensual,"  6 2 9 .
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concern regarding a romantic appeal to scientific reliability?4^  Allow me, in a 
preliminary response, to suggest that while fact-dependent research provides a 
preliminary understanding of the ‘big picture” of peoples, cultures, and modes of 
being in the world, it does not possess all the tools (ethical or methodological) to 
encompass, construct or reduce the former to the stuff of generalizing conclusions. 
Social scientists, in short, are poor story-tellers for wanting to select for objectivity, 
“laundering ... experience to isolate the ‘facts’ of the matter at hand, and of course, 
taking a hard right turn away from the poets on writing and other forms of reporting 
... results.”464 The relationship between this kind o f ‘reporting’ and bearing witness 
will be viewed as a political question.
the  post-m odern  c e n te r  or, on the n a tu re  of productive d ifference
Assumptions about literature involve assumptions about language 
and about meaning, and these in turn involve assumptions about 
human society. The independent universe of literature and the 
autonomy of criticism are illusory. (Catherine Belsey)
As Ivan Brady confesses in relation to the programmatic nature of 
ethnography (and most social scientific enquiry), “the unfinalizability of ethnography 
is not so much a problem of unknowables. The overriding problem is plural 
“knowabilities” and the frustration of choosing among them. (Or having someone 
choose for you, someone or some institution with the power to enforce the choice, 
say, society, for example. Or the Taliban. Or your department head).”46s If there is 
one thing that the linguistic turn makes apparent, it is the fact that writing is always 
unsettling if only because one has to privilege certain stories and subjects over others. 
Though the latter might not be reduced so much anymore to “simplistic modeling
4&3 For a lis t  o f  ex em p la ry  m eth o d o lo g ica l and  em p irica l tex ts  on  th e  su b ject, refer to  an y  g iv en  sy llab u s  
from  a c la ss o n  R ea lism  as ta u g h t in m o st N orth  A m erican  u n iv ersit ie s . K ing, K eoh an e an d  V erb a’s 1994  
tex t(b o o k ) on  q u a n tita tiv e  so c ia l sc ie n c e  research  is a sta u n ch  rep resen ta tiv e  in its fam ily .
^  Brady, “In D e fe n se  o f  th e  S en su a l,” 6 3 0 .
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techniques and scientific representations of utilitarian, rational action,”466 they are 
nevertheless reduced, by positivist and critical scholars alike, to a totalizing iteration.
If, in academia, “language alienates us from everyone except ourselves”467 and 
“if language is central to being human”468 “as the means by which meaning is 
exchanged, created and recreated,”469 then it is important to recognize that all 
linguistic engagement with the world has the potential to reduce by making 
exemplary the sum total of its possible engagements. In other words, any threat of 
dissidence has the potential to colonize difference. IR has moved, if not all the way 
around its axis of reference, at least so far as recognizing that there is no such thing as 
a homogenous community of subjects. On the other hand, “To be a structuralist is 
first to concentrate on the organization of meaning, on the anatomy and idiosyncratic 
balance, the completion of each moment, each form; and it is to refuse to relegate 
everything that is not comprehensible as an ideal type to the status of aberrational 
accident. The pathological itse lf... cannot be understood as the deficiency, defect, or 
decomposition of a beautiful, ideal totality.”470
Derrida alerts to the fact that the violence inherent in hospitality is, every 
time, conditioned on that same hospitality, informed by distrust for alterity and a 
suspicion of difference as such. In other words, “It is only ever possible to extend 
hospitality to the other while at the same time, scandalously and paradoxically 
sacrificing all the others to whom it is also necessary to respond.”471 In this sense, 
Derrida’s aporetic inclination recognizes the paradoxical nature of all political 
interactions and exchanges.
466 G eorge, ’’R ea list E th ics ,” 215.
467 R o x a n n e  D oty. “M alad ies o f  O ur Souls: Id en tity  and  th e  V o ice  o f  W riting  in A ca d em ic  In tern ation a l  
R e la t io n s” C a m b r id g e  R e v ie w  o f  In te r n a t io n a l  A f fa ir s  17, n o  3 (2 0 0 4 ):  8 .
468 P rem  K um ar R ajaram . “T h e Sp ectacle  o f  D e te n tio n .” W o rk in g  P a p e r  S e r ie s  n o . 7 (A sia  R esearch  
In stitu te , 2 0 0 3 ) ,  2 0 2 .
469 R ajaram , “T he S p ecta c le  o f  D e te n tio n ,” 2 0 4 .
r " D errida, W r itin g  a n d  D ifferen ce , 26 .
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International relations has the potential to recover the singular nature of 
experience through novel ways of engaging and reporting on the subject. I argue that 
truth claims, in addition to being “necessary but not sufficient conditions”472 also 
alert us to the role language plays not only for bearing witness, but for situating 
witnessing within language’s sensual universe. In other words, human “fear, anxiety, 
loneliness, pain, reassurance, solidarity, ambition, confusion, failure, pleasures and 
puzzles of mind” not only inform of and account for the nature of our shared 
Otherness, but are “essential for accounting for life from the perspective of humans 
as sentient beings that are likely to be laundered out of scientific reports.”473
The language of facticity does not correspond to “the search for significance 
that marks the victim’s world.”474 By victims I do not mean only those individuals 
who have undergone traumatic or painful experiences, though their cases do 
represent a clearer distinction between normal and limit experiences. What I am 
suggesting more generally is that no substantive engagement with the wor(l)d is 
possible lest it be guided by a narrative informative by virtue of having its singular 
nature acknowledged.
A (poetic) engagement with the singular nature of experience facilitates a 
working through trauma and loss without defining the latter as hypothetical. A 
“politics of singular novelty” recognizes that the experience of the impossible (i.e., 
limit experiences) is not dismissible through normatively informed reasoning but 
opens up a space for working through the ethical, juridical and sociopolitical tensions 
inherent in studying and representing the everyday. Moreover, while “the whole 
issue of how one narrates the dissolution of the very possibility of narration is a
472 LaC apra, W r itin g  H is to r y ,  W r itin g  T ra u m a , xii.
B rady, “In D efen se  o f  th e  S e n su a l,” 6 3 0 .
474 V een a  D as. The W o r d  a n d  th e  W or ld .  (N ew  D elh i: Sage, 1 9 8 6 ), 7.
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fascinating one,”47s it also asks that we put on our critical hat whenever faced with a 
grand narrative voice.
singularity  Df political novelty
One of the fundamental postmodern acts is the opening up once again 
of the question of where the domain of the arts should be, how they 
abut on the social and natural sciences. (David Antin)
As has been tellingly pointed out by Asja Szafraniec in her recent book, 
Beckett, Derrida, and the Event o f Literature, “Since the singular is never given as a 
fact, object, or existing thing, there is nothing in a work that would be absolutely 
singular.”476 Nick Vaughan-Williams summarizes Derrida somewhat differently, 
suggesting that “For singularities to be genuinely singular they cannot be described as 
anything else that would compromise their singularity. Yet, as soon as any given 
singularity is identified as a singularity, it has to be, even in a very minimal way, like 
something -  or indeed everything -  else.”477 Singularity, then, becomes reified when 
viewed as manifestations of being in the world. While a commitment to responsible 
decision-making involves, for Derrida, recognition of the singular nature of all beings 
(human as well as non-human), it also demands that one conceive of a politics of 
singularity by going beyond a political defined by a system of nation-states.
This, paired with Jacques Derrida’s insistence on literature’s formalizing 
ability, leads me to suspect that for Derrida, the singular is achieved (realized) only 
when it appears (is given) as fact: be it a date, a name, a signature, a word of text, a 
mark. It is perhaps useful to remind the reader of Derrida’s famous statement that 
there is nothing outside the text. His “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” might perhaps be 
translated better as “there is no outside-text” which avoids the implication that
475 D as, T he W o r d  a n d  th e  W o r ld ,  2 0 6 .
i"6 S zafran iec , B eck e t t ,  D e r r id a ,  a n d  th e  E v e n t  o f  L i t e r a tu r e ,  2 0 .
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everything is just language and nothing else. “Derrida’s denial of the transcendental 
signified is not a denial of reference or a denial of any access to extra-textual reality. 
However, it is meant to suggest that meaning can be derived only from within texts 
through deferral, through differance.”^  Language is not just a tool for the 
dissemination of information, but lives at the core of the ontico-ontological difference 
between the theory of ‘event’ and the history/study of events as process-driven 
practices that produces evidence, knowledge and specific implications for action; 
between writing as producing memory and neutralizing ‘living memory.’
The question, posited in my discussion of Paul Celan, remains the following 
one: how does one speak of this dual nature of the event (of writing)? My preliminary 
answer: by engaging the singular nature of event and problematizing “the political” 
by way of novel linguistic engagements, reporting both on scientific facticity and on 
singular historicity. While truth claims are important for an engagement with the 
world, they are “neither the only nor always the most important consideration in art 
and its analysis. Of obvious importance are poetic, rhetorical, and performative 
dimensions ... which not only mark but also make differences historically.”479
In a sense, then, it is the poetic elements contained in every narrative that 
help turn a list into a story. Language and writing more specifically are poetic not 
because they supplement content, but because they are creative in addition to being 
analytic and declarative and thus, avoid “the artificial distancing in thought and 
writing that characterizes scientific endeavors, and tied as they are to individual 
perceptions and meanings that help to calculate both our individual personas and our 
raveling to the others in an out of our own Made Worlds.”480
978 H u tc h e o n , T he P o e tic s  o f  P o s tm o d e rn is m ,  149.
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However, that does not mean that narrative automatically makes things ‘real’ 
or ‘whole.’ Documents are neither inert nor fixed traces of the past in that they 
problematize the ways in which we relate to, understand, analyze and live the 
present. The facts of history can thus be posited as overtly discursive rather than 
given, teaching that “while all knowledge of the past may be provisional, historicized, 
and discursive, this does not mean that we do not make meanings of that past.”481 
Derrida’s appeal to the resuscitative nature of poetic language can be read as a more 
general appeal to recognize that knowledge cannot but be recovered through the 
interplay of narrative and scientific objectivity.
What that means is that beyond archiving and the tireless work of academics 
‘making something re-appear’ out of the ruins of memories, bearing witness is a 
double challenge to that singular “creative pursuit of which works of literature are an 
outcome.”482 The problem of representing and researching historic events carries 
with itself “the problem of implication, your own implication, your own response, 
begin[s] on the level of naming. ”4g3
theoretical impasse: postm odern and other pains
On the one hand, re-affirming repetition, originality, and differance threatens 
to sentence all inquiries into the past to a field of ‘postmodern fiction.’ On the other 
hand, one is made aware of the heightened and ever so urgent impulse to turn the 
process of representation into a totalizing narrative. Yet, the aporetic nature of 
differance is not exactly the same as playing (in) the middle. The former stipulates a 
philosophical undecidability that characterizes the nature of enunciation while the 
latter, though partially informed by the same undecidability, addresses any 
discussion of the real-life implications of memory to an active process of dual
-i«‘ H u tc h e o n , A  P o e tic s  o f  P o s tm o d e r n is m ,  149.
'82 S zafran iec, B e c k e t t , D e r r id a ,  a n d  the  E v e n t  o f  L i t e r a t u r e . 2 0 .
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recovery: past and future. When recalling the problematic character of traumatic 
memory, for example, it is important to keep in mind that the “middle voice” is not 
necessarily the appropriate way to write trauma especially if the “middle voice” allows 
a going beyond as an over-deterministic scientific reliance on binary opposites.484
What happens when relying on any one modality of addressing painful
memories is that the medium of address ends up institutionalizing the process of
remembering through an insistence on being able to encompass and represent what
is most demanding and truthful about the experience in question. In that sense,
Derrida’s insistence on the resuscitative nature of poetic language suggests that the
literary is endemic to an “authentic” access to truth. Dominick LaCapra has
discussed Derrida’s thought as
an analysis that doesn’t seem to enable other forms of working through -  an 
analysis that somehow /  wants to affirm the necessity of being implicated in 
trauma and yet also wants politics.485
A certain insistence, perhaps an unavoidable one, on the literary work’s 
singularly generalizable nature allows Derrida to make a somewhat effortless 
transition between “bearing witness,” “poetic language,” and “singularity” without 
ever raising the question of memory. “Despite the anti-totalizing aim” of Derrida’s 
writing and because of his focus on a few select concepts (writing, singularity, 
differance), “there is still an essentializing center around which totalities can be 
constructed.”486 The political character of the process of bearing witness, discussed 
from the point of view of no one theory or dialectic figuring of the world, informs of a 
multi-faceted engagement with memory and (historical) event.
484 LaC apra, W r itin g  H is to r y ,  W r itin g  T ra u m a ,  1 9 -2 0 .
4^  LaCapra, W r i t in g  H i s to r y ,  W r i t in g  T r a u m a .  152-3.
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Recall my discussion of the nature of ‘event’ as always taking place in a 
specificity informed by a dual historical and ontological relationship to facticity. 
Beyond enunciation and iterability, neither Derrida nor academic IR provide us with 
an answer to the questions: “Who is doing the witnessing? Who is the aporetic 
witness responsible for recovered singular truths?” Posing and attempting to answer 
these questions should be the foremost concern of political science, since witnessing 
is not an anonymous process and since historical facts cannot automatically be traced 
back to truthful testimony. The Muselmann, too, has a name, though her testimony 
might not always be recoverable under it. The (singular) witness, implied and 
represented in language, subverts language’s own stylistic and institutional laws 
according to an economy of memory. This ‘economy of memory’ dictates the 
possibility that stories are recoverable as well as recovering. An ‘economy of memory’ 
poses as open-ended the relationship between fact, singularity, subject(ivity) and the 
drive for objectively reporting on institutionalized knowledge.
Derrida acknowledges the ethical implications inherent in one’s “relationship” 
to alterity as “the memory of the phantom, of that which is neither dead or living, 
more than dead and more than living, only surviving, the law of the most 
commanding memory, even though it is the most effaced and the most effaceable, but 
for that very reason the most demanding’’^ 87 The figure of the phantom does not 
recover a commitment to justice but becomes symptomatic of an oscillating 
movement between mysticism and messianism, whose reliance on the transcendental 
quality of experience poses justice as an outcome of an (im)possibility. In this sense, 
memory problematizes the proclaimed objectivity of scientific facticity.
Allow me to pause and summarize my discussion so far. First, I introduced 
the question of memory and the implications it had for processes of archivization,
-*iS~ J a cq u es D errida, “Force o f  Law, 11.
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recovery and reporting of facts. The former was shown as instrumental in pointing 
out the correlation between preserving information and the politically-significant 
implications inherent in all forms of institutionalized, fixed memory. The desire for 
factical accountability informing the drive toward accuracy, truth, and progress was 
contrasted with the inconstant, unreliable, non-scientifically verifiable nature of 
memory. This, in turn, opened my discussion to a reading of politics through the 
prism of singularity and the witness. The thought of Jacques Derrida and more 
specifically, a discussion of his particular engagement with the concept of memory, 
pointed out a totalizing tendency in a somewhat romantic Derrida. Singularity, 
rooted in the historical nature of politics and transmitted through the historicity of 
‘event,’ was discussed as inescapable and fundamentally definitive of all political 
inquiries. The fact that traditional political science methodology does not address 
this issue or take its implications for research seriously should not discourage a 
singular reading of politics. To that end, I will supplement my discussion so far with 
a brief engagement with Agamben’s homo sacer as thejuridico-political exception.
cerem onial encoun ters: agam ben and the p re se n c e  of the rem nant
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ 
in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at a concept of history that 
corresponds to this fact. Then we will have the production of the real 
state of exception before us as a task. (Walter Benjamin)
I open this section with a hypothesis: In order to be accessible, the remnant 
must exceed the limit(s) of an exception. As intimated earlier, Giorgio Agamben’s 
thought on bare life singles out an inaccessible “other” and builds upon the latter’s 
silence a theory of the juridico-political exception. The exception, defined by the 
sovereign suspension of law, in turn, gives birth to homo sacer. Unlike Derrida, who 
explores the relationship between the singular nature of ‘event’ and enunciation, 
Agamben’s contributions to an understanding of the relationship between bare life 
and politics begin and end with a self-referential theory of the exception vested in
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narrowly contextualized etymological derivations. His work has, however, been 
central in initiating an academic discussion on the relationship between sovereign 
power, juridically-suspended law (turned norm) and the fragile nature of the human.
Agamben’s corporeal engagement with the juridico-political concept of the 
remnant fails on two fronts. While Agamben seems to engage only hurriedly the 
relationship between the remnant and memory yet, his M usselmanner are the silent 
witnesses. Derrida’s romantic appeal to the saving power of (poetic) language is 
mirrored, in Agamben, by a ‘bio-political’ rendition of an ethical dilemma 
unsupplemented by a closer engagement with language. In an important sense, both 
Derrida and Agamben teach by their omissions about the engagement with the 
question of memory and its rendition as a political concept. In an attempt to 
materialize my critique, I will read Agamben in light of the implications he offers for 
understanding the political.
I will first remind the reader of the main points of contention in Agamben’s 
thought and then, engage the question of memory alongside Agamben’s remnant as 
homo sacer. In Agamben’s oeuvre, the latter is posited as a politically universalizing 
concept not unlike the archive, itself rooted in the institutionalization and control of 
memory. The original problematic of bearing witness will, throughout my discussion, 
help un-sublimate the juridical relationship between trauma and memory by calling 
for a coming to terms with the legacy of limit experiences and the tendency they have 
to lead to philosophical reductionism. The latter will be discussed in light of the 
ceremonial and ritualistic practices of creation and dissemination of information 
underwriting an Enlightenment drive toward progress.
Recall that the central issue in Agamben’s thought on the juridico-political -
the sovereign exception -  bears on the nature of the hum an. In addition to defining
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life as a referent of political power, Agamben intimates that the juridical state of 
exception is indicative of the impossibility of testimony. Thus, not only is ‘normal’ 
law suspended, but so is the linguistic resource giving individual agency. Agamben 
offers a version of sovereign power where the latter self-suspends by suspending the 
law that is its own creation. Sovereignty thus becomes definitive not only of the 
political, but also of the moral and social life of an individual, making the happy life 
“one over which sovereignty and right no longer have hold.”488
In addition to labeling the life of the individual as “bare life,” Agamben makes 
sovereign rule into more than a juridico-political category by endorsing it with the 
power to determine, highlight and/or underwrite the individual drive toward 
achieving a good life. Human beings, read as juridico-political subjects, no longer 
possess the ability to employ, nurture and pass on ways of relating to the world that 
are not entirely informed by their relationship to sovereign power. I am not entirely 
sure that Agamben makes an additional satisfactory connection between bare life and 
politics. The singular nature of memory and bearing witness challenges the 
relationship between the exception (politically informed), the human (bio-politically 
(de)posited) and language (aporetic and directly implicated in the work of memory).
While Agamben may indeed be correct in claiming that “language also holds 
man in its ban insofar as man, as a speaking being, has always already entered into 
language without noticing it,”48? positing language as “something nonrelational” does 
overlook the fact that language, in addition to being defined by what is nonrelational, 
is also the main tool in service of establishing, maintaining and representing political 
as well as human relations. As R.B.J. Walker has suggested, “what is at stake in many 
claims about contemporary transformations ... is that we have become caught up in
i88 A gam b en , M e a n s  W i th o u t  E nd,  115.
->8‘> G iorgio A gam b en . The E n d  o f  the P oem .  (Stan ford , CA: Stanford  U n iversity  P ress, 1 9 9 9 ), 5 o.
204
radically novel forms of norm, as normativity and normalization, and in radically 
novel, and dangerous, forms of exceptionalism . ”490 The latter point is especially 
relevant when considering the implications Agamben’s thought potentially has for 
international relations.
the exception as the source o f sovereign power
Read against traditional sovereign rhetoric, Agamben’s underlying logic does 
not problematize sovereign power as compromised, constructed, and normalizing to 
begin with. In effect, sovereign power becomes independently self-referential and 
without check, challenging itself in order to reaffirm itself where the “state o f  
exception becomes a stable spatial arrangement inhabited by naked life that cannot 
be inscribed into the order. ”491 The latter also manages to create a category of 
identification, i.e. homo sacer, that is posited as a problematic, extra-ordinary 
condition of being without itself casting a shadow on the legitimacy of sovereign 
power as democratic, non-authoritarian. The paradox uncovering the 
interdependent nature of the relationship between governing and governed no longer 
prescribes the same kind of agency for the governed, spoken of as “abandoned,” 
“non-human,” remnants, as Muselmanner, extra-ordinary and in excess of address.
Agamben seems to understand politics as “a sphere of pure means” where the
human is a unit of management rather than a physically and ethically-informed
being. That is why Agamben can say both that “naked life” is the original foundation
of sovereignty and, at the same time, that “naked life has become the dominant form
of life e v e r y w h e r e ” 4 9 * now, making a state of emergency the norm without sounding
self-contradictory or too offensive to critical theorists. It is one thing to say that
“naked life” is the product of the exploitative relationship between rich and poor
•49° R. B. J . W alker. “C on clu sion . S o v ere ig n ties , E xcep tio n s, W o r ld s .” In S o v e r e ig n  L iv e s .  E d ited  by  
J e n n y  E d k in s et al. (N e w  York: R ou tledge , 2 0 0 4 ) ,  2 4 6 .
101 A g am b en , M e a n s  W i th o u t  E nd,  43 .
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nations, but it is a whole other thing to use this in lieu of acknowledging the violent 
implications resulting from having theoretically posited a category of “limit(ed) 
existence.” The anonymous and quotidian nature of the powers that produce ‘naked 
life,’ while informative of the processes underwriting the transparency of much of 
modern political and social interactions, does in effect reduce victims of that violence 
to quotidian and anonymous beings. Did Agamben do this on purpose?
While the figure of the M uselmann posited as the only ‘true’ witness to the 
Holocaust does provide a reference point for a discussion of limit experiences, it also 
defers knowledge and the agency of the subject to an impossible, dead, and a 
negatively-constructed figure. Language, in this sense, or rather ‘being-in-language’ 
becomes “a gigantic loss of memory”493 which is beyond even Benjamin’s apocalyptic 
idea of “pure language” as the unachievable, perfect experience of language. What 
Agamben does not explore is the possibility that in a state o f exception, language as 
“the only one thing ... reachable, close and secure amid all losses” that “had to go 
through its own lack of answers, through terrifying silence, through the thousand 
darknesses of murderous speech”494 has the potential to recover, if not renew the 
relationship between subject and past, suffering and witness, silence and testimony.
Survivors who translate their experiences through what I call “a performative 
reenactment of the past” transcend these differences. The latter refers to every 
instance of engaging a traumatic experience through the lens of linguistic, artistic, 
dramatic or other performative idioms that bear witness to the fact that any 
engagement with the past is a dynamic process making use of performative idioms 
and methodologies. By performative here I mean the active, interchangeable and 
mutually-informative interplay between speaking, writing, psychological and
A gam b en . M e a n s  W i th o u t  E nd ,  6 0 .
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emotional working through, acting out and remembering that go into every example 
of engaging the past.
I would like to suggest that what is particularly interesting about the process 
of bearing witness is that unlike scientific methodologies that aim at a level of 
generality, bearing witness is sustained and defined by ‘micropractices’ necessarily 
different in that they do not as readily privilege one idiom over another. By 
‘micropractices’ I am referring to linguistic, material and/or philosophical idioms 
whose power to address the singular nature of bearing witness is exemplary of the 
latter’s singular nature. What Agamben poses at the state of exception dictated by 
the work of sovereign power relies on a totalizing idiom where the power to challenge 
the exception is denied. In this sense, Agamben’s “juridico-political” and Derrida’s 
“poetic” become two idioms underwriting the world as figured through the interplay 
between philosophy, theory and practice.
Recall again my positing of Agamben’s thought against Veena Das’ concept of 
a ‘descent into the ordinary’ which I found particularly informative when addressing 
the communicable, though problematic, essence of trauma for ordinary people. In 
Das’ discussion of women’s experiences of violence during the 1947 India-Pakistan 
partition, healing is achieved and subjectivity restored not through silence but by 
physically taking on the same world that was the very bystander to inflicted violence. 
Das allows for transference between memory and testimony to take precedence over 
the silence of dead or dead-like human beings. Rather than focus on what is 
terrifying and unspeakable, the women Das studies explore their world through 
“micropractices” such as sewing, cooking, tending the house, re-marrying, child­
bearing, story-telling, singing, writing, crying.
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These practices teach of an everyday “politics of singular novelty” informed by 
a desire to sustain, resist and creatively work through suffering, pain and violence. 
What Das does in addition is translate her observations into similarly creative, multi­
faceted, novel idioms of academic research. Agamben’s quasi-sacrificial, unspeakable 
rendition of the Holocaust atrocities keeps him from engaging traumatic experiences 
as communicable, narratable instances of being alive. The result is a theoretically- 
derived unwillingness to allow for working through painful experiences. Agamben’s 
remnants turn into documentary knowledge and their silenced testimonies neither 
“attempt to understand experience and its aftermath /  including the role of memory 
and its lapses” nor come “to terms with ... the past.”495
The privileging in Agamben’s thought of “limit experiences” and the fact that 
actual Holocaust testimonies do exist, pose as impossible the creation of a critically- 
informed, politically-responsible public sphere. Agamben’s discussion forecloses any 
attempt to represent and/or transcend an unrepresentable singularity. He suggests 
that testimony “concerns the subject’s capacity to have or not to have language,”496 in 
which way “the subject is thus the possibility that language does not exist, does not 
take place -  or, better, that it takes place only through its possibility of not being 
there, its contingency.”497 In drawing up a self-referential theory of the exception 
informed by its very own product (homo sacer), Agamben suspends the greater 
political relevance of his discussion of the “exception” vis-a-vis bearing witness.
What makes homo sacer even more problematic is the fact that, as the 
materialization of the state o f exception, the former allows Agamben to state the 
following: “Life and law, anomie and nomos, auctoritas and potestas, result from the 
fracture of something to which we have no other access than through the fiction of
495 LaCapra, W r itin g  H is to r y , W r it in g  T ra u m a , 8 6 , 87 .
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their articulation and the patient work that, by unmasking their fiction, separates 
what it has claimed to unite. ”498 The kind of political singularity exemplified in the 
responsibility to speak must be extended beyond a juridical prescription predicated 
upon the human as bare life in a state o f exception.
excess and the rem nant
Agamben seems fascinated with a philosophy of the excess. The figure of the
remnant, however, must exceed the limit experiences that inform it. Otherwise it
remains an abstraction that not only erases the possibility for testimony but also
challenges the notion of remembering as such, reducing it to an endless ceremonial
evocation and mock-recreation of an untouchable past. Put otherwise, one has to
undergo the temptation of the excess in order to be able to “relate excess to legitimate
limits (or desire to desirability) which is the ethical problem. ”499 i n Agamben, the
impossible interaction between language and the ‘limit event’ turns into a ceremonial
encounter destined to remain locked in and defined by a circle of human misery.
Despite its clear and present danger, the value of the notion of 
unrepresentable excess is to foreground the problem of the possible ties and 
limits of both representation and dialogic exchange in responding to, or 
coming to terms with, events of the Shoah (as well as other limit events in 
history). And it simultaneously raises the question of the relations between 
research, memory, and what limits them.s00
Derrida’s rendition of the relationship between poetry’s resuscitative potential 
and the work of mourning revealed a failure to discuss actual physical death.
Likewise, Agamben’s remnants become non-definable, sublimated products of a 
legitimized sovereign power they can neither move beyond nor ignore. A ‘politics of 
singular novelty’ recognizes that these very subjects, no matter how dejected, 
miserable, reducible, tortured, and speechless might be can speak for themselves 
regardless of the theoretical limits set before them.
-198 A ga m b en , The S t a t e  o f  E x c e p t io n ,  8 8 .
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ra ttling  laws
But now shrinks the place where you stand:
Where now, stripped by shade, will you go?
Upward. Grope your way up.
Thinner you grow, less knowable, finer.
Finer: a thread by which 
it wants to be lowered, the star: 
to float farther down, down below 
where it sees itself gleam: in the swell 
of wandering words.s01
I would like to direct the reader’s attention to the question of archiving again. 
An insistence on making known, on coming out and revealing one’s experiences, 
thoughts, feelings, and past can, even when aiding reconciliation and healing, turn 
into a compulsive obsession with unearthing, excavating, and re-building bastions of 
knowledge. What this means is that witnessing is also and always necessarily 
underwritten, despite its performative nature, by a desire for revelation bordering on 
the sublime. Certain things follow from this realization: First, bearing witness, in its 
communicative, informative but also performative, and singular nature provides the 
researcher with multiple tools for the study of human experiences. These tools allow 
the use of metaphoric, idiomatic, allegorical, and fragmentary idioms without having 
to fall within the boundaries of disciplinal methodologies. Meaning is not better 
accommodated by a fragmentary engagement with language; ellipsis and half-hearted 
metaphors do not address better language’s inability to contain all meaning, nor do 
they respect the responsibility incumbent upon writing to become a decision. The 
idioms within language that the linguistic turn draws our attention to, if they are to 
be engaged responsibly and fully, require that one follow through with the choices 
one makes in writing all the way to the unexplored territory of political singularity.
As I have tried to show so far, neither philosophy, nor literature, nor poetry, 
nor political science on their own address just how theoretically rich, metaphorically- 
enlightening, novel, and politically latent the issue of bearing witness is. The
."i°> C elan, P o e m s o f  P a u l C e lan . 69 .
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implication here is not that one should substitute bombs with poetry or abandon 
grammar and structural coherence altogether in trying to answer the question: “What 
is politics after the linguistic turn?” The issue is, rather, one of exposing the nostalgia 
to totality guiding political science inquiries, both positivist and critical, especially 
since (singular) writing has not been engaged beyond a romantic appeal to the 
undecidability and aporia  of fragments.
Second, because the process of bearing witness is informed by uncontrollable, 
unpredictable, non-verifiable sources (memory, traumatic violence), so are its 
assumptions and conclusions likewise conditional, open to revision, and contingent 
on an understanding of truth and progress that is post-truth and post-progress. On 
the one hand, the power to regulate and discipline (the subject of political inquiry) 
poses the question of issuing forth, at any time, a responsibility whose origin is 
necessarily neither theoretical nor empirical, neither singular nor universal. On the 
other hand, a singular experience of language, because of its resistance to being 
translated, substituted or summarized, bears witness to the responsibility that law, 
language and politics alike have for engaging life as the singular expression of those 
who live the political everyday. An engagement with bearing witness teaches that if it 
is to serve life, itself final, fragmentary and experimental, language must be more 
than swearing or truth telling and law, in the moment of its suspension, must be 
exposed to its own performative limits. Such a suspension relocates responsibility 
from fixed systems of knowledge toward the unfolding of different intentions toward 
language.
What is the nature of this language since already it no longer belongs, no 
longer belongs simply, either to the question or to the response whose limits 
we have just verified and are continuing to verify? Will one call this a 
testimony ... providing that it can never be reducible, precisely, to verification, 
to proof or to demonstration, in a word, to knowledge?5°2
so- Derrida, P oin ts .  22 -3 .
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If “powers are themselves written, articulated performances based upon the 
circulation and withholding of knowledges in an inscribed manner,”503 then any 
theory claiming to explain the world using a system of talking, writing, coding, re­
coding, talking and writing again, turns writing into an archive from policy to culture.
This suggests that if the irreducible singularity of each example is derived 
from exemplarity itself, if there is always a universalizing dimension to any 
engagement with language, then the exemplarity (universality) of the law “articulates 
itself as an obligation to decision. ”5°4  Justice becomes a question of unavoidable 
choices implying ethical as well as political obligations to bearing witness to these 
choices that, in making them, also make us. For Agamben to say that “In the case of 
homo sacer, a person is simply set outside human jurisdiction without being brought 
into the realm of divine law,”505 he must also presuppose that divine law holds a kind 
of precedence over human law that not only defines but also revokes identity.
“If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is 
perhaps because we are all virtually homines s a c r i”506 This should not leave us 
content. The death of the witness not only compromises but also sabotages the 
project of reconciliation. Rather than challenge the silence and complacency borne 
out of the Holocaust, Agamben underwrites the former not only theoretically and by 
honoring the “exception,” but also through a juridico-political universe. Allow me to 
suggest that when reading sovereign power against the experience of being human in 
the world, it is important to make the distinction between, for example, refugees and 
non-refugees, camp inmates and bystanders, victims and sympathetic listeners, for 
there is something unique in the experience of being a refugee that is not the same as
503 W olfrey s, The D e r r id a  R e a d e r ,  14.
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being defined by the power of the sovereign exception. Thus, the ontology of being a 
refuge becomes reified by treating the time and place of the specific event of 
displacement as something that can be appropriated in service of theory.
Discussing witnessing through the figure of an impossible witness, Agamben 
does not quite situate his discussion within the domain of publicly accessible 
memory, important in that “Accurate m em ory... including memory that confronts 
the traumatic dimensions of history, is ethically desirable in coming to terms with the 
past both for the individual and for the collectivity.”507 In a way, Agamben’s witness 
remains thinkable only in the context of limit experiences that, in turn, not only 
romanticize trauma but also make witnessing conditioned on the moment of violence.
In order to create a clearer picture of Agamben’s relationship to ordinary life, 
in my next and last chapter, I will ask the following question: Does the refugee exist 
beyond the juridical as a homo sacer? For what Agamben does by creating the 
category of homo sacer is institute a theoretical species of human being that helps 
make thinkable the violence, cruelty, and sheer beastliness of normal people doing 
things from behind the mask of orders, exceptions, weakness, survival, or madness. 
This extra-ordinary human being ends up helping to theorize a politics of the event 
constituted by a totally new breed of sovereigns.
Allow me to conclude my engagement with Agamben by briefly engaging his 
concept of the “inclusive exclusion” in light of the question of a “politics of singular 
novelty.” If Agamben is correct in saying that (natural) life (zoe) is included in the 
polis by means of an exclusion blurring the difference between zoe and bios, then 
what we are left with is an intimation that politics is the place where life has to 
transform itself into good life and where what has to be politicized were always
LaCapra, W r i t in g  H i s t o r y , W r i t in g  T r a u m a .  96.
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already bare life. Agamben almost fetishizes the real-life implications of historic
events by making homo sacer into a monist theoretical category of identity.
Dominick LaCapra addresses Agamben’s treatment of “sacred man” and its
implications for the practice of politics and historiography in the following manner.
The result is an overly reduced, analytic idea of the (impure) sacred divorced 
from ambivalence (which Agamben explicitly rejects and sees as 
‘mythologeme’). This one-sided conception of the sacred in its application 
to the Holocaust inserts the latter into one more variant of modernization 
theory in which the Holocaust becomes the culmination and paradigm of 
modernity. It also coincides with an often exaggerated emphasis on confined, 
positivistic, relatively antiseptic notions of biology, medicalization, and 
eugenics, which in Agamben are coordinated with a Foucauldian notion of 
biopower and biopolitics.... It does not account for Nazi quasi-ritual horror at 
contamination, elation in victimization, regeneration or redemption through 
violence, fascination with extreme transgression, and equivocation or even at 
times ambivalence with respect to the Jew.508
Agamben’s remnant rejects the singularity of event by attempting to reduce it 
to a definition of the “sovereign exception ... [as] the figure in which singularity is 
represented as such, which is to say, insofar as it is unrepresentable.”509 The category 
of ‘inclusive exclusion’ allows Agamben to suggest that what cannot be spoken about 
is outside of language which, we saw with Paul Celan, was not the case. Though one 
cannot say that Celan is the prototypical survivor one can, however, assert that he is 
exemplary of what it means to be a survivor. Not so with the remnant. In addition to 
being silenced the remnant, set outside the law, is abandoned, “that is, exposed and 
threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become 
indistinguishable.”510 What this suggests for a “politics of singular novelty” is that, in 
an important sense, the question of the survivor as an authoritative witness takes us 
back to a politics demonstrating a different intention toward language: one that bears 
witness to a singularity of enunciation that is not verifiable until engaged in itself.
s°8 LaC apra, W r itin g  H is to r y , W r itin g  T ra u m a ,  127 (ftn  # 1 4 ).
501) A g a m b e n ,  H o m o  S a c e r ,  24 .
510 A g a m b e n ,  H o m o  S a c e r ,  28 .
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being in flight
There is no identity with is ‘self-identical’ ...
all identity is fundamentally ambiguous. (Etienne Balibar)
If, in search of one’s bearings, one has to come up with a case eventually, a 
question comes to mind as to whether refugees are an exemplary case for thinking the 
moment of being in flight? If iterability is “the necessary repeatability of any item  
experienced as meaningful, which at the same time can never be repeated exactly 
since it has no essence that could remain unaffected by the potentially infinite 
contexts (within contexts) into which it could be grafted,”511 then the universality that 
being in flight entails is always contained in the millions of individual bodies that the 
historical figure of the refugee evokes, and vice versa. In its singularity, the refugee 
represents a paradoxical figure set against the background of political theorizing. If 
“the fragment can only be approached by a discourse without recourse to power,”512 
then the refugee can only be approached by a theory without recourse to closure. The 
encounter of the refugee with political science makes for an interesting dilemma: 
either the singularity of the refugee has to be given up in service of a meta-theory, or 
the controlling instinct of academic scholarship itself must be rethought.
Thus far, I have argued that if we took the “language turn” seriously, then a 
continuous insistence on interrogating the relationship between the singular and the 
historical is in order. What this suggests for bearing witness, itself conditioned on 
relating remembering to linguistic enunciation to a singular event, is that no single 
idiom can claim extra-ordinary representational power.
In that sense, I argued that the poem engages politics by its insistence on the 
pure taking place of language beyond any prescriptive frameworks. The relationship 
between the subject and language (both in writing and reading) is not a constitutive
D erek  Attridge, “In tro d u ct io n .” In Derrida, A c ts  o f  L ite ra tu re ,  18.
Frey, I n te r ru p t io n s .  33.
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one, that is, language does not represent a subject only to make it knowable (through 
language). Note that the attention here is not on the possibility of language to engage 
knowledge, but on knowledge itself as an end. This means that out of the possible 
referential emptiness (purity) of language, writing produces a subject and since there 
are many different ways of writing, there must also be many different modes of 
subjectivity, or at least ways of being human in some sense or another.513
The issue here is not about teaching Princes how to rule, nor is it about 
mobilizing resistance so that Princes in waiting can take over from Princes in power. 
The issue here is recognizing a mode of writing politics and its subjects that exposes 
and interrogates research/writing differently, an event that addresses being in the 
world through the micro-idiom of bearing witness; a language that neither simply 
represents nor recalls, neither formalizes nor breaks down, neither generalizes nor 
reduces but uncovers the tension underwriting the nature of being human.
Next, I will offer an engagement with “the refugee” in an attempt to 
problematize security and refugee definitions. A teleological view of history will be 
exposed for overlooking the active role that individual human beings play in shaping 
both politics and history. As Nick Vaughan-Williams has suggested, specific 
situations give rise to specific actions that give rise to political decisions,514 informed 
by an understanding of responsibility defined by asking what one should do under 
every single circumstance.515 This situates marginal voices beyond the contested 
space between self and other, citizen and foreigner, and ideas of eternal Kantian 
peace.516 The next chapter will engage the refugee not as a homo sacer, but as a 
singular human being underwriting a desire to out-live security.
5‘3 M ick, th a n k s for form u la tin g  th is  in sig h t for m e.
51-} V a u g h a n -W illia m s, “B eyond  a C osm op olitan  Id ea l,” 117.
5*5 V a u g h a n -W illia m s, “B eyond  a C osm op o litan  Id ea l,” 119.




Refugee voices and vo ice-avers: Dn exile, an um brella, and the 
question: "Who am I a f te r  the  night of the  e s tran g ed ?"
Insects endlessly busy,
horses the color of sun,
donkeys the color of cloud,
clouds, huge rocks that weigh nothing,
mountains like tilted skies,
a flock of trees drinking at the stream,
they are all there, delighted in being there,
and here we are not who are not,
eaten by fury, by hatred,
by love eaten, by d ea th s
I would like to open this chapter with a confession. I believe that one can, 
perhaps, only speak authoritatively about things one has lived through, things one 
has experienced oneself. It is not enough to read about them in a paper, in someone’s 
journal, in a book, on the internet, or learn them in a political science seminar on 
International Relations theory. In light of what will follow and though I did visit a 
Bhutanese refugee camp in the summer of 2003 and though I did work with refugees 
in Phoenix, AZ, I am not a refugee myself nor have I ever had an experience 
approximating in any way the experience of being displaced. The extent to which I 
understand what being a refugee means is, to a great degree, informed by the official 
UNHCR and academic definitions implying homelessness, poverty, joblessness, 
insecurity and the lack of rights (legal or otherwise). The closest I get to knowing 
what it might feel like to be a refugee (a paperless subject defined by an international 
bureaucracy) is being a visa-holding Eastern European living abroad. The closest I 
got to knowing what it felt like to be a powerless foreigner was when accused of being 
an Eastern European prostitute by a Homeland Security Officer at Washington Dulles 
International Airport.
Paz, O ctavio . “R iprap. (7. L an d scap e)” In Selected  Poem s  (T oronto: N ew  D irection s B ooks, 19 8 4 ), 9 -
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But, unlike a refugee, I did speak good English, knew how to defend myself 
against unjust allegations and waited in line with all other non-US citizens rather 
than stand in the special “refugee” queue, often unmanned, very quiet, evoking the 
curious, spectacle-hungry looks of the rest of us. Unlike a refugee, writing and 
thinking about the experience of refugeeness is my only way of understanding, 
sympathizing with, and approaching refugees themselves. Unlike a refugee, I work 
and write with the fashionable demand for ‘durable solutions’518 in mind, chanted 
equally loudly and authoritatively by both academics and practitioners. These 
solutions cannot be “durable” in the same way that they can never be “final” and so 
they will be, in the context of this paper, discussed as ordinary, contingent, and 
informed by the demand for physical survival. Unlike a refugee, even my home away 
from home remains one within a critical academic training pushing and urging me on 
to write, research and speak, for I well know that silence feeds on fear, ethical 
amnesia and the symptoms of materially-informed detachment. I am not a refugee, 
yet allow me to share with you how a non-refugee understands her displaced fellow- 
wo(men).
introducing the  argum ent
The outline of my argument will unfold in three steps. First, I will address the 
nature of being a refugee not simply as a political question informed by the doings 
and concerns of sovereign states, but also as an ethical and a linguistic issue. I will do 
that by showing that while (becoming) a refugee is very much a political problem, 
regardless of the misguided anti-problematic rhetoric endorsed by some critical 
security and displacement scholars, being a refugee transgresses the thinking and 
writing of mainstream politics in important ways. To maintain that refugees are not a 
problem, that defining them as a problem undercuts their humanity, that their
518 T he  three  ‘durable so lut ions'  are voluntary repatriation, integration  in th e  h ost -co u n try  and  
r es e t t lem en t  in a third, usually  deve loped ,  country.
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problematic nature endorses a statist discourse by underwriting regimes of power 
and oppression means to overlook the real-life implications that being displaced has 
both for the individuals and for the nation-states in question. I am sure that asked 
whether being a refugee is problematic for them, all refugees would answer in the 
affirmative. Fine-tuning semantics is not what interests me. Rather, the question 
that engages my research has to do with the ways in which refugees, on their own, 
cope with and understand their predicament in ways that are physically, politically, 
culturally and temporarily different from “official” narratives. The nature of 
displacement, the ways in which we understand and address it as political scientists, 
how it moves us to comport ourselves in the world, does behoove us to examine more 
closely just what the ‘refugee problematique’ uncovers regarding the human nature of 
its subjects. Refugees represent an instance of crisis in the international order if only 
because the latter thinks itself as stable, peace-driven, orderly and law-informed. As 
Nevzat Soguk has pointed out with regard to United Nations’ own conceptualization, 
refugees “are seen as a problem existing prior to international regime activities, while 
the regime activities are represented as solutions to that difficult, morally demanding 
but not intractable problem of the refugee within the otherwise presumably 
unproblematic, stable, and secure territorial bounds of the sovereign state . ”519 It is 
clear that refugees and other liminal beings (the homeless, the immigrant, the 
prisoner, the mentally or physically challenged, the aging) alert us to the fact that the 
international order is defined by a crisis, that it is only envisioned and not actually 
underwritten by security concerns aimed at reducing the degree of uncertainty, 
danger and threat that, in turn, inform the desire for order, law and power. To that 
end, displaced lives will be presented as individually and not institutionally-informed 
ways of, first, exposing and then, out-living the chimera of security.
5|l) N e v z a t  Soguk. S ta te s  a n d  S t r a n g e r s .  (M inneapolis :  U n ivers ity  o f  M in n eso ta  Press, 1 9 9 9 ), 13.
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Second, I engage what I see as a paradoxical positing of the refugee within 
critical academic discourses. In an attempt to offer an in depth critique and being 
aware of the limited space available for me to do that, I will purposefully omit from 
my discussion a close engagement with a number of mainstream security arguments 
relating and relating to displacement. Their assumptions, propositions and 
conclusions will undoubtedly be alluded to in the process of my engagement with the 
critical representations of the refugee within political science after the linguistic turn. 
In this chapter, I take my lead from the work of Dillon, Malkki, Nyers, Rajaram, 
Soguk520 and others whose contributions to the field of critical refugee and security 
studies have helped emancipate the discussion from otherwise totalitarian, 
oppressive, ethically-void, and universalizing tendencies. The latter have posited the 
refugees as an ‘exclusive inclusion’ challenging the self-proclaimed authority of the 
nation-state rhetoric on the one hand while, at the same time, the refugee is still 
spoken of as a silent “category of unfortunates”521 in need of agency, a voice and, most 
importantly, a state. As Soguk has shown, “When the refugee seems to exhibit any 
sign of agency in the discourse, either as some kind of threat or as someone whose 
agency was manifest in her will to drag her body between distances, she hardly ever 
figured as a person but was part of an amorphous mass, faceless and speechless.”522
I will show that refugees possess an (authentic) voice that they use in the 
everyday conducting of their lives, both through language and through their actions, 
and that this voice, unlike its academic counterpart, is not a pre-determined,
520 S ee  D illo n , P o litic s  o f  S e c u r ity ;  D il lo n /T h e  S overeign  and th e  S tran ger,” In E k inds e t al (ed s). 
S o v e r e ig n ity  a n d  S u b je c t iv i ty  (B ou ld er, L ynne R ein n er, 1 9 9 9 ); D illon , T he S candal o f  th e  R efu gee, In  
C am p bell and  S h ap iro  (ed s .)  M o r a l  S p a c e s . (M in n eap o lis: U n iv ersity  o f  M in n eso ta  P ress, 1999 a ), D illon , 
“C orrelating  S o v ereign  an d  B io p o w er” In E dkins et al (ed s) . S o v e re ig n  L iv es . (N ew  York: R ou tledge , 
2 0 0 4 ) .  S ee  a lso  L iisa M alkki. P u r i ty  a n d  E xile. (C hicago: U n iversity  o f  C hicago P ress, 1995); P eter  
N yers. R e th in k in g  R e fu g e e s . B e y o n d  S ta te s  o f  E m e r g e n c y .  (N ew  York: R ou tledge , 2 0 0 6 ) ;  Prem  K um ar  
R ajaram . “T h e S p ecta c le  o f  D e te n tio n .” W o rk in g  P a p e r  S e r ie s  110.7 (A sia  R esearch  In stitu te , 2 0 0 3 );  
R ajaram  an d  G rundy-W arr, “T h e Irregular M igrant as H om o S a cer .” I n te r n a t io n a l  M ig r a tio n  4 2 , no . 3 
(2 0 0 4 ):  3 3 -6 3 ; an d  Soguk , S ta te s  a n d  S tra n g e i's .
5ai A ristid e  Z olberg, A stri Suhrke and Sergio  A guayo (ed s .)  E s c a p e  f r o m  V io len ce: C o n flic t a n d  th e  
re fu g e e  c r is is  in th e  d e v e lo p in g  w o r ld .  (O xford: Oxford U n iv ersity  P ress. 1989) .  3 3 - 
Soguk, S ta te s  a n d  S tr a n g e r s .  242.
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homogenizing one. In addition to all formal definitions, it is this (active) voice that 
gives content and meaning to what it means to live days on end as a refugee, 
underwritten by, yet challenging, other agendas’ ends. Emma Haddad reaches a 
similar conclusion in her examination of the various definitions attached to refugees: 
“The way in which the refugee sees her own identity often contrasts sharply with the 
perceptions of those bestowing the label.”525 That is, monolithic definitions are 
exposed not only for violating the integrity of individual experiences, but also for 
being informed by the understandings and agendas of people far removed from the 
reality of displacement. All this is true despite the fact that rhetoric of clientelism  
veiled in political neutrality tries to hide the fact that the label of ‘refugee’ is not 
benevolent and creates its own momentum. Bureaucratically-imposed, Haddad 
argues, “the concept can be seen as a form of control.”524 What is more, defined both 
against and alongside statist agendas, the refugee remains conceptualized by the 
sovereign state as both a problem and a product of nationalist politics, as a tamed 
being “whose protection is only possible by another state.”525 I suggest that refugees 
alert us to the “absence of state protection of citizen’s basic needs”526 as well, casting 
the former as inactive, ineffective and directly responsible for the creation of 
liminality. It is for this reason that the issue of security becomes a common 
denominator when examining the relationship between the state and its citizens, the 
latter’s legitimate rights based on their relative position of threat vis-a-vis the nation­
state. In other words and as Shacknove has pointed out, nation-states and their 
policies are indeed, in many cases, the main causes for the generation of refugees.52? 
What this points to is, on the one hand, an understanding of the process of refugee 
creation as state-induced and, on the other, the re-affirmation, in trying to ‘solve’ the 
refugee problem, of state borders and sovereign agendas.
523E m m a H ad d ad . “W h o is (n o t) a R efu gee?” E uropean  U n iv ersity  In stitu te  W ork ing P aper no. 6 
( 2 0 0 4 ) ,  18.
524 H ad d ad , “W h o is (n o t) a re fu gee?” 18.
525 H ad d ad , “W h o is (n o t) a re fu gee?” 13.
.42" H addad,  “W h o  is (not)  a refugee?" 13.
42- A n d rew  E. Shacknove.  "Who is a refugee?" Ethics  95. no. 2 (1 985) ,  2 8 2 .
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By continuously insisting on the need to problematize and re-problematize 
the refugee, critical theorists construct the latter largely from a theoretical point of 
view. By continuously insisting on the need to define and cast the refugee vis-a-vis 
questions of national security, on the other hand, mainstream political science ends 
up configuring the refugee without critical regard for questions of power, oppression 
and language. “This reveals, of course, the extent to which the refugee is a creature of 
states and state interests first and foremost, and only secondly a consequence of 
concerns and cosmopolitanism.”828 Conceived of as an ‘inclusive exclusion,’ the 
refugee is defined as a limit condition and thus, as subjectivity set up negatively, in 
need of fixing, securing, and normalization. In an attempt to think the refugee with 
attention to the latter’s ethico-politico-linguistic nature, I offer a re-reading of 
Giorgio Agamben’s theory of homo sacer.
Third, I re-turn my discussion to the question of bearing witness in hopes of 
providing an insight into the relationship between language and (academic) 
theorizing about refugees on one hand and language and field/policy-informed work 
on the other. The bulk of my argument will address the discipline of political science 
as such and more specifically, the methodologico-practical commitments that inform, 
direct and shape its goals and tools. I engage the latter by suggesting that how we 
understand, theorize and teach about refugees has important implications for the 
ways in which we conduct ourselves in the world as academic practitioners, educators 
and witnesses. My discussion will be guided by the following hypothesis: The 
historicity of refugees is what makes them credible; that historicity is always singular. 
Factually speaking, refugee populations across time demand a number of the same 
basic services, i.e. clean water, food, shelter, income, security; they have similar 
grievances and end up going through similar national and international procedures
5:s H ad d ad ,  “W h o  is (not)  a refugee?" 19.
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set up to restore, protect and guarantee the inalienability of their rights. The UNHCR 
definition of what a refugee is addresses precisely this set of characteristics.32^
defining refug ees: the logic and the law
It is commonly accepted that this definition has some very important
limitations for being Eurocentric, deterministic, “genderized”530 in suggesting that
women and children endure the greatest suffering, privileging the powerful, exclusive
of refugee voices themselves, too narrow and over-reliant on the ability of the
international regime to fix things. The latter is exemplary in the following UN
statement: “International protection as provided by countries of asylum in
cooperation with the UNHCR is an effort to compensate for the protection that
refugees should have received in their own countries.”331 The definition is, as
suggested by Peter and Renata Singer,
a narrow one, demanding that claims to refugee status be investigated “case 
by case” which means that “the same international disorder that makes people 
refugees also prevents their recognition as refugees, for the statement that 
people face persecution in their own country implies criticism of that country, 
and most countries are slow to criticize allies, particularly when their own 
support of those allies has contributed to the suffering of the refugees.332
It overlooks two important implications inherent in being a refugee. The first 
one is the fact that the category of displacement is informed by individual experiences 
that are neither calculable, nor generalizable beyond their individual scope. The 
second is that the international regime, charged with the task of delivering solutions 
to displacement, does little preventative work and is informed by similar if not the
529 T he 1951 R efu gee  C o n ven tion  d efin es th e  ‘re fu g ee’ as an y  p erson  w h o  “o w in g  to  w e ll-fo u n d ed  fear o f  
p ersecu tio n  for rea so n s o f  race, relig ion , n a tion a lity , m em b er sh ip  o f  a particu lar soc ia l grou p  or po litica l 
o p in io n , is  o u ts id e  th e  cou n try  o f  h is  n a tion a lity  and is u n ab le  or, o w in g  to  su ch  fear, u n w illin g  to  avail 
h im s e lf  o f  th e  p ro tectio n  o f  th a t country; or w h o , n o t havin g  a n a tio n a lity  and b e in g  o u ts id e  th e  cou n try  
o f  h is  form al hab itu a l re s id en ce  as a resu lt o f  su ch  even ts, is u n ab le or, o w in g  to su ch  fear, is u n ab le  to  
return  to  it .” (A rtic le  ( i ) ( 2 )  U n ited  N a tio n s C on ven tion s R elatin g  to  th e  S ta tu s o f  R efu gees, Ju ly  2 8 ,
1951)-
x’° Soguk , S ta te s  a n d  S tr a n g e r s ,  31.
531 U n ite d  N a tio n s  (U N ). N o te  on  I n te r n a tio n a l p ro te c tio n .  ( 4 4 th S ess io n . E xecu tive  C om m ittee  o f  th e  
H igh  C o m m iss io n e r ’s P rogram m e, 1 9 9 3 )> 2 .1 -2 .3 .
332 p eter  and Renata  Singer. “T he E th ics o f  R efugee P o licy” In O pen  B o rd e rs?  C lo sed  S o c ie tie s?  The  
E th ic a l a n d  P o litic a l Issu es , edited by Mark Gibney. 113-130. (N e w  York: G reen w ood  Pres),  114.
223
same assumptions that underwrite the logic of sovereign nation-states: the desire for 
stability, legitimacy, and territorial autonomy.
As Soguk has shown, the international regime “should not be understood 
simply as a tertiary response to the refugee problem by state-agents presumed to be 
already historically fixed” but “as a practice of statecraft of the first order, oriented to 
produce, stabilize, and empower contingent images, identities, subjectivities, 
relations, and institutions of sovereign statehood in local and global politics.”533 
Furthermore, Prem Kumar Rajaram has suggested that, because of the arbitrary 
nature of donor aid and its allocation within the humanitarian camp, the latter “may 
be seen as a disciplinary strategy guaranteed by donor governments.”^  There, 
refugees’ actions are followed and recorded by aid agencies and researchers in order 
that the latter may use them as data to justify their often arbitrary allocations of aid 
or the denial thereof. In other words, “Refugees are seen as a problem existing prior 
to international regime activities, while the regime activities are represented as 
solutions to that difficult, morally demanding but not intractable problem of the 
refugee within the otherwise presumably unproblematic, stable, and secure territorial 
bounds of the sovereign state.’’sas The inability of nation states to protect their 
citizens alerts also to the international regime’s own hand in helping perpetuate 
humanitarian crisis and statist agendas.
Refugees, “except for their common experience of having felt forced to 
migrate ... are an extremely heterogeneous category of people.”536 As suggested by 
Nevzat Soguk, an attitude that recognizes the polymorphous nature of refugees “takes 
seriously the powers and resourcefulness of these people to remake their lives even in
533 S ogu k , S ta te s  a n d  S tra n g ers,  111.
534 Rajaram, “The Irregular Migrant as Hom o Sacer, 40-
535 S ogu k , S ta tes  a n d  S tra n g ers, 13.
53<> E llen  L aem m ers. Refugees. G ender an d  H um an Security . (Netherlands: International Books, 1999),
O O
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displacement, for example, in a refugee camp, or in re-placement in new places with 
unfamiliar names, speeches, and mores that are fast familiarized in their 
determination to s u r v iv e .”537 Because the figure of the refugee evokes the concept of 
the limit, the exception(al) and the sacred, and because it is often given as an example 
of the modern biopolitical human condition, a number of ordinary implications of 
being a refugee, i.e. bearing and raising children, putting food on the table, marrying, 
dying, fetching water, and cooking food are overlooked and/or recruited in service of 
theoretical goals.
These ordinary needs, met under harsh circumstances, are much like the 
everyday demands that life places on us all. To present refugees as exceptional, while 
sensitive to their particular situation, does overlook the kinds of physical tasks that, 
when engaged, re-write and re-draw the theoretical boundary between the ordinary 
and the extraordinary. The nature of the politico-ethico-biological fact of being 
displaced has important implications for the ways in which we as academics bear 
witness to and understand the refugee not only as an unstable and destabilizing but 
also, as a powerful politically-constructed figure. Jacques Derrida and Giorgio 
Agamben will help situate my exegesis with attention to questions of hospitality, 
aporia, bare life, and the exception. Furthermore, I engage (refugee) poetry by way 
of inviting the reader to think about bearing witness independently from 
academically-translated commentary.
537 Soguk , S ta te s  a n d  S tr a n g e r s ,  5.
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prelim inary  n a te s  Dn “the  refugee": in lieu of a lite ra tu re  review
I am afraid of ambiguity’s
old academic hush. Still...
things happen,
and simply to record them
is often to deceive,
is even sometimes to mimic fog,
the way it’s perfectly
yet inadequately clear about itself. ...538
Taking lead from Michael Dillon’s writing on the relationship between 
security and the (inter)national,539 1 would like to offer the following preliminary 
hypothesis: “The refugee underwrites (inter)national security by confronting us with 
the task of ‘out-living’ the desire to be secure.” By this, I do not mean to suggest that 
being displaced is more attractive than holding a passport issued by a national 
government, nor that refugees offer a romantic commentary on what it means to be 
(human) in the world: displaced, uprooted, a nomad, thus - free. What I am rather 
alerting to is the fact that the thoughts and concerns that guide the work of 
International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline, in addition to being informed 
by questions of security and scientific validity, are also underwritten by questions of 
fear, not knowing, absence, loss, violence, displacement, and trauma.
These terms are not simply the missing partner in a dichotomous pair; they 
inform by virtue of addressing the issue of insecurity through the prism of the 
everyday. Hence, we enjoy a security that is informed not by the peaceful co­
habitation of individuals, ethnic (racial, religious, political, etc) groups, or nation­
states, but a security that is predicated on the everyday struggles of ordinary people 
to out-live the yoke of the very things that define them once as secure and then, as 
insecure. “One of those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which 
informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For whatever
538 F rom  “N o t th e  O ccu lt” in  S tep h en  D unn , N e w  a n d  S e le c te d  P o e m s 1 9 7 4 -1 9 9 4 . (N e w  York: W .W .
N o rto n  and C om pany, 1 9 9 5 ). 2 6 9 -
539 Dil lon, P oli t ics  o f S e c w i t y .
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politics is allowed or taken to be -  how it is captured, fixed and determined in its 
foundations; in short secured -  is a decisive element in all power struggles.”540 
Concern with formulating a theory of war, democracy, balance of power, peace, to 
give a few examples, can obscure the complex ways in which these concepts evolve 
within the everyday, a-theoretic struggles of ordinary people. Likewise, massive 
internal and external displacements of peoples suggest that the crossing of an 
international border is no longer a requirement for becoming a refugee.541 These 
definitional sensitivities carry important implications for a discussion of (human) 
security outside traditional statist understandings.
Much of the discourse informing our engagement with refugees is aimed 
precisely at undermining, veiling or cross-dressing insecurity into a language devoid 
of much else than a concern for ensuring its own longevity. The question to ask is 
whether such engagements with refugees are helpful beyond their theoretical 
implications. My answer has two parts: on one level, the desire for territorial 
stability/security that informs much of International Relations thinking is the longing 
for security derived from a Kantian understanding of progress, stability and 
nationality. The global migration flow of people, legal or illegal, cosmopolitan or 
rural, Western or not, characterizes modernity’s problematic Kantian cartographic 
imperatives, informed by a coherent national culture that “functions, interpretatively, 
within the European state-oriented political imaginary.”542 The ever increasing 
refugee numbers, supplemented by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 
peoples, supplemented by the illegal immigrants both in Western Europe and the 
Southern border of North America, point to trends in border crossings whose raison
5 4 0  D illo n , P olitics o f  S ecu rity , 18.
541 H ad d ad , “W h o is (n o t)  a re fu g ee? ” 2.
51^  D avid C am pbell and  M ichael S hap iro  (ed s). “In tro d u ctio n ” In C am pbell and Sh ap iro , M o ra l Spaces. 
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d etre is indeed a search for greater security, though a security informed by factors 
challenging directly the powers of nation-states.
As suggested by Singer and Singer, “to distinguish, in meeting the need for 
protection, refuge, food, and resettlement, between someone fleeing from political 
persecution and someone who flees from a land made uninhabitable by prolonged 
drought is difficult to justify.”543 The very meaning of “security” has been altered by 
these mass movements of people and by the insufficiently adequate treatment they 
receive by both nation-states and international organizations. In an example of 
institutionalized hypocrisy, to identify these movements solely as national security 
threats means to fail to acknowledge and engage the shifting definition(s) of nation, 
security, border and citizen. David Campbell points to the complex nature of global 
relations and their bearing on the open question of ethical responsibility and alterity 
in relationship to the Gulf W a r . 5 4 4  For him, “we need to develop an approach to 
responsibility that is cognizant of the way in which the reterritorialization of states 
necessitates a deterritorialization of theory”545 which would figure the discussion of 
Being as a responsibility toward an Other.
On the other hand, if we recognize that how we say things bears upon our 
understanding of the ways in which relations are built, actions executed and 
scholarship conducted, then it behooves us as scholars to recognize that an ethical 
engagement with the world carries with it a linguistic charge that helps both 
construct and radicalize identities, theoretic commitments and interpretive 
conventions. Because refugees are conceptualized as victims, as speechless 
emissaries of a violent past, as the ambassadors of ethnically-informed political
543 S in g er  and S in ger , “T h e E th ics o f  R efu gee Policy, 114.
s44 D avid  C am pbell. P o litic s  W ith o u t P rin c ip le : S o v e r e ig n ty , E th ic s  a r id  th e  N a r r a t iv e s  o f  th e  G u lf  W ar.
(B ou ld er , Co: Lynne R ein n er, 1993)-
'45 D avid  Cam pbell .  “The Deterritorialization o f  Responsibility" in M o r a l  S p a c e s .  29.
228
practices, as objectified and oppressed human beings in need o f ‘durable solutions,’ 
they are also constructed as the stuff that, brought back to stability, informs security 
itself. The latter is measured through statist appeals to repatriation, assimilation or 
resettlement. As Nevzat Souk has pointed out, refugee discourse “takes for granted, 
never questions, and starts by positing the paradigmatic hierarchy of the 
citizen/nation/state ensemble. There is an ‘already there’ quality in the 
representations of this hierarchy, which is presumed to be already historically 
located, already articulated through prevailing forms and relations, and already 
empowered to speak and to be heard.”546 Rather, the refugee is a figure that bears 
witness to the state’s failure to provide security to its citizens and thus, itself becomes 
a source of anxiety, a threat to statist logic calling for the hermetical re-production of 
truth, knowledge and power. Understood as historical figures, both the nation-state 
and refugees represent “multiple, intersecting, and overlapping fields of activity.”547
As suggested by Michael Shapiro, “the stories through which ‘peoples’ enact 
their identities and collective coherences ... and the spatial models allocating global 
proprietary control -  participate in violence and inhibit ethical modes of mutual 
recognition at a global level.”548 The influence and agendas of nation-states, however, 
are so far reaching that the very discourses informing the former’s desire for security 
and for securing bodies end up skipping right over the singular experiences that 
inform their subjects and their ability to formulate, understand, problematize and/or 
puzzle over the implications that a (refugee) camp, for example, has for our 
understanding of other territorial encampments considered part of the nation-state. 
Diken and Laustsen have suggested that the camp, from a transitory and temporary 
‘hom e,’ has been turned into a tool for the immobilization of people that, in turn,
546 Sogu k , S ta tes  a n d  S tra n g ers, 3 0 .
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effectively problematize the notion of the city and politics.”549 The camp 
architecture, so often represented by family huts/tents lined in rows and squares, 
also caters to an ordered, geometrical visualization of refugee security underwritten 
by an appeal to the latter’s temporary nature and by an insistence on effectiveness 
rather than affectivity.550 Refugee camps, set up to mimic the social and political 
make-up of a city become “the sites of an enduring organization of space, social life 
and system of power that exist nowhere else.”551
Michel Agier defines refugee camps as “the emblem of the social condition 
created by the coupling of war with /  humanitarian action, the site where it is 
constructed in the most elaborate manner, as a life kept at a distance from the 
ordinary social and political world, and the experimentation of the large-scale 
segregations that are being established on a planetary scale.”552 He posits that the 
formula of the camp itself bears witness to the “form ation o f a global space fo r  the 
‘hum anitarian ’ m anagement o f the m ost unthinkable and undesirable populations 
o f the p lan et”553 where the camp itself becomes “a life kept at a distance from the 
ordinary social and political world” in the form of a “large-scale segregation.”554 In 
other words, a discourse on refugees and their humanitarianly-assigned dwelling 
places has important implications not only for our understanding of displacement, 
but also for the ways in which security inserts itself as a prerogative in our academic, 
humanitarian and personal agendas.
The need to define the refugee and the paranoia borne from not being able to 
do so readily alerts to a fear inherent in recognizing that, indeed, belonging to a single
549 B lilen t D ik en  and  C arsten  B agge L austsen . “’C am p in g’ as a C on tem p orary  S trategy  -  From  R efugee  
C am ps to  G ated  C o m m u n itie s .” A M ID  W orking Paper S eries (A alborg U n iversity , no . 3 2  (2 0 0 3 ) ) ,  2.
550 J im  L ew is, “T he E x igen t C ity.” N e w  Y ork  T im es M a g a z in e  (J u n e  2 0 0 8 ) ,  3 0 -3 8 .
551 M ich el A gier. “B etw een  W ar and  City: T ow ards an U rban A n th ro p o lo g y  o f  R efu gee ca m p s.” 
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category of identification is an impossibility -  for the refugee and the citizen alike.
Belonging to more than one category means ambivalence in as much as the search 
for distinctions based on either/or is present.”555 Jenny Edkins (2003) has pointed to 
a similar problem of fixing identities found in famine relief camps where the concern 
of international humanitarian organizations is often/always one with food, life and 
death and not with upholding an economic self-sufficiency or cultural integrity for 
the refugees. That means that upon arrival, refugees are grouped based not on 
family, clan or ethnic associations, but on the international organization’s assessment 
of their needs and the best ways to cater to them. The fact that this causes 
resentment on the part of the refugees who think that the international humanitarian 
organizations are not being sensitive enough to their (individual) plight should not 
discourage scholars and humanitarian workers from attempting to develop 
alternative ‘processing’ strategies while, at the same time, still do their job. However, 
this observation alerts us to the fact that in addition to needing to care for starving 
and dying bodies, the responsibilities of states and relief organizations, when reduced 
solely to food, water and shelter, end up producing bare life. The long term task of 
saving this life becomes, soon enough, a question that cannot be limited just to the 
nutritional intake and/or physical fitness of people.
The situation has not become any less complicated with the advent of the 
‘terrorist,’ as immigrants and terrorists are often addressed, constructed and treated 
together as ‘dangerous subjects.’ The following statement from former US Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, delivered on October 21st, 2001, illustrates the extent of this
bureaucratic metamorphosis:
Let the terrorists among us be warned. If you overstay your visas even 
by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, we will work 
to make sure that you are put in jail and kept in custody as long as 
possible.556
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This refugee and immigration paranoia is manifested to an even larger degree in the 
example of the Australian migration law, which gives its own rationale for treating 
refugees and illegal immigrants as ‘criminals.’ Not only are the prescriptions of the 
law generally discriminatory, but so are the provisions extended to include the 
territory of the whole country as subject to ‘exception.’ The Australian justice system  
thus makes itself (legally) exempt from having to care for, insure and/or listen the 
grievances of the refugees, as they are, from the moment of their arrival, placed in 
detention centers exempt from the laws of the land or from international provisions 
of non-refoulement. What is more, Singer and Singer point out that the Australian 
fear that the steady influx of refugees might damage the environment is highly 
unjustified in a reality where Australian residents “having holiday houses, roaring 
around the bush in four-wheel-drive vehicles, going skiing, and throwing away their 
drink containers without bothering to return them to r e c y c l i n g . ”557 The issue remains 
one of fear as rhetorics of security.
Refusing to respect the legal obligations ensuing from international
agreements conflicting, threatening and/or challenging the sovereignty of Australia,
the nation-state simply makes the latter null. The question of national security is
hereby given as a reason why Australia only observes international treaties and
obligations that suit its vision of who is safe to be allowed in the country and who is
not. Beyond the obvious fact of diplomatic h y p o c r isy , here is an example of outright
likening of refugees and other stateless people to criminals and terrorists. Allow me
to quote in its entirety an excerpt from a law passed in 2001 by the Australian
Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA):
The Australian Government is firmly committed to ensuring the integrity of 
Australia’s borders and to the effective control and management of the 
movement of people to and from Australia. This commitment stands before 
Australia’s absolute commitment to meeting its international obligations
557 S inger  and Singer, "The Ethics ot Retugee P o l i c \ , 126.
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under refugee-related conventions. Underlying these commitments is the fact 
that Australia is a sovereign country which decides who can and who cannot 
enter and stay on its territory. Only Australian citizens have the unrestricted 
right to travel freely in and out of the country -  all other people must have a 
legal authority in the form of a visa.558
Thus, sovereignty underwrites not only the juridico-political relations
between subject and state, but it also defines bio-political existence as something to
be maintained, supervised, evaluated and de-limited. So much we know from
Foucault. If a citizen is causing trouble, then s/he is either arrested, fined, jailed or
otherwise reprimanded in an effort to restore a sense of normalcy and order. If a
citizen, once expelled, finds herself a refugee, then the responsibilities of the state are
transformed from those of a protector, to those of a participant donor as
inconspicuously veiled under rhetoric of neutrality and humanitarianism as is
necessary to restore, once again, normalcy and order.
The segregation of nationalities; the orderly organization of repatriation or 
third country resettlement; medical and hygienic programmes and 
quarantining ... the accumulating of documentation on the inhabitants of the 
camps; the control of movement and black-marketing; law enforcement and 
public discipline; and schooling and rehabilitation were some of the 
operations that the spatial concentration and ordering of people enabled or 
facilitated.559
These are the very political and humanitarian markers used to secure bodies. None 
of these markers engage the individual experiences of displaced people who, “in 
becoming objects of the philanthropic mode of power, the political, historical, and 
biographical specificity of their life worlds vanishes into a vast register labeled 
‘unknowable, irrelevant, unconfirmed, unusable.’”560 Procedures of screening, 
monitoring, securing and defining the refugee help produce the refugee as “a
558 D ep a rtm e n t o f  Im m igration  and  M ulticu ltural and In d ig en o u s A ffairs (D IM IA ). 2 0 0 2 a . F a c t S h e e t
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knowable entity”561 and the camp as an “’hors-lieux,’ outside of the places and outside 
of the time of a common, ordinary, predictable world.”562
The creation and dissemination of knowledge about the refugee becomes a 
humanitarian concern where processes of normalization and ‘calculation’ are 
connected in one way or another to questions of securing states against the bodies of 
the displaced, the “undesirables.”565 This, in turn, has led the academic discipline of 
political science to address the question “Who am I after the night of the estranged?” 
in the passive voice: re-positing it as a commentary on the realm of the international 
as a citizenship-less, order-less, though a statist realm. That the creation of the 
refugee is a problem is, at this point, evident. As to the origin of this problem and the 
ways in which it is ‘handled’ and ‘operationalized,’ the lack of sufficiently critical 
debate is itself indicative of the degree of political and humanitarian hypocrisy. If “IR 
is a tiny place” informed by invented mainstream epistemological commitments, as I 
heard Michael Shapiro say once, and if “modes of thinking create kinds of subjects,” 
then how do we think of a ‘we’ versus ‘them’ from within IR itself is an important 
question to ask? Who, precisely, is charged with answering and addressing this 
question?
When speaking of refugees, “an individual identity is replaced by a 
stereotyped identity with a categorical prescription of assumed needs.”56* It is 
important to note that securing is done both before and after accepting the label of 
refugee -  which is never simply and unproblematically granted, especially as 
industrialized countries’ shared response to refugee petitions for resettlement are
5&1 R ajaram  an d  G rundy-W arr, “T he Irregular M igrant as H o m o  S a cer ,” 4 2 .
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often met with deterrent policies” and doors closed “as tightly as they can.”s65 The
refugee label assimilates but also excludes, commenting on the violence inherent in
the ways in which we construct and/or represent the stories we tell.
To pose our puzzlement about existence, and our desire for the truth of it, 
this way requires that it be shown how something is wrested from nothing 
and prevented somehow against falling back into nothingness. In other 
words, it requires us to discover how secure (certain) things are -  what 
secures them and how they can be secured -  so that we can confidently take 
them to be the very things that we take them to be; or resolve disputes 
between us in respect of what they really are. A ground is sought that will 
explain the emergence of some-thing, allow us to judge exactly what it is, and 
measure the inevitable variation in its appearance against how that ground 
tells us it ‘really’ is. And, of course, it this is done, if we can securely 
determine how something is something rather than nothing, then we have 
mastered it.566
Our understanding of the world, our experience of it, our doing politics within it are 
always contaminated by an insecurity informative of the nature of human life itself. 
The latter questions the conceptualization of liminality as a security threat and, in 
turn, bears witness to the fact that no representation of the refugee, be it academic, 
artistic, humanitarian or political, is enough. “The story” is really a riddle, a 
Derridean aporia  calling for different readings in accordance with the institutional 
and temporal commitments of both narrator and audience.
going places: vanishing points
Tell me, draftsman of the desert,
Surveyor of the sinking sands;
Is the unrestraint of lines
Really stronger than the blowing winds? s&7
While being uprooted as a refugee is associated with insecurity, homelessness 
and powerlessness, being uprooted as a tourist, a legalized immigrant, or an ex-pat is 
associated with freedom, courage, wisdom and adventure. Or, as Michael Shapiro 
suggests in relation to Mexican cosmology, “there is more than one time in the world
565 S in g er  an d  S in ger, “T he E th ics o f  R efu gee P o licy ,” 115. 
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... there is another time existing altogether alongside, above, underneath, the linear 
time calendars of the West.”868 The refugee’s insecurity is seen as tragic, as a 
reflection of his subaltern identity or, as Liisa Malkki observes, “understanding 
displacement as a human tragedy and looking no further can mean that one gains no 
insight at all into the lived meanings that displacement and exile can have for specific 
people ...”s69 Broken roots become symbolic and synonymous with going non-native, 
with being an outcast, a person without nationality.
At the same time, travelling and tourism, prerogatives of the citizen, are seen 
as educational, informative and adventurous. Notions of space and map-traversing 
are constructed according to a system of culturally and nationally pre-defined 
identities where the act of border crossing is understood once according to one’s 
relationship to a home state, then according to one’s intentions vis-a-vis the host 
state and then again, regarding one’s partaking in a number of identity-defining 
characteristics: race, gender, religion, continent, knowledge of English. Challenged 
by the incessant flow of people through them and, as Kirtik Raj has suggested, rather 
than as rigid, geographic identifiers, “Borders are better conceived today as a set of 
points, or broken, discontinuous lines ... that serve the same set of functions, but in a 
way that troubles the simple inclusion/exclusion logic far more seriously.”57« The 
Levinasian call to recognize the (absolute) Other, the stranger, as constitutive of the 
se lfs reciprocal relationship to oneself before and above the sovereign state becomes 
here a violent, repulsive appropriation and absorption of the spaces and cosmologies 
this Other occupies in the world. The common-sense logic of native vs. foreigner is 
supplemented by an underlying logic of self-preservation - 1 would do anything to 
protect my life. Turned sour, this citizenship-informed instinct leads to the
s68 S h ap iro , “T h e E th ics o f  E n co u n ter ,” 62.
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construction of alterity as dangerous, different, unknown, and subject to exclusionary 
policies and a demand that the state take care of these fears by taking care of them. 
But fear, when misunderstood and unexplored, has a funny way of mutating, of 
acquiring monstrous dimensions, of reproducing itself and taking over one’s life.
In this sense, Levinas’ “pluralism that does not merge into a unity”571 is not 
only domesticated but, if defiant, becomes representative of a threat to the self, a 
disruption to the homestead. Refugees are thus spoken of as inferior, dangerous, 
broken, and stuck; as “a symbol of instability” in need of mending. Tourists, on the 
other hand, are adventurous, voyeuristic, possessing a knack for overcoming danger - 
with their particular kind of freedom appealing to some originary idea of what being 
free means (an idea that immediately implies what not being free is as well). Indeed, 
“the immigration laws of developing countries effectively confer on their residents the 
benefits of membership in the better-off group, without giving the worst-off group 
any opportunity at all -  never mind equal opportunity -  to be among the better- 
off.1”572 After the prevailing understanding of the relationship between the state and 
its citizens “in terms of participation, representation, and protection in the bounded 
space of presupposed particularity and difference ... the refugee is seen as one who 
lacks the citizen’s unproblematic grounding within a territorial space and, so, lacks 
the effective representation and protection of a state . ”573
A politics of security functions as a commentary on the nature of bare life as 
uprooted, tragic and broken and of natural life as free, happy and whole. As observed 
by Liisa Malkki in her study of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, “One vital 
underpinning of the generalization and universalization of the refugee in 
contemporary therapeutic discourses on refugees is to be found, then, in the common
571 L evin as, E m m an u el. T im e  a n d  th e  O th er. (P ittsb urgh , PA: D u q u esn e  U n iversity  Pres 1987): 42 .
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assumption that ‘the refugee’ -  apparently stripped o f the specificity o f  culture, place  
and history  — is human in the most basic, elementary sense. The refugee as bare 
humanity stands, we imagine, for all of us at our most naked and basic level.”574 This 
makes the homeland a sacred and desired realm that must be defined and signed off 
on by state, nation, and community. Being homeless, then, is a curse and an 
impediment to realizing one’s potential, the right to a homeland being the condition 
for realizing the human right to freedom. Memory, homelessness, violence and the 
human end up being formalized in a relationship of good vs. bad, right vs. wrong, 
peace vs. war, security vs. insecurity.
the  re fug ee  problem : securing  bodies
“ Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman -  a 
rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous 
on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous 
shuddering and stopping.” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra)
The goal of securing bodies, posited by the nation-state as an outcome of 
perpetuating the exercise and use of legitimate power has, as pointed out by Michael 
Dillon, “come to dominate our understanding of rule, so sovereign power has come to 
limit our imagination in relation to the possibility and to the promise of politics . ”575 
Refugees, in that sense, have been brought to political and juridical submission by the 
rhetoric of sovereign logic commenting on the ways and modalities according to 
which power, both statist and international, is organized. This points out to the fact 
that sovereignty itself depends on human insecurity, the former being defined and 
underwritten by its relationship to liminal beings: refugees, the homeless, 
immigrants, illegal aliens, the mentally ill, the handicapped, the old. As the 
relationship between liminality and power shifts, so does security become redefined 
and refined over and over in relation to the limit, the exception, and to the kinds of
•'v-i M alkki, P u r ity  a n d  Exile, 12.
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(marginal) lives that inhabit the tenuous zones of indistinction that Giorgio Agamben 
calls “exceptions.”
As Etienne Balibar (2002) has pointed out, borders have come to be 
proliferated both within and outside the domain of the nation-state to the extent that 
“there is an increasing ‘interpenetration’ of interior and exterior, such that day-to-day 
living becomes increasingly securitized even when the survival or society or identity is 
not really under threat.”576 As the sovereign desire to secure lives grows, so does the 
deployment of insecurity originating within the sovereign state become more and 
more prominent and uncontrollable. Otherwise put, “In the symbiotic relations and 
relational transfers and exchanges of power relations, sovereignty takes on a different 
tenor, as it then becomes exposed to other accounts of the life whose deployment and 
death it ultimately seeks to command.”577
These visions of insecurity are inescapable and must be addressed through the 
lens both of sovereign power and the limit that, tempting and theoretically savvy, can 
ultimately transgress our desire to overcome it. As I argue later in this chapter, 
Agamben’s state o f exception become norm limits the ability of sovereign power to 
secure itself not only historically (as with Agamben) but also, in the everyday. If we 
follow through with Michael Dillon’s insight that “the first exercise of sovereign 
power is to create the sovereign”578 and with Carl Schmitt’s “sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception,” then securing the body of the refugee is no longer only a 
question of securing the legitimacy and life of the sovereign state. The process of 
securing (human) bodies alerts to the performative, singular modalities that inform 
both the sovereign state and the liminal populations produced by and producing it.
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This also alerts to the fact that addressing refugees as liminal beings only 
insufficiently recognizes their singular nature.
Hence, what ultimately concerns me are the ways and modalities of thinking 
the refugee as a “we,” not the history of the development of the ‘label,’ the current 
definitional quarrels, or an enumeration of statistics in humanitarian and academic 
reports. What drives me is the question of whether it is possible to speak about 
liminal beings in a way that is sensitive to the singularity of their temporally-specific 
being in the world. That is, what kind of language should we recruit to address the 
singularity of the refugee without, while remaining intelligible, adopting the very 
violence it resists? This issue is at the bottom of understanding and addressing the 
current political imaginary and of being able to think, write and comport oneself 
ethically and politically in the world. It informs my ability to contribute and partake 
in the work and thought of academic political science. It regards a desire to see past 
theoretical bickering, past the (un)critical gaze of elitist audience, and past a self- 
inflicted need to preface, excuse and justify my theoretical commitments -  and 
toward a potential to create, imagine, embrace, and love my work and its informants.
While an engagement with the refugee might, in the end, tell me very little 
about the ways in which the experience of the (displaced) sovereign subject is 
constructed and constructs politics, it comments on the relationship between states 
of emergency and the subject’s continuous transgression of and out-living the desire 
for security as defined by the sovereign center. As Raj’s summary of Jane Caplan5?9 
points out, “stQ.tBS require the individual to have an identity in order to be recognized 
at all, and in most cases, this identity — a legal name, a national identity number, a 
passport number — is both state-issued and unchangeable without state
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permission, s80 I am not suggesting that living in fear is more desirable than living in 
peace. Rather, I claim that a security defined by the sovereign bureaucratic, political 
and juridical apparatus, by creating the insecure bodies that it must then secure, 
undermines itself. It does so not only because refugees continue to exist in spite of 
the nation/state/citizen holy Trinity, but also because displaced people’s lives re­
define, re-conceptualize, and re-claim security for themselves in ways that, not 
underwritten by the authority of the state, sabotage the ‘legal’ identifiers otherwise 
denied them by sovereign power.
Take the example of false documentation discussed by Liisa Malkki in her
engagement with town Hutu refugees in Tanzania. What she suggests is that identity
documents, in addition to making subjects visible and traceable, serve also as an
avenue of invisibility, especially in cases when buying oneself nationality papers and
having (any kind of) papers from international organizations helps identify someone,
other than as illegal or a refugee, as part of the local, recipient community.
The range of different meanings attached to citizenship and to the 
documentary construction of identity shows how inadequate is the common 
assumption that when a person ‘assimilates,’ he or she simply ‘gains’ aspects 
of a new cultural identity while ‘losing’ something definite from the old 
identity in the bargain. Just as citizenship was always something more than a 
simple matter of have or have-not for the town refugees, so, too, was that 
messy, vital phenomenon that scholars so passionately gesture at by saying 
‘identity.’ Rather than revolving around a transition from one fixed, rooted 
identity to another, the lives of the town refugees celebrated what Deleuze and 
Guattari have called ‘rhizomes.’s81
Michel Agier comments on similar assimilation techniques among other African
refugees in Kenya. “A Kenyan identity card or driver’s license, or a regularly renewed
temporary work permit, obtained by bribing the officials who issue or check these
580 Raj, “R efu gee , B order-C am p ,” 15.
5gl “U n lik e  trees  or th e ir  roo ts, th e  rh izom e co n n ects any p o in t to  any o th er  p o in t, an d  its tra its are not
n ecessa r ily  lin k ed  to  tra its o f  th e  sam e nature; it brings in to  p lay very d ifferen t reg im es o f  s ig n s , and
ev en  n o n -s ig n  sta tes. [...]  It is  co m p o sed  n ot o f  u n its b ut o f  d im e n sio n s , or rather d irection s in m otion .
It h a s n e ith e r  b eg in n in g  nor en d , bu t a lw ays a m id d le  (m ilie u ) from  w h ich  it grow s and w h ich  it
o v ersp ills . [...] T h e tree  is filia tion  b u t th e  rh izom e is a llian ce, u n iq u ely  a llian ce. T he tree  im p o ses  the
verb ‘to  be.' but th e  fabric o f  the rh izom e is the con jun ction , ‘and ... and ... and ...” (D eleu ze  and Guattari
q u oted  in M alkki, Purity  and  hxilc. 174)■
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documents outside the camps, enable them to carry out their business deals.”582 This 
uncovers the everyday strategies used to re-invent ways of being/feeling free, normal, 
invisible and safe.585 I would go so far as to suggest that these alternative identifiers, 
in their illegitimate, illegal character, both exempt the refugees from the need to seek 
the approval and stamp of officialdom while, at the same time, underwriting the 
refugees’ desire to reaffirm and re-claim the rights and freedoms of recognized 
citizenry outside legal norms.
detention, definition and defiance
l . detention
Question: Why did you leave Algeria?
Answer: Because I am Berber.
Question: Why did you choose Australia?
Answer: Because I am an indigenous.58*
In addition to sovereign and humanitarian practices of refugee protection, 
another kind of securing the refugee body goes on that is initiated and carried out by 
the refugees themselves. This particular kind of securing is not always aimed at 
reclaiming lost citizenship, nor does it directly help the refugees on their quest for 
international political recognition. Rather, this kind of securing is aimed at 
facilitating the carrying out of everyday rituals, customs, and demands of life that, in 
helping the refugees cope with their situation, also offer a sense of bodily and 
communal security otherwise unavailable to stateless subjects. This is important 
because it draws attention to the political charge of much overlooked, everyday acts 
of coping with and making livable that bear weight in the re-claiming of freedom and 
the restoration of agency. In their essence, these acts are physically-performative 
commentaries on ordinary life -  they give voice, face, physical dimensions, color,
582 “A gier, “B etw een  W ar and C ity,” 3 3 0 .
583 For an in te restin g  d iscu ss io n  in to  th e  d istin ctio n  b etw een  stra teg ies and tactics , tho u g h  en g aged  in a 
m ark ed ly  d ifferen t co n tex t, refer to  M ichel de C erteau’s T he P ra c tic e  o f  E v e r y d a y  L ife  (B erkeley: T he
U n iv ers ity  o f  C alifornia P ress, 2 0 0 2 ) .
r,84 A iw el B oujb iha. "Interview ” h ttp ://w w w .b o r d e r 1a n d s .n e t .n ii/v o lin o i  20p 2 /b o u ]b ih a  p o e m s.h tm l.
| M ay 2 9  2 0 0 8 ] .  B oujbiha w rote th is poem  as a d eta in ee  in \  illa u o o d  d e ten tio n  cen te i in A u stia lia .
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warmth and vision both to the refugees and to those working with them. To the 
extent to which these acts comment on an individual engagement with life/daily 
happenings, they are singular and non-generalizable beyond the individual example 
each of them offers. This, in turn, is important because it calls for idioms and 
modalities of addressing this “securing,” this ‘ouf-hoirig’ security, this particular kind 
of practicing survival that are informed not by calculable methodologies but are 
derived from the experience of life-events. Refugee poetry, giving voice without 
always naming, is one such instance of alternative opposition and defiance.
My name is asylum
I was born in here
Here is the detention center
The center is circled by wire 
Wire makes it scaring
The wire is 1, 2, 3,4,  5
1 is the wire for closure
2 is the coiled barbed wire
3 is the protection for 1 and 2
4 is the razor wire on the top of 3
5 is the high fence.
The higher fence
Which stops birds coming inside
Stops thoughts and imagination
Which stops the world outside
The higher fence which becomes
The border between me and Australia....5®5
Being a refugee is here exemplified in an interesting way: by numbers, the same 
statistically-informed tool that often strips refugees of their humanity. Boujbiha 
portrays the detention center as a self-contained, circular reinforcement of a fort-like 
nature. The different layers of barbed wire, securing and securing one another over 
and over again represent a rather symbolic fact o f ‘being in control’ on the part of the 
guarding officials. Ruddock’s caution against cutting one’s wrists is hereby
5*5 B oujb iha, A ngel, "Mv N am e is A sy lu m ”
h U p : //w \\^ v .b o |Ylpi'hm ds.n e t .a u /v o lin o i y ^ o ^ o u j b i l u L J ^ n N l l t i n l ;  [M ay 2 9 th, 2 0 0 8 J .
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underwritten by a shared cultural fear of deviance, terrorism and violence. The 
refugees are not only locked away behind barbed wires, they are also displaced from 
their culture -  the latter’s occasional surfacing seen as potentially dangerous, 
unclear, non-Australian and contagious. Thus, the refugees’ proposed deviancy 
underwrites the Australian citizen’s normalcy. In terms of securing this deviancy, the 
five layers of barbed wire not only represent a physical obstacle to any attempt to 
escape, they also exemplify a physically-informed suspension of the understood 
nature of being a refugee - a powerless, persecuted human being in need of 
protection, not detention - a claim that should, at the least as the UN understands it, 
offer a safe place of temporary residence for those under its protection.
Detaining refugees is seen as a move toward making Australia a safer place. 
What is so interesting about this statement is that it contradicts the status of the 
displaced as ‘legal,’ ‘authentic,’ and ‘genuine’ refugees since, the understanding is, the 
latter kinds could not possibly present a threat. Thus, definitionally speaking, the 
Australian government’s practices showcase the right to determine, on the one hand, 
the legitimacy of refugee claims based on modes of entry into the country (boats seen 
as ‘semi-barbaric’ and uncivilized), ethic and cultural background and, on the other, 
once under Australian jurisdiction, to choose to deny protection “based primarily on 
the fact that legal obligations do not apply to detainees that are ‘unlawful.’”586
What is more, “the Australian Government has created an expansive zone of 
indistinction, encompassing by inference the entire Australian nation-state, where a 
stable exception has been created.”587 Consider detention described thus.
586 R ajaram  and G rundy-W arr, “The Irregular M igrant as H om o S acer ,” 4 6 .




Welcome to the process 




The flying time 
Called human rights
Why so many years detained?s88
Securing the body of the detainee also means pushing the latter to such desperate
measures such as sewing their lips, throwing their children off boats and cutting their
wrists. It serves to portray the detainees as deranged and anomalous, as dangerous
and uncivilized human beings whose reactions are not desperate pleas for help, but
well-calculated, unreasonable, deviant, manipulative and violent ways of getting the
better of the Australian state and its perks. What is even more scandalous is that all
this institutionalization is veiled under the name of law that not only gives priority to
“certain forms of existence while denigrating others, ”589 but also justifies itself by an
appeal to the public morale and understanding of a community whose unity is based
around exclusionary parameters and false formalities.
2. definition: “w ho’s there?”
Recall my engagement with Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben and Paul 
Celan and my continuous insistence on the singular nature of the process of bearing 
witness. Recall that in Chapter Five, Derrida’s thought helped introduce my 
discussion on the tension between political science s desire for progress, rationality 
and enlightenment and the singular, non-generalizable experience that life 
represents. Giorgio Agamben’s writings, engaged in Chapter Two, were challenged 
for their e x c l u s i v e l y  juridico-political understanding of being in the world. The limit
588 A n g el B ou jb iha . “D eta in ed .” h ttp ://w w w .b o rd er la n d s .n e t.a u /v o lin o i  2 0 0 2 /b o u jb ih a p o e m s.h t m.l-
[M ay 2 9 , 2 0 0 8 b
category of bare life paired with his “state of exception” become-norm were 
challenged on account of being self-contained where “bare life,” personified by the 
M uselm anner - dead, unable to speak or bear witness to having been in the 
concentration camps - does overlook and undermine the real-life testimonies that 
camp and violence survivors offer. Recall my critique of Derrida in Chapter Three: 
first, for his tendency to romanticize the literary, writing and poetry; second, for 
being anti-Derridean in not problematizing enough the singular in light of the 
(im)possibilities it offers for political action and third, for opposing actual physical 
life to physical death when speaking of the resuscitative function of the poetic. My 
engagement with Celan’s poetry in Chapter Three discussed his language as a novel 
positing of an otherwise old language/world. I suggested that the reason poetry was 
different than other linguistic modes was because of its ability and its suitability for 
using otherwise ordinary language in a novel way.
In light of these critiques, I will re-read the experience of being a refugee from 
the point of view of the ethico-political implications that life-experiences have for 
questions of security, the limit, states of exception, “bare life,” and language. Allow 
me to preface what will follow by a lengthy excerpt from Thomas Keenan’s Fables o f  
Responsibility.
Any political responsibility is itself nothing other than an experience of a 
certain encounter at the border, of a crossing and its irreducible difficulty, 
of the aporia and the no pasaran  which marks all frontiers as structurally 
undecidable. Something other than knowledge comes into play at the 
frontier, something that exceeds or cannot be reduced to cognition and the 
application of a rule -  otherwise the decision at the border would make no 
difference.590
What Keenan suggests is that the responsibility of assigning and assuming 
responsibility is not as clear cut and/or rationally-deduced as it might seem at first 
glance and is, like Dillon’s (1996) securing of security, to be out-lived. If Keenan’s
590 K eenan, F ables  o f  R e sp o n s ib i l i t y ,  12.
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Who s there? is, first of all, a question of language , ” 5 9 1  then who one is speaking to is 
important in light of the implications that power has in supplementing any rhetorical 
construction. Politics, in this sense, involves an exposure to the difficulties of 
language, resolving the dilemma of bearing witness to an event without erasing the 
latter s singularity. In the sense in which refugees’ everyday actions inform the 
possibility of their safely being in the world, they also comment on the modalities that 
constitute their being in the world unsafely.
2.1 camp landscapes
“There is a man sitting across the room 
in shadow, but I know who he is.
His brilliant eyes burn through shade.
He tells me that if I sit still and listen
then all the stories of the world will come to me. .. 592
Next, allow me to introduce the Bhutanese refugees whom I visited in the 
summer of 2003. I am not interested in the reasons for their exile or in the ongoing 
tri-partite talks between the Nepalese government on the one hand, the Bhutanese 
government on the other and the refugees themselves, though I am aware that these 
negotiations have direct bearing on the refugees’ everyday lives. What I will engage, 
though briefly, are my impressions of the relationship between living as a liminal 
being and the politics underwriting the camp’s legitimate existence. Thinking back 
on that visit and having to write about it, I am reminded of the words of 
Subcomandate Insurgente Marcos, a former professor and the visionary behind the 
Zapatista National Liberation Army: “It’s very difficult when you have a theoretical 
scheme that explains the whole of society and then you arrive in that society and you 
realize that your scheme explains nothing.”593
591 Keenan, F a b le s  o f  R e sp o n s ib il i ty ,  13-
592 F rom  “L ives” in  B rain  D aldorph , O u tca sts . (W arrensburg, M issouri: M id-A m erica  P ress, 2 0 0 0 ) ,  3 .
Q uoted  in H igg in s, N ich o las. “The Z apatista U p risin g  and th e  Poetics o f Cultural R esistance”
A l t e r n a t i v e s  25 , no. 3 (2 0 0 0 ):  3 64 .
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I visited the refugee camps in July, at the height of the monsoon season, when 
bridges and rivers were impassable and we had to mount an army truck in order to 
make the treacherous crossing between town and the camps. The entry to the refugee 
camp itself was not heavily manned or under obvious security, though we did have to 
sign our names in a visitor log-book as well as answer a few questions as to the 
purpose of our visit. I had previously obtained a rather arbitrarily-granted permit to 
carry out two days of camp research from the Nepalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
who happened to be in town that day and whose “protection” I was lucky enough to 
secure after an “official” visit consisting of a discussion of my legitimate academic 
standing, his powerful political status and his making sure I knew that being allowed 
to visit the camps was a favor and an act of good will on his part.
During my short visit, I was escorted at all times by a local Red Cross official 
who insisted on showing me the progress that had been made toward making the 
refugees self-sufficient. They had developed their own vegetable gardens, though the 
size of the enterprise was hardly on a scale sufficient to feed even one-hundredth of 
the population. Gardening had thus become an activity for the ‘consumption’ of 
visitors, onlookers and report-writers. I was shown the ‘offices’ of the various 
support and humanitarian organizations, unmanned at the time, each housing a 
table, a few chairs and posters from central offices situated on other continents of the 
world. I asked if I could speak with the camp leader, after which I was escorted to an 
improvised “studio” where Hari (the camp leader) and myself sat and talked 
surrounded by children, heat and flocks of lazy flies. Hari spoke good English in a 
slow and composed manner: his tall, slender shape bent forward to meet me. His feet 
were barej he had on a white shirt and off-white pants. He smoked a lot and used his 
hands and body to gesture in making a point, seldom looking around longer than a 
moment. There was little obvious urgency in his tone, not much drama either, and as
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the conversation turned from a question-answer format to story-telling, I set aside 
both my list of prepared questions and my recorder.
Hari spoke of the refugees’ attempts at setting up schools, of their political 
and social initiatives, of the frustrated youth they had to appease daily, of the 
difficulty of finding food or securing any income, of feelings of uselessness, of the 
idleness threatening of the spirit of the young, of depression and the difficulty of 
motivating people to be engaged in community activities, of the poor condition of 
their dwellings, of the lack of healthcare, and of their political demands towards both 
the Bhutanese and Nepali governments. As has been suggested by Michel Agier in 
relation to ethnically-mixed refugee camps in Africa, the re-construction of life in the 
refugee camps is an example of “inventions of the everyday” that “transform the 
everyday vision that the refugees have of space in their daily lives ... accompanied by 
the beginnings of a symbolics of space.”594 Hari placed no demands on me, did not 
make me promise anything in return for his audience and only asked that I 
accompany him on a short tour of the camp, without the Red Cross official present. 
Hari introduced me to a former Bhutanese Cabinet Minister whose crooked hut was 
packed with so many books that, to me, it represented a vain attempt at maintaining 
a bastion of knowledge despite the poverty and widespread illiteracy of the camp 
population. We shared chai, spoke to a young, angry man who insisted he was 
doomed to be an exile forever. This young man had been a teacher in Bhutan and 
had, since coming to the camps, helped set up a school here as well. Hari introduced 
me to a group of weaving children between the ages of 8 and 15 whose work helped 
bring their families some income; to the leader of the Youth political organization, 
also named Hari, who in turn showed me his family hut — a room wallpapered with 
newspapers, two single beds shared by five people, a few cooking pots and a small
5 9 4  A gier, “B etw een  W ar and City, 3 2 9 -
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pile of clothes. We spoke some more; I was given copies of ‘secret’ documents, shown 
the largely empty food distribution center, and urged on to take pictures.
2.2. pictures and seeing
I would like to address one of those pictures next, if only briefly. In a 
dissertation on bearing witness, it seems to me almost obligatory to engage at least 
one photograph, photographs themselves representing one definitive form of 
testimony. A photograph freezes time and sometimes even defies linguistic 
explanation. In other words and as Roland Barthes has suggested, a photograph 
supposedly (re)presents the “this was” of an event, the definitive modality allowing us 
a glimpse into the past. For the purposes of this dissertation, photography will be 
discussed as one among a number of modalities relating the past. I hope to show that 
it is not necessarily a better, for being truth-faithful, tool of addressing memory. The 
fluid, unreliable, singular nature of memory defies even the supposedly non-partisan, 
unbiased message a photograph communicates. However, photography does offer an 
eye in the past and for its pertinence to the subject of this thesis, I will address it next.
Taking lead from Liisa Malkki’s criticism of the enframing function of much of 
official refugee photography, itself informed by “the shared view that refugees 
constitute something different, unusual, and strange and hence, require a unique 
identity, ”5951 would like to offer my thoughts on a picture I took in the Bhutanese 
refugee camp. As Malkki suggests, photographic portrayals of refugees nowadays are 
extremely abundant, offering “a strong visual sense of what ‘a refugee’ looks like. ” 596 
Thus, photographs portray a certain aspect of being a refugee which is never the 
whole picture of being a refugeei women are portrayed working, tending to children,
5 9 5  N yers, R e th in k in g  R e fu g ees ,  13.
596 M alkki, P u r i t y  a n d  Exile,  10.
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animals, the fields while men are portrayed doing most everything else that might
characterize their social and class status in their particular population, ethnic groups.
Review of contemporary photographs of refugees would seem to suggest that 
children have come to embody, more easily than adults, the universalism of 
bare humanity. The intent here is ... to signal the operation of a humanistic, 
universalizing representational practice that should be studied further.597
Thus, women are predominantly represented as caretakers surrounded by children, 
as the backbone of the camps, as the peace loving but also, as weak, overworked and 
in need of assistance. Commenting on Salgado’s Family o f M an photographic 
collection, Nyers observes: “One is struck with the impression that during their exile, 
refugees never worship, trace, build, sing, or dance. /  It is as if only in the context of 
welcoming the return of statist identities that such activity can be seen.”598 Women 
are often portrayed in colorful clothing, wearing traditional jewelry, keeping up 
appearances. Men, on the other hand, are often missing from pictures or if they are 
present, it is either their manliness and strength that come across, or their idleness.
In the set-up of the African refugee camp, men are often the breeders of violence, the 
rapists, the uncontrollable ones. In an effort to avoid homogenizing images of 
refugees that work to obscure their individual humanity “erasing the specific, 
historical, local politics of particular refugees, and retreating instead to the 
depoliticizing, dehistoricizing register of a more abstract and universal suffering,”599 
and in an attempt to supplement my previous discussion of the refugees everyday 
ways of securing their bodies and speaking for themselves, allow me to turn your 
attention to a picture of a man holding an umbrella. This is my proof that I was there 
and that Hari was the way I describe him. The photograph bears witness.
597 M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  E x ile , 11.
598 N yers, R e th in k in g  R e fu ges ,  21-2.
5 9 9  M alkki, P u r i t y  a n d  Exile,  13.
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3- defiance: hari’s um brella
The picture is of Hari, the camp leader, holding a rainbow-colored umbrella to 
protect himself from the afternoon sun. Hari is standing in the middle of one of the 
main roads in the camp, surrounded by a handful of curious, grinning children. At 
the time, his umbrella seemed to me the biggest umbrella I had ever seen in my life, 
maybe because he had a lot of sun to protect himself against, maybe because its 
colors stood in sharp contrast to what I had come to know as the grim camp reality.
In the picture, Hari is posing for me as I prepare to leave the camp, he is saying good­
bye. I am reminded of a line from Alphonso Lingis’ Foreign Bodies going something 
like that: “The body is always lived in f ir s t person .”600 The body is secured in first 
person as well. Allow me to address Hari’s umbrella as one such tool for securing his 
body. First, the umbrella protected him from the scorching sun. After all, that is 
what an umbrella’s purpose is - to protect the body from harsh atmospheric 
conditions. Hari’s umbrella, in that sense, was an object that aided Hari in his daily 
dealings with the heat, why not with the grayness as well.
Elaine Scarry recognizes the fact that “the ongoing work of civilization is not 
simply in making x or y but ‘making making’ itself, ‘remaking making,’ rescuing, 
repairing, and restoring.”601 Her understanding of the piles of shoes, eyeglasses, hair 
and bags on display at ‘Auschwitz I’ memorial site showcases the sentient nature of 
all suffering. Had it been raining, Hari would have been using the umbrella to protect 
himself from getting wet. When it rains, as it does daily during the monsoon season,
I am sure he uses it for this purpose too. Hari s umbrella, bearing witness to the 
needs and sensations of Hari’s body, was defined by and definitive of the specific 
temporal implications of Hari’s environment that day. It drew my attention to one 
aspect of being in the camp. As Jenny Edkins suggests with reference to exhibits
(>oo A lp h o n so  L ingis. Foreign Bodies. (N ew   ^ork: R outledge, 1994)- 48 .
o*” E la in e  Scarry* The Body  in Pain. (N ew  York: Oxford U n iversity  Press. 1985), 279.
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(piles) of concentration victims’ objects, “they are intimately connected with the 
living body yet survive it. Not sentient or alive they are nevertheless the last 
witnesses.”602 The umbrella infused Hari’s environment with color. Hari was still in 
a refugee camp and though he was the camp leader, he had no privileges of the kind 
that would have made him feel ‘freer,’ or ‘more protected.’ That umbrella, however, 
protected Hari’s body from the heat. Over the years of being in the camp, Hari and 
his body had developed the skill of endurance; he had become good at it. This kind of 
endurance is unknown to one who has never inhabited a refugee camp.
Hari’s picture interrupted the sense of continuity and generalizability my visit 
to the camps had created in me. I had seen everything I expected to see, safe that one 
huge, colorful umbrella. Suffering, I was reminded, is never simply debilitating or 
tragic. “There rises up in the body that suffers a power of endurance, which can 
generate powers to devise mockeries, evasions, rules, and even posthumous 
subversions.”6°3 “The worst part,” acknowledged by Nietzsche as our surface self- 
consciousness defined by dependence on others was, for a moment, supplemented by 
independence. Hari’s language was that of the body, bearing witness to being a 
refugee at the outer limits of language. Hari’s umbrella distinguished him from the 
hundreds of other refugees I saw that day though it did not make him special or more 
valuable, only more memorable in the way in which it implicated him in a kind of 
empirical presence that was marked by the sign of the unexpected performative. As 
far as “the conservative presumption of positivism and empiricism ... become the 
essentializing and politically suspect practices against which a self-proclaimed anti- 
essentialism approves itself,”604 the world of the refugees, independent of the signs, 
academic models and theoretical orientations available to encompass it, is already
602 E d k in s, Tr-aum a a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litic s , 152.
I,0'j L ingis, Foreign Bodies,  63.
V icki Kirby. Telling Flesh: The Substance o f  the Corporeal.  (N ew  York: R ou tledge, 1997), 52 .
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and always present to itself, both independent of, and anterior to, those signs that 
would designate it . ”6°5
Allow me to draw a connection between this thought and Derrida’s “there is 
no outside-text. Derrida is not implying that everything is just language and nothing 
else, nor that the subject is caught up in an endless system of referrals, going from 
one meaning to another, from one signifier to another, from one text to another, ad 
infinitum, never reaching an end, never yielding a conclusion. In other words, if we 
understand Derrida, we will expect no instruction from him. The absolute resistance 
to a type of ‘clinical exegeses’606 inherent in all processes of representation alerts to 
the nature of all things, bodies included, as unstable, shifting and contingent.
What is more, Derrida’s “there is no outside-text” calls into question “the 
common understanding of materiality as a rock-solid ‘something’ that is, as the 
absolute exteriority that qualifies and limits the efficacy of representational 
practices.”60? For, if we entertain the thought that whatever (sovereign) insecurity 
measures itself against is not security but always another form of insecurity, then we 
come to appreciate the fact that the breathing, moving, sleeping vibrations of 
everyday life address security not as secure bodies but as bodies of matter. That is, 
bodies that secure themselves otherwise than through the legitimate networks of 
sovereign power, bodies whose materiality bears witness to the parallel processes of 
assimilation and exclusion that underwrite and, at the same time, define the claims of 
legitimate sovereign power. Securing the body of the refugee reveals the myth of 
sovereign security.
605 K irby, T ellin g  F lesh , 55.
606 D errida , W r i t in g  a n d  D if feren ce , 1 7 5 -
607 K irby, Tell ing  Flesh, 61.
254
My stay in the refugee camp was very short and thus, limited in its ability to 
draw grand conclusions as to the “real” refugee life. In addition, my visit took place 
five years ago and since, a lot of things have changed without my knowledge. I am 
perhaps only in a position to quote here from someone I know from my significantly 
longer library sojourns: We who are hom eless-... we, children of the future, how can 
we be at home in this today? We feel disfavor for all ideas that might lead one to feel 
at home even in this fragile, broken time of transition ... we ourselves who are 
homeless constitute a force that breaks open ice and other all too thin ‘realities.’”608
□n being classified
Such is your present removal from what you take to be your 
native land. For by nature there is no such thing as a native 
land, any more than there is by nature a house or farm or 
forge or surgeiy, as Ariston said; but in each case the thing 
becomes so, or rather is named and called. (Plutarch)
If it does not drive you crazy, walking though a refugee camp could possibly 
shake you out of the dark unawares characteristic of well-wishers. If you are not in a 
hurry or followed by a Red Cross official whose vehicle is the only one that can take 
you back across the bridge-less river, you might find yourself lost among the rows of 
huts and buzzing mosquitoes, amidst the arid, though tended to, landscape of the 
camp. If you forget all that you’ve been taught in international relations seminars, 
you might engage the multiplicity around you: presence as incoherent, unpredictable, 
stubborn, and disfigured as it is beautiful, humbling, and real. I take that back, do 
not totally forget the academic seminars and your own homeland — their weight 
should help keep you honest. Remember the silence and your own lack of words 
when faced with the numbing appeal of the tragic. You might also remember your 
mother’s heeding to call all things and people by their proper names, to give your pen 
to a kid and write your name on the humid, colossal wall of scorching, monsoon air as
h‘>8 F riedrich  N ie tzsc h e  quoted  in D aniel W arner. “Search in g  for R esp o n s ib ility /C o m m u n ity  in  
In tern a tio n a l R e la tio n s” In C am pbell and Shapiro (ed s). M o r a l  S p a c e s , 18.
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if writing on sand at high tide -  the words legible only in the short moment between 
rising and receding tide.
Normal life, as I knew it outside the camp, was recreated as camp life and 
despite the fact that here lived despair, anger and disappointment, there was a reality 
of very real self-sufficiency and resilience that, bearing witness to the refugees’ 
hardiness, also commented on another important issue: the securing of bodies. 
Visiting the camp reminded me of going to a museum, where you are given an 
information booklet, a set of headphones with an itemized, narrated tour of the 
premises and the freedom to walk around as long you don’t touch, approach too 
closely or in any way damage the exhibitions. You are not allowed to take pictures of 
the exhibits, reproductions of which can be purchased from the gift shop on your way 
out. Museums, in addition to being emissaries of high culture, represent spaces 
targeting the mass consumption of art; spaces where art unfolds itself via the medium 
of a commercialized spectacle.
the  'cam p ' a s  m useum
I like going to museums; I don’t like going to camps. For the ways in which 
museums serve as depositories of knowledge, as archival spaces organizing, storing, 
classifying, preserving and disseminating information — they are valuable examples 
of a particular kind of securing. As Edkins has suggested, museums become places 
of pilgrimage since they contain relics”609 that prove the authenticity of the exhibits. 
Despite and perhaps because of the recent academic insistence on the importance of 
narrative, museums become designated as (the) legitimate endorsers of a specialized 
kind of knowledge responsible for the identification of certain art pieces as surrealist 
art, avant-garde art, cubism, Art Nouveau, Art Deco, futurism, fauvism, minimalism, 
contemporary art, modern art, postmodern art, pop art, Rococo, etc, etc. Museums -
6ot) E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  the  M e m o r y  o f  Poli tics ,  1 5 3 -
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topic-specific, time-specific and often highly specialized — grant entry to some by 
denying entry to others. So do refugee camps.
Allow me to draw a brief analogy between the refugee camp and the memorial 
camp (museum). Jenny Edkins suggests in her Trauma and the M em ory o f  Politics 
that memorial sites are, often and with time, appropriated for different purposes — 
either for the creation of a narrative of suffering, for the dissemination of a certain 
linear view of history or, as is often the case, for the political purpose of the states 
that often “use accounts of heroism and sacrifice to tell a story of the founding of the 
state, a narrative of glorious origin.”610 In a suggestive though not directly analogous 
way, refugee camps remind of memorial camps in that, like the memorial at 
Auschwitz or that at Buchenwald and Dachau, visiting these sites is often a guided 
affair, with the sites themselves serving the memory of a particular group of people 
rather than the memory of the event in its entirety. As Edkins poignantly observes, 
“perpetrators, or descendants of perpetrators, current generations demand a 
particular, unique place in the memory of the horror”611 which makes the nature of 
memory itself the result of a productive, performative and very dynamic rendition of 
history, much unlike the linear renditions we are used to receiving.
Allow me to suggest, furthermore, that the fact of refugee camps, their 
practical implications for real-life people and their inherently political nature 
demand a reading away from monolithic, generalized accounts. Indeed, the fact that 
most refugee camps do not figure on demographic and/or physical maps of the 
countries that host them suggests that in the official imaginary of states and 
international organizations, the camps figure as hors-lieux. In fact, and as Edkins 
has shown in her account of various memorial and museum sites, representations
610 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  the  M e m o r y  o f  Poli tics .  54-
611 E d k in s, T r a u m a  a n d  the  M e m o r y  o f  Poli tics .  135.
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themselves often become suggestive of a monolithic history that, in addition to being 
instrumentalised, is also constructed as an imperative, as something that “had to be 
told. 612 Malkki has suggested that, in the case of refugees, the monolithic nature of 
this story is often challenged by ‘victims’ themselves who produce their own ‘mythico- 
histories that approximate in very specific ways whatever it is they feel represents 
best what it means to be part of the nation they would like to return to, politicizing 
displacement beyond the narratives of the sovereign state.
tim e-lines as  bubbles
Even though Jenny Edkins argues that non-linear narratives (no narratives at 
all for that matter) of trauma and suffering address the ‘real’ as opposed to the 
‘symbolic,’ that is, linguistic and representational elements of an event through what 
she calls ‘encircling,’ I would like to suggest that ‘encircling’ the real itself can become 
problematic if and when it leads to ignoring or minimizing the importance of the 
temporality of an event, as in the reality of its having taken place in time. Though 
monolithic, totalizing and sometimes violent, linear narratives do alert to one 
characteristic of an event -  its historicity - that, when engaged properly, does not 
neutralize an event but makes us aware of the social real inherent in every traumatic 
real.” Setting up “linear time” against “trauma time,” in addition, can create a 
dichotomous relationship that differentiates between “standard political processes” 
and “real politics.”6^  Both ‘linear’ and ‘trauma’ time, it seems, have to be reproduced 
all the time, the former because of its indebtedness to a scientific notion of truth, the 
latter because of its singular, non-reproducible nature.
jji this sense, it is not that the language of science with its insistence on 
replicability and generalizability is opposed to that which is ‘unspeakable’ and
E dkins, T r a u m a  a n d  the  M e m o r y  o f  Poli tics ,  17.
E dkins, T r a u m a  a n d  the  M e m o r y  o f  Politics,  xm -xiv.
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unrepresentable but rather that, like Celan’s poetry, the language of trauma, if you 
wish, is additionally informed by performative, innovative and non-scientific idioms. 
This is important because it points to the ways in which language comports itself in 
the face of trauma in ways that are respectful of the demands of trauma yet, not 
totally reducing itself to silence. Survivors have their ways of re-inventing language, 
of appealing to language in novel ways, be it through poetry, through actions, or even 
through the eyes and pens of observers and researchers. While they may operate 
within the dominant power structures, within the dominant linguistic community, 
they are not entirely beholden to it or locked within its boundaries in much the same 
way that their lives are not locked within and defined by “trauma time.”
Allow me to summarize my engagement with Jenny Edkins so far. First, I 
agree with her that some survivors are not in a position to bear witness to what has 
befallen them, either because they are dead or because they are unable to speak. The 
fact of their non-existence should not be taken, as has been the case with some 
prominent deniers of the Holocaust, namely Robert Faurrison, to mean that the 
Holocaust never happened. On the contrary, the absence of the witness is first and 
foremost indicative of the destructive, real nature of the event. Silence, too, bears 
witness. In that sense, I do not subscribe to Edkins use of Agamben to show that the 
true witness to the Holocaust is the dead witness. To say this means to construct the 
Holocaust as a certain kind of event, the witnesses to which are only and always dead. 
In fact, that contradicts Edkins' own contention that the Holocaust has been 
institutionalized and brought to mean certain things and not other things.6 4
Second, I do not agree that there is no available language with which to 
express what the survivors went through. There might not be an easy access to this 
language and it might be the case that testimony is, in the end, not linguistic at all,
E dkins, T r a u m a  a n d  the M e m o r y  o f  Poli tics .  i~.
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but to say that no language accommodates the camp experience on the one hand and, 
the experience of being a survivor on the other, means to gloss over testimonies that 
en§aSe the difficulty of finding words alongside the imperative to try and find words.
Edkins herself recognizes this aporetic condition in her engagement with 
memorials and museums, though she nevertheless considers “trauma time” and 
methods of encircling direct representation as singularly appropriate for dealing with 
traumatic memories. Third, to say that a survivor has not seen the extremities of 
what it means to have been in a concentration camp means to fix a definition of what 
it means to be a survivor with anything outside that definition considered as 
inauthentic survivor testimony.615 As Edkins correctly identifies, alternative 
testimonies in the form of art installations, museum exhibits, videos, and literature 
do “find other languages of remembrance.”616
Finally, I do agree with the shared opinion that giving survivors a forum at 
truth and reconciliation commissions or other such juridico-political constructions 
does restore their agency to an extent. However, as Fiona Ross (2003) has shown, 
these commissions, set up to offer closure and truth, end up reinforcing a state- 
supported view and a certain explanation (construction) of the event in question. 
Regarding the inherently problematic nature of representing violence and/or trauma 
and, as Veena Das has suggested, “because the use of violence is rooted in 
philosophical doubt it invites not only elaborate structures of representation but may 
also be surrounded by silence and the breakdown of signification.”61? An engagement 
with and enabling of a singular narrative voice alerts us to the whole issue of how 
one narrates the dissolution of the very possibility of narration.”618 It is to this
6>5 E d k in s, T ra u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litics , 18.
616 E d k in s, T ra u m a  a n d  th e  M e m o r y  o f  P o litics , 17.
D as, The W o r d  a n d  the W orld ,  177.
818 D as, T he W o r d  a n d  the W o r ld ,  2 0 6 .
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dissolution and the ways in which it is represented in the world that this thesis bears 
witness.
Dn the  politics of displacem ent: the discipline and its d issidents
Refugees are theorized and conceptualized by the discipline of political 
science in ways that grant them one kind of legitimacy by denying them other kinds. 
What is more, “the generalization and problematization of ‘the refugee’ may be linked 
to yet another process, that of the discursive externalization of the refugee from the 
national (and, one might say, cosmological) order of things. ”6 l9 Securing the body of 
the refugee is presented as a most natural duty of the nation-state in reaction to the 
fact of displacement. Refugees are easily categorized by virtue of certain identifiers, 
their individual identities having been subsumed into a collectivity held together by 
the common denominator of political rightless-ness. The ways in which refugees are 
identified by adding the negative “less” to words is not just an indication of how they 
differ, but also of how they define their positive linguistic counterparts. What 
happens when we call them by their names? What happens to the name-less 
objectification that has, for years, defined their joint treatment in the eyes of states 
and benefactors? What would happen when the sovereign center is denied the power 
to name? Do we, then, introduce a different kind of politics? Does that change us?
Refugees become “at once no longer classified and not yet classified. They are 
not longer unproblematically citizens or native informants. They can no longer 
satisfy as “representatives” of a particular local culture. One might say they have lost 
a kind of imagined cultural authority to stand for their kind or for the imagined 
‘whole’ of which they are or were a part.”620 Their bodies are thus secured, rather 
than against the kind of violence that created them in the first place, because they are
6UI M alkki. P u r i ty  a n d  Exile, 9.
620 M alkki, P u r i t y  a n d  Exile.  17.
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seen as potential threats to national-security. Refugee camps, in that sense, are 
constructed as politically-controlled safe havens, spaces of segregation responsible as 
much for the ‘safety’ of the refugees as for the securing and perpetuation of state- 
informed conceptions of order and security.
Allow me to suggest that the discourse on refugee camps and refugees is a 
monolithic discourse whose “tendency to universalize ‘the refugee’ as a special ‘kind’ 
of person occurs not only in the textual representation of refugees, but also in their 
photographic representation.”621 Refugees are thus made into the exemplary case for 
thinking the moment of being in flight. A teleological view of history, characterizing 
much of modern political science reasoning, ignores the active role that individual 
human beings play in shaping politics, history, and policy. The universalization of 
the category of “the refugee,” overlooks and neutralizes the fundamental inequalities 
responsible for erasing the specific, singular circumstances of particular refugees in 
favor of discussions of universal suffering and universal solutions to this suffering.
To put this another way, “understanding displacement as a human tragedy and 
looking no further can mean that one gains no insight at all into the lived meanings 
that displacement and exile can have for specific people.”622 In the same way that 
narratives focus on ‘the refugee’ as a general category, thus within specific instances 
relating to one refugee population or another, narratives can also generalize and posit 
one ethnic group against another, one gender against another, one person against 
another, one home against another. As Michael Shapiro has pointed out, “The 
identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person -  man versus 
woman, national citizen versus nomad, one versus another ethnicity, and so on -  
provide the foundations for historical and contemporary forms of antagonism, 
violence, and interpretive contention over the meaning of actions. ... Such stories ...
hLM M alkki, P u r i t y  a n d  Exile , 9.
M alkki, P u r i t y  a n d  Exile , 16.
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are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility and tend to escape explicit 
contentiousness within ongoing political and ethical discourses.”623 A mainstream 
desire for generalization underwrites the desire to identify perpetrators vs. victims, 
killers vs. murdered, victors vs. losers, citizens vs. others.
Against such essentialization I would like to entertain a responsibility 
cognizant of chance, contingency and the fable. Thomas Keenan has observed that 
much himself: “What could responsibility mean without the risk of exposure to 
chance, without vulnerability to parasitism, without the opening of the conscious ego 
by way it cannot contain ... without the indiscernible wolf. Without them, there 
would be nothing of responsibility but the choice between yes and no, this or that, 
nothing but the application of a rule of decision and a program. ”624 A generalized 
account of refugees’ rights and needs, of the kinds of dangers they face overlooks 
specific, culturally-informed instances of coping, violence and oppression that not 
only recreate “life back home,” but also serve to underwrite, legitimize, and construct 
the everyday lives of camp refugees. Yet, rights can only proceed as generalizations. 
As Liisa Malkki has suggested, refugees often live with and hide behind “fictitious 
identities” that protect them from being picked on, insulted, or discriminated against 
by their host country. A 2001 quote from the then Australian Immigration Minister, 
Phillip Ruddock, illustrates the reality of bureaucratic ignorance brilliantly, if sadly, 
thus:
There are some people who do not accept the umpire’s decision, and believe 
that inappropriate behavior will influence people like you and me, who have 
certain values,... who have certain views about human rights, who do believe 
in the sanctity of life, and are concerned when people say, “If you don’t give 
me what I want, I’m going to cut my wrists” ... You say it’s desperation, I say 
that in many parts of the world, people believe that they get outcomes by 
behaving in that way. In part, it’s cultural.623
623 S h ap iro , “T h e E th ics o f  E n co u n ter ,”59.
6-4 K eenan , F ables  o f  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 51.
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On the contrary and as Liisa Malkki has shown, most people do “not imagine for
themselves a categorical, collective existence as ‘refugees.”’626 Michael Dillon, too,
has challenged our thinking on the refugee by positing the latter
as a figure of the “inter” -  or the in-between  -  of the human way of being, as a 
figure of the ‘inter’ of international relations ... a scandal for politics ... in that 
the advent of refugee is always a reproach to the formation of the political 
order of subjectivity that necessarily gives rise to the refugee. The scandal is 
intensified for any politics of identity that presupposes the goal of politics is 
the realization of sovereign identity, and for any politics that presupposes that 
the goal of politics requires epistemology’s promise to secure political 
knowledge.627
This suggests that the ‘heterogeneous’ nature of politics is informed by a search for a 
dwelling place, by an indebtedness to the very insecurity underwriting both the 
refugee and the nation-state.
Allow me to offer a revised definition of what it might mean to be a refugee, 
coming from refugees themselves. For the ways in which this comments on the 
discrepancies between commonly-circulated official labels and rarely addressed self­
definition, I will share the quote in its entirety:
The following points were commonly listed: (1) a refugee is always afraid that 
he will be transported somewhere against his will; (2) a refugee cannot vote of 
be elected to office; (3) a refugee cannot be a member of a political party; (4) a 
refugee always has to worry about Leave Passes; and finally, (5) a refugee does 
not feel free. It is significant that all these aspects of an imagined refugee’s 
status were hindrances and constraints. The leitmotiv ... was the curtailment 
of liberty and freedom. Freedom here referred to personal freedom in the 
contemporary context, in distinction to the more collective, revolutionary 
freedom envisioned by the camp refugees ...628
The day-to-day coping mechanisms for securing the bodies of individual human
beings define and shape the lives of refugees without commenting directly on the
nature of academic or political/policy solutions. Sewing one s lips, writing poetry,
and Hari’s rainbow-colored umbrella protecting him against the hot tarai62? sun, all
represent everyday rebellions against being fixed within a taxonomy one cannot
626 M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  E xile , 159.
627 D illon , “T h e S can d al o f  th e  R efu gee ,” 9 5 -
628 M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  E xile , 160.
h2t' T a r a i  is the  N ep ali w ord for th e  flat p lains in the  S ou th eastern  part o f  th e  cou n try  w h ere th e  refu gee  
cam p s are located .
264
escape from. They represent individual struggles that, as part of a collective refugee
identity, become the fruits of modern technologies of power. Michel Foucault alerts
us to this dynamic when he speaks of the ways in which, within the prison or the
mental clinic, power produces reality, knowledge and truth.63° In a similar vein,
Malkki problematizes the refugee camp thus:
The refugee camp as a ‘technology of /  power’ produced its objects and 
domains of knowledge on two levels. On the one hand, it helped to constitute 
‘the refugees’ as an object of knowledge and control. On the other, the camp 
served to produce ‘the refugees’ as a categorical historical subject empowered 
to create a mythico-history of a people. Its local, particular pragmatics 
conspired to produce -  independently of intentions -  historical narratives 
which reordered the lived-in world. Thus, as a technology of power, the camp 
ended up being much more than a device of containment and enclosure; it 
grew into a locus of continual creative subversion and transformation.^1
The refugees in Malkki’s study are divided into camp refugees and the self­
settled town refugees. Michel Agier suggests that for Malkki, “the attachments of the 
exiles to the places they came from were of varying strength and the effect of 
detachment also depended on their place of relocation.”^ 2 The camp refugees 
(opposed to the more cosmopolitan town refugees) nurture and exhibit a desire to 
hold onto their refugeeness as a marker of purity, authenticity, and faithfulness to a 
Hutu Burundi identity -  a faithfulness that would eventually make them privy to 
higher moral claims and earn them re-entry into the native cosmology from which 
they have been forcefully expelled.
Malkki insists on the importance and constitutive political, social and ethical 
power of camp-produced mythico-histories, the daily reenactment of which becomes, 
with time, an idealized version of ‘home,’ a type of symbolic securing of both history 
and the present. I would like to suggest that this self-coined and self-narrated 
security defines the refugees vis-a-vis their imagined identities and not according to
630 M ichel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison. (N ew  York: Vintage, 1995).
(,:il M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  Exile,  236 -7 .
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government trade-marked, statist, or humanitarian logic. This suggests that the 
business of defining security as this or (and not) that is a performative act: a case of 
both opening and limiting reality, containing within itself seeds of transformation 
and stasis, bearing on the ways in which we conceptualize and tell of both politics and 
history. As Malkki suggests, refugeeness and exile “can show how nationness -  and 
historical-national consciousness -  may come to be formed in the absence of a state 
apparatus or a territorial base -  or, indeed, other characteristics usually taken to be 
necessary properties of nations.”633
This suggests that questions of security, nationhood, belonging and liminality 
are not static derivatives of a monolithic theoretical exercise, but are contingent on 
the everyday experience of being a refugee. “In contrast to the evolutionary view of 
historical consciousness as a capability typifying a particular stage of development, it 
is being argued here that actors produce historical consciousness where they need it 
Tor the sake of life and action.’”63^  This exposes the act of ‘securing bodies’ as an 
ongoing process whose “historicity is cumulative, dynamic, and capable of continual 
transformation, not a static structure fixed outside of time and place.”635 Notions of 
security, community and agency are, in the refugee camp, formed outside the 
cosmology and mythology of nation-states and in turn redefine the contours of the 
nation-state itself.
The statist and humanitarian desire to produce “secure bodies” is, in turn, an 
example of a totalizing, monolithic, and generalized order eager to encompass both 
the norm and the limit, both the citizen and the exile, without really encompassing 
them at all. “Possibility implies calculability and hence the erasure of the ethico- 
political. If ethics and politics name the urgency and necessity of a response, freedom
633 M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  E xile , 254 .
(’3-i Friedrich  N ie tz sc h e  q uoted  in M alkki, P u r i ty  a n d  Exile.  242 . 
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and responsibility name the impossibility of doing it with any guarantees.”^ 6 The 
implications of this for the discipline of political science suggest that the accepted 
necessary and sufficient conditions for explaining war and peace, truth and falsity, 
reality and fiction, are indeed informed by a desire to translate epistemological into 
academic into humanitarian into policy into all-encompassing commitments.
□n the  (e x tra o rd in a ry  n a tu re  of human experience
With a variable key
you unlock the house in which
drifts the snow of that left unspoken.
Always what key you choose
depends on the blood that spurts
from your eye or your mouth or your ear.
You vary the key, you vary the word 
that is free to drift with the flakes.
What snowball will form round the word 
depends on the wind that rebuffs y o u .637
Recall my engagement with the question of ‘liminality’ alongside Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of “bare life.” What I will show next is that Agamben’s theory of 
the exception, in addition to problematizing the relationship between sovereign 
power, law and the human being, ends up essentializing, totalizing and normalizing 
the concept of ‘liminality’ itself. What is more, Agamben’s “state of exception” 
actually posits the limit of the ability of the sovereign state to secure itself, thus 
making it possible for the refugee to “out-live” the kind of security prescribed for 
ailing sovereign states. Peter Nyers’ interpretation of Agamben s Homo Sacer 
uncovers that “refugees are included in the discourse of normality and order only 
by virtue of their exclusion from the normal identities and ordered spaces of the 
sovereign state. As an object of classification, the refugee is trapped within the 
sovereign relation of the exception, a relation that Agamben argues is an extreme
636 K eenan , F ab les  o f  R e s p o n s ib i l i t y  ,72 
b:i7 C elan , P o e m s  o f  P a u l  C elan,  59.
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form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.’”638 
However, I would like to point out that the “state of exception” is not a stable 
category, something that remains fixed, permanent, and into whose universe 
different other concepts, people-, subjectivities are plugged in. Nyers defines the 
state of exception” as “central to understanding how both sovereign power and 
refugee identity are constituted.
The basic idea behind the state of exception is that the law can be legally 
suspended for the purpose of preserving that state and its system of law for some 
grave internal or external danger.”6^  As discussed in this chapter, refugees and other 
liminal beings exceed the “state of exception” insofar as they bring to it a sense of 
contingency, a sense of living an everyday made possible despite the insecurity 
associated with limit states, through temporality. The refugee’s relationship to the 
sovereign realm, however, should not be defined and viewed solely from the critical 
perspective of an ‘inclusive exclusion’ that can be just as normalizing as the 
sovereign’s view of the political significance of the refugee herself. In either case, 
even when defined against practices challenging sovereign discourse, the refugee still 
remains conceptualized from within statist logic as a marginalized, right-less, illegal, 
and dangerous subject because of the latter’s exclusion from the nation, and not 
because of the state’s primary role in that exclusion. To speak of an inclusive 
exclusion’ means giving the refugee back into the hands and policies of states, 
defining the refugee first and foremost as a limit figure and then, as a subjectivity set 
up negatively, as something that needs to be fixed, normalized, and secured.
Moving between the exception, “bare life” and the violence inherent in any 
law, Agamben envisions a kind of modern politics predicated on liminality. If we
N yers, R e th in k in g  R e fu gees ,  xiii.
639 N yers, R e th in k in g  R efu gees ,  xii.
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want to be equal to the absolutely new tasks ahead, we will have to abandon 
decidedly, without reserve, the fundamental conceptions through which we have so 
far represented the subjects of the political (Man, the Citizen and its rights, but also 
the sovereign people, the worker, and so forth) and build our political philosophy 
anew starting from the one and only figure of the refugee.”640 While the figure of the 
refugee is informative of the relationship between human life and the violence of 
sovereign power, I disagree that the we should build our political universe on the 
figure of the refugee, as if the latter were some sort of a fundamental example of “bare 
life,” somehow better informing what it means to be human and what the condition 
of being in flight encompasses. Agamben is, throughout his political writings, quite 
ambiguous on the relationship between “bare life” and politics. That is, in Homo 
Sacer, he draws a distinction between “bare life” and natural life -  the latter defined 
as politicized natural life, albeit its politicization as excluded from the body politic.
The refugee is one of many examples available for understanding nation-state 
bred homelessness. Agamben’s “homo sacer” as the being that can be killed but not 
sacrificed, as the being whose life is neither sacred nor purely human, underwrites 
the refugee only as a limit concept, only as an ‘inclusive exclusion.’ Both referents 
have the effect of taming the refugee. Giorgio Agamben posits the refugee as a 
problem by framing the refugee as the epitome of liminality, as the physical 
representation of the limit. This, I argue, ends up essentializing the category of the 
refugee in service of a theory of the limit. For the ways in which this informs of the 
anomalous nature of modern politics, it is a useful exercise. For its failure to 
differentiate between the “excess and access to that excess it does disservice both 
to discussions of the refugee and to understanding bearing witness to that condition.
<’4o G iorgio A -a m b e n  “B evond H um an R igh ts” In R a d ic a l  T h o u g h t  in I ta ly :  A P o te n t ia l  Poli tics .  E dited  
by P ao lo  V irno and  M ichael H ardt. (M inneapolis: U n iversity  o f  M in n esota  P ress, 1996), i 5 9 -
269
Recall that Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ underwrites the issue of human 
(in)security by insisting on the nature of “bare life” as depoliticized life as opposed to 
politicized life, most clearly manifest in the citizen.”641 There is no depoliticized life. 
If homo sacer’ is excluded from the normal limits of the state, if the former 
constitutes an excess over the protection sovereign power can offer, then the ‘bare’ of 
‘bare life’ alerts to a type of security that, underwritten by the suspension of law, 
demands a collapsing of the distinction between inclusion and exclusion beyond the 
political. “Bare life” thus is neither on the outside nor on the inside. While Agamben 
is correct in correlating the political plight of refugees with their otherwise 
compromised personal freedom, what he does ends up pointing once again to the 
citizen as the starting point of the analysis on rights, identity and freedom. In that 
sense, Agamben reinforces the rhetoric on sovereignty (by making it constitutive of 
the definition of human life). He does not challenge the sovereign rhetoric as such 
nor the violence it gives birth to, while at the same time offering an extension of the 
Foucauldian logic of biopower. “Bare life” is discussed as politically unqualified life 
ultimately coinciding with the political.642
‘Bare life’ is thus made to stand for a form of the political predicated on 
violence and death. Or, perhaps it is the constitution of the political itself as insecure 
that Agamben hints at, without criticizing, in his analysis. While modern politics is, 
to a great degree, defined by blurring the distinctions between inside and outside, 
citizen and foreigner, national and (inter)national, it is nonetheless neither the sole 
arbiter nor the ultimate sovereign responsible for the creation of sovereign law [that]
exempts itself from operating.”643
Here the paradox is that precisely the figure that should have embodied 
human rights more than any other -  namely, the refugee -  marked instead 
the radical crisis of the concept. ... In the system of the Nation-State, the so-
641 R ajaram  an d  G rundy-W arr, “T he Irregular M igrant as H om o Sacer, 34 .
(’4- N vers, R e th in k in g  R e fu g e e s , 39 .
<’43 Rajaram and Grundy-W arr, “The Irregular Migrant as H om o Sacer," 36 .
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called sacred and inalienable human rights are revealed to be without any 
protection precisely when it is no longer possible to conceive of them as rights 
of the citizens of a State.1644
In light of the ways and modalities through which the refugee takes up the
task of securing her/himself, in light of the daily actions that inform the lives of
refugees and other liminal beings, in light of the fact that refugees problematize the
sovereign desire for security and in lieu of a conclusion, I offer the following
proposition: Though historically informed and constituted, the factual example that
each refugee represents defies the generalizations of theoretico-historical accounts.
That is, Agamben’s generalizing, juridico-political conception of displacement is in
fact underwritten by particular, singular examples of so-called “bare life.” Borders,
exceptions and violent laws are made possible, coherent and endorsed by specific
processes of control, othering, and exclusion. Agamben’s generalizing thought on
refugees, concentration camp victims (.Muselmanner) and other liminal beings fails
to acknowledge the existing, real testimonies borne out of the “exception.” Liminal
beings are not defined by silence, nor does their testimony need be evoked only to
posit the restorative powers of the nation-state. Liminal beings are human because
they are not defined by their liminality -  their historical experiences bear witness to
the excess of living over the truth that theory can give. The complex process of
bearing witness to being liminal recalls, once again, Paul Celan s witness:
That which you wove out of light thread 
I wear in honor of stone.
When in the dark I awaken
the screams, it blows on them, lightly.
Often, when I should stammer, 
it raises forgotten crinkles 
and he that I am forgives 
he that I was.
But the god of the slagheaps 
beats his most muted drum, 
and just as the crinkle ran 
the grim one puckers his brow.645
h-u A g a m b e n ,  H o m o  S a c e r , 160-1.
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d e to u rs  and right-of-w ays
I have suggested that the camp should be addressed not only as an example of 
the state of exception become norm, as suggested by Agamben, but also as a complex 
and multi-faceted cartography; as an active, productive force inscribed on the bodies 
of people; as an archive, if you will, of actions, journeys, and stories. The (refugee) 
camp is thus both a poetic and a juridical trope. It is, indeed, the bio-political space 
where power confronts bare life as its referent object, but there is also mediation 
under way -  mediation through the tools of staying alive. Agamben maintains that in 
the camp, the state takes the maintenance of naked/biological life in its hands, thus 
turning the camp into a “stable spatial arrangement inhabited by naked life that 
cannot be inscribed into the order.”646 Beyond and before the juridico-territorial- 
sovereign order of the camp’s living space lives life that is not just a problem to be 
solved, but a journey to be taken -  a journey ripe with detours, roundabouts, and 
right-of-ways; a journey predicated on the power of the human to bear witness to 
something beyond liminality.
The refugee camp, in its juridical origins, cannot only be a precedent of 
absence, since the human being’s presence cannot be thought of negatively. In the 
camp one finds the food distribution center, the Red Cross and UNHCR offices, 
patches of wilting vegetables, check-in points. There are also the rice fields tended by 
refugees, the spinning wheels on the front steps of huts, Hari s umbrella, schools, the 
striking intensity of color; there is Nepali tea the refugees offer me in a gesture of 
hospitality, there are crinkled relatives pictures waving from a distant past, shelves 
with books learned by heart; there are freedom-fighters, ambassadors to Kathmandu, 
Delhi and Geneva i all ling-graphic tropes constituting the state of exception above all 
else as inhabited by human beings.
15 Celan, Poem s of Paul Celan. 39.
A g a m b e n ,  M eans  Without End. 43-
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Michael Dillon points out, with reference to the complexity of systemic, 
genetic relationality and connectivity, that “Being-in-formation necessarily entails 
deformation, reformation, mutation and transformation. ... characterized by gaps, 
misfires, breaks, slippage, unintended outcomes, transference and change.”647 In this 
sense, fragmentary thought is a measure of a system’s liminality, a measure of a 
theory’s breaking point, a measure of language’s point of “dissipation.” In the refugee 
camp, “power derives from aligning itself with the force of the law of becoming, 
rather than with some sovereign monopolizing of ‘being the law,’ that is, “the force of 
law without significance.”648 Violence under the flag of the nation-state has been 
theorized as a way to discipline non-conformity and smooth out ideational doubts, so 
that “the State can in this way say that violence is ‘primal,’ that it is simply a natural 
phenomenon the responsibility for which does not lie within the State, which used 
violence only against the violent, against ‘criminals’ -  against primitives, against 
nomads -  in order that peace may reign . ” 649 Borders are strengthened, the police 
wear the clothes of (un)ruly violence, and modern, civilized man exists within a 
reality of neo-racism, where “the refugee is human or s/he is nothing, or at least 
nothing but raw stuff’650 inhabiting “those ambivalent spaces between the inside and 
the outside, between order and disorder, between clarity and ambiguity. 651
In the words of Slavenka Drakulic, a Bosnian refugee herself: “A refugee is 
someone who has been expelled from somewhere but does not go anywhere because 
they have nowhere to go.”652 From within the state system, the voice of the refugee 
tells a story: its variations, palpitations, and insecurity reveal a desire for
647 M ich ael D illon . “P oststru ctu ra lism , C om plex ity  and  P oetics Theory, C u ltu re , S o c ie ty  17, no . 5 
( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  13.
648 D illo n , “P oststru ctu ra lism , C om p lex ity  and P o etic s ,” 13-4.
649 D oty , A n ti- I m m ig r a n tis m  in  W e ste rn  D e m o c ra c ie s , 14-
65° D illo n , “T h e S o v ereign  an d  th e  S tranger,” 102.
6^ 1 D o ty ,.A nti-Im m igrantism  in Western D em o cra c ie s .  27.
<*- S lavenka Drakulic.  The Balkan Express.  (Perennial,  1994)
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engagement. When understood in its contingency, the hegemony of territorial 
sovereignty and conventional discursive choices is revealed as a myth and a story that 
offends and excludes without admitting to it.
I hope the preceding chapter has been able to show the following three things: 
first, that securing the body of ‘the refugee’ underwrites the legitimate claims to 
power by nation-states themselves. Second, that being a refugee is a historical 
experience that is neither generalizable nor calculable beyond the fact of the 
experience itself. Third, that refugees communicate and relate their experiences 
through a number of different non-statist tropes: songs, poems, dance, umbrellas.
The material sentience of their bodies, in their daily negotiations with displacement, 
instantiates a witness. As Michel Agier has shown, “camps create id en tity”6^  that is 
relational in addition to reproducing and reinforcing an already existing ethnic, 
socio-economic, cultural, gender and/or political associations. Camp life is dynamic, 
versatile, innovative and experiential in addition to being experimental. The plural 
nature of the refugee camp suggests the likewise plural identity of the refugees 
themselves -  always only a nuanced commentary on the individual experiences that 
shape, constitute and predicate our own understanding of the limit. In Michel Agier’s 
words:
The policing of emergency makes the camps spaces of pure waiting without a 
subject, to which are opposed the sketches of subjectivation that appear in 
initiatives aimed at recreating work, in movements, meetings, even in the 
conflicts themselves. Being human, winning back this medium of identity, of 
being-in-the-world, which war and exodus endanger, therefore consists for 
each refugee in redefining his or her place by taking advantage of the 
ambivalence of the life of the camps, between emergency and duration, the 
here-and-now and the long term, the sentiment of physical or social death, 
and the recommencement of life.654
An examination of the processes by which a refugee discourse informed by liminality 
and exception reveals that securing the camp means constructing the latter as a
6 5 3  A gier, “B etw een  W ar and City, 333-
(>54 A gier, “B etw een  W ar and City, 337-
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naked, deserted and segregated space where sociability, integration, and peace are 
not envisioned but delegated as the prerogatives of nation-states, recognized cities 
and legal citizens. Performative ways of bearing witness to the everyday, 
polymorphous life of refugees offers one way of ‘out-living’ this security.
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CONCLUSION
The task of this thesis has been to question and expand on conventional 
international relations engagements with language and refugees. In the preceding 
pages, language was addressed as constitutive of discussions of power, sovereignty, 
and displacement. I have argued that bearing witness should be understood as a 
system of practices and inventions, and not as a fixed, truth-centered engagement 
with ‘event’ in language. I have also argued that the refugee, as a figure of displaced 
humanity, ‘out-lives’ nation-state underwritten security by giving rise, in refugee 
camps, in town settlements or in detention centers, to a system of practices, 
interactions and ‘cultures’ that re-introduce a security of a different kind. The latter, 
underwritten by individuals’ efforts at maintaining life, should be addressed more 
carefully both by academics and by policy makers for its implications not only for our 
understanding of displacement but also, for the systems and discourses informing the 
current relationship between difference and sameness, between outside and inside, 
between fiction  and truth.
Bearing witness, defined as an ongoing, performative and singular 
engagement with the wrorld, was theorized as one such mode of address. Paul Celan’s 
poetry in particular was shown to bear witness to the performative, relational 
potential not only of poetic, but of all language. It is this potential within poetry that 
exemplifies the performance of the exceptional without reducing the latter to a pre­
committed, pre-determined discourse on dichotomies. The politics of bearing 
witness, informed to an equal degree by an engagement with the potential of 
language, memory and practice to prevent, rather than enable change, places 
emphasis on the constitutive relationship between these categories and their ability 
to supp lem ent as well as problematize one another.
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Chapters one and two of this thesis focused on already existing theoretical 
discourses. Giorgio Agamben’s engagement with homo sacer as a given category of 
identification was exposed for its passive, rather narrow definition of exceptionality. 
In effect, bearing witness was differentiated from the static charge of an Agambenian 
luminal universe and positioned in light of its relationship to Veena Das’ concept of a 
“descent into the ordinary.” The result of this analogous positioning was intimation 
into the nature of bearing witness as a certain performative enactment of the 
ordinary without being reduced to it.
Chapter two examined the “resuscitative” character of poetic witnessing as 
hypothesized by Jacques Derrida. What I could not have foreseen, yet what became a 
guiding point of my discussion, was the contradictory character of Derrida’s own 
reading of witnessing. On the one hand, his particular attention to the poetry of Paul 
Celan introduced a certain melancholic fix to Derrida’s argument. A discourse 
predicated on a commitment to the constitutive power of loss, mourning and lacunas 
cannot, in turn, re-fashion itself unproblematically by revealing its life-giving 
potential. Thus, Derrida’s treatment of poetic language was either insufficiently 
Derridean or there was, indeed, something more going on. In this analysis, poetic 
language remains a constitutive part of language as such and as such, must, to some 
extent at least, also be informed by language’s potential to fall into lethargy, passivity, 
and repetition.
Having alerted to this contradiction without dismissing poetic language, I 
argued for the potential performativity of all language, including the language of 
political science. From there onwards, the thesis unfolded as an exploration and an 
exegesis on the different idioms of engaging the singularity of bearing witness.
Poetry, memory, storytelling and academic accounts uo ic  analyzed in their
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relationship to the process of witnessing. Derrida, more so than Agamben, was an 
important starting point for uncovering the political nature of the relationship 
between undecidability, language and power. I argued for the practical ramifications 
of his thought in asking to take the political nature of witnessing seriously.
fault lines and measured dangers
It behooves me at this point to share a few of the potential weaknesses borne 
out of this thesis. First, based exclusively on an engagement with other people’s 
writing, the argument put forth might be considered speculative in nature. That is, 
my own truth-claims remain unsupplemented by the kind of material evidence 
known as ‘case studies,’ field work, and more generally, data. To this I would like to 
respond in a twofold way. On the one hand, I have tried to argue that engaging 
poetry (as data) and stories indeed has if not quantitative, at least methodological 
implications for practicing politics, both by academics and by policy makers.
On the other hand, recognizing that no academic endeavor is impervious to 
error, omissions or misjudgment means that the same is true for this thesis. As a 
finite work, constructed and organized around certain academic directives, this thesis 
is not only limited in its ability to mark a fissure, but it is also indebted for its 
existence to the history of academic research. As such it summarizes, quotes, follows 
from, executes and brings to life a certain institutionally-informed image. However, 
it also problematizes, performs, questions, marks and discloses the fissures and 
detours that characterize the nature of academically-informed truth production.
Each of these methodological commitments obliges a certain amount of exclusion of 
alternative inclinations. The goal of my argument is not to disseminate difference, 
but rather, to promote a methodological openness that, in its polymorphous nature, 
can be defined as almost pragmatic. Standing at the crossroads of literature, history 
(historiography) and political studies, this thesis hopes to ha\ e disclosed and
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commented on the ethical commitments resulting from the demand for a decision on 
one hand, and a commitment to critical engagement on the other.
A second potential weakness of this thesis has to do with its practical 
implications or, traditionally put, with its contributions to the advancement of the 
discipline. My response will offer a summary account of the purpose of this thesis. It 
was never intended to serve as an aid tool for practitioners in the field of 
displacement. In addition, it never aspired to prescribe, envision or enumerate 
strategies and directives for coping with, alleviating and preventing wars, 
displacement and/or suffering. Having said that, this thesis was borne out of a 
frustration with the methodological rigidity characterizing social scientific endeavors. 
Having been dismissed for being non-scientific, amateurish and immature at a 
number of conferences, I wanted to figure out a way of refining my thoughts on 
witnessing and language. It soon became apparent to me that these negative 
responses were indeed rooted in a certain kind of fear: a fear of being exposed and 
accused similarly for being non-scientific, dilettante and immature. The only way to 
outgrow this fear was to face and engage it. The only way to continue bearing witness 
to my academic interests was to stop apologizing for what they were not and embrace 
what they were. The purpose of this thesis has been to do just that. Yet, I hope it has 
not outgrown its own reservations and fears by moving beyond doubt, skepticism and 
failure.
As suggested in chapter six, a discussion of bearing witness as a performative, 
interpretive and singular engagement with language carries implications for the 
ways(s) in which we practice, understand and represent our involvements with the 
world and its inhabitants. These implications always remain as affirming as they are 
problematic. This thesis hopes to have laid the foundations for a further discussion 
of the inadequacies and normalizing agendas characterizing the current discourses on
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testimony, security, and displacement. That is, beyond its appeal to well-known 
critiques of sovereign power and logic, this thesis testifies to a mode of addressing 
being in the world that recognizes the latter’s multiple, chaotic, and messy nature. All 
this should, in the end, alert to the potential of language choices to construct and 
serve as data informing of intentions, agendas, and interests. It should also provoke 
a re-examination of the ways in which we, as academics, comport ourselves both in 
the community of our peers and among the subjects of our study.
what fallow s... the future of the project of witnessing
There are a number of possible implications of this thesis beyond its current
engagements with poetry and political science alongside each other. Here are a few
of the puzzles it leaves unanswered in hopes that they will be engaged more closely in
future research. First, what is the relationship between bearing witness and
institutions? What are the implications of a critical engagement of witnessing for an
understanding of the institutional make-up of international relief agencies,
governments and humanitarian organizations? Nevzat Soguk alerts to the
constitutive relationship between institutions and the understanding and theorizing
of the refugee. His genealogical study of refugee production and definition since the
1920s uncovers a displacement of responsibility for the creation of refugees from the
failure of sovereign states to a discourse heavily invested in humanitarian caretaking
offered by international organizations. This leads to a situation where
Refugees are seen as a problem existing prior to international regime 
activities, while the regime activities are represented as solutions to that 
difficult, morally demanding but not intractable problem of the refugee within 
the otherwise presumably unproblematic, stable, and secure territorial 
bounds of the sovereign state.655
This means, in addition, that refugee situations are ‘dealt with’ from the point of view 
of institutionally-identified issue-specific problems - food, water, clothing, shelter,
(’55 Soguk, S ta te s  a n d  S tra n g e r s ,  13.
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repatriation, safety -  and not from a point of view informed by refugee demands 
themselves. This has led to a situation where refugee crisis have been turned into 
managerial tasks where the gross yield is measured in directives, annual output, and 
problem containment, and not in an informed, accountable and performative (that is, 
informed by difference, change and unpredictability) action.
This brings me to a second alley for future research I see exemplified by this 
thesis, namely -  the academic institutionalization of the refugee. Recall my 
engagement with Dominic LaCapra’s re-casting of the relationship between truth 
claims and idioms of expression. I suggested that this had important implications for 
the practice of academic political science. By way of a reminder, the question of fact 
was posited as an outcome of the dynamic and highly complex simultaneous interplay 
of narrative structures and the desire for (scientific) truth. Furthermore, this each- 
other-constitutive relationship alerted to important work of problematization carried 
out equally rigorously both in the direction of truth claims and in the direction of art 
forms. That is, “the interaction or mutually interrogative relation between 
historiography and art (including fiction) is more complicated than is suggested by 
either an identity or a binary opposition between the two, a point that is becoming 
increasingly forceful in recent attempts to reconceptualize the study and of art and 
culture.”656
More specifically and regarding the academic engagement of ‘event’ and 
‘witnessing,’ LaCapra’s discussion opens the ways for a revision of the ways in which 
events of witness such as conferences, forums, symposiums and workshops, to give a 
few examples, are constructed and carried out under the auspices of mutually and 
institutionally agreed-upon conventions, directives and expectations. Thus, it is not 
uncommon for an international conference on refugees’ roster to be made up almost
656 LaCapra, W riting H istory, Writing Trauma, 15-
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entirely of academics, policy makers and practitioners, with refugees themselves 
hardly in sight but for an occasional photography exhibition, brochures with 
summary introductions of crisis populations, and donation pleas on their behalf. 
Over the past four years of attending such conferences, a number of questions have 
come to mind regarding the relative absence of refugee input at refugee-themed 
academic functions. I cannot help but attribute this either to the fact that refugees 
are not considered legitimate and scientifically-sound contributors to the discussion 
or that there is an institutionally-endorsed agreement pertaining to the very idioms 
and modalities of engagement allowed to transpire within the walls of academia. For 
claiming to be venues for critical thinking, conferences actually discipline the very 
discourses that make them up.
Since conferences, workshops and seminars are directly involved in the 
business of ‘bearing witness,’ a close examination of their underlying rhetoric and 
m ission statement vis-a-vis their actual unfolding has the potential to inform not only 
of the relationship between researcher and discipline, but also of the greater rhetoric 
defining the academic pursuit of truth as such. In fact, engaging in dissident moves 
in an effort to provoke a response uncover the particular assumptions and beliefs that 
make up the actual practice of creating an academic community. In addition, these 
practices are not isolated examples of yearly or semi-annual displays of ongoing 
research. They also serve as gate-keeping exercises aimed at defining the legitimacy 
q£ academic projects by helping to validate hierarchies and truth-claims symptomatic 
both of the University as a venue responsible for the creation and dissemination of 
power/knowledge and of the practicing of academic research in general.
In that sense, a serious engagement with witnessing as a performative, 
dynamic, and singular activity can help identity the various ways in which academics 
have become desensitized to the violent outcomes of their work. The kind of violence
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I am referring to is not measured in heads cut-off, mutilated bodies or destroyed 
houses, though the analogy can be just as physically and emotionally crippling as it is 
subtle. In that sense, Roland Barthes insight regarding the role of literature in 
establishing agency is especially potent for a discussion of the relationship between 
academic political science and the subjects of its research. “Modern literature is 
trying, through various experiments, to establish a new status in writing for the agent 
of writing. The meaning or the goal of this effort is to substitute the instance of 
discourse for the instance of reality (or of the referent), which has been, and still is, a 
mythical ‘alibi’ dominating the idea of lite r a tu r e .”^  An insistence on truth can 
provide one such ‘alibi’ for the otherwise rashly generalizing voice of academically- 
legitimated research.
The third opening has to do with a number of questions, each of them 
important in a different way in relationship to witnessing. Allow me to enumerate 
them here: “What is the relationship between truth and oral testimony?” “How has a 
discourse on expert witnesses contributed to the construction of the process of 
witnessing as truth-producing?” “How does testimony obtained under torture in a 
world ripe with terrorism redefine the study of politics?”
Engaging the politics of bearing witness is especially problematic in instances 
of trauma. This is so not only because of the painful nature of traumatic memories, 
but also because of the burden shared by victims and liberators alike in reinstating 
justice. Engaging the politics of witnessing remains, however, crucially important for 
understanding the motivations, desires and beliefs that underwrite all instances of 
truth-construetion and ideological dissemination. It is difficult to understand how 
living in refugee camps for years at a time can be considered, by international 
institutions and nation-states, a viable alternative to being at home. It is even more
B arth es, R olan d . “T o W rite: An In transitive Verb?" InriT/re. S tr u c t ,™ !  C on jroue t-sy: T he L a n g u a g e  
o f  C r it ic ism  a n d  th e  S c ien ces  o f  M a n . (B altim ore: J o h n s H opkins P ress, 1970), 1 4 4 -
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difficult to remain impartial when analyzing survivors’ testimonies. Yet to fail to 
engage the myriad ways in which language constructs and determines knowledge 
means to abandon the dialogue before it has begun.
This thesis remains an attempt at thinking through the implications our 
understanding of responsibility and witnessing has for how we comport ourselves in 
the world as political beings. As I have tried to show, there is no one Truth on which 
we can base our actions, nor is there a universal law we can rely on forjudging the 
good from the bad, the innocent from the guilty, the friend from the foe. All we can 
hope to do is engage continuously questions of security, displacement, and testimony 
without settling for the appeasing allure and reassuring representation of nation­
states’ daily construction, dissemination and justification of violence.
284
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agamben, Giorgio. “Beyond Human Rights.” In Radical Thought in Italy: A  
Potential Politics, edited by Paolo Virno, Michael Hardt, 159-166. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
-----------  Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel
Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
-----------  ppe End o f the Poem: Studies in Poetics. Translated by Daniel Heller-
Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
----------- . M eans Without End. Notes on Politics. Translated by Vincenzo Binetti
and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
----------- - Rem nants o f Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Translated by
Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone, 2002.
----------- - The State o f Exception. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago, II: The
University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Agger, Inge. The Blue Room. Trauma and Testimony among Refugee Women: a 
Psycho-Social Exploration. Translated by Mary Bille. London: Zed, 1994.
Agier, Michel. “Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee 
Camps.” Ethnography 3, no 3 (2002): 317-341.
Allen, William. Ellipsis. Of Poetry and the Experience o f Language after Heidegger, 
Holderlin, and Blanchot. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2007.
Amadiume, I. and Abdullahi An-Na’im (eds.) The Politics o f M emory: Truth,
Healing and Social Justice. London: Zed, 2000.
Antze, Paul and Michael Lambek (eds.) Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and  
M emory. New York: Routledge, 1996.
Ashley, Richard. “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique.” Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 17, no 2 
(1988): 227-262.
----------- . “Living on Borderlines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War.” In
International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings o f World 
Politics. Edited by James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro. Massachusetts: 
Lexington, 1989.
Attridge, Derek. The Singularity o f Literature. London: Routledge, 2004.
Auge, M. Non-Places: Introduction to An Anthropology o f Superm odernity. 
Translated by John Howe. London: Verso, 1995-
Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics o f Space. Boston: Beacon, 1994.
285
Badiou, Alain. “La Poesie en condition de la philosophic.” Europe: Revue litteraire 
mensuelle 78, nos. 849-850 (2000): 65-75.
-----------  Being and Event. Translated by Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum,
2007.
Baer, Ulrich. Rem nants o f Song. Trauma and the Experience o f M odernity in
Charles Baudelaire and Paul Celan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
2000.
Balibar, Etienne. “Violence, Ideality and Cruelty.” N ew  Formations: The Ethics o f  
Violence 35 (1998): 7-19.
-----------  Politics and the Other Scene. Translated by C. Jones, J. Swenson and C.
Turner. New York: Verso, 2002.
Bar-On, D. The indescribable and the undiscussable: reconstructing human
discourse after trauma. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University 
Press, 1999.
Barthes, Roland. “To Write: An Intransitive Verb?” In The Structural Controversy: 
The Language o f  Criticism and the Sciences o f  Man, 1 3 4 - 1 5 6 . Ed. Richard 
Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimomre: Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 7 0 .
Baucom, Ian. Specters o f the Atlantic. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.
Beardsworth, Richard. Derrida & the Political. London: Routledge, 1996.
Beier, J. Marshall. International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, 
Cosmology and the Limits o f International Theory. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005.
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Translated by Harry Zohn. Fontana, 1973.
----------- _ One-Way Street and Other Writings. Brooklyn, NY: Verso Classics, 1997.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Instant o f M y Death. Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Bleiker, Roland. “Give it the Shade’: Paul Celan and the Politics of Apolitical Poetry.” 
Political Studies XLVII (1999): 661-676.
----------- . “Stroll Through the Wall: Everyday Poetics of Cold War Politics” In
Alternatives 25, no 3 (2000): 391-409.
----------- , “Editor’s Introduction.” In Alternatives 25, no 3 (2000a): 269-285.
----------- _ “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory.” Millenium: Journal
o f International Studies 30, no 3 (2001): 5 0 9 _5 3 3 -
_______ . “Forget IR Theory.” In The Zen o f International Relations: IR Theory from
East to W est,” edited by Stephen Chan, Peter Mandaville and Roland Bleiker. 
New York: Pelgrave, 2001a.
Bloom, Harold et al (eds). Deconstruction and Criticism. London: Routledge, 1979.
286
Booth, W. James. Communities o f M emory. On Witness, Identity and Justice. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Boujbiha, Angel. My Name is Asylum and Other Poems” in Borderlands e-journal 1, 
no. 1, available at [May 29, 2008].
http://www.borderlands.net.au/volinoi 2002/bouibiha poems.html
Brady, Ivan. “In Defense of the Sensual: Meaning Construction in Ethnography and 
Poetics.” Qualitative Inquiry 19, no 4 (2004): 622- 644.
Brassetta, James and Dan Bulley. 2007. “Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism 
and Beyond?” International Politics 44, no. 1(2007): 1018,1-18.
Bruns, Gerald L. H eideggers Estrangements. Language, Truth and Poetry in the 
Later Writings. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
----------- . “Introduction.” In Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gadamer on Celan.“Who Are
You and Who Am  I?” and other essays. Albany, NY,: State University of New 
York Press, 1997.
----------- - Tragic Thoughts a t the End o f Philosophy. Language, Literature, and
Ethical Theory. Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press. 1999.
----------- - On the Anarchy o f Poetry and Philosophy. A Guide fo r  the Unruly. New
York: Fordham University Press. 2006.
Buber, Martin. I  and Thou. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Touchstone, 1971.
Burke, Anthony. “Poetry Outside Security.” Alternatives 25, no. 3 (2000): 307-322.
----------- - “Borderphobias: the politics of insecurity post-9/11.” Borderlands e-
journal 1, no. 1 (2002), available at: http://www.borderlands.net.au/
----------- _ “New Languages: Power, Feeling, Communication.” BorderlandsE-
Journal 2, no. 3(2003), available at: h ttp : / / w w w .borderlands.net.au
Campbell, David. Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives 
o f  the Gulf War. Boulder, Co: Lynne Reinner, 1993.
Campbell, David and Michael Shapiro (eds.) Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and  
W orld Politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Caplan, Jane. W ritten on the Body. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000.
Caplan, Jane. “‘This or That Particular Person’: Protocols of Identification in 
Nineteenth CenturyEurope.” In Documenting Individual Identity: The 
Developm ent o f State Practices in the Modern World, 49-66. Edited by Jane 
Caplan and J. Torpey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Caputo, John. Against Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1993-
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, N arrative, and History. Baltimore:
287
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Celan, Paul. Collected Prose. Translated by Rosemarie Waldrop. London: Carcanet,
1999.
Poems o f Paul Celan. Translated by Michael Hamburger. New York: 
Persea Books, 2002.
 . Selections. Paul Celan. Translated by Pierre Joris. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2005.
 • Threadsuns. Translated by Pierre Joris. Los Angeles: Green Integer, 2005a
 . Breathturn. Translated by Pierre Joris. Los Angeles: Green Integer, 2006.
Cixous, Helene. Three Steps on the Ladder o f Writing. Translated by Susan Sellers.
New York: Columbia University, 1994.
Clark, Timothy. The Poetics o f Singularity. The Counter-Culturalist turn in
Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the late Gadamer. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University, 2005.
Clarke, Juanne, Angela Febbraro, Maria Hatzipantelis and Geoffrey Nelson (eds). 
“Poetry and Prose: Telling the Stories of Formerly Homeless Mentally 111 
People.” Qualitative Inquiry 11, no. 6 (2005): 913-932.
Coady, C. A. J. Testimony: A  Philosophical Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992.
Constantinou, Costas. “Poetics of Security.” Alternatives 25, no 3 (2000): 287-307.
Copeland, Dale C. The Origins o f M ajor War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001. 
Darby, Philip. “Reconfiguring “the International”: Knowledge Machines, Boundaries,
and Exclusions.” Alternatives 28 (2003), 141-166.
Das, Saityabrata. “The Melancholic Name.” Paper presented at a Lancaster
University colloquium November 2006.
Das, Veena (ed). The Word and the World. Fantasy, Symbol and Record. New
Delhi: Sage, 1986.
----------- . “Composition of the Personal Voice: Violence and Migration.” Studies in
H istory 7, no. 1 (1991): 65-77.
----------- . “Language and Body Translations in the Constitution of Power” in
Daedalus 125, no. 1 (1996): 67-92.
-------------- . “V io le n c e  a n d  the Work of Time.” In Signifying Identities, 5 9 ~7 3 - Edited
by Anthony P. Cohen. London: Routledge, 2000.
_______ . Life and Words. Violence and the Descent into the Ordinary. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 2007.
Das, Veena, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Rampele and Pamela Reynolds (eds).
Violence an d  Subjectivity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000.
288
Dauphinee, Elizabeth. The Ethics o f Researching War: Looking fo r  Bosnia.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.
Davis, Colin. Levinas. An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA).
Fact Sheet 71: N ew  M easures to Strengthen Border Control. Public 
Affairs Section, Canberra, 2002.
Derrida, Jacques. Writing and Difference. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978.
----------- . Positions. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1981.
----------- . Dissemination. Translated by Barbara Johnson. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1983.
----------- - The Ear o f the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation.
Translated by Peggy Kamuff and Avita Robell. Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988.
----------- - “Force of Law.” Translated by Mary Quintance. Cardozo Law Review  972,
1990.
----------- . Acts o f Literature. New York: Routledge, 1992.
----------- . The Other H eading. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992a.
----------- . Aporias. Translated by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1993.
----------- . On the Name. Translated by David Wood, John P. Leavey Jr., and Ian
McLeod. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 9 5 -
----------- _ Archive Fever. Translated by Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1995a.
----------- . The Gift o f Death. Translated by David Willis. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1995b.
----------- . Points. Interviews 1974-1994. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1995a.
----------- _ Politics o f  Friendship. Translated by George Collins. London: Verso,
1997.
----------- , Demeure. Fiction and Testimony. Translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
----------- . O f H ospitality. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2000a.
_______ . “A Self-Unsealing Poetic Text’: Poetics and Politics of Witnessing.” In
Revenge o f the Aesthetic, 180-207. Edited by Michael P. Clark. Berkeley, CA:
289
University of California Press, 2000b.
----------- • The Work o f Mourning. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Acts o f Religion. Edited by Gil Anidjar. New York: Routledge, 2002.
On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2002a.
Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy. Translated by Peter 
Pericles Trifonas. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002b.
----------- . Sovereignties in Question. The Poetics o f Paul Celan. Translated by
Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005.
De Vries, Hent and Samuel Weber. Violence, Identity and Self-Determination.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Diken, Biilent and Carsten Bagge Laustsen. “’Camping’ as a Contemporary Strategy -  
From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities.” AMID Working Paper Series 
(Aalborg: Aalborg University, no. 32 (2003): 1-26.
Dillon, Michael. Politics o f Security. London: Routledge, 1996.
-----------  “The Sovereign and the Stranger.” In Sovereignty and Subjectivity.
edited by Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram and Veronique Pin-Fat. Boulder, Co: 
Lynn Reinner, 1999.
----------- . “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the Tnter’ of
International Relations and Continental Thought.” In M oral Spaces. 
Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, edited by David Campbell and Michael 
J. Shapiro. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999a.
----------- . “Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics.” Theory, Culture and Society
17, no. 5 (2000): 1-26.
----------- . “Correlating Sovereign and Biopower.” In Sovereign Lives, edited by Jenny
Edkins at al, 41-60. New York: Routledge, 2004.
----------- < “a  Passion for the (Im)possible: Jacques Ranciere, Equality, Pedagogy, and
the Messianic.” European Journal o f Political Theory 4, no. 4 (2005): 429- 
4 5 2 .
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies. Statecraft, 
Desire and the Politics o f Exclusion. London. Routledge, 2003.
________ . “Maladies of Our Souls: Identity and the Voice in the Writing of Academic
International Relations.” In Cambridge Review o f International Affairs 17,
no.3 (2004): 3 7 7 -3 9 2 - 
Douglass, Ana and Thomas Vogler (eds). Witness and Memory. The Discourse o f
Trauma. New York: Routledge, 2003.
290
Edkins, Jenny. Poststructuralism  and International Relations. Bringing the 
Political Back In. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
Trauma and the M em ory o f Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003.
Edkins, Jenny, Veronique Pin-Fat and Michael J. Shapiro (eds). Sovereign Lives.
Power in Global Politics. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Felman, Shoshana and Dori Laub. Testimony. Crises o f Witnessing in Literature,
Psychoanalysis, and History. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Feldman, A. Formations o f Violence: the narrative o f the body and political terror
in Northern Ireland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Felstiner, John. Paul Celan. Poet, Survivor, Jew. New Haven: Yale University,2001.
Fioretos, Aris (ed). W ord Traces. Readings o f Paul Celan. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994.
Fitzpatrick, Peter. “Bare Sovereignty.” In Politics, Metaphysics and Death, 4 9 -7 3 .
Durham: Duke University Press, 2 0 0 5 .
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology o f Knowledge and the Discourse on Language.
Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon, 1972.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison. New York:
Vintage, 1995.
 ----- _ Fearless Speech. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001.
Frey, Hans-Jost. Interruptions. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1996. 
Fynsk, Christopher. “The Realities at Stake in a Poem.” In Word Traces. Readings 
o f Paul Celan, edited by Aris Fioretos. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Translation edited by Garret Barden and 
John Cummings. New York: Routledge, 1975.
----------- . Gadam er on Celan. “Who Am  I  and Who Are You?” and other Essays. ”
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997.
George, Jim. “Realist Ethics,’ International Relations and Post-Modernism: Thinking 
Beyond the Egoism-Anarchy Thematic.” In Millenium: Journal of 
International Studies 24, no. 2 ( i9 9 5 ) : i 9 5 -223 - 
Gilpin, Robert. W ar and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 2003.
Glissant, Edouard. Poetics o f Relation. Betsy Wing (trans). Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1 9 9 7 - 
Hacking, Ian. The Social Construction o f What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1 9 9 9 - 
Haddad, Emma. “Who is (not) a Refugee?” European University Institute working
291
paper SPS No. 2004/6  (2004): San Domenico, Florence.
Hand, Sean, ed. The Levinas Reader. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1989. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2 0 0 0 .
Hartman, Geoffrey. Saving the Text. L iterature/Derrida/Philosophy. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
------------- Scars o f the Spirit. The Struggle Against Inauthenticity. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Hatley, James. Suffering Witness: The Quandary o f Responsibility after the 
Irreparable. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
Herman, Judith. Trauma and Recovery. New York: Basic Books, 1992.
Higgins, Nicholas. “The Zapatista Uprising and the Poetics of Cultural Resistance” in 
Alternatives  25, no. 3 (2000): 359-375.
Hoy, Terry, “derrida: postmodernism and political theory.” Philosophy Social 
Criticism  19 (1993): 243-260.
Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics o f Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. London: 
Routledge, 1988.
-----------  j 'he Politics o f Postmodernism. London: Routledge, 1989.
Josselson, R, A. Lieblick (eds). The Narrative Study o f Lives. Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage, 1993.
Jost-Frey, Hans. “Intertextuality in Celan’s Poetry.” In Word Traces. Readings o f  
Paul Celan, edited by Aris Fioretos. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994.
Kamuff, Peggy (ed). A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991.
Keenan, Thomas. Fables o f Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in 
Ethics and Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
Kirby, Vicki. Telling Flesh: The Substance o f the Corporeal. New York: Routledge,
1 9 9 7 -
La Capra, Dominick. Writing History, Writing Trauma. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Poetry as Experience. Translated by Andrea Tarnowski.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1 9 9 9 - 
-----------  H eidegger and the Politics o f Poetry. Translated by Jeff Fort. Chicago, IL.
University of Illinois Press, 2007.
Laemmers, Ellen. Refugees, Gender and Human Security. A theoretical
introduction and annotated bibliography. Utrecht. International Books,
292
1999-
Langer, Lawrence. Using and Abusing the Holocaust. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006.
Lavery, Carl. “Audiology.” http: / /w7ww.pacitticompanv.com/audiologv-review.html.
Law, John. After method: mess in social science research. London: Routledge, 2004.
Levi, Primo. The D rowned and the Saved. London: Abacus, 1989.
Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other. Richard Cohen, trans. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1987.
-----------  O f Ood Who Comes to Mind. Translated by Bettina Bergo. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1988.
-----------  Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 1998a
Levine, Michael G. The Belated Witness. Literature, Testimony, and the Question 
of Holocaust Survival. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
Lingis, Alphonso. Foreign Bodies. New York: Routledge, 1994.
Lynch, Michael. “Archives in formation: privileged spaces, popular archives and 
paper trails.” H istory o f the Human Sciences 12, no.2 (1999): 65-87.
Macdonald, Sharon and Gordon Fyfe (eds). Theorizing Museums: Representing 
Identity and Diversity in a Changing World. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
Malkki, Liisa. Purity and Exile: Violence, M emory and National Cosmology among 
Hutu Refugees in Tasmania. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 5 -
----------- . “Speechless emissaries: Refugees, humanitarianism and dehistoricization.”
In Siting Culture, edited by K. Olnig and K. Hastrup, 223-253. London: 
Routledge, 1997.
Marion, Jean-Luc. InExcess. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.
Mbembe, Achille. On the Postcolony. Berkeley: California University Press, 2001.
Mouffe, Chantal (ed.). Deconstruction and Pragmatism. London: Routledge, 1996.
Musil, Robert. Precision and Soul. Translated by Burton Pike and David S. Luft. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. In The Birth to Presence. Translated by Brian Holmes. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1 9 9 3 -
----------- . Being Singular Plural. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
Neruda, Pablo. Memoirs. New York: Penguin, 1978.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely M editations, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983.
Norris, Andrew (ed). Politics, M etaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio 
A gam bens Homo Sacer. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005.
293
Nyers, Peter. Rethinking Refugees. Beyond States o f Emergency. New York: 
Routledge, 2006.
Oliver, Kelly. Witnessing. Beyond Recognition. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001.
Passavant, Paul A. ’’The Contradictory State of Giorgio Agamben.” Political Theory 
35 (2007): 147-174.
Paz, Octavio. The Bow and the Lyre. Ruth L.C. Simms (trans.). Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1956.
Perrera, Suvendrini. “They Give Evidence’: Bodies, Borders and the Disappeared.”
Paper presented at the UQ Australian Studies conference, ‘The Body Politic”
in Brisbane, Australia, 24-26 November, 2004.
Putnam, Hilary. Ethics Without Ontology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2005.
Raj, Kartik V. “Refugee, Border-Camp,” Working paper prepared for Minnesota 
International Relations Colloquium “On-the-Move,” 4 April, 2005.
Rajaram, Prem Kumar. “Theodor Adorno’s Aesthetic Understanding: An Ethical 
Method for IR” In Alternatives 27 (2002): 351-372.
-------------  “The Spectacle of Detention: Theatre, Poetry and Imagery in the Contest
over Identity, Security and Respon8sibility in Contemporary Australia.” 
Working Paper Series no.7 (2003): Asia Research Institute.
Rajaram, Prem Kumar and Carl Grundy-Warr. “The Irregular Migrant as Homo 
Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia and Thailand.” 
International M igration  42, no. 1 (2004): 33-63.
Ross, Fiona. Bearing Witness: Women and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee in South Africa. London: Pluto, 2003.
Roundtable Discussion on Derrida’s legacy. Millennium: Journal o f International
Studies 34, no. 1 (2005) 237-258. (Panel Participants: Jenny Edkins, Richard 
Beardsworth, David Campbell, Michael Dillon, Christina Howells,
Christopher Norris, Michael J. Shapiro, Maja Zehfuss, Joseph Ansorge. April 
Biccum. Sarah Dillon, Indira Hasimbegovic, Priscilla Netto, Laura Routley, 
Alison Scott-Baumann and Nich Vaughan-Williams).
Sallis, John (ed). Deconstruction and Philosophy. The Texts o f Jacques Derrida.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking o f the World. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 8 5 - 
Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11” in University o f Pennsylvania Journal o f Constitutional
294
Law  6 (2 0 0 4 ) : 1001-1080.
Scheub, H. Story. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.
Schorr, Daniel. “Officials Change Tune on Tortue.” NPR story: June 19th, 2008.
h ttp :/ /w w w ,n p r .o rg /te m p la te s /s to rv /s to rv ,p h p ? s tQ rv Id = Q i703.E;Q8 [19 J u n e  
2 0 0 8 ] .
Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept o f Sovereignty.
Translated by George Schwab. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006.
Schwab, George. The Challenge o f the Exception. An Introduction to the Political 
Ideas o f Carl Schmitt.1921-1036. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1970.
Scott, Charles E. The Time o f  M emory. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1999.
Scully, James. Line Break. Poetry as Social Practice. Seattle: Bay Press, 1988. 
Shacknove, Andrew E. ‘Who is a Refugee?’ Ethics 95, no. 2 (1985): 274-284.
Sider, Gerald and Gavin Smith (eds). Between H istory and Histories: The
Production o f  Silences and Commemorations. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997.
Singer, Peter and Renata. “The Ethics of Refugee Policy.” In Open Borders? Closed 
Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues,” 113-130. Edited by Mark Gibney. 
New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.
Soguk, Nevzat. States and Strangers. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999.
Spiegel, Gabrielle M. (ed.) Practicing History. N ew  Directions in H istorical Writing 
after the Linguistic Turn. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Steiner, George. “On Difficulty.” The Journal o f Aesthetics and A rt Criticism , 36, no. 
3 (1978): 263 -276 .
Sukkarieh, Omeima & Mia Zahra. 2002. “Silence that Speaks and Dreams that Cry.” 
Borderlands E-Journal. 1, no. 1 (2002) at: http: / 7www.borderlands.net.au/
Sylvester, Christine. “Development Poetics” In Alternatives 25, no. 3 (2000): 335- 
352 -
Szafraniec, Asja. Beckett, Derrida, and  the Event o f  Literature. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2007.
Szondi, Peter. Celan Studies. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Taylor, Charles. Sources o f the Self  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
Terdiman, Richard. Present Past: Modernity and the M em ory Crisis. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1993.
Tonkin, Elizabeth. N arrating our Pasts: The Social Construction o f  Oral History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
United N ations (UN). 44th Session. Executive Committee of the High
295
Commissioner’s Programme. Note on International Protection. 31 August
1993 (GA, a / a c . 96/799).
Van Evera, Stephen. Causes o f War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2001.
Valverde, Mariana. “As if Subjects Existed: Analysing Social Discourses.” Canadian 
R eview  o f Sociology and Anthropology 2 3, no. 2 (1991): 173-187.
Vaughan-Williams, Nick. “Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: the Politics of Singularity.”
International Politics 44 (2007): 107-124.
Vernant, Jacques. The Refugee in the Post-w ar W orld.” New Haven, Conn: Yale
University Press, 1953.
Vogler, Thomas. “Poetic Witness: Writing the Real.” In Witness and M emory. The
Discourse o f Trauma, 173-205. Edited by Anna Douglas and Thomas Vogler.
New York: Routledge, 2003.
Walker, R.B.J. “Conclusion. Sovereignties, Exceptions, Worlds.” In Sovereign Lives,
239-249. Edited by Jenny Edkins at al. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Wall, Thomas Carl. 2005. “Au Hasard.” In Politics, M etaphysics, and Death, 31-48.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
Walt, Stephen. The Origins o f Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990. 
Walzer, Michael. Spheres o f Justice. New York: Basic Books, 1983.
Warner, Daniel. “Searching for responsibility/Community in International
Relations.” In M oral Spaces. Rethinking Ethics and W orld Politics, 1-28.
Edited by David Campbell and Michael Shapiro. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1999.
Weber, Cynthia and Thomas Biersteker (eds). State Sovereignty as Social Construct.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Wolfreys, Julian (ed). The Derrida Reader. Writing Performances. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998.
Wyschogrod, Edith. An Ethics o f Remembering. Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1998.
Young, James. The Texture o f M emory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
Zetter, Roger. “Refugees and Refugee Studies -  A Label and an Agenda.” Journal o f  
Refugee Studies 1, no. 1 (1988): 106.
------------, “Labeling Refugees: Forming and transforming a Bureaucratic Identity.”
Journal o f Refugee Studies 4, no. 1 (1991)- 39_62.
Ziarek, Krzysztof. The H istoricity of Experience: M odernity, the Avant-Garde, and  
the Event. Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
Zolberg, Aristide, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo (eds). Escape from  Violence: 
Conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world. Oxford: Oxford , 
University7 Press, 1989.
296
